Deon Logan, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] After falling on to some hard times, Deon Logan and his wife moved in with his sister-in-law K.L. Shortly after moving in, Logan started making sexual advances towards K.L., which she continuously rejected. One day, Logan entered K.L's bedroom while she was sleeping, and he raped her. The State charged Logan with rape. At trial, without objection, several witnesses recounted K.L.’s out-of-court statements disclosing the rape. Logan was found guilty as charged. Logan appeals and presents one issue for our review: Whether the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting testimony regarding K.L.’s out-of-court statements.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In June of 2023, Logan and his wife, Jennifer, moved into K.L.’s home in Indianapolis. At the time, K.L. was living with her daughter. Shortly after moving in, Logan started to make K.L. uncomfortable by making comments about how he “wasn't attracted to [Jennifer]” and “[t]hey wasn't having sex.” Tr. Vol. VII at 54. Logan also told K.L. that he wanted to be with her and that “he would treat [K.L.] better than [K.L.’s] husband [did].” Id.

[4] K.L. suffers from multiple sclerosis, which limits her ability to do physical tasks, causes pain in her legs, and requires medication. Jennifer would often come into K.L.’s bedroom to check on her and make sure she was okay. However, one night, K.L. woke up to find Logan in her bed rubbing her legs. K.L. told Logan to leave, which he initially did, but then he quickly returned and continued to rub her legs, so K.L. again had to ask him to leave. Additionally, there was an incident in a car where Logan touched K.L.’s face and thigh in front of her daughter.

[5] In July, Jennifer and Logan stayed at K.L.’s house “[o]n and off” because K.L. did not feel comfortable being in the home with Logan while Jennifer was not there. Tr. Vol. VII at 55. During that month, Jennifer was in and out of the hospital, so they arranged for Logan to stay somewhere else while Jennifer was in the hospital. K.L. also retrieved the house key that she had previously given Logan.

[6] On the night of August 4, K.L. was alone at her home when Logan showed up and knocked on her window. K.L. assumed Jennifer was with him, so she let Logan in; however, after he entered, Logan told K.L. that Jennifer was back in the hospital. After he entered the house, K.L. noticed that Logan was carrying a bottle of alcohol and that he “had been drinking,” and he started “rambling” and “talking ․ about [K.L.] and him sleeping together.” Tr. Vol. VII at 58. K.L. ignored Logan and went to her room, but shortly thereafter, Logan appeared at K.L.’s bedroom stark naked except for wearing his tennis shoes. K.L. yelled at Logan, and he eventually went to his bedroom. K.L. took her medication—a muscle relaxer and a pain medication—before going to sleep.

[7] K.L. woke up the following morning to Logan touching her arm while he lay in her bed naked. After K.L. woke up, Logan climbed on top of her. K.L. tried to push Logan away and asked him to stop multiple times, but he refused. Logan started to forcibly have vaginal sex with K.L. and told her that if she “just let him have sex with [her], he'll leave [her] alone.” Tr. Vol. VII at 65. K.L. continued to tell Logan to stop, but he persisted until he eventually ejaculated and left the room.

[8] That same morning, K.L. called her mother and her son to tell them that Logan had raped her. After making the calls, K.L. left her house, walked to the end of the street, and called 911. K.L. was taken to the hospital where she disclosed the incident to a forensic nurse. That night, K.L. also disclosed the incident to her daughter over the phone. A few days later, K.L. again disclosed the incident when giving a statement to Detective Dustin Greathouse. The State charged Logan with rape as a Level 3 felony.

[9] At trial, prior to K.L.’s testimony, the State elicited testimony from K.L.’s mother, son, and daughter as well as the forensic nurse and Detective Greathouse regarding K.L.’s disclosure of the rape. Logan did not object to any of this testimony. Thereafter, K.L. testified and gave her account of the rape. Logan was found guilty as charged, and this appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error by Admitting Testimony About K.L.’s Out-of-Court Statements

[10] Logan claims the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony into evidence. We review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012)), cert. denied, 145 S.Ct. 424 (2024). “[W]e may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis supported by the record,” Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021)), and we will reverse “only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 858 (quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)). However, Logan did not object to any of the relevant testimony at trial. “[A] failure to timely object to the erroneous admission of evidence at trial will procedurally foreclose the raising of such error on appeal unless the admission constitutes fundamental error.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 118 (Ind. 2015) (citing Davis v. State, 598 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (Ind. 1992)). “An error is fundamental if it ‘made a fair trial impossible’ or if it clearly and blatantly violated basic principles of due process resulting in ‘undeniable and substantial potential for harm.’ ” Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 559 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018)). “[F]undamental error in the evidentiary decisions of our trial courts is especially rare.” Merritt v. State, 99 N.E.3d 706, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

[11] Logan argues that the trial court committed fundamental error when it did not sua sponte intervene to limit hearsay testimony that allegedly resulted in “drumbeat repetition” of K.L.’s allegations.¹ Logan cites Modesitt v. State, 578 N.E.2d 649, 653-654 (Ind. 1991), to support his claim that the trial court erred. However, there, the trial court admitted hearsay testimony over Modesitt's objections, Modesitt, 578 N.E.2d at 650, and the Supreme Court determined it was erroneous to do so, id. at 653–54. Here, as previously mentioned, Logan did not object to any of the testimony he now claims was erroneously admitted.

[12] We have previously described how defense counsel's failure to object to the admission of evidence at trial significantly narrows the claims available on appeal:

An attorney's decision not to object to certain evidence or lines of questioning is often a tactical decision, and our trial courts can readily imagine any number of viable reasons why attorneys might not object. Cf. Merritt, 99 N.E.3d at 710 (“The risk calculus inherent in a request for an admonishment is an assessment that is nearly always best made by the parties and their attorneys and not sua sponte by our trial courts.”). Fundamental error in the erroneous admission of evidence might include a claim that there has been a “fabrication of evidence,” “willful malfeasance on the part of the investigating officers,” or otherwise that “the evidence is not what it appears to be.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010). But absent an argument along those lines, “the claimed error does not rise to the level of fundamental error.” Id.

Nix v. State, 158 N.E.3d 795, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Here, we can “readily imagine” that counsel did not object because of the potential that all (or most) of K.L.’s disclosures could have cleanly fit within the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. See Ind. Evidence Rule 803(2); Lieberenz v. State, 717 N.E.2d 1242, 1245–46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Additionally, in both voir dire and opening statement, Logan addressed the jury with concerns about K.L.’s disclosures, which opened the door to this testimony. On appeal, Logan claims only that the testimonial hearsay “prejudiced his consent defense and his ability to cross examine.” Appellant's Br. at 15. Additionally, Logan does complain at all about the several texts that K.L. sent to people disclosing the rape. Thus, Logan has not presented any evidentiary errors that rise to the level of fundamental error. See Nix, 158 N.E.3d at 801.

[13] Nonetheless, Logan believes the trial court should have intervened because “[i]t does not appear there was any tactical reason not to object given the prejudice of the evidence.” Appellant's Br. at 14–15. However, neither we nor the trial court can make that assumption. See Nix, 158 N.E.3d at 801–02. We have previously noted that

[t]here are often tactical reasons for an attorney not to object to the admission of evidence or the questioning of witnesses, and, however discerning our trial courts may be, they are not expected or required to divine the mind of counsel. And, if a defense counsel lacks a tactical reason for not objecting to prejudicial evidence that would not have been admitted with a proper objection, the defendant has the post-conviction process available to him to pursue relief.

Id. at 802. Regardless, as we addressed above, there are at least two reasons, one evidentiary and the other tactical, for Logan to not object to the admission of K.L.’s disclosures. We conclude that the trial court did not commit fundamental error, and we affirm the trial court's decision.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Logan also suggests that the trial court allowed impermissible vouching in violation of Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b). However, Logan does not identify which testimony constitutes vouching, and his argument lacks the cogent reasoning required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). “We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). Because Logan has not adequately presented this claim, he has waived it. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015).

Felix, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Tavitas concur. [15] Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.