MCCAULEY v. US NATIONAL BANK ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE FOR STRUCTURED ASSET SECURITIES CORPORATION TRUST 2006 RF4 (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Derek Steven McCauley appeals the trial court's order denying his motion to vacate a judgment of foreclosure that was issued in 2010. McCauley purports to raise three issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the court erred when it denied his motion. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[2] In early 2004, McCauley entered into a mortgage with a mortgage company to obtain a loan for a property in Indianapolis. The mortgage secured a promissory note in the principal amount of $147,763.00. The mortgage company subsequently assigned the mortgage to US National Bank Association, as Trustee for Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2006-RF4 (“the Lender”).

[3] In April 2010, the Lender brought an action against McCauley to foreclose on the property due to McCauley's failure to meet his payment obligations. On August 31, the court issued a judgment of foreclosure and awarded the Lender $178,341.58 plus interest and ordered the sale of the property. McCauley appealed that judgment, but this Court dismissed his appeal. See Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 48. The property was then sold at a sheriff's sale in 2013.

[4] On October 9, 2013, McCauley filed a complaint against the Lender and others and alleged that the Lender had “unlawfully commenced a fraudulent and unlawful conveyance of real property[.]” Id. at 52. The Lender moved to dismiss the complaint, which motion the trial court granted. Thereafter, in 2014, McCauley filed a motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment. The court did not rule on that motion, allowing it to be deemed denied.

[5] Then, on August 23, 2024, McCauley filed another motion to vacate the judgment. In his motion, McCauley cited to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(1), (2), and (3) and Indiana Code Section 34-11-2-12 and alleged that the judgment should be vacated based on “[n]ewly discovered evidence” and “fraud” and because the judgment is “void.” Id. at 3. McCauley then listed seventeen pieces of “evidence” in support of his motion. Id. The Lender filed an objection to McCauley's motion and argued that his motion was “untimely” and that he had failed to “allege a meritorious defense.” Id. at 12.

[6] On November 6, 2024, the trial court issued its order on McCauley's motion. The court found that McCauley's motion was “untimely” as it was filed fourteen years after the judgment of foreclosure was entered. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 12. In addition, the court found that McCauley had failed to “present any meritorious defense[.]” Id. at 13. Accordingly, the court denied McCauley's motion. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] McCauley appeals the trial court's order denying his motion to vacate. We first note that McCauley is proceeding pro se. “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citation omitted).

[8] The Indiana Appellate Rules require an appellant to include in his brief a Statement of Facts that “describe[s] the facts relevant to the issues presented for review,” which “shall be in narrative form[.]” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(6). In addition, the rules require an appellant to include an argument section that “contain[s] the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on[.]” App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). And the rules require the appellant to include “a concise statement of the applicable standard of review” for each issue. App. R. 46(A)(8)(b).

[9] Cogent argument supported by adequate citation to authority “promotes impartiality in the appellate tribunal. A court which must search the record and make up its own arguments because a party has not adequately presented them runs the risk of becoming an advocate rather than an adjudicator.” Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). We will not address arguments so poorly developed or expressed that they cannot be understood. Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984 (quotation marks omitted).

[10] Here, McCauley's brief on appeal wholly fails to comply with Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A). First, his Statement of Facts is not in narrative form and does not describe the facts relevant to the issues presented. Rather, McCauley simply recites, in a numbered list, the various “exhibits” he provided to the trial court in support of his motion to vacate. See Appellant's Br. at 2-6.

[11] Further, McCauley fails to set out his contentions supported by cogent reasoning. McCauley purports to raise three issues, including whether his motion to vacate was timely under a twenty-year statute of limitations, whether the court violated his due process rights, and whether his evidence supports his claims. However, each argument is between two and five sentences, contains only conclusory statements, and fails to include a standard of review. For example, in his first issue, McCauley argues that his “discovery of fraudulent activities” occurred “well within the 20-year statute of limitations provided by Indiana Code 34-11-2-12.” Appellant's Br. at 7. But, other than a bald assertion of “fraud,” he does not explain what alleged fraud occurred, how that statute is relevant, or why it should apply to these proceedings. Id.

[12] In addition, in his second argument alleging due process violations, he claims that the court erred when it allowed an attorney to testify because that testimony was not “based on firsthand knowledge.” Id. But other than stating that the attorney is the Lender's attorney, he does not provide any information as to when the attorney testified or to what the attorney testified, nor has he provided the copy of any transcript in his Record on Appeal. Thus, he has not provided any information as to how the attorney's testimony “impact[ed] the fairness of the proceedings.” Id.

[13] Finally, in his third issue, McCauley claims that he submitted “substantial evidence” in support of his “claim of entitlement to relief[.]” Id. But, again, other than listing the documents that he provided to the court, he gives no argument as to how those documents support his claim or how the court erred in light of those documents. And it is not our role to search the record to address his arguments.

[14] As a result of his noncompliance with the appellate rules, McCauley has failed to meet his burden on appeal to demonstrate that the trial court erred. We therefore affirm the trial court's order.

[15] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.