KING v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Matthew P. King appeals the revocation of his placement in the Madison County Continuum of Sanctions Program (the COS Program)¹ , claiming that his due process rights were violated because he was improperly sanctioned for violations that were not alleged in the Notice of the COS Program Termination (the Termination Notice) and for violating a condition that was not included in his terms of probation. King also maintains that the evidence was insufficient to support the revocation and that the sanction imposed was an abuse of the trial court's discretion because the alleged violations were only minor.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 8, 2024, the State charged King with the following offenses related to his former girlfriend, D.A., as the victim: burglary, a Level 3 felony, confinement, a Level 5 felony, confinement, a Level 6 felony, domestic battery with moderate injury, a Level 6 felony, and residential entry, a Level 6 felony. King was also charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Level 6 felony.

[4] Pursuant to a July 30 plea agreement (the Agreement), King was to plead guilty to all charges. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend an aggregate sentence of seven years, with three years to be served in the COS Program with placement starting on home detention, and four years suspended, with three years of supervised probation.

[5] On August 30, the trial court accepted the Agreement, imposed standard conditions and terms of probation, and ordered King “to have no contact with [D.A.].” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 92.² Thereafter, on September 9, the trial court issued a no contact order, which provided that King was not to have any contact with D.A. “in person, by telephone or letter ․ directly or indirectly ․ while on probation. This includes, but is not limited to, acts of harassment, stalking, intimidation, threats, and physical force of any kind.” Id. at 99.

[6] On September 18, the probation department filed the Termination Notice, alleging that King violated the conditions of the COS program by not following his required work release schedule on September 17, and for violating the no-contact order that same day.

[7] At a hearing on the Termination Notice, D.A. testified that King called her and texted her sometime in September 2024. D.A. further testified that while visiting her mother on September 17, a community corrections representative notified her that King was near her residence. D.A. also testified that while there is a housing subdivision behind her property, that area cannot be accessed from her property without going over a fence or walking through someone's yard.

[8] King's case manager, Madison Allen, testified that an area (the exclusionary zone) around D.A.’s home was created as part of the COS Program's rules that prohibited King from entering that area. King was made aware of the exclusionary zone when he began home detention. Allen further testified that King was required to adhere to the following schedule: For eight weeks beginning September 16, King was permitted to be away from his residence from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. throughout the week for work. On some days—and for reasons including church attendance or grocery shopping—King was allowed to be away from his home at other times. King signed and acknowledged the required schedule on September 16.

[9] The evidence established that on September 17, a GPS monitoring device showed that King was not at his residence from 7:03 p.m. to 7:22 p.m. King's schedule that day permitted him to be away from home only from 7:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. The GPS reports also showed that from 7:04 p.m. to 7:07 p.m., King was in the exclusionary zone. The reports showed the address where King was located was the same as D.A.’s home address, and the map showed that King was in a yard near D.A.’s house.

[10] After King was notified that he had violated the terms of home detention, Allen met with him the following morning. When King arrived for the meeting, his phone was taken and searched. It was discovered that King had texted and phoned an individual, identified in his contact list as “Levi King,” at various times in September 2024. Transcript Vol. II at 27. The phone number listed under that name was registered to D.A.

[11] King admitted that he was not permitted near D.A. or her property and acknowledged that he was permitted to be away from home only from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. on September 17. King claimed, however, that he was not home by 7:00 p.m. because he was on an emergency plumbing call in the subdivision behind D.A.’s property. King could not recall the address or street name where he was called to work and denied that he was on D.A.’s property. King further testified that he did not complete the plumbing job because he was notified by someone with the COS Program around 7:05 p.m. that he was away from his residence during non-scheduled hours, and that he was not allowed to be at his current location. King then testified that he left the job and went home.

[12] Although King claimed that he had asked his employer to verify that he was working after 7:00 p.m. on September 17, he presented no documentation at the revocation hearing verifying his version of the events. Additionally, while King initially denied that he had contacted D.A. in September 2024, he subsequently admitted that he had texted and called her during that time, but was “not rude or mean or anything.” Id. at 40-41.

[13] Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court found King's testimony not credible and remarked that King was “telling a story to save [himself].” Id. at 51. The trial court then determined that there was credible evidence that King was at D.A.’s house in violation of the no-contact order and conditions of probation, and that he had violated the COS Program schedule.

[14] In determining the appropriate sanction, the trial court noted that it was especially troubled that only two weeks had elapsed from King's sentencing to his commission of the violations. The trial court observed that King was not trying to change his behavior as it related to D.A. and thus ordered him to serve the previously suspended three-year sentence at the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC).

[15] King now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Due Process

A. Violations Not Alleged in the Termination Notice

[16] King argues that he was denied due process because the trial court sanctioned him for violations that were not alleged in the Termination Notice. Specifically, King maintains that he was misled because the Termination Notice alleged that he violated the no contact order on September 17, but the State presented evidence at the hearing that he violated the order by texting and calling D.A. on other days in September. Thus, King argues that the incorrect date regarding the “violation of the no contact order” prevented him from adequately preparing a defense to the alleged violations. Appellant's Brief at 6, 8.

[17] Probation and community corrections programs serve as alternatives to incarceration. Monroe v. State, 899 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Procedural due process in a revocation proceeding requires that the probationer receive written notice of the claimed violations. Debro v. State, 821 N.E.2d 367, 375 (Ind. 2005). The written notice must be sufficiently detailed to allow the probationer to prepare an adequate defense. J.H. v. State, 857 N.E.2d 429, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. Whether a party was denied due process is a question of law that we review de novo. Miller v. Ind. Dept. of Workforce Dev., 878 N.E.2d 346, 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[18] In this case, the Termination Notice alleged that King violated the COS Program's rules by being away from home after his scheduled hours on September 17, 2024, and for violating the no-contact order that same day. King challenges the Termination Notice only as to the alleged violation of the no contact order.

[19] Notwithstanding King's claim that he was prevented from preparing an adequate defense as to the alleged violations, the evidence established that King was present in the exclusionary zone on September 17 after 7:00 p.m., which constituted a violation of the COS Program's rules and the no contact order. To be sure, the September 9 no contact order provided that King was not to contact D.A. “in person ․ or in any other way, directly or indirectly” during his “executed sentence and until probation has been terminated.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 99-100. When King began home detention, he was informed of—and acknowledged—the provisions of the exclusionary zone.

[20] The trial court rejected King's claim that he was on a plumbing job behind D.A.’s property and concluded that the State satisfied its burden as to both violations that were alleged in Termination Notice. In so concluding, the trial court did not comment on the evidence regarding the text messages or phone calls as a basis for the revocation.

[21] In sum, King has failed to show that the State relied on a separate, unspecified allegation, i.e., the telephone calls and text messages that King sent to D.A. sometime in September, to prove the violation. The Termination Notice was sufficiently detailed to allow King to prepare a defense, and he has not shown that his due process rights were violated on this basis.

B. Improper Condition of Probation

[22] King also asserts that his due process rights were violated because he was improperly sanctioned for entering the exclusionary zone—a condition that was not included in the terms and conditions of probation. Thus, King claims that the revocation order must be vacated because neither the sentencing order nor the no contact order prohibited him from being near D.A.’s residence.

[23] Trial courts have broad discretion in determining the appropriate conditions of a defendant's probation. Howe v. State, 25 N.E.3d 210, 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The court's discretion “is limited only by the principle that the conditions imposed must be reasonably related to the treatment of the defendant and the protection of public safety.” Id. We will not set aside probation terms unless the trial court has abused its discretion. Id.

[24] King did not claim at the hearing that the exclusionary zone was an improperly imposed condition of probation. Because King failed to object to the propriety of such condition and a due process claim may not be raised for the first time on appeal, King has waived this issue. See, e.g., Terpstra v. State, 138 N.E.3d 278, 285-86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that the defendant's failure to raise due process objections at the revocation hearing waived review of those claims), trans. denied.

II. Sufficiency of Evidence

[25] King claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the revocation of his placement in the COS program. Specifically, King maintains that the trial court's determinations that he was in the exclusionary zone and violated the no contact order were not supported by the evidence.

[26] Probation revocation is a two-step process. Trammell v. State, 45 N.E.3d 1212, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). First, the State is required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated the conditions of probation. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 615. Next, the trial court determines the sanction to impose for the violation. Trammell, 45 N.E.3d at 1215. The standard of review on appeal from the revocation of a community corrections placement mirrors that for the revocation of probation. McQueen v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1237, 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ind. 1999)). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 954-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's decision that a defendant has violated any terms of probation, we will affirm the trial court's judgment. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 639-640 (Ind. 2008).

[27] In this case, the evidence established that King's weekly schedule provided that he was permitted to be away from home for work on September 17 between 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. King's GPS monitoring device and map showed that he was not at his residence from 7:03 p.m. to 7:22 p.m. King also admitted that he was not at home at that time. King was aware of the exclusionary zone, and he knew that he was not permitted to be near D.A. “or her property.” Transcript Vol. II at 35. King left D.A.’s property only after he received a call from an individual at the COS Program who informed him that he was “outside of [his] times” and was “not allowed to be where [he] was.” Id. at 37. Although King testified that he was not on D.A.’s property and was working in the subdivision behind her home, the GPS map showed that he was in D.A.’s backyard.

[28] When considering the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court was well within its discretion to make a credibility determination and disbelieve King's testimony and revoke his COS Program placement. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. State, 992 N.E.2d 951, 954 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the defendant's probation where the defendant's only evidence was his own self-serving testimony), trans. denied.

[29] In sum, the evidence was sufficient to show that King violated both conditions as alleged in the Termination Notice.

III. Improper Sanction

[30] King argues that the revocation order must be set aside because the sanction imposed for his violations was improper. King maintains that this case should be remanded for the trial court to reconsider revoking his placement in the COS Program and its order directing him to serve his previously suspended sentence at the DOC because the violations were minor and he was “away from [his] residence for only 19 minutes.” Appellant's Brief at 14.

[31] Probation sanctions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. If a trial court finds that an individual violated a condition of probation and revokes that person's probation, among its options is to “order execution of any part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of the initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3); Rosa v. State, 832 N.E.2d 1119, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). So long as the trial court follows due process requirements, “it may properly order execution of a suspended sentence.” Abernathy v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[32] In this case, the evidence showed that King committed the two violations only weeks after he was sentenced. When considering an appropriate sanction, the trial court observed that the timing “mean[t] a lot,” in that King's commission of the violations just a few weeks after sentencing indicated that King was “not seriously trying to change [his] behavior” with respect to D.A. and the no contact order. Transcript Vol. II at 59.

[33] King's presence at D.A.’s house established that he was not willing to abide by the court's no contact order. The evidence supports the trial court's determination that King was not seriously attempting to change his behavior and demonstrates that he had complete disregard for the law and the court's authority. In short, King's actions posed a danger to D.A., and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering him to serve the previously suspended three-year sentence at the DOC.

[34] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The COS Program is similar to work release and is administered at the Madison County Community Justice Center.

2.   The trial court merged the Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated conviction with the operating a vehicle while intoxicated Level 6 felony conviction.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.