Isaiah Lawrence, Appellant-Petitioner v. Toni Jackson, Appellee-Respondent (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Isaiah Lawrence (“Husband”) appeals the trial court's dissolution of his marriage to Toni Jackson (“Wife”). Husband appeals and argues that the trial court erred by: (1) improperly valuing certain marital assets; (2) deviating from a presumptive equal division of the marital estate; (3) improperly calculating the parties’ weekly gross incomes for child support purposes; and (4) awarding Wife work-related child care costs. We conclude: (1) the trial court erred in valuing certain marital assets; (2) because the trial court erred in valuing certain marital assets, its calculation of the marital estate was incorrect, and a reconsideration of the division of the marital estate is necessary; (3) the trial court improperly calculated the parties’ weekly gross incomes for child support purposes; and (4) the trial court erred by awarding Wife work-related child care costs. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

Issues

[2] Husband raises four issues, which we reorder and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court erred in valuing certain marital assets.

II. Whether the trial court erred by deviating from a presumptive equal division of the marital estate.

III. Whether the trial court erred in calculating the parties’ weekly gross incomes for child support purposes.

IV. Whether the trial court erred by awarding Wife work-related child care costs.

Facts

[3] Husband and Wife married on July 3, 2003, when both were members of the military. The marriage produced three children, Ja.L., born in 2013; Jo.L., born in 2016; and J.R.L., born in 2018 (collectively, “the Children”). Husband and Wife are both rated as 100 percent disabled, and neither are employed. Both receive income from disability benefits, and Husband also receives disbursements from his military retirement pension.

[4] During the marriage, Wife and the Children lived in Camby. From 2012 to 2018, Husband lived in either South Carolina, where his mother and sisters live; was stationed in San Diego, California; or was deployed in Afghanistan. Husband visited the family on some weekends and holidays and sent $1,400 to the family each month from his military housing allowance. Wife was medically discharged from the military early during the marriage. She cared for the Children and supervised their homeschooling while Husband lived outside of Indiana. Husband retired from the military in May 2018 and took a teaching job in South Carolina. Husband left the teaching position in 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and health concerns, and he returned to Indiana.

[5] In early December 2022, Husband's sisters loaned him several thousand dollars, and Husband transferred the money from a joint account with Wife to an individual account. On December 7, 2022, Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, and on February 13, 2023, Wife filed a counter-petition for dissolution of marriage.

[6] The trial court held a final hearing on the petitions on July 23, 2024, and Husband appeared pro se. On September 26, 2024, the trial court issued a final order granting the dissolution of marriage (“dissolution decree”). The trial court valued the marital estate at $275,379.46 and awarded sixty-four percent to Wife and thirty-six percent to Husband. This included awarding Wife half of husband's military retirement pension.

[7] Regarding child support, the trial court determined that Husband's weekly gross income was $1,637.68 and that Wife's weekly gross income was $1,313.99. These figures reflect the values in Wife's proposed child support worksheet, which she designated as Exhibit C during the final hearing, and include all of Husband's military retirement pension disbursements in Husband's weekly gross income; the trial court did not include the fifty percent of the military retirement pension disbursements that Wife was awarded in calculating Wife's weekly gross income.

[8] In the child support calculation, the trial court also included $100.00 for Wife's weekly “work-related child care expenses.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25; Ex. Vol. p. 21. This was also based upon Wife's proposed child support worksheet. The trial court, thus, ordered Husband to pay $419.00 in weekly child support.¹ Husband now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Husband challenges the trial court's: (1) valuation of certain marital assets; (2) deviation from the presumptive equal division of the marital estate; (3) failure to include half of the military retirement pension disbursements when calculating Wife's weekly gross income and the inclusion of all of the disbursements when calculating Husband's weekly gross income; and (4) the inclusion of work-related child care costs for Wife on the child support obligation worksheet.

[10] In adjudicating the parties’ dissolution of marriage, the trial court entered sua sponte findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). “ ‘As to the issues covered by the findings, we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.’ ” Hahn-Weisz v. Johnson, 189 N.E.3d 1136, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). “We reverse ‘the findings only if they are clearly erroneous.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Adoption of I.B., 32 N.E.3d 1164, 1169 (Ind. 2015)). “We review any remaining issues under the general judgment standard, under which we will affirm the judgment ‘if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287). “We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo.” Id. (quoting Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013)).

[11] We also note that:

there is a well-established preference in Indiana “for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1993). Appellate courts “are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Brickley v. Brickley, 247 Ind. 201, 204, 210 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1965)). “On appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Id.

Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016).

I. Valuation of Marital Assets

[12] We first address Husband's argument that the trial court erred in its valuation of certain assets in the marital estate. “The trial court has broad discretion in ascertaining the value of property in a dissolution action, and we will not disturb its valuation absent an abuse of that discretion.” Meyer v. East, 205 N.E.3d 1066, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Smith v. Smith, 194 N.E.3d 63, 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)). “The trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is sufficient evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom to support the result.” Id. (citation omitted). “In other words, we will not reverse the trial court unless the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id. at 1072-73 (citation omitted).

[13] Husband argues that the trial court improperly valued Wife's personal property, which was awarded to Wife, and Husband's Navy Federal Credit Union Active Duty Checking account, which was awarded to Husband.² Both values used by the trial court are the proposed values Wife submitted in Wife's Exhibit N. See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 36-37; Ex. Vol. I p. 53.

[14] We begin by addressing Wife's personal property. At trial, Wife agreed to assign a value of $5,000.00 to her personal property, and this value was uncontested by Husband. See Tr. Vol. II pp. 244-45. Wife's Exhibit N, however, does not list nor place a value on Wife's personal property. Wife's personal property should have been assigned a value of $5,000.00 based on her undisputed testimony. The trial court clearly erred in assigning no value to Wife's personal property.

[15] Next, as for the Navy Federal Credit Union Active Duty Checking account, the trial court listed this property twice and valued it both as $30,722.01 and again as $9,313.61 based on the figures proposed in Wife's Exhibit N. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 36. According to Husband's bank statements, the account never carried a balance over $20,410.54. See Ex. Vol. I pp. 73-74. Wife directs us to the summary of the transactions regarding this account, but the summary merely shows that Husband had $30,722.01 of “Deposits/Credits” into the account, not that the account carried a balance of this amount. Id. at 70 (emphasis added). On December 7, 2022—the date Husband filed for dissolution of the marriage—the account had a balance of $20,410.54, and as of December 24, 2022—the last entry in the exhibit representing the account—Husband carried a balance of $9,319.61. The trial court appears to have double counted the account, and the trial court's valuation thereof is clear error.

[16] The trial court clearly erred in valuing the marital estate. We, therefore, reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court correct these errors.

II. Deviation from Presumptive Equal Division of Marital Estate

[17] Husband next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by deviating from a presumptive equal division of the marital estate and awarding Wife sixty-four percent. The party challenging the trial court's property division “ ‘must overcome a strong presumption that the court complied with the statute and considered the evidence on each of the statutory factors.’ ” Randolph v. Randolph, 210 N.E.3d 890, 901 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Smith, 194 N.E.3d at 72); see also Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. “ ‘The presumption that a dissolution court correctly followed the law and made all the proper considerations when dividing the property is one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal.’ ” Randolph, 210 N.E.3d at 901 (quoting Smith, 194 N.E.3d at 72). We will reverse the trial court's division of the marital estate only if the trial court abused its discretion, which occurs when the “decision stands clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or reasonable inferences, if it misinterprets the law, or if it overlooks evidence of applicable statutory factors.” Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 225 (Ind. 2022) (citation omitted).

[18] Once the trial court has determined the value of the marital estate, “ ‘the trial court must then divide the marital property under the presumption that an equal division is just and reasonable.’ ” Randolph, 210 N.E.3d at 901 (quoting Eads v. Eads, 114 N.E.3d 868, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). “The presumption of an equal division may be rebutted by the presentation of certain factors detailed in Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-5.” Id.

[19] Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-5 provides,

The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. However, this presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.

Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. The trial court “must state its reasons for deviating from the presumption of an equal division in its findings and judgment.” Randolph, 210 N.E.3d at 901 (citing Eads, 114 N.E.3d at 874).

[20] Here, the trial court found that several factors supported a deviation from the presumptive equal division of the marital estate. We need not decide whether these factors support the deviation because, as discussed in Part I, the trial court's valuation of certain marital assets was erroneous. Accordingly, “the trial court's decision to divide the marital pot [ ] was not based upon the proper valuation of the marital estate.” Falatovics v. Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d 108, 111 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “ ‘[K]nowing the numerical split of the entire estate might alter the trial court's view of the appropriateness of its property division.’ ” Id. (citing Montgomery v. Faust, 910 N.E.2d 234, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). We, thus, remand with instructions that the trial court redetermine division of the marital estate once it has properly valued the marital estate as a whole. See Hughes v. McKenzie, 246 N.E.3d 275, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (remanding with instructions that trial court include improperly omitted “tax liability in the marital pot, assign a value to the liability, then make any findings or deviation from the original 50/50 division of the marital estate”); Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d at 112 (remanding with instructions that the trial court include improperly omitted assets in marital estate and then “redistribute the marital assets as it deems appropriate”).

III. Weekly Gross Income

[21] Husband argues that the trial court erred in calculating the parties’ weekly gross incomes for purposes of the child support calculation by failing to account for the award of half of Husband's military retirement pension to Wife in dividing the marital estate. A trial court's calculation of child support is presumptively valid, and we will reverse only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. In re Paternity of K.C., 171 N.E.3d 659, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Young v. Young, 891 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind. 2008)). A decision is clearly erroneous if the evidence does not support the trial court's findings or if the trial court applies the wrong legal standard. Id. (citing Young, 891 N.E.2d at 1047).

[22] “ ‘The first step in establishing a child support award is to determine the weekly gross income of each parent.’ ” In re Paternity of C.B., 112 N.E.3d 746, 757-58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Scott v. Scott, 668 N.E.2d 691, 695-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)), trans. denied. Indiana Child Support Guideline 3(A)(1) defines weekly gross income as:

actual weekly gross income of the parent if employed to full capacity, potential income if unemployed or under-employed, and the value of ‘in kind’ benefits received by the parent. Weekly gross income of each parent includes income from any source, except as excluded below,[3] and includes, but is not limited to, income from salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses, overtime, partnership distributions, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, annuities, structured settlements, capital gains, social security benefits, worker's compensation benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, disability insurance benefits, gifts, inheritance, prizes, and alimony or maintenance received.

[23] Here, the trial court adopted Wife's proposed child support obligation worksheet, which calculated Husband's weekly gross income as $1,657.68 and Wife's weekly gross income as $1,313.99. The calculation of Husband's weekly gross income included all of Husband's military retirement pension disbursements instead of the actual fifty percent Husband is directed to receive under the dissolution decree; the trial court ordered the other fifty percent of the military retirement pension disbursements to be distributed to Wife. Accordingly, only half of the military retirement pension should have been used to calculate Husband's post-dissolution weekly gross income, and the other half should have been included as part of Wife's post-dissolution weekly gross income. The trial court's calculations of Husband's and Wife's weekly gross income, thus, are clearly erroneous. We remand with instructions that the trial court reduce Husband's weekly gross income determination and increase Wife's weekly gross income determination accordingly.

IV. Work-Related Child Care Costs

[24] Lastly, Husband argues that the trial court erred by awarding Wife $100.00 in weekly work-related childcare costs because Wife does not work and is not seeking employment. Child Support Guideline 3E.1 provides:

Child care costs incurred due to employment or job search of both parent(s) should be added to the basic obligation. It includes the separate cost of a sitter, day care, or like care of a child or children while the parent works or actively seeks employment. Such child care costs must be reasonable and should not exceed the level required to provide quality care for the children. Continuity of child care should be considered.

Child care costs required for active job searches are allowable on the same basis as costs required in connection with employment.

(Emphasis added).

[25] Here, the trial court found that Wife “incurs $100/week in work-related childcare expenses,” which was factored into the child support obligation worksheet. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25. Wife included this amount in her proposed child support obligation worksheet, which the trial court adopted. See Ex. Vol. I p. 21. Wife, however, testified unequivocally that she has not worked since 2003 and is not capable of working due to her disabilities. Wife testified that she incurs child care costs only when she has “an appointment,” has to “come to court,” needs to “run errands,” or wishes to spend time with one of the Children “one on one.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 180-81.

[26] There is no evidence that Wife was incurring child care costs “due to employment or job search[.]” Child Supp. Guideline 3E.1. The trial court's finding of work-related child care costs, thus, is clearly erroneous. See Ashworth v. Ehrgott, 934 N.E.2d 152, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that trial court erred by including daughter's preschool costs in child support order because mother was not employed and there was no evidence of any job search that required mother to seek child care); Cross v. Cross, 891 N.E.2d 635, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that mother's “child care expense [was] neither work-related nor income-producing” and, thus, did not fall within the provisions of the Child Support Guidelines). We remand with instructions to the trial court to recalculate child support in accordance with this opinion.

Conclusion

[27] The trial court clearly erred in valuing Wife's personal property and Husband's Navy Federal Credit Union Active Duty Checking account; in calculating both Husband's and Wife's post-dissolution weekly gross income for child support purposes; and by including work-related child care costs in the weekly child support calculations. Additionally, the trial court must redetermine the division of the marital estate based on the corrected values of the marital assets. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

[28] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court's dissolution decree states, “A Child Support Obligation Worksheet is attached and incorporated hereto as Exhibit A”; however, no such exhibit or child support obligation worksheet is attached to the trial court's dissolution decree. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25 (bold in original). Instead, the trial court's figures and calculations appear to be based on Mother's proposed child support obligation worksheet, which she entered as Exhibit C during the final hearing and attached as Exhibit A to her proposed order submitted after the hearing. See Ex. Vol. I p. 21.

2.   Husband also raises a third argument in his brief, but he refers only to his testimony at the final hearing. The argument reads in its entirety:Husband stated that [Husband's] vehicle was totaled after the petition for dissolution was filed, Transcript, Vol. 2, p. 235-6. He explained that the money he received from the insurance company as compensation for the value of the vehicle was placed into his Navy Federal Credit Union savings and checking accounts, Transcript, Vol. 2, p. 247, which clearly was after the petition for dissolution was filed[.]Appellant's Br. p. 21. Husband fails to present a cogent argument supported by caselaw or other authority, and we are unable to discern his claim of error. His argument, thus, is waived. See Ind. R. App. P. 46(A)(8)(a) (providing that an appellant's arguments “must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning” and “be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on[.]”); Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (noting that appellate courts will not address arguments that are “ ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood’ ”) (quoting Terpstra v. Farmers & Merchs. Bank, 483 N.E.2d 749, 754 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), trans. denied).

3.   “Specifically excluded are benefits from means tested public assistance programs, including, but not limited to, Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Security Income, and Food Stamps. Also excluded are survivor benefits received by or for other children residing in either parent's home.” Child Supp. Guideline 3(A)(1).

Tavitas, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Felix concur. Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.