Randy Lee Jent, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] In 2024, the State charged Randy Lee Jent with two counts of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and being a habitual offender for selling methamphetamine to a confidential informant on two occasions. At the jury trial, Jent testified in his own defense, admitting he sold the drugs but claiming he did so because he was homeless and “it was part of [his] need to survive.” Tr. Vol. III p. 34. After the close of evidence, defense counsel requested the pattern jury instruction on the defense of necessity, which provides:

The defense of necessity is an issue in this case.

The defense of necessity applies when:

(1) the act charged as criminal was the result of an emergency and was done to prevent a significant harm;

(2) there was no adequate alternative to the commission of the act;

(3) the harm caused by the act was not disproportionate to the harm avoided;

(4) the Defendant had a good-faith belief that his/her act was necessary to prevent greater harm;

(5) the Defendant's belief was objectively reasonable under all the circumstances of the case; and

(6) the Defendant did not substantially contribute to the creation of the emergency.

The State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was not acting out of necessity, and may do so by disproving any one of the above facts.

Ind. Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction No. 10.2100 (2023). The trial court declined to give the instruction, finding there was no evidence in the record to support it because Jent didn't prove that an emergency existed. See Tr. Vol. III p. 50 (explaining that dealing drugs is not an “adequate alternative to being hungry”). The jury found Jent guilty, and he admitted to being a habitual offender.

[2] Jent now appeals, arguing the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on necessity. “[I]n order for the defense of necessity to apply to a criminal offense, the defendant must be responding to a true emergency, meaning a situation which is then occurring in his presence and requires an immediate response[.]” Rochefort v. State, 177 N.E.3d 113, 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Here, there is no evidence that Jent's claim that he had to deal drugs to “survive” presented the type of immediate danger required to warrant a necessity instruction. On appeal, Jent claims that he “faced a Hobson's choice: die, or sell drugs.” Appellant's Br. p. 13. But as the State points out, “The record is devoid of any fact suggesting that he would have died if he had not sold drugs.” Appellee's Br. p. 16.

[3] Jent cites cases where our Supreme Court and this Court determined that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the defense of necessity, but they are distinguishable. In one case, Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373 (Ind. 2015), the police pulled over a car in which the defendant was a passenger, and the defendant told the police that he had a gun in his pocket. The defendant was arrested and charged with misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. At trial, the defendant testified that he put the gun in his pocket when the driver, who declared he was not going back to jail as they were being pulled over, ordered him to “take the gun or else,” which he took to mean that he would be shot. Id. at 375; see also Patton v. State, 760 N.E.2d 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (defendant, charged with misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license, testified he believed a person would have killed him if he didn't grab the gun). In another case, Toops v. State, 643 N.E.2d 387, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), the defendant, who had been drinking, grabbed the wheel of a car that had begun “to careen out of control” when the driver, who had also been drinking and was underage, dove into the back seat upon observing a police car turn around and follow them. Unlike here, these cases involve immediate threats of harm. The trial court did not err in not instructing the jury on necessity.

[4] Affirmed.

Vaidik, Judge.

Judges Tavitas and Felix concur. Tavitas, J., and Felix, J., concur.