RUCKER v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Ryan Rucker's conviction for child molesting, as a Class A felony,¹ and corresponding twenty-five-year sentence were vacated, the State refiled the charge against him. Rucker was then convicted following a jury trial, and the court sentenced him to forty years, with five years suspended. Rucker now appeals and contends that the court violated Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(10) when it imposed a more severe penalty than he originally received. We reverse and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the night of August 26 into August 27, 2011, Rucker molested an eight-year-old girl. The State charged Rucker with child molesting, as a Class A felony. On March 12, 2012, Rucker and the State entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which Rucker pleaded guilty as charged in exchange for a twenty-five-year, fully executed sentence. The court accepted Rucker's guilty plea, entered judgment of conviction, and sentenced him pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Rucker was also designated a sexually violent predator, which subjected him to lifetime parole.

[3] Rucker then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court denied his motion, and Rucker appealed. On appeal, Rucker alleged, in relevant part, that his counsel had “failed to advise him of the penal consequences of his guilty plea, namely that he would automatically be classified as a sexual violent predator[.]” Rucker v. State, No. 35A02-1610-PC-2461, 2018 WL 911960 at *2, n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2018) (mem.). But this Court held that Rucker had waived that claim for failing to raise it in his petition for post-conviction relief and affirmed on all grounds.

[4] Rucker then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. In that petition, Rucker alleged that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel when his counsel did “not inform[ ] him that he would be subject to lifetime mandatory parole as a sexually violent predator before his guilty plea.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 145. The court agreed that counsel's failure to advise Rucker of that consequence “constitute[d] deficient performance,” and it “conditionally granted” Rucker's petition. Id. at 167 (capitalization removed). But the court specified that the State “may retry” Rucker. Id. The trial court vacated Rucker's conviction the same day.

[5] The State refiled the charge against Rucker, and Rucker proceeded to a jury trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Rucker guilty, and the court entered judgment of conviction accordingly. Following a sentencing hearing, the court identified as aggravators Rucker's criminal history, violations of court orders, and that the victim was less than twelve years old. The court did not identify any mitigators. Accordingly, the court sentenced Rucker to forty years, with five years suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Rucker contends that the court erred when it sentenced him following the jury trial because his sentence violated Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(10).² That rule provides:

(a) If prosecution is initiated against a petitioner who has successfully sought relief under this rule and a conviction is subsequently obtained; or

(b) If a sentence has been set aside pursuant to this rule and the successful petitioner is to be resentenced, then the sentencing court shall not impose a more severe penalty than that originally imposed unless the court includes in the record of the sentencing hearing a statement of the court's reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes which includes reliance upon identifiable conduct on the part of the petitioner that occurred after the imposition of the original sentence, and the court shall give credit for time served.

Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(10).³

[7] We first note that the State contends that Rucker has waived this issue by failing to raise it to the trial court. While it is true that “a claim is not normally available for review on appeal unless first made at trial, [our Supreme Court] and [this Court] review many claims of sentencing error ․ without insisting that the claim first be presented to the trial judge.” Kincaid v. State, 837 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind. 2005). And, here, Rucker could not have known that the trial court was going to impose a greater sentence than he originally received until the court actually imposed the sentence. As such, we decline to find that he waived his argument.

[8] Still, the State contends that Rucker invited any error when he argued for a sentence that was greater than the sentence he previously received. “The invited-error doctrine generally precludes a party from obtaining appellate relief for his own errors, even if those errors were fundamental.” Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874-75 (Ind. 2022). Here, Rucker asked the court to impose a thirty-year sentence, with five years suspended, for a total executed sentence of twenty-five years. That is the same executed sentence he received pursuant to his guilty plea and ten years less than the court imposed following the jury trial. In other words, Rucker did not ask the court to impose a harsher executed sentence than he originally received, and he did not invite any error in the court's sentencing statement. We therefore turn to the merits of Rucker's assertions.

[9] On appeal, Rucker contends that the trial court erred under Post-Conviction Rule 1(10) when it imposed a harsher sentence than he originally received because the court did not rely on identifiable conduct that occurred after he was originally sentenced. We agree. As outlined above, the sentencing court shall not impose a more severe penalty than that originally imposed “unless the court includes in the record of the sentencing hearing a statement of the court's reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes which includes reliance upon identifiable conduct on the part of the petitioner that occurred after the imposition of the original sentence.” P-C.R. (1)(10)(b).

[10] Here, when the trial court sentenced Rucker to forty years, it relied on three aggravators: his criminal history, his violations of court orders, and that the victim was less than twelve, all of which existed prior to his original sentencing date. Indeed, there is nothing in Rucker's Presentence Investigation Report that indicates that he had any new criminal charges or convictions or that he violated any court orders after the date he was originally sentenced. See Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 98-106. And while the State presented evidence that Rucker has “continued to lie,” that he was investigated for “a similar circumstance” in another county, and that he has exhibited “grooming behaviors” toward his fiancée's young child, the trial court did not mention any of those allegations in its sentencing order. Tr. Vol. 6 at 142.

[11] Because the court did not include a statement of its reasons for selecting a harsher sentence that “include[d] reliance upon identifiable conduct” on Rucker's part that “occurred after the imposition of the original sentence,” the court erred when it sentenced Rucker. P-C.R. 1(10). We therefore reverse Rucker's sentence and remand for the court to hold a new sentencing hearing and to sentence Rucker subject to the limits and requirements imposed by Post Conviction Rule 1(10).

Conclusion

[12] The trial court erred when it sentenced Rucker to a more severe penalty without including in the record a statement of the court's reasons for doing so that includes reliance on identifiable conduct on Rucker's part that occurred after his original sentence was imposed. We therefore reverse Rucker's sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

[13] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2011).

2.   The State notes that “no Indiana appellate court has ever applied Post-Conviction Rule 1(10) to a petitioner who was resentenced after obtaining federal habeas relief.” Appellee's Br. at 11. The State is correct that no appellate court has applied the rule in this exact scenario. However, our appellate courts have not limited the application of Post-Conviction Rule 1(10) to petitioners who were resentenced after obtaining post-conviction relief. Rather, our appellate courts have applied the rule in other situations. Indeed, in Hicks v. State, our Supreme Court applied the rule to a resentencing following a direct appeal. 729 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2000). And, in Wilson v. State, our Supreme Court applied the rule in the context of a sentence following a motion to correct erroneous sentence. 5 N.E.3d 759, 764 (Ind. 2014). Thus, it is apparent that Post-Conviction Rule 1(10) applies beyond the scope of post-conviction proceedings, and the State has provided no reason why it should not apply here.

3.   The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) do not apply when a conviction based on a plea agreement is set aside, the State files an offer to abide by the terms of the original agreement, and the defendant fails to accept the terms of the original agreement. P-C.R. 1(10)(c). That exception does not apply here.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.