WOODS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Derrick M. Woods appeals his convictions for Level 5 felony domestic battery and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Woods raises three issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted Woods's prior convictions for domestic battery into evidence during the first phase of his jury trial.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it declined one of Woods's proffered jury instructions.

3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Woods's conviction for Level 5 felony domestic battery.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Woods and his wife, Reta, have two children together, and they all live in an apartment in Elkhart with Reta's mother. Around 2012, after Woods and Reta had their first child together, things between them became “more difficult,” and Woods spent more time “out of the house.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 34. Reta frequently attempted to communicate with Woods about co-parenting issues, and, on four occasions, those attempts at communication resulted in Woods battering Reta. Woods pleaded guilty to criminal charges stemming from those prior offenses.

[4] In the evening hours of March 2, 2024, Woods left the family residence to “go cut hair” for money. Id. at 39. He was gone approximately four hours and returned to the residence around 11:30 p.m. When he returned, Reta noted that he was “upset” and appeared intoxicated. Id. at 40. Reta attempted to talk to him, but Woods responded by getting “face to face” with her, “being rude,” and screaming loud enough for the neighbors to hear. Id. at 42.

[5] Reta was “nervous” and called the police in the hope of having officers “escort [Woods]” out of the house so she and Woods could “sleep whatever off.” Id. at 43-44. On the phone with 9-1-1, Reta stated that Woods was spitting on her. And when their daughter came into the main room to check on them, Reta told her to call 9-1-1 too. In the background of the daughter's 9-1-1 call, Reta can be heard yelling, “get off of me” and “you're hurting me.” State's Ex. 101 (call 2) at 2:45 to 2:53.

[6] Elkhart Police Department Officer Ethan Pasternak was the first officer to arrive at the residence, with Officer Adam Jackson arriving shortly afterward. Officer Pasternak knocked on the door. Reta answered, and Officer Pasternak observed that she was “very distraught and upset.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 160. As Officer Pasternak was attempting to assess the scene, Woods, who had been near Reta, started walking away toward an unknown room. Officer Pasternak then entered the residence for his own safety to stop Woods. Reta followed and Officer Pasternak ended up between Reta and Woods.

[7] Woods continued to try to go to a back room, and Officer Jackson entered the residence to stop him while Officer Pasternak attempted to separate Reta and Woods. The officers then made the decision that they needed to detain Woods to prevent him from accessing the unknown areas of the apartment, and at that time Woods “began to actively fight” the officers. Id. at 165. After a notable struggle, the officers were able to detain and arrest Woods.

[8] The State charged Woods in relevant part with Level 5 felony domestic battery and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The trial court ordered Woods's ensuing jury trial to be bifurcated between the base-level domestic battery offense and the Level 5 felony enhancement, which was premised on Woods's prior domestic battery convictions against Reta. However, despite the bifurcation, the State sought to introduce Woods's prior convictions during the first phase of the trial and during Woods's case-in-chief.

[9] In particular, Woods called Reta as his first witness. In an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury, Reta stated that “[t]his [wa]s all a misunderstanding,” that Woods spitting on her was just “an accident,” and that the officers were to blame for the situation escalating. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 13, 22. The State moved to admit Woods's prior domestic battery convictions in part to prove the absence of a mistake in the current circumstances, and the trial court concluded that the evidence was admissible to do so over Woods's objection. Id. at 26.

[10] At the close of the evidence, Woods sought to have the jury instructed that he was lawfully permitted to use reasonable force to resist the unlawful use of force from a law enforcement officer. The trial court denied Woods's request on the ground that the evidence did not support that Woods had a reasonable belief that the officers were acting unlawfully. Following the first phase, the jury found Woods guilty of the base-level domestic battery charge as well as Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. And, following the second phase, the jury found him guilty of the domestic battery enhancement.

[11] The trial court entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced Woods accordingly. This appeal ensued.

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of Woods's prior convictions.

[12] On appeal, we first address Woods's argument that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the State to introduce his prior convictions into evidence during the first phase of his trial.¹ We review the trial court's decision to admit or to exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision either clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or misinterprets the law.” Nardi v. King, 253 N.E.3d 1098, 1103 (Ind. 2025) (quotation marks omitted).

[13] Woods objected to the introduction of his prior convictions under Indiana Evidence Rules 403 and 404(b). As our Supreme Court has explained:

Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) serves to safeguard the presumption of innocence in favor of criminal defendants. The Rule's mandate is clear: a court may not admit evidence of another crime, wrong, or act “to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(1). This restriction prevents the jury from indulging in the “forbidden inference” that a criminal defendant's prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.

But Rule 404(b) does not totally proscribe other-bad-acts evidence—only its use as character evidence. Indeed, the Rule plainly states that other-bad-acts evidence may be admissible for other purposes, and it provides an illustrative list—to show “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2). So when the State claims that other-bad-acts evidence is admissible for a proper purpose, the trial court is tasked with deciding whether that evidence is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act.

If the evidence passes that relevance test, it has to clear a second hurdle: Indiana Evidence Rule 403’s balancing test. In applying Rule 403, the trial court must conclude that the evidence's probative value is not “substantially outweighed” by the danger of unfair prejudice—otherwise, the evidence is not admissible.

Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019) (cleaned up).

[14] We initially address the State's argument that Woods's prior convictions were admissible under Rule 404(b)’s motive exception. In particular, the State notes that our Supreme Court has recognized that “[h]ostility is a paradigmatic motive for committing a crime.” Appellee's Br. at 14 (citing Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind. 1997) (quotation marks omitted)). But Hicks involved a motive for murder. 690 N.E.2d at 222-23. Likewise for the cases cited in Hicks, see id. (collecting cases), and for one of our Court's precedents also cited by the State here, see Iqbal v. State, 805 N.E.2d 401, 407-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). And the other two authorities cited by the State in its brief discuss a defendant's prior criminal history as being relevant in the context of a claim of self-defense. See Davis v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1203, 1211-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied; Embry v. State, 923 N.E.2d 1, 9-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

[15] Woods was not charged with murder of the victim of a prior battery, and he did not claim self-defense against Reta. And the State cites no authority for what the State claims here: that evidence of prior convictions for domestic battery is admissible to prove a motive for another act of domestic battery. We therefore find the State's motive argument unpersuasive.

[16] However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Woods's prior convictions during the first phase of his trial because the evidence was admitted to challenge Reta's testimony that Woods spitting on her, the apparent basis for her 9-1-1 call, was an accident. The fact that Woods had a history of aggressive behavior toward Reta was thus admissible under Rule 404(b)’s nonpropensity purposes of showing that him spitting on her was the absence of a mistake or was the lack of an accident.

[17] Nor did the court abuse its discretion in weighing the probative value of that evidence against its prejudicial value. While the evidence was prejudicial, its probative value to show the absence of a mistake or the lack of an accident during the victim's testimony was also significant. Further, the parties did not dwell on the facts underlying the prior convictions but simply noted that the convictions existed, and, indeed, Reta testified that Woods had taken accountability for his prior acts by pleading guilty to them. We therefore conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion when it admitted the evidence under Evidence Rules 403 and 404.

2. The trial court did not err when it instructed the jury.

[18] We next consider Woods's argument that the trial court erred when it denied Woods's request to have the jury instructed that he was lawfully permitted to use reasonable force to resist the unlawful use of force from a law enforcement officer. We initially note that Woods argues that the trial court committed fundamental error in denying his request. We do not agree on that framing; this issue was plainly argued to the court in a timely manner. We therefore review the trial court's instruction of the jury for an abuse of the court's discretion.

[19] As our Supreme Court has explained:

To determine if a trial court abused its discretion, we consider (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions that are given. Jury instructions are to be considered as a whole. A trial court acts within its discretion if it denies a request that would likely confuse the jury.

Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 267-68 (Ind. 2023) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[20] The trial court denied Woods's proffered instruction on the ground that there was no evidence in the record to support giving it. We agree. A person is justified in using force against a law enforcement officer only if the person reasonably believes that the officer is using unlawful force against him. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(i) (2023). Nothing in the record demonstrated an objectively reasonable basis for Woods to believe that the law enforcement officers were in any way acting unlawfully when he resisted them. We therefore affirm the trial court's decision to not give Woods's instruction to the jury.

3. The State presented sufficient evidence to show that Woods committed Level 5 felony domestic battery.

[21] Last, Woods argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for Level 5 felony domestic battery. For challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[22] Under Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1.3(a), a person who knowingly or intentionally touches a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor. However, the offense is a Level 5 felony where, as here, the person has a previous conviction for a battery offense against the same family or household member. I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(c)(4).

[23] Woods argues only that the State failed to show that he touched Reta in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. We cannot agree. In the background of their daughter's 9-1-1 call, Reta can be heard yelling, “get off of me” and “you're hurting me.” State's Ex. 101 (call 2) at 2:45 to 2:53. A reasonable inference from that evidence is that Woods was touching her at that time in a rude, angry, or insolent manner, and Woods's arguments to the contrary on appeal simply seek to have our Court reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

Conclusion

[24] For all of these reasons, we affirm Woods's convictions.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We disagree with the State that Woods did not properly preserve this issue for our review.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.