RAND v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Velma Rand was convicted following a jury trial of Level 3 felony aggravated battery,¹ Level 6 felony residential entry,² and Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief.³ Rand appeals her convictions, raising three issues: (1) Did the trial court commit fundamental error in admitting evidence that Rand had participated in community service?; (2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting the victim's deposition?; and (3) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence as irrelevant? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Willie Scott met Rand in 2010. They dated for the next ten years and lived together for some of that time. At some point, Scott got his own apartment and then Rand moved to Wisconsin, but they continued dating. In May 2020, Scott moved to a new apartment. Rand helped him move. Scott's was the only name on the lease and he did not give Rand a key.

[3] On May 13, 2020, Rand was at Scott's apartment. Scott went outside to smoke and when he returned to the apartment, Rand was looking at his phone. The two argued and then Scott fell asleep. When Scott woke up, Rand was gone and he found bleach had been poured on the clothes in his closet and drawers. Scott spoke to Rand a few days later and Rand said something about “payback.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 164.

[4] In the early morning hours of May 19, Scott heard a knock on the window. Rand was outside and wanted to come in. Scott told her no, but Rand said she had two of her grandchildren with her, so Scott let them in. Scott said Rand's grandson B.J. and granddaughter J.H. were with her. Rand said she wanted to see the damage she had caused and told Scott she would pay him back. Scott thought she was sincere, but then Rand started arguing with Scott about another woman. Scott asked Rand to leave and walked her and her grandchildren toward the back door of the apartment building. Rand hit Scott in the back of the head with a “little” baseball bat. Id. at 175. Then she hit him at least twenty more times, including in the knee, on both of his arms, his back, and down his leg. After Rand stopped hitting him and left, Scott laid on the ground for about five minutes to “get [his] composure” and then called the police. Id. at 178. Police took pictures of Scott's injuries, and an ambulance transported him to the hospital. Among other injuries, Scott had a broken kneecap and required crutches and a knee brace for a few months.

[5] Scott was afraid to go home because Rand “could do something to [him] while ․ [he's] on crutches” so he went to stay with relatives. Id. at 182. In early June, Scott returned to his apartment briefly. When Scott had last left his apartment, the windows were shut and both locks on his door were locked, including a deadbolt that could only be locked and unlocked with a key. When Scott got to his apartment, a window was open, and the deadbolt was unlocked. Inside, his bed had been “cut ․ up,” milk had been poured on it, and a picture of his deceased son and other personal effects were missing. Id. at 189.

[6] The State charged Rand with criminal mischief for the May 13 incident; aggravated battery, domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury, domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon, and domestic battery for the May 19 incident; and residential entry and criminal mischief for the June incident.

[7] At Rand's jury trial, Scott testified about meeting Rand:

Q: When did that start?

A: ․ I was working at the Salvation Army and I met her through -- she was doing community service at the Salvation Army and I was a janitor there and that's how we met.

Q: Do you remember what year that was?

A: 2010.

Id. at 161.⁴ Rand did not object or move to strike Scott's testimony.

[8] Both parties questioned Scott about the May 13 bleach incident and Rand's counsel attempted to impeach Scott using his pretrial deposition testimony about it. On direct and cross-examination, Scott testified Rand admitted to pouring bleach on his clothes and said she would pay him back for the damage. Rand then questioned Scott about specific passages of his pretrial deposition, ultimately asking, “So given multiple opportunities to tell the attorneys that she admitted to bleaching your stuff, you repeatedly answered no, correct?” Tr. Vol. 2 at 221. The State objected and Rand withdrew the question. Even so, the State indicated it would “be admitting this [deposition]. You were trying to say he's inconsistent and he's been consistent throughout.” Id. at 223. The trial court took admission of the deposition under advisement until a later time. On redirect, the State also questioned Scott about specific passages from his deposition. Later, the trial court returned to the topic of the deposition. The State formally moved to admit Scott's full deposition, arguing, “Yesterday defense had spoken with [Scott] on cross and was incorrectly mentioning what was said in the deposition and only quoting portions of it. [I]t's only fair for the jury to see the whole statement[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 39. Rand responded that the State had already cleared up any confusion through its own questioning of Scott. The trial court found the cross-examination was confusing and the State should “be allowed to admit the entire statement in order to allow the jury to have a fuller picture of what occurred.” Id. at 40–41. A redacted version of Scott's deposition was read into the record.

[9] B.J. testified as a State's witness and said he and J.H. were with Rand on May 19 and described Rand hitting Scott with a baseball bat. On cross-examination, Rand asked B.J. if his parents “are going to court about things right now?” Id. at 17. The State objected to the relevancy of the question. Rand explained she wanted “to present argument that part of the reason why [B.J.] would be testifying the way that he is today is because of interference by [his] parents involving the custody dispute.” Id. at 18. The trial court sustained the objection. When B.J.’s mother (Rand's daughter) testified, Rand asked her whether she previously had custody of B.J. and if there were court proceedings going on. The State objected to both questions. Rand said she was trying to show a “motivation for dishonesty.” Id. at 103. The trial court sustained the objections. In Rand's case-in-chief, J.H. and Rand both testified they traveled together from Wisconsin to Indiana on May 19 and B.J. was not with them.

[10] The jury found Rand not guilty of criminal mischief for the June incident but guilty of all other charges. The trial court entered judgment of conviction for Level 3 felony aggravated battery (May 19), Level 6 felony residential entry (June 3), and Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief (May 13), and sentenced Rand to a total of twelve years at the Indiana Department of Correction.

The trial court did not commit fundamental error in allowing evidence that Rand participated in community service.

[11] Rand first claims inadmissible prior conviction evidence was twice presented to the jury, depriving her of a fair trial. She concedes she did not object to this allegedly inadmissible evidence but claims the trial court committed fundamental error in not sua sponte declaring a mistrial when Scott testified he met Rand when she was doing community service. See Appellant's Br. at 11.

[12] Failure to object to the admission of evidence at trial generally results in waiver and precludes appellate review unless the admission constitutes fundamental error. Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013). The fundamental error exception to waiver is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006). This “formidable standard ․ applies only where the error is so flagrant that the trial judge should have corrected the error on [their] own, without prompting by defense counsel.” Tate v. State, 161 N.E.3d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2021). The appellant “faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to [their] rights as to ‘make a fair trial impossible.’ ” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)). “[F]undamental error in the evidentiary decisions of our trial courts is especially rare.” Merritt v. State, 99 N.E.3d 706, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

[13] Rand has failed to meet her heavy burden of showing admission of Scott's testimony about the circumstances in which he met Rand made a fair trial impossible. Rand asserts the “inference from such testimony to the jury is that [Rand] was performing community service in 2010 because of some form of criminal conviction” and alleges the error deprived her of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Appellant's Br. at 10.⁵ The fundamental error doctrine is not to be used to “elevate run-of-the-mill trial decisions or omissions to ‘a challenge to the integrity of the judicial process.’ ” Willoughby v. State, 244 N.E.3d 473, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010)), trans. denied. “An attorney's decision not to object to certain evidence or lines of questioning is often a tactical decision, and our trial courts can readily imagine any number of viable reasons why attorneys might not object.” Nix v. State, 158 N.E.3d 795, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. If the trial court “could recognize a viable reason why an effective attorney might not object, the error is not blatant enough to constitute fundamental error.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018) (quotation omitted). Moreover, evidentiary decisions “where multiple viable paths forward exist ․ do not result in Fifth Amendment process issues.” Willoughby, 244 N.E.3d at 477.

[14] A trial court has no affirmative duty to consider sua sponte the admissibility of each piece of evidence offered by the State and interject on the defendant's behalf, except to avoid an obvious and blatant violation of due process. See Bolcerek v. State, 255 N.E.3d 1206, 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (noting the fundamental error doctrine “does not oblige our trial courts to guess the mind of counsel” who may have “tactical reasons ․ to not object to the admission of evidence”). Scott's passing reference to community service at trial did not amount to evidence of a prior conviction on its face and was not an “obvious and blatant violation of due process” requiring the trial court's intervention. Counsel may have chosen not to object so as not to draw attention to Scott's statement. And by the time Scott's deposition was read into evidence, the State had properly impeached Rand during her testimony with evidence of four prior convictions beginning in 2014. Even if the jury inferred from Scott's statements that Rand had an additional conviction, the probable impact of this testimony was minor, at best, and did not make a fair trial impossible.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Scott's deposition.

[15] Rand next argues the trial court erred when it admitted Scott's deposition into evidence. We review a trial court's decision on the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. McCoy v. State, 193 N.E.3d 387, 390 (Ind. 2022). Reversal is warranted “only if the trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. We will not reverse the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence “if that decision is sustainable on any ground.” Crawford v. State, 770 N.E.2d 775, 780 (Ind. 2002).

[16] In moving to admit Scott's deposition, the State referenced Scott's “consisten[cy] throughout” and also stated, “[I]t's only fair for the jury to see the whole statement[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 223; Tr. Vol. 3 at 39. In admitting the deposition, the trial court said, “[W]hen a witness’ credibility is attacked under the doctrine of completeness the State would be allowed to admit the entire statement in order to allow the jury to have a fuller picture of what occurred.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 40–41. In other words, whether the basis for admitting the deposition was the doctrine of completeness or Indiana Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B) as a prior consistent statement is not entirely clear.

[17] Under the doctrine of completeness, when one party seeks to admit a portion of a document or recorded statement into evidence, the opposing party can place the remainder of the statement into evidence. Evans v. State, 643 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ind. 1994); see also Ind. Evidence Rule 106. This prevents the jury from being misled by statements taken out of context. Evans, 643 N.E.2d at 881.⁶ Rule 801(d)(1)(B) allows a prior consistent statement to be admitted as substantive evidence if the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge of fabrication or improper influence or motive and was made before the alleged improper motive arose. Id. at 882–83.

[18] Rand analyzes her claim under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and concludes the State rehabilitated Scott's credibility on re-direct and “[a]dmitting the entire deposition of the complaining witness into evidence in order to address a prior consistent statement matter which had already been resolved was an abuse of discretion by the trial court.” Appellant's Br. at 12.⁷ Even assuming her analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is correct, the statement may still be admitted under the doctrine of completeness. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and the doctrine of completeness may overlap in certain circumstances, but they are “distinct evidentiary categories.” Evans, 643 N.E.2d at 882.

The completeness doctrine may apply without any implication that a witness has recently fabricated his or her story or has an improper motive. Its purpose is to provide context for otherwise isolated comments when fairness requires it. Rule 801(d)(1)(B), on the other hand, may be triggered with or without the introduction of a prior statement. It is triggered by a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive[.]

Id.

[19] Here, it appears there was some uncertainty about which incident between Rand and Scott was being discussed in the deposition passages Rand quoted during Scott's cross-examination. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 222 (State objecting because the deposition testimony Rand was referring to “is talking about the 29th,” but Scott has “always said that he talked to [Rand] after the first incident. Never after the 29th.”).⁸ The trial court found Rand's cross-examination of Scott was confusing and the State's attempts to clarify the timeline were not wholly successful. Accordingly, the trial court admitted the redacted deposition because “fairness dictates” the jury have “a full, complete look at what his actual statement was[.]” Tr. Vol. 4 at 41. The purpose of the doctrine of completeness “is to provide context for otherwise isolated comments when fairness requires it.” Hart v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1283, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Sanders v. State, 840 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Ind. 2006)). “[T]he jury must be permitted to determine for itself the extent of the inconsistencies in context.” Evans, 643 N.E.2d at 882. Because the parties’ questioning interjected confusion about Scott's prior statements, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Scott's deposition under the doctrine of completeness.

The trial court did not err in excluding irrelevant evidence.

[20] Finally, Rand contends the trial court restricted her right to present her defense that B.J. was biased against her by “twice sustaining the [State's] objections to questions designed to expose B.J.’s motive to lie.” Appellant's Br. at 14.⁹ On cross-examination of B.J., Rand established B.J. used to live with Rand but now lives with his dad. Rand then asked B.J. “if [his] mom and dad are going to court about things right now?” Tr. Vol. 3 at 17. The State objected to relevance and the trial court sustained the objection. Rand explained, “[W]e are intending to present argument that part of the reason why [B.J.] would be testifying the way that he is today is because of interference by the parents involving the custody dispute․ [T]hat's the last question I intended to ask on that subject.” Id. at 18. The explanation did not change the trial court's ruling. Rand then called B.J.’s mother to testify and established B.J. currently lives with his father, not her. Rand then started to ask, “And there are court proceedings –.” Id. at 102. The State again objected to relevance, the court asked Rand if the question was “on the previous grounds,” and when Rand said it was, the trial court sustained the objection. Id.

[21] As stated above, we review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. McCoy, 193 N.E.3d at 390. “[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905, 924 (Ind. 2003) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)). Although a defendant's right to present a defense “is of the utmost importance, it is not absolute.” Jacobs v. State, 22 N.E.3d 1286, 1288 (Ind. 2015) (quotation omitted). “A defendant must comply with the rules of evidence in presenting her case ‘to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.’ ” Crossland v. State, 256 N.E.3d 517, 528 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). “[I]t is constitutional ‘to exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of fairness and reliability.’ ” Id. (quoting Crane, 476 U.S. at 690)).

[22] One of the rules a defendant must abide by concerns relevancy. Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence [and] the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Evid. R. 401. The question of whether there was a custody dispute between B.J.’s parents did not appear calculated to elicit testimony relevant to Rand's guilt of the charges against her. Although Rand now argues her “defense” was that B.J. was biased against her “because he viewed her as being responsible for him being placed with his father and being removed from his mother,” she did not offer that explanation to the trial court and did not make an offer of proof. Appellant's Br. at 14; see Evid. R. 103(a)(2) (stating a party may not claim error in a ruling to exclude evidence unless the error affects a substantial right of the party and the party “informs the court of its substance by an offer of proof”). The trial court was within its discretion to conclude this line of questioning was not relevant and did not violate Rand's rights, constitutional or otherwise.

Conclusion

[23] The trial court did not commit error in any of the challenged evidentiary rulings.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5(2) (2014).

2.   I.C. § 35-43-2-1.5 (2014).

3.   I.C. § 35-43-1-2(a)(1) (2018).

4.   The same information was shared when Scott's pretrial deposition was read into evidence later in the trial. See Tr. Vol. 3 at 52 (Scott stating he worked at the Salvation Army doing housekeeping and maintenance and supervising community service and he met Rand when she “was doing community service and we met on the job”).

5.   Rand also cites Article 1, section 12 of the Indiana Constitution—the “due course of law” provision. This provision “applies only in the civil context” and “provides none of the criminal protections” of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509, 514 (Ind. 2001) (quotation omitted).

6.   The remainder of the statement is still subject to the normal rules of admissibility, such that any portions found to be immaterial, irrelevant, or prejudicial must be redacted. Id. Here, a redacted version of the deposition was prepared and read into the record and Rand does not make any claim of error on this ground.

7.   Rand cites generally to Reynolds v. State, 142 N.E.3d 928 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied, for this proposition. But Reynolds does not address this particular point—the panel held Rule 801(d)(1)(B) did not justify admission of a prior statement by the victim because the statement was made after the victim's alleged motive to fabricate arose and the doctrine of completeness did not apply because the defendant did not put a portion of the victim's statement into evidence before the State sought to introduce it in its entirety. Rehabilitation of the witness’ credibility was not a factor in the decision. Id. at 941.

8.   The exhibits were not transmitted to this Court on appeal. Although the deposition was read into the trial record, it is not separately paginated, and therefore we cannot easily find the passages of the deposition to which the parties referred throughout the trial.

9.   Rand cites to her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses; her right under Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution to meet witnesses face-to-face; and her right to attack B.J.’s credibility under Evidence Rule 616. Appellant's Br. at 13–14. Rand did not raise any of these grounds to the trial court.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.