J.O., Appellant-Respondent v. K.H., Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.O. appeals the trial court's grant of a protective order to K.H., claiming the trial court reversibly erred by admitting irrelevant evidence and entering the protective order even though it was not supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] K.H. is a behavioral health professional who works with individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities. During the underlying incidents, K.H. held a leadership position in a statewide trade association for behavioral consultants. J.O. owns a business related to the disability industry in Indiana. He also produces a podcast on the topic. K.H. and J.O. had never met.

[3] In August 2022, K.H. began receiving communications from J.O. Over the next two years, J.O. sent several emails to K.H. and her co-workers about K.H. K.H. received some of the emails directly; others were forwarded to her by co-workers. In one email to K.H.’s colleague, J.O. expressed that the colleague and K.H. “will not be doing a f****** thing to conti[n]ue to corrupt this industry,” vowing “[e]verything that I have, every favor & chit owed to me, every dollar Ive [sic] made, and everything that I am as a man is being allocated to cutting [K.H.] and her corrupt friends down.”¹ Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 62. In another instance, J.O. proclaimed “we are coming for [K.H.], and there is nothing you can do to stop us.” Id. at 75. At some point, J.O. mailed K.H. a book titled “How Not to Be a D***.”

[4] J.O. also mentioned K.H. in several of his podcast episodes. In some of J.O.’s earlier episodes, he made some “digs here and there” toward K.H. Tr. Vol. 2 at 8. By 2024, however, J.O. mentioned K.H. in most episodes, including two or three just about K.H. In one such episode, J.O. “really got into [K.H.’s] personal life” by sharing K.H.’s personal address, commenting on her sexual orientation, and promising to have K.H. followed. Id. at 15. K.H. described J.O.’s “obsession” as “really, really frightening ․ because ․ there is no end to what he will do.” Id. at 16.

[5] In August 2024, K.H. petitioned for a protective order due to J.O.’s “escalating and more aggressive behavior over time.” Id. at 7. During a hearing on the petition, K.H. described how she feels “terrorized ․ afraid ․ intimidated, and threatened” by J.O.’s “emotional terrorism.” Id. at 20, 23. The trial court shared “there's no doubt in my mind ․ that this kind of conduct would and did cause [K.H.] the distress” she detailed. Id. at 49. The trial court later granted K.H.’s petition for a protective order against J.O.

A. The challenged email is relevant and was properly admitted into evidence.

[6] J.O. first claims the trial court erred in admitting into evidence an email he sent to K.H.’s colleague because it was irrelevant. We review a trial court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 176 (Ind. 2017) (noting a trial court's discretion is “wide on issues of relevance”).

[7] Relevant evidence is generally admissible. See Ind. Evidence Rule 402. And evidence is relevant if it “has any tendency” to prove or disprove a consequential fact. Evid. R. 401; Snow, 77 N.E.3d at 177. “This ‘liberal standard for relevancy’ sets a low bar.” Id. (quoting Escamilla v. Shiel Sexton Co., 73 N.E.3d 663, 670 (Ind. 2017)).

[8] In the email at issue, J.O. twice mentioned K.H.: “To be abundantly clear, you and [K.H.] will not be doing a f****** thing to conti[n]ue to corrupt this industry” and “Everything that I have, every favor & chit owed to me, every dollar Ive [sic] made, and everything that I am as a man is being allocated to cutting [K.H] and her corrupt friends down.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 62. These statements have at least some tendency to prove or disprove a material fact—that is, whether it was reasonable for K.H. to believe J.O. presently intended to harm her. This evidence clears relevancy's “low bar” and was properly admitted.

B. Sufficient evidence supports the trial court's order.

[9] J.O. next contends K.H. presented insufficient evidence to support the trial court entering a protective order against him. We apply a two-tiered standard of review when a party appeals a trial court judgment entering a protective order: we first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, if so, whether those findings support the judgment. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A); S.D. v. G.D., 211 N.E.3d 494, 497 (Ind. 2023). In doing so, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility, and consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court's decision. S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 497. We grant such deference because “trial courts are far better than appellate courts ‘at weighing evidence and assessing witness credibility,’ ” particularly in protective order cases, “where our trial judges see and hear the parties interact as they relay details about intensely personal, traumatic events.” Id. at 498 (quoting Snow, 77 N.E.3d at 177). To prevail, the appellant must show the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous, meaning they leave us firmly convinced a mistake has been made. N.B. v. L.B., 251 N.E.3d 1117, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[10] “A person who is or has been subjected to harassment may file a petition for an order for protection against a person who has committed repeated acts of harassment against the petitioner.” Ind. Code § 34-26-5-2(b) (2021). In this context, “harassment” means “conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing impermissible contact ․ that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress [and] actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” I.C. § 34-6-2-51.5 (2019). And “impermissible contact” includes “[c]ommunicating with the victim.” I.C. § 35-45-10-3 (2022) (providing a nonexclusive list of conduct constituting “impermissible contact”).

[11] To justify the issuance of a protective order, the harassment must objectively include a present and credible threat. S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 220 (Ind. 2020). A threat is “credible” if it is “plausible or believable.” Id. The burden falls on the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent presently intends to harm the petitioner[.]” Id.

[12] J.O.’s repeated harassment of K.H. came in many forms. Whether it be emails threatening to “cut[ ] [K.H] ․ down” or that he was “coming for [K.H.],” podcast episodes sharing K.H.’s personal information, or sending K.H. a book with an off-color title, J.O.’s threatening conduct caused K.H. to suffer emotional distress. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 62. The trial court explicitly found K.H.’s testimony credible on this issue. The evidence also bolsters the trial court's conclusion that K.H.’s distress was objectively reasonable and J.O.’s actions constituted a present and credible threat. The trial court's decision to grant K.H. a protective order was supported by sufficient evidence.² To the extent J.O. contends otherwise, he asks we reweigh evidence and judge witness credibility for ourselves, which we cannot do. See S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 497.

Conclusion

[13] Because the challenged evidence was relevant and admissible, and sufficient evidence supports the trial court's order, we affirm.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   J.O. objected to a copy of this email being admitted into evidence, raising relevancy and hearsay arguments. Pertinent to this appeal, the trial court found the email was relevant, and J.O.’s objection went “more towards weight and not admissibility.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 11.

2.   J.O. dedicates several pages of his brief to arguing K.H. presented insufficient evidence to prove J.O. stalked her. But this misses the mark, as K.H. was not required to prove, and the trial court was not required to find, J.O. stalked K.H. to warrant the issuance of a protective order. Evidence of J.O.’s repeated harassment of K.H. was enough. See I.C. § 34-26-5-2(b); I.C. § 34-6-2-51.5.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.