Crystal J. Kincy, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] During a confrontation outside a nightclub, Crystal Kincy shattered Latoya Wyatt's vehicle windows. Kincy was charged with and convicted of criminal mischief. Kincy now appeals, raising one issue for our review: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support her conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Prior to July 2012, Wyatt had been best friends with Latasha Twyman—Kincy's aunt—until their relationship deteriorated due to personal issues. Thirteen years ago, on July 9, 2012, Wyatt left an Indianapolis nightclub and walked to her vehicle accompanied by one of Twyman's male cousins. Once she got into the driver's seat of her vehicle, another vehicle pulled up in front of Wyatt's car and blocked her in. Several women exited the car, and Wyatt saw Twyman and Kincy inside the vehicle. Kincy told the male cousin at Wyatt's car, “[D]on't talk to her, that's that Toya girl.” Tr. Vol III at 96.

[4] After Kincy exited the vehicle, she “popped the trunk ․ and picked up something that was pretty big and walked up to [Wyatt's] vehicle.” Tr. Vol III at 79. Kincy approached Wyatt's driver's side, talking about how Wyatt had messed with Twyman,¹ and swung the object at Wyatt's vehicle, breaking her windows and causing approximately $700 in damage. Wyatt later identified Kincy from a photo array as the person who smashed her windows. The State charged Kincy with criminal mischief as a Class D felony.² The jury convicted Kincy of criminal mischief as a Class B misdemeanor as a lesser-included offense, and the trial court sentenced her.³ This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Kincy's Conviction for Criminal Mischief

[5] Kincy argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support her conviction for criminal mischief as a Class B misdemeanor. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

Our standard for reviewing evidentiary sufficiency challenges is well established, as we have made clear that “[i]t is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783.

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025).

[6] To convict Kincy of criminal mischief as a Class B misdemeanor under Indiana Code section 35-43-1-2(a) (effective July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2014), the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Kincy “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damage[d] or deface[d]” Wyatt's vehicle without Wyatt's consent. Kincy claims that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that she damaged Wyatt's vehicle. However, there is testimony Kincy swung an object into Wyatt's car, breaking a window and causing $700 in damage. Kincy's arguments on appeal are merely requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[7] For example, Kincy argues that “the testimony clearly shows that a conflagration was occurring between some of her relatives and [Wyatt]” and that “[s]ince [Kincy] was pregnant and visiting from out of town, [Kincy] removed herself from the incident so as not to risk injury to her pregnancy.” Appellant's Br. at 9. However, the jury was presented with this testimony and was entitled to believe Wyatt's account over Kincy's. The jury was in the best position to observe the witnesses, assess their behavior, and determine the reasonableness of the testimony while considering other evidence. See Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090–91 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783). The probative evidence and reasonable inferences in support thereof demonstrate that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Kincy caused damage to Wyatt's car by striking it with an object.

[8] Based on the foregoing, the State presented sufficient evidence that Kincy knowingly or intentionally damaged Wyatt's windows without her consent. We therefore affirm Kincy's conviction.

[9] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This was a reference to the personal issues that developed prior to July 2012.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2(a)(1)(B)(i) (effective July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2014).

3.   The lengthy delay between the offense and the trial date related to Kincy failing to appear and not returning to the jurisdiction for approximately eight years.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Tavitas concur. [10] Vaidik, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.