Samuel C. Womack, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Samuel Womack placed 28-day-old N.W. (“Child”) face down in a bassinet with a pacifier in its mouth. To stop Child from fussing, Womack placed his hand on the back of Child's head and pushed Child's head into the mattress. Child died from suffocation. During the investigation into Child's death, Womack admitted what he had done. The State charged Womack with neglect of a dependent, and he was found guilty as charged. Womack now appeals and presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting Womack's confession into evidence; and

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Womack's conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On March 12, 2024, Womack was living with his fiancé and their two children, Child and a one-year-old son, in an extended stay hotel in Vanderburgh County, Indiana. At 3:00 a.m., Womack put Child to sleep in a bassinet that was located by his bed, laying Child on its back. Womack fell asleep shortly thereafter, and sometime around 4:30 a.m., Womack's fiancé left to go to work.

[4] Around 7:00 a.m., Child became “fussy” and woke up Womack. Tr. Vol. II at 182. To get Child to calm down, Womack decided to lay Child face down in the bassinet and put a pacifier in Child's mouth. Womack “did know” that he was not supposed to lay Child on its belly, but he “thought [he] could pull it off.” Id. at 170. Womack “tried something new and used [his] own weight” to keep the pacifier in Child's mouth, id. at 171, placing “pressure down on [Child's] head,” id. at 173. While Womack was trying this “new” approach, he fell asleep. Womack woke up two hours later, found Child unresponsive, and called 911. Child was pronounced dead shortly after arriving at the hospital, and the autopsy revealed that the cause of death was “probable suffocation due to smothering.” Id. at 244.

[5] At the hotel room on March 12, Womack initially told law enforcement that he fell asleep at 3:00 a.m. and found Child unresponsive at 9:00 a.m., omitting the part where he woke up and placed Child on its stomach. Detective Jonathan Helm conducted two later interviews with Womack discussing the events of March 12. In these interviews, Womack admitted that he woke up around 7:00 a.m., placed Child face down in the bassinet with a pacifier in its mouth, and put his hand on Child's head. The State charged Womack with neglect of a dependent resulting in death as a Level 1 felony.¹ At trial, the State offered, and the trial court admitted recordings of Womack's interviews with Detective Helm. Womack was found guilty as charged and sentenced to 20 years of incarceration. Womack now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error by Admitting Womack's Confession

[6] Womack claims that the trial court erred by admitting his confession into evidence. We review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012)), cert. denied, 145 S.Ct. 424 (2024). “[W]e may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis supported by the record,” Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021)), and we will reverse “only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 858 (quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)).

[7] Womack failed to object to the admission of the confession at trial, so he asks us to review his claim for fundamental error. “Fundamental error is an exception to the general rule that a party's failure to object at trial results in a waiver of the issue on appeal. An error is fundamental if it made a fair trial impossible or amounted to a clear violation of basic due-process principles.” Tate v. State, 161 N.E.3d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2021) (internal citations omitted) (citing C.S. v. State, 131 N.E.3d 592, 595 (Ind. 2019)). However, when the State offered Womack's confessions into evidence, Womack stated he had no objection to their admission. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a defendant's failure to object to the admissibility of evidence at trial waives the issue for our review unless fundamental error occurred. Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678–79 (Ind. 2013) (citing Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind. 2010)). Further, “we will not review claims, even for fundamental error, when appellants expressly declare at trial that they have no objection.” Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 161 (Ind. 2017) (citing Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 678–79). “The appellant cannot on the one hand state at trial that he has no objection to the admission of evidence and thereafter in this Court claim such admission to be erroneous.” Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 679 (quoting Harrison v. State, 258 Ind. 359, 281 N.E.2d 98, 100 (1972)). Thus, Womack has waived this claim for our review. See id. at 678–79.

[8] Waiver notwithstanding, Womack argues that the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting the confession because the State failed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule. “In Indiana, a person may not be convicted of a crime based solely on a nonjudicial confession of guilt.” Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. 2017) (citing Green v. State, 159 Ind. App. 68, 304 N.E.2d 845, 848 (1973)). There must be “independent proof of the corpus delicti is required before the defendant may be convicted upon a nonjudicial confession.” Id. (citing Green, 304 N.E.2d at 848). “Proof of the corpus delicti means ‘proof that the specific crime charged has actually been committed by someone.’ ” Id. (quoting Walker v. State, 249 Ind. 551, 233 N.E.2d 483, 488 (1968)). Thus, to admit Womack's confession, the State was required to provide some independent evidence that neglect of a dependent occurred. See id. However, “[t]he State is not required to prove the corpus delicti by independent evidence prior to the admission of a confession, as long as the totality of independent evidence presented at trial establishes the corpus delicti.” Id. (citing McManus v. State, 541 N.E.2d 538, 539-40 (Ind. 1989)). The State need only “present ․ independent evidence that provid[es] an inference that the crime charged was committed,” id. (citing Malinski v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1071, 1086 (Ind. 2003)). This inference can be based on circumstantial evidence. Id. at 843 (citing Malinski, 794 N.E.2d at 1086).

[9] Here, the State charged Womack with neglect of a dependent resulting in death as a Level 1 Felony, meaning the State had to provide independent proof that Womack had care of Child, who was younger than 14, and that he knowingly or intentionally “plac[ed] [Child] in a situation that endanger[ed] [Child's] life or health” resulting in Child's death. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a)(1), (b)(3). Womack claims that his confession was the only source of evidence suggesting he committed the crime. We cannot agree. The autopsy report indicates that Child was found in the prone position and the circumstances of death are consistent with suffocation. Also, the medical examiner testified that the autopsy results indicated, at the time of death, that Child's face was “the lowest portion of the body” and that the area around Child's nose and mouth “was actually in contact with the bedding or mattress,” which was “providing pressure.” Tr. Vol. II at 249. These independent pieces of evidence support the inference that Womack committed neglect of a dependent. See Shinnock, 76 N.E.3d at 843–44. Thus, the trial court did not commit fundamental error by admitting Womack's confession.

2. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Womack's Conviction

[10] Womack claims the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

Our standard for reviewing evidentiary sufficiency challenges is well established, as we have made clear that “[i]t is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783.

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025).

[11] As described above, the State charged Womack with neglect of dependent resulting in death as a Level 1 felony and was required to prove the elements therein beyond a reasonable doubt. See I.C. § 35-46-1-4(a)(1), (b)(3). Womack argues only that the State failed to prove that he knowingly placed Child in a situation that endangered its life.

[12] “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). Further, “[w]e have interpreted the mens rea requirement of the neglect statute to require proof that a defendant possessed a subjective awareness of a high probability that a dependent had been placed in a dangerous situation.” Marksberry v. State, 185 N.E.3d 437, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shultz v. State, 115 N.E.3d 1280, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). “Because, in most cases, such a finding requires the factfinder to infer the defendant's mental state, this Court must look to all the surrounding circumstances of a case to determine if a guilty verdict is proper.” Shultz, 115 N.E.3d at 1286 (quoting Pierson v. State, 73 N.E.3d 737, 741 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)).

[13] Womack claims there is insufficient evidence showing that he was aware of the high probability that he was placing Child in a dangerous situation. The evidence suggests otherwise. Womack had experience caring for both of his young children, and Womack “did know” that Child was not supposed to lay on its belly. Tr. Vol. II at 170. However, Womack “thought [he] could pull it off” when he laid Child in that position. Id. Womack described his attempt to calm Child as follows: “I, you know, tried something new and used my own weight.” Id. at 171. Further, Womack admitted that he was “kind of asleep” while he was trying this new method. Id. at 170. Because Womack knew Child was in an unsafe position but still placed his own weight on Child while he was “kind of asleep” himself, id., the evidence supports the inference that Womack knowingly placed Child in a position that endangered its life. Consequently, we conclude the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Womack's conviction.

Conclusion

[14] In sum, the trial court did not commit fundamental error by admitting Womack's confession into evidence, and the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Womack's conviction. We affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a)(1), (b)(3).

Felix, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Tavitas concur. Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.