IN RE: A.B. and An.B. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After the trial court found the two children of A.P. (“Mother”) to be children in need of services (“CHINS”), the trial court found Mother in contempt. The trial court ordered Mother to serve sixty days in jail, which Mother served during the pendency of this appeal. Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding her in contempt. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding Mother in contempt because Mother violated the dispositional order. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issues

[2] Mother raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding Mother in contempt. The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) raises another issue, which we restate as whether Mother's appeal is moot based on her completion of the sixty-day jail sanction during the pendency of this appeal.

Facts

[3] Mother has two daughters, Ab.B. born in 2014, and An.B. born in 2022 (“Daughters”). On June 27, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging that Daughters were CHINS based on neglect by Mother. The petition alleged that, when Mother took Ab.B. to the dentist, Mother appeared to be under the influence. Mother was “jerking around, grabbing her skin and acting out of her mind.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 16. Mother left Ab.B. at the dentist's office, and Mother was “reported to have babies in her car with her.” Id. Law enforcement officers were called, and when Mother returned, they administered five field sobriety tests—three of which Mother failed.

[4] The officers escorted Mother home, where Mother continued to act strangely. On a nightstand in Ab.B.’s bedroom, the officers found “a liquor bottle, vape, blunt and what looked to be residue.” Id. Mother admitted to using marijuana, produced a medical marijuana card from Florida, and refused to submit to a drug screen. Daughters’ father was incarcerated at the time. DCS placed Daughters in the care of their maternal grandmother.

[5] Following court-ordered mediation, on August 19, 2024, Mother and DCS reached a mediated agreement whereby Mother admitted that Daughters were CHINS and agreed to: (1) stay in contact with her case manager; (2) complete a substance use disorder assessment and follow all recommendations from that assessment; (3) participate in random drug screens; (4) complete a clinical interview and assessment and follow all recommendations of that assessment; and (5) consistently engage in parenting time with Daughters. The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on August 26, 2024, and adjudicated Daughters to be CHINS.

[6] Mother began in-person and virtual visits with Daughters, but on September 15, 2024, DCS filed a motion to suspend Mother's visits “due to misbehavior from Mother.” Id. at 30. During a visit on September 9, 2024, “Mother got upset because the visit was in a small room and the children were acting up,” and “Mother began using profanity in front of the children.” Id. A new visit supervisor was assigned to Mother because the previous one cancelled the referral due to Mother's “manipulative behaviors[.]” Id. Mother “evad[ed] accountability[,]” was “highly confrontational[,] and work[ed] to triangulate her treatment team against each other.” Id. Mother also tested positive on her drug screens and refused to participate in an outpatient treatment program. On September 16, 2024, the trial court issued an order suspending Mother's in person and virtual visits.

[7] Following a dispositional hearing, on October 10, 2024, the trial court issued an order incorporating the mediated agreement into a dispositional order. Two weeks later, on October 24, 2024, DCS filed a motion for rule to show cause based on Mother's failure to comply with the mediated agreement and dispositional order. The motion alleged that Mother: (1) failed to complete a substance abuse assessment; (2) tested positive for combinations of methamphetamine, amphetamine, and/or THC ¹ eight times in July 2024, nine times in August 2024, and three times in September 2024; (3) Mother had not called in for further drug screening since September 16, 2024; (4) Mother failed to participate in inpatient or outpatient treatment services, although referrals were made for both; and (5) Mother failed to comply with home-based casework.

[8] The trial court held a hearing on DCS's motion for rule to show cause on December 18, 2024. DCS permanency case manager David Talarico testified regarding Mother's failed drug screens, refusal to continue drug screening, and refusal to engage in substance abuse treatment and home-based casework. He further testified that Mother was referred to Volunteers of America for inpatient treatment, but she left after one day. Mother repeatedly interrupted Talarico's testimony. Mother then testified, and she admitted to using marijuana and methamphetamine. She also admitted to leaving Volunteers of America and stated that she was unwilling to participate in inpatient treatment.

[9] The trial court found Mother in contempt and noted that Mother “had an opportunity to go to in-patient treatment and [ ] chose to leave after one day,” was still using methamphetamine, had positive drug screens, and had not submitted to drug screens “since September[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 26. As a sanction, the trial court ordered Mother to serve sixty days in the Madison County Jail. Mother now appeals the contempt finding, although she has already served her jail sanction during the pendency of this appeal.

Discussion and Decision

I. Mootness

[10] We first address DCS's argument that this appeal is moot because Mother has already served her sixty days in jail. “The long-standing rule in Indiana courts has been that a case is deemed moot when no effective relief can be rendered to the parties before the court.” T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Ctr., Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991)). When the case is moot, the appeal will ordinarily be dismissed. Lawrence, 579 N.E.2d at 37.

[11] Our courts, however, have identified several exceptions to the mootness doctrine, including the collateral consequences doctrine. Under the collateral consequences doctrine, we “review the merits of appeals where the order at issue, if invalid and left undisturbed, could contribute to a future adverse finding against the appellant.” C.P. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 219 N.E.3d 142, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (collecting cases). Because our review of the merits in such cases will eliminate the collateral consequences of an invalid order, “ ‘meaningful relief may still be had’ upon review.” J.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Ctr., Inc., 256 N.E.3d 1260, 1267 (Ind. 2025) (quoting C.P., 219 N.E.3d at 147).

[12] We conclude that this appeal is not moot because the contempt finding could have adverse consequences against Mother as the CHINS proceedings continue and in possible termination of parental rights proceedings that might develop in the future. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1290 (Ind. 2014) (holding that review of CHINS determination was not moot despite the fact that DCS had since returned the child to the mother's care because of the potential adverse consequences of the CHINS determination on the mother). Accordingly, we review the contempt finding on the merits.

II. Contempt

[13] Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding her in contempt. “ ‘Trial courts maintain considerable discretion in determining whether a party should be found in contempt of court, and these determinations are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.’ ” In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 478 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting In re Paternity of B.Y., 159 N.E.3d 575, 577 (Ind. 2020)). “Our court will reverse a finding of contempt only if there is no evidence or inferences drawn therefrom that support it.” Id. (quotation omitted).

[14] “Contempt of court generally involves disobedience of a court or court order that undermines the court's authority, justice, and dignity.” Id. (citing B.Y., 159 N.E.3d at 579). There are two kinds of contempt: direct contempt and indirect contempt. Id. (citing Reynolds v. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 832 (Ind. 2016)). Only indirect contempt is at issue here, and it “involves those acts committed outside the presence of the court which nevertheless tend to interrupt, obstruct, embarrass or prevent the due administration of justice,” typically through the disobedience, resistance, hindrance, or delay of a lawfully issued court order. Id. (citing Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d at 832); Ind. Code § 34-47-3-1,² -2.³

[15] A person alleged to be in indirect contempt is entitled to “an array of due process protections, including notice and the opportunity to be heard.” Stanke v. Swickard, 43 N.E.3d 245, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing In re Contempt of Wabash Valley Hosp., Inc., 827 N.E.2d 50, 62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)). Compliance with Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-5 ensures that these due process protections are met. Id.; accord Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d at 833. Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-5 provides:

(a) In all cases of indirect contempts, the person charged with indirect contempt is entitled:

(1) before answering the charge; or

(2) being punished for the contempt;

to be served with a rule of the court against which the contempt was alleged to have been committed.

(b) The rule to show cause must:

(1) clearly and distinctly set forth the facts that are alleged to constitute the contempt;

(2) specify the time and place of the facts with reasonable certainty, as to inform the defendant of the nature and circumstances of the charge against the defendant; and

(3) specify a time and place at which the defendant is required to show cause, in the court, why the defendant should not be attached and punished for such contempt.

(c) The court shall, on proper showing, extend the time provided under subsection (b)(3) to give the defendant a reasonable and just opportunity to be purged of the contempt.

(d) A rule provided for under subsection (b) may not issue until the facts alleged to constitute the contempt have been:

(1) brought to the knowledge of the court by an information; and

(2) duly verified by the oath of affirmation of some officers of the court or other responsible person.

[16] “[S]trict compliance with the statute may be excused,” however—and due process is still provided—if it is clear that the alleged contemnor “nevertheless had clear notice of the accusations against him or her.” Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d at 833 (citing In re Paternity of J.T.I., 875 N.E.2d 447, 451 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). “[D]ue process is only denied when neither a court order nor a motion for rule to show cause contain sufficient factual detail about the allegations of contempt.” Id. (citing Stanke, 43 N.E.3d at 249) (italics in original).

[17] Once the alleged contemnor has been given an opportunity to respond to the allegations in the rule to show cause, if the trial court determines that “the [alleged contemnor's] answer to the rule does not sufficiently deny, explain, or avoid the facts set forth in the rule, so as to show that no contempt has been committed, the court may proceed to attach and punish the [contemnor] for the contempt[.]” Ind. Code § 34-47-3-6.

[18] Here, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding her in contempt because the contempt finding was based on conduct that occurred before the trial court's dispositional order was entered. Mother is correct that she could only be found in contempt for failing to comply with the dispositional order. See Ind. Code § 34-47-3-1, -2.

[19] DCS's rule to show cause motion is problematic because it alleged conduct that occurred both before and after the dispositional order was entered. The motion alleged that Mother failed drug screens in June, July, August, and September—before the dispositional order was entered—so this conduct could not have been a basis for which to find Mother in contempt. But the motion also alleged that Mother failed to complete a substance abuse assessment, failed to participate in treatment services, was refusing to drug screen, and failed to comply with home-base casework. This conduct continued after the entry of the dispositional order, so Mother could properly be found in contempt for it. Thus, although the motion was overinclusive regarding Mother's conduct, Mother was given sufficient notice of the allegations for which she could be found in contempt.

[20] The trial court found that Mother refused to participate in inpatient treatment services, had been refusing to submit to drug screening since September 2024, and had tested positive for illegal drugs. As we have explained, Mother's positive drug screens could not form a basis to find her in contempt because the drug screens occurred prior to the dispositional order. Still, the trial court's findings that Mother was unwilling to engage in drug treatment or submit to drug screening—conduct that continued after the entry of the dispositional order—are supported by the evidence and are sufficient to affirm the trial court's contempt finding. The trial court, thus, did not abuse its discretion by finding Mother in contempt.

Conclusion

[21] Mother's appeal is not moot, so we address her challenge to the trial court's contempt finding on the merits. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding Mother in contempt because the contempt finding was supported by the evidence that Mother violated the dispositional order. Accordingly, we affirm.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   THC is the common abbreviation for tetrahydrocannabinol, which is the main active chemical in marijuana. Medina v. State, 188 N.E.3d 897, 900 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

2.   Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-1 provides:A person who is guilty of any willful disobedience of any process, or any order lawfully issued:(1) by any court of record, or by the proper officer of the court;(2) under the authority of law, or the direction of the court; and(3) after the process or order has been served upon the person;is guilty of an indirect contempt of the court that issued the process or order.

3.   Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-2 provides: A person who willfully resists, hinders, or delays the execution of any lawful process, or order of any court of record is guilty of an indirect contempt of court.

Tavitas, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Felix concur. Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.