Mac Anthony Lewis, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Mac Anthony Lewis appeals his convictions for murder, Level 1 felony attempted murder, Level 5 felony criminal recklessness, and two counts of Level 6 felony criminal recklessness. He presents the following restated issues for review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence a letter written to Lewis by the murder victim?

2. Did Lewis's three convictions for criminal recklessness violate Indiana's prohibition against double jeopardy?

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Lewis and his wife Elizabeth had been together for five years and married for about two years prior to the events underlying Lewis's convictions. They lived in a neighborhood in Sellersburg with Lewis's sixteen-year-old daughter and Elizabeth's two daughters, including eleven-year-old T.M. Elizabeth had recently confided in T.M. that she wanted a divorce but felt bad about telling Lewis. In fact, Elizabeth had written a letter to Lewis telling him such. Elizabeth told T.M. that she suspected Lewis might have seen the letter, as she had left it in their Dodge Durango, which he had recently driven, and he was, according to Elizabeth, “acting different.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 233.

[4] On the evening of April 1, 2022, T.M. had her friend E.R. at the house for a sleepover. They were in a bathroom getting ready for Elizabeth to take them to a trampoline park. Meanwhile, Elizabeth had come home from work and Lewis asked to speak with her. Elizabeth and Lewis went into their bedroom and discussed Elizabeth's desire for a divorce. Elizabeth then went and informed T.M., “I just told him.” Id. at 206.

[5] While Elizabeth was in the bathroom with the girls, Lewis went out to their white Hummer and obtained Elizabeth's 9mm Taurus semiautomatic handgun (the Taurus). He then came back inside the home and asked Elizabeth to return to their bedroom, which was on the other end of the house from the other first-floor bedrooms and bathroom. He also asked Elizabeth if she was going to hook him up to his dialysis machine.¹

[6] Minutes after Elizabeth had gone back to the bedroom with Lewis, the girls heard her crying and then heard her yell, “[T.M.] help, call 911.” Id. at 207. T.M. went to see what was happening but the bedroom door was locked. The girls then heard gunshots and ran into the guest bedroom before hearing more gunshots. E.R. called her parents from the bedroom, and T.M. frantically looked for her phone to call 911.

[7] During this time, Elizabeth was shot at least four times. She suffered a defensive wound to the back of her right hand, a graze wound to her right shoulder, flesh wounds to her right shoulder and the right side of her forehead, and a fatal wound to the right side of her face. The fatal gunshot entered just below her right eye, traveled through her skull, and exited the back of her head. This wound would have immediately incapacitated her. She died face down in a pool of blood on the floor in the closet of the bedroom. In total, six bullets were fired with the Taurus in the bedroom and closet. There was also a live round on the floor of the bedroom that had been ejected from the Taurus when Lewis racked it before the shooting.

[8] After shooting Elizabeth, Lewis went out into the living room and began screaming “why, why, why.” Id. at 207. The girls hid in the closet of the guest bedroom while Lewis was “shooting everything up, the whole living room.” Id. He fired random shots throughout the living room. One struck the television on the east wall of the living room,² one struck the south wall of the living room above the entrance to the kitchen, two struck the ceiling, and one struck an upper alcove in the southwest corner of the living room.

[9] At some point, T.M. left the guest bedroom and asked Lewis, from across the living room, what he had done to her mother. He responded, “I shot her.” Id. T.M. screamed and told him to leave. Lewis then raised the Taurus and fired a shot toward T.M. The bullet struck the wall near T.M., and she ran back to the bedroom, locking the door. The girls hid in the closet again, as Lewis came to the bedroom door.

[10] Thereafter, Lewis returned to his bedroom and placed the (now empty) Taurus on a dresser. He then drove away in the Hummer, calling a nearby friend, Adam Mallad. Lewis told Mallad that he “messed up” and “just killed Lizzie.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 171. Lewis indicated that he was going to turn himself in, and he asked Mallad to check on T.M.

[11] T.M. called 911 at 7:44 p.m., and Lewis was stopped by the police minutes later while driving his Hummer. Lewis told officers on the side of the road that he had killed his wife. He stated that she was leaving him for someone else, so he “just blanked out.” Exhibit 3 at 2:00. He acknowledged that there was a physical altercation before the gun went off and explained, “I was about to point it to myself and she went to grab it and I just went nuts and I just started shooting.” Id. at 2:19. When asked how many shots he fired, Lewis responded: “The gun's empty. I shot up the whole house. I was so pissed.” Id. at 5:08.

[12] In two subsequent recorded interviews conducted at the Clark County Jail, Lewis repeatedly claimed that Elizabeth's death was accidental. He stated that the Taurus went off when Elizabeth pulled it away from his head during a struggle, as he was threatening to kill himself. He also claimed that he shot her a second time accidentally and that he then just blanked and kept shooting around the house in the bedroom and then the living room.

[13] Lewis suggested to investigators that the Taurus had a history of malfunctioning. During subsequent testing of the Taurus by a firearms expert, however, the Taurus “functioned as designed and only fired when [the expert] pulled the trigger.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 20. The Taurus required at least 4.5 pounds of pressure for each trigger pull.

[14] The State charged Lewis with Elizabeth's murder, the attempted murder of T.M., and three counts of criminal recklessness (one listing T.M. as the victim, one listing E.M., and the last listing the Belchers). The State also filed a notice of intent to seek a firearm enhancement.

[15] Lewis's six-day jury trial began on September 26, 2023. Although instructed on the lesser included offenses of reckless homicide and voluntary manslaughter, the jury found Lewis guilty as charged of murder, as well as the other counts. The trial court then entered convictions on all counts and, on November 2, 2023, sentenced Lewis to an aggregate term of 100 years in prison.

[16] Lewis now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Discussion & Decision

1. Admission of Evidence

[17] It is well-established that a trial court is “afforded wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence.” Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841, 842 (Ind. 2017). Accordingly, we review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when a ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. at 842-43. Even where a trial court abuses its discretion, we will not reverse unless the error affects a party's substantial rights. See Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013). That is, a non-constitutional error will be considered harmless where its “probable impact in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 488 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A)).

[18] Here, Lewis challenges the admission into evidence of Exhibit 177, which was a one-page typed letter from Elizabeth to Lewis. Investigators found the letter tucked above the driver's side visor of the Durango. The letter expressed Elizabeth's desire for a divorce, her difficulty in telling Lewis, and her regret for the hurt this would cause him. She indicated that she still loved and cared for him but that she was no longer in love with him and could not continue sacrificing her own happiness.

[19] At trial, Lewis argued that the letter was not relevant because the State could not show that he saw it before the shooting. He also asserted that the letter was more prejudicial than probative “given the fact that it can't be a motive for anything he's alleged to have done if there's no proof that he was aware of it.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 225.

[20] The State responded that Exhibit 9, a photograph of the same letter, had already been admitted into evidence without objection and “displayed on the big screen to the Jury.” Id. Further, the State argued that the letter was relevant to show Elizabeth's state of mind.

[21] The trial court indicated that it was inclined to agree with the State because the photograph of the letter was already in evidence, and “[y]ou can't unring a bell.” Id. The trial court then inquired as to how the letter was prejudicial, and defense counsel responded: “Judge, there's nothing real prejudicial in terms of like a 404 violation․. We're just saying that it's, it can't provide confident evidence to explain the conduct of Mr. Lewis if we don't know that she prepared it, or that he received it.” Id. at 226. The trial court overruled Lewis's objection and admitted Exhibit 177 into evidence.

[22] On appeal, Lewis argues that the letter was not relevant and served only to inflame the jury. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact that is of consequence in the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Ind. Evidence Rule 401. Only relevant evidence is admissible at trial. Ind Evidence Rule 402.

[23] Lewis does not dispute that evidence of motive is relevant in the proof of a crime. See Davis v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1203, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. He asserts, however, as he did below, that there is no evidence establishing that he read the letter before killing Elizabeth. On the contrary, there is evidence suggesting that he read the letter. That is, he had driven the Durango either the morning of the shooting or the night before, and Elizabeth informed T.M. that Lewis was acting differently and that she believed he might have read the letter when he drove the Durango.

[24] Even more, the letter was relevant to establish Elizabeth's state of mind at the time of the shooting. One could infer that it was written close in time to the shooting, as T.M. testified that Elizabeth had mentioned the letter to her recently and Lewis told investigators that Elizabeth had not slept at their house for the last two nights because they had been arguing. Further, Elizabeth made similar representations to T.M. about wanting a divorce and feeling bad about telling Lewis. Given that the jury was asked to consider whether Lewis acted in sudden heat,³ Elizabeth's compassionate attitude toward him despite wanting a divorce was relevant. That is, her state of mind, as reflected in the letter, was at least minimally relevant as to whether she acted in a way to provoke Lewis while talking to him about the divorce.

[25] We also agree with the State that even if the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Exhibit 177 into evidence, Lewis has failed to demonstrate reversible error. Under App. R. 66(A)’s probable impact test, “the party seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating how, in light of all the evidence in the case, the error's probable impact undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding below.” Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492.

Importantly, this is not a review for the sufficiency of the remaining evidence; it is a review of what was presented to the trier of fact compared to what should have been presented. And when conducting that review, we consider the likely impact of the improperly admitted or excluded evidence on a reasonable, average jury in light of all the evidence in the case. Ultimately, the error's probable impact is sufficiently minor when – considering the entire record – our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.

Id.

[26] Lewis asserts that the letter “likely inflamed the jury and invited the jury to convict based on outrage.” Appellant's Brief at 23. We do not agree. Based on our review of the entire record, we believe the likely impact of Exhibit 177 on the jury was at most minimal. Other evidence presented at trial – T.M.’s testimony and Lewis's own recorded statements – showed Elizabeth's ongoing care and compassion for Lewis. Further, Exhibit 177 was clearly cumulative of Exhibit 9, the picture of the letter to which Lewis expressly stated “[n]o objection” when it was offered into evidence. Transcript Vol. 2 at 186. And we cannot imagine how the letter weighed heavily in the minds of the jurors against the facts showing that Lewis shot Elizabeth multiple times while her eleven-year-old daughter and another child were in the home and that he then unleashed bullets in the living room, including one directed toward T.M. To the extent the jury felt outrage, it was not due to the letter. We are confident that the jury would have reached the same verdict regardless of whether Exhibit 177 was admitted into evidence.

2. Double Jeopardy

[27] Lewis next argues that his multiple convictions for criminal recklessness violate Indiana's prohibition against double jeopardy. This presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 247 (Ind. 2020).

[28] “Substantive double-jeopardy claims principally arise in one of two situations: (1) when a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple statutes with common elements, or (2) when a single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute and results in multiple injuries.” Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 263 (Ind. 2020). The issue presented in this case presents the latter situation and calls for application of the test set out in Powell.

[29] In resolving a claim of multiplicity, our task is to determine whether the statute permits punishment for a single course of criminal conduct or for certain discrete acts – the successive, similar occurrences – within that course of conduct. Id. at 264 (internal quotations omitted). The Supreme Court established a two-step process in Powell.

[30] First, we review the text of the statute to determine if it indicates a unit of prosecution; that is, we look at whether the crime is defined by conduct or consequence/result. Id. at 264-66. The Court explained:

In short, crimes defined by conduct (rather than by consequence) permit only a single conviction (with multiple consequences resulting in enhanced penalties, not multiple crimes). But crimes defined by consequence (rather than by conduct) permit multiple convictions when multiple consequences flow from a single criminal act.

Id. at 266. If the statute clearly indicates a unit of prosecution, we follow the legislature's guidance and our analysis ends; but if the statute is ambiguous, we turn to the second step. Id. at 268 (“[W]hen a statute permits more than one reasonable interpretation, we consider that statute ambiguous.”).

[31] Under the second step in Powell, we determine “whether the facts – as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial – indicate a single offense or whether they indicate distinguishable offenses.” Id. at 264.

To answer this question, we ask whether the defendant's actions are so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction. If the defendant's criminal acts are sufficiently distinct, then multiple convictions may stand; but if those acts are continuous and indistinguishable, a court may impose only a single conviction. Any doubt counsels against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.

Id. at 264-65 (cleaned up).

[32] “A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performs an act that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person commits criminal recklessness.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(a). We have previously concluded that this statute includes both conduct-based language and result-based language and thus “is ambiguous as to unit of prosecution.” See Moore v. State, 181 N.E.3d 442, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Consequently, we proceed to step two of the Powell test.

[33] Under the second step, unless the facts show that Lewis's multiple gunshots fired in the living room amounted to distinguishable offenses, we must conclude that the statute permits the prosecution for only a single count of criminal recklessness. See Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 268. In determining whether criminal acts are sufficiently distinct, we look to whether they were “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Id. at 264.

[34] In Moore, the defendant was upset with her three relatives who would not leave her house after an argument. She then obtained a handgun and fired two shots in quick succession, one into the floor and another into an adjacent room. She was convicted of two counts of criminal recklessness, each relating to a different victim. On appeal, we held that the multiple convictions violated double jeopardy, explaining:

The evidence in the record indicates the two gunshots were fired in the same general direction and without a meaningful break in time. There is no evidence that one shot was meant for one victim and the second shot was meant for another, or evidence that any victim was placed at greater risk by one shot or the other. The record demonstrates Shenell fired the two shots in quick succession with the unified purpose of scaring the other women out of her house.

Moore, 181 N.E.3d at 448.

[35] Here, the State concedes that the gunshots supporting the convictions for criminal recklessness all occurred while Lewis was randomly firing shots throughout the house and that the evidence did not establish any period of time separating the shots. Indeed, in closing argument the State characterized Lewis's reckless behavior as “[j]ust firing wildly” inside the house and acknowledged that Lewis did not intend to direct a bullet into the Belchers’ house. Transcript Vol. 4 at 46.

[36] The State acknowledges that convicting Lewis of two counts of Level 6 felony criminal recklessness – the counts relating to T.M. and E.R. – violated double jeopardy, noting that the children were hiding together in a closet during the shots and thus only one of those counts may stand. But the State argues that the Level 5 felony conviction may also stand because the shot that traveled through the television and into the Belchers’ house was identifiable and created “a different harm to a different group of people.” Appellee's Brief at 19. The State continues, “the fact that the Belchers were not in the same location as T.M. and E.R. creates enough of a distinction between the two offenses that there is no double jeopardy violation.” Id. at 19-20.

[37] The State's argument misses the point by focusing on the result of Lewis's criminal conduct. The focus, instead, should be on Lewis's actions. The evidence establishes that over an extremely compressed period of time, Lewis angrily and randomly fired the Taurus from inside his living room. He did so without targeting any distinct groups of people or different residences. And there is no indication that he fired with anything other than a singleness of purpose and continuity of action.

[38] As any doubt under the second Powell step counsels against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses, we conclude that only one of Lewis's three convictions for criminal recklessness may stand. See Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 265. Accordingly, we remand with instructions to vacate the two Level 6 felony criminal recklessness convictions and sentences.

[39] Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Elizabeth was a nurse and had met Lewis when she was providing dialysis care to him. They had a dialysis machine set up in the basement, which Lewis needed to use five times per week.

2.   The bullet that struck the television travelled through the exterior of the house and then about a quarter of a mile before striking a house in another neighborhood. Debbie Belcher and her husband were inside their home when the bullet struck their back door and lodged inside the glass.

3.   “Sudden heat exists when a defendant is provoked by anger, rage, resentment, or terror, to a degree sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection.” Carmack v. State, 200 N.E.3d 452, 459-60 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotations omitted).

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Brown and Tavitas concur. Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.