C.H., Appellant-Respondent v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.H. was found to be a delinquent child for committing an act that would be criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor, if committed by an adult. C.H. appeals and claims: (1) the juvenile court failed to adequately advise him of his right to testify; and (2) insufficient evidence supports his adjudication. We disagree and affirm.

Issues

[2] C.H. presents two issues, which we restate as:

I.  Whether the juvenile court failed to adequately advise C.H. of his right to testify.

II. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support C.H.’s delinquency adjudication.

Facts

[3] On the night of June 20, 2024, then sixteen-year-old C.H. was visiting his girlfriend, who lived on Lot 118 of a mobile home park in Bloomington. C.H. lived with his guardian and grandmother, T.H. (“Grandmother”), on Lot 71 of the same mobile home park. At approximately 12:17 a.m., Grandmother texted C.H. and told him to come home. Soon thereafter, C.H. walked home. On his way home, C.H. picked up a rock and threw it at the home located on Lot 87 and broke a window. The home on Lot 87 was owned by Patrick Allgood, who was out of state at the time. When Allgood returned home two days later, he noticed that his window was broken. A surveillance camera captured video of C.H. throwing the rock at Allgood's home.

[4] On September 16, 2024, the State filed a petition alleging that C.H. was a delinquent child for committing an act that would be criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor, if committed by an adult. An initial hearing was held on October 2, 2024, at which C.H., Grandmother, and his counsel were present. The order on the initial hearing confirmed that the juvenile court advised C.H. and his guardian of his rights under Indiana Code Sections 31-37-12-5 and 31-37-12-6. A fact-finding hearing was held on November 28, 2024, after which the juvenile court entered an order finding that C.H. had committed the act alleged. C.H. did not testify at the hearing. At a dispositional hearing held on December 11, 2024, the juvenile court placed C.H. on supervised probation. C.H. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Right to Testify

[5] C.H. claims that the juvenile court failed to advise him of his right to testify or adequately assure that C.H. waived his right to testify on his own behalf. C.H. notes that, pursuant to statute, “[t]he juvenile court shall inform the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, if the person is present” of certain rights, including the right to “[r]efrain from testifying against himself or herself.” Ind. Code § 31-37-12-5. C.H. claims that “at no point did the [juvenile court] acknowledge C.H.’s decision to waive his right to testify on his own behalf, nor did [the court] confirm that [C.H.] waived that right knowingly, intentionally, and after being advised on the matter.” Appellant's Br. p. 10.

[6] We first note that C.H. made no objection below to the juvenile court's alleged failure to advise C.H. of his rights or to assure that C.H. waived his right to testify. “ ‘[A] trial court cannot be found to have erred as to an issue or argument that it never had an opportunity to consider.’ ” Partee v. State, 184 N.E.3d 1225, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Shorter v. State, 144 N.E.3d 829, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020)), trans. denied. “Thus, as a general rule, ‘a party may not present an argument or issue on appeal unless the party raised that argument or issue before the trial court. In such circumstances the argument is waived.’ ” Id. (quoting Shorter, 144 N.E.3d at 841); see also G.H. v. State, 987 N.E.2d 1164, 1169 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that an argument presented for the first time on appeal is generally waived), trans. denied.

[7] A defendant who failed to object to error below will often seek to avoid appellate waiver of the issue by claiming fundamental error. Woodward v. State, 187 N.E.3d 311, 317 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). C.H., however, does not argue fundamental error on appeal. Any claim of fundamental error is, accordingly, also waived. See Carter v. State, 105 N.E.3d 1121, 1132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that defendant waived any argument of fundamental error by declining to present such an argument despite having the opportunity to do so).

[8] Waiver notwithstanding, we note that the juvenile court's order on the initial hearing specifically stated that C.H. and his “parent(s), guardian, or custodian has been informed of the matters required by IC 31-37-12-5[¹ ] & 31-37-12-6.[² ]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 47. C.H. was represented by counsel at the initial hearing, and his guardian, Grandmother, was also present. The record, therefore, indicates that C.H. was properly informed of his various rights as required by statute.

[9] Moreover, the statute requires that the juvenile defendant be advised of his or her right not to testify; it does not require the juvenile court to advise the juvenile of the right to testify. To be sure, the right to testify on one's own behalf is “ ‘a right implicit in the Constitution.’ ” Vanzandt v. State, 730 N.E.2d 721, 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993)). But “a trial court judge has no affirmative duty to insure that a defendant represented by counsel knowingly and intelligently waived his right to testify at trial.” Id. (citing Correll v. State, 639 N.E.2d 677, 681-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). Instead, “[a] trial court is entitled to presume that a lawyer and his client have discussed the possibility of testifying.” Id. (citing Phillips v. State, 673 N.E.2d 1200, 1202 (Ind. 1996)). C.H. directs us to nothing in the record here that would rebut this presumption.

[10] C.H.’s citation to N.M. v. State, 791 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), is unavailing. In that case, the juvenile court did not sufficiently advise the juvenile defendant of her right to counsel or adequately ensure that the juvenile waived her right to counsel. Specifically, the juvenile court informed the juvenile defendant and her parents that she had a right to be represented by counsel, but it did not inform them that an attorney would be appointed at public expense if they could not afford one. Id. at 806. It was also unclear from the record whether the defendant and her parents had heard the video recording of the juvenile court's en masse advisement of rights. Id.

[11] In contrast, here, C.H. has presented nothing that would call into question the juvenile court's order on the initial hearing that specifically stated that C.H. and his guardian were informed of C.H.’s constitutional rights as required by statute.³ Accordingly, even if C.H. had not waived his claim regarding the juvenile court's advisement of rights, he would not prevail.⁴

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[12] C.H. also claims that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his delinquency adjudication. In juvenile delinquency proceedings, the State must prove every element of the delinquent act beyond a reasonable doubt. B.R. v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1173, 1176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing A.B. v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Ind. 2008)). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile delinquency adjudication, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. (citing B.T.E. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ind. 2018)). Instead, “ ‘[w]e consider only the evidence favorable to the [adjudication] and the reasonable inferences supporting it.’ ” Id. (quoting B.T.E., 108 N.E.3d at 326). If a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the delinquent act was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm. Id. (citing B.T.E., 108 N.E.3d at 326).

[13] To prove that C.H. committed criminal mischief, the State had to show that C.H. “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damage[d] or deface[d] property of another person without the other person's consent[.]” Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2(a). C.H. does not deny that the State presented evidence that someone threw a rock at Allgood's home and broke his window. C.H. instead claims that the evidence presented by the State is insufficient to prove that he was the person depicted in the video who threw the rock and broke the window in Allgood's home.

[14] C.H. notes that two witnesses—C.H's girlfriend and Grandmother—testified that, on the night in question, C.H. was wearing long shorts, a hooded sweatshirt, and athletic shoes. C.H. claims that, in contrast, the person depicted in the video was wearing long pants. The juvenile court, however, was under no obligation to credit the testimony of these two witnesses, and we cannot reassess the credibility of witnesses on appeal.

[15] C.H. also takes issue with Allgood's testimony identifying C.H. as the person in the video. Allgood testified that he recognized C.H. because he had interacted with C.H. “a few years back.” Tr. Vol. II p. 8. C.H. attacks Allgood's testimony by claiming that Allgood's identification was based on the manner in which C.H. ran in the video. C.H. argues that it is unreasonable to believe that, given Allgood's limited interactions with C.H., Allgood could recognize C.H. by his demeanor in the video.⁵ This is merely another request that we reweigh evidence and witness credibility, which we may not do.⁶

[16] As noted by the State, circumstantial evidence also supports the juvenile court's finding. Grandmother texted C.H. at approximately 12:17 a.m. and told him to return home. C.H. left his girlfriend's home at that time and started to walk home. Allgood's home was on the path that C.H. always took to walk home from his girlfriend's house. At this same time, surveillance video depicts a person matching C.H.’s general appearance pick up a rock and throw it at Allgood's home seconds after 12:17 a.m. At exactly the same time, glass can be heard breaking on another surveillance video. A few seconds later, C.H. appeared at his home, where Grandmother was waiting for him.

[17] Considering only the evidence favorable to the juvenile court's judgment, and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this evidence, we conclude that the State presented evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that C.H. threw a rock at Allgood's home and broke a window. This act would be criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor, had it been committed by an adult. Thus, sufficient evidence supports C.H.’s delinquency adjudication.⁷

Conclusion

[18] C.H. waived his argument regarding the juvenile court's advisement of rights. Waiver notwithstanding, the juvenile court properly advised C.H. of his constitutional rights. The State presented sufficient evidence to prove that C.H. was the person depicted in the surveillance video throwing a rock and breaking a window at Allgood's home. The evidence is, therefore, sufficient to support the juvenile court's finding that C.H. committed an act that would be criminal mischief if committed by an adult. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court's judgment.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This statute provides:The juvenile court shall inform the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, if the person is present, of the following:(1) The nature of the allegations against the child.(2) The child's right to the following:(A) Be represented by counsel.(B) Have a speedy trial.(C) Confront witnesses against the child.(D) Cross-examine witnesses against the child.(E) Obtain witnesses or tangible evidence by compulsory process.(F) Introduce evidence on the child's own behalf.(G) Refrain from testifying against himself or herself.(H) Have the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the delinquent act charged.(3) The possibility of waiver to a court having criminal jurisdiction.(4) The dispositional alternatives available to the juvenile court if the child is adjudicated a delinquent child.Ind. Code § 31-37-12-5.

2.   This statute provides:The juvenile court shall inform the parent or guardian of the estate of the following if a child is adjudicated a delinquent child:(1) The parent, guardian, or custodian of the child may be required to participate in a program of care, treatment, or rehabilitation for the child.(2) The parent or guardian may be held financially responsible for services provided for the child or the parent or guardian.(3) The parent, guardian, or custodian of the child may controvert:(A) an allegation made at the dispositional or other hearing concerning the participation of the parent, guardian, or custodian; or(B) an allegation concerning the financial responsibility of the parent, guardian, or custodian for services that would be provided.Ind. Code § 31-37-12-6.

3.   C.H.’s citation to Bridges v. State, 299 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. 1972), is similarly unavailing. In that case, the juvenile court wholly failed to advise the juvenile defendant of his right to court-appointed counsel, whereas the juvenile court here clearly advised C.H. of his right to court-appointed counsel and his right not to testify. See Vanzandt, 730 N.E.2d at 723.

4.   The present case is distinguishable from D.D.B. v. State, 691 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). In that case, the juvenile's guardian ad litem refused to permit the juvenile to testify when the juvenile's counsel called the juvenile as a witness to testify on his own behalf. Here, nothing in the record suggests that C.H. was prohibited from testifying.

5.   C.H. makes no argument that the video evidence indisputably conflicts with the juvenile court's finding. See Quinn v. State, 126 N.E.3d 924, 927-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (explaining that a court on appeal does not impermissibly reweigh evidence if video evidence “ ‘indisputably contradicts the trial court's findings.’ ”) (quoting Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 699 (Ind. 2017)). C.H. merely claims that Allgood was insufficiently familiar with him to identify him in the video. As set forth above, this is merely a request to reweigh the evidence.

6.   Although Allgood testified on cross-examination that he based his identification on C.H.’s demeanor in the video, Allgood also noted that C.H.’s face is visible in the surveillance video before C.H. pulled the hood of his sweatshirt over his head. Our review of the video confirms that the face of the person in the video is briefly visible in the video before he pulls his hood over his head. Thus, the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, could have concluded that C.H., who was present in the courtroom, was the same individual depicted in the surveillance video.

7.   C.H. cites R.L.H. v. State, 738 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), and Ferrell v. State, 656 N.E.2d 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), for the proposition that merely being in the area at the time criminal mischief occurs is insufficient to support a delinquency adjudication. We do not disagree with this proposition. But in R.L.H. and Ferrell, there was no video evidence depicting a person generally matching the appearance of the juvenile committing the act of mischief. Such evidence is present here.

Tavitas, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.