JONES v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Vincent Jones was convicted of Level 3 felony rape, for which he received a sentence of eight years—three executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC), two on home detention, and three on probation. Jones presents the following restated issues on appeal:

1. Was T.G.’s testimony incredibly dubious, leaving insufficient evidence to support Jones's conviction?

2. Did the trial court abuse its sentencing discretion by considering two aggravators that were not supported by the record?

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Jones and T.G. met at work toward the end of 2019 and worked daily with one another until August of 2020. The two became friends and hung out with each other on several occasions outside of work. By August 2020, following the passing of T.G.’s brother, T.G. stopped contact with most people and the two no longer worked together. In March of 2021, Jones reached out to T.G. on Facebook. The pair reconnected, and on March 21, 2021, at 12:51 a.m., Jones met T.G. outside her mother's house, where she was staying. They drove to two gas stations and then returned. While they were parked outside the home, the two drank alcohol and conversed. Jones began acting strangely.

[4] Jones got out of the vehicle, looked at T.G. through the windshield, and then got back into the car. Jones then tried to recline T.G.’s seat. T.G. told Jones that she was going to go inside if he did not stop and then she attempted to get out of the car. Before she was able to exit, Jones pulled the lever that reclined T.G.’s seat, climbed on top of her, and began choking her. T.G. tried to hit Jones and told him to get off her. T.G. felt that Jones was choking her to death, so she stopped struggling. Jones unbuttoned T.G.’s pants, and then T.G. pulled them down the rest of the way herself. Jones then penetrated T.G. vaginally with his penis. Afterwards, Jones got off of T.G. and started talking as if nothing happened. T.G. then got out of the car and entered her house casually to make Jones think that she was not going to call the police.

[5] T.G.’s mother woke up around 4:00 a.m. and found her standing silently in the living room. Before returning to bed, she asked T.G. what she was doing, but T.G. did not answer. At 9:00 a.m. when her mother was leaving for work, T.G. was still awake. Her mother asked her again what was wrong, but T.G. was unable to get the words out while crying. T.G. eventually stated that she was assaulted, and her mother called the police. After providing an initial police report, T.G. went to the hospital and received a sexual assault examination. T.G. reported that she had been sexually assaulted and strangled. A nurse practitioner noted two abrasions on her neck and a small tear on her vagina. The nurse practitioner then collected swabs from T.G.’s neck, face, and genitals.

[6] Officers later obtained buccal swabs from Jones and compared them to the swabs collected from T.G. during her sexual assault examination. Jones's DNA matched the DNA found on T.G.’s external genital swab.

[7] Jones was charged with Level 3 felony rape and Level 6 felony strangulation and found guilty by a jury on both counts. Citing to double jeopardy concerns, however, the trial court vacated the strangulation count.

[8] Prior to the sentencing hearing, the State submitted a memorandum referencing an uncharged 2020 incident involving another alleged rape victim (L.H.) along with medical records from the incident. The memorandum additionally stated that a DNA match was found between L.H. and Jones. The State argued at sentencing that the two incidents bore similarities. The trial court acknowledged the concerns raised but ultimately gave limited weight to the uncharged conduct, noting it had not been adjudicated.

[9] The court found two additional aggravating circumstances. The nature of the offense, and Jones's position of trust. As mitigating, the court recognized that Jones had no criminal history, had a low risk of reoffending, was a productive member of society, and may respond affirmatively to probation or short-term imprisonment. The trial court ultimately found that the mitigators outweighed the aggravators and sentenced Jones to eight years—three executed in the DOC, two on home detention, and three on probation.

[10] Jones now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Discussion and Decision

1. Sufficient evidence supports Jones's conviction for rape.

[11] Jones contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his rape conviction. Our standard of review on a claim of insufficient evidence is well settled.

For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017) (internal citation omitted). Further, a conviction can be based on the uncorroborated testimony of one witness, “even if that witness is the victim.” Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012).

[12] To convict Jones of Level 3 felony rape as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally had sexual intercourse with T.G. and that T.G. was compelled by force or imminent threat of force. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1). Jones does not argue that any specific element is unsupported by the evidence. He argues only that the testimony of T.G. was incredibly dubious – “inconsistent and unequivocal” – and thus should not be believed. Appellant's Brief at 14.

[13] As our Supreme Court has stated:

Under our “incredible dubiosity” rule, we will invade the jury's province for judging witness credibility only in exceptionally rare circumstances. The evidence supporting the conviction must have been offered by a sole witness; the witness's testimony must have been coerced, equivocal, or wholly uncorroborated; it must have been “inherently improbable” or of dubious credibility; and there must have been no circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt.

McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 559 (Ind. 2018). “Incredible dubiosity is a difficult standard to meet, requiring ambiguous, inconsistent testimony that ‘runs counter to human experience.’ ” Carter v. State, 44 N.E.3d 47, 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2012)).

[14] Jones first emphasizes several discrepancies between T.G.’s trial testimony and prior statements made to the nurse practitioner and detective. However, Indiana courts have consistently held that discrepancies between a witness's trial testimony and prior statements to law enforcement or in depositions are insufficient to render testimony “incredibly dubious.” Holeton v. State, 853 N.E.2d 539, 541-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[15] Jones then directs us to supposed inconsistencies within T.G.’s direct testimony at trial “regarding whether the doors to the car were locked, what steps she took to open the door, and whether Jones attempted to kiss her prior to the alleged assault.” See Appellant's Brief at 22. However, inconsistencies of this nature—generally involving the sequencing or peripheral details of a traumatic event—do not suffice to meet the incredible dubiosity standard. The inability to provide a precise chronological account of a traumatic assault is not inconsistent with human experience. See Carter, 44 N.E.3d 47 at 53 (holding that victim's omission of minor details in the wake of a traumatic rape did not render testimony incredibly dubious).

[16] Here, T.G.’s core allegations—that Jones choked and raped her—remained consistent throughout the trial. These central facts were not contradicted, and minor variations cited by Jones do not render T.G.’s testimony to be inherently improbable or counter to human experience. Furthermore, there was not a complete lack of circumstantial evidence as Jones contends. The sexual assault examination revealed a vaginal tear and two abrasions on T.G.’s neck. Accordingly, we find that the incredible dubiosity rule does not apply in this case.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of aggravating sentencing factors.

[17] Jones claims that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion in its consideration of certain aggravating circumstances.

“[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). When imposing a sentence for a felony offense, a trial court must enter a sentencing statement explaining the reasons it imposed a particular sentence. Id. A trial court may abuse its discretion by failing to enter this statement, by overlooking reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or by considering reasons that are not supported by the record or are improper.

Carranza v. State, 184 N.E.3d 712, 717 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[18] Jones initially argues that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by finding that he occupied a position of trust with the victim and by assigning aggravating weight to that determination. In Rodriguez v. State, 868 N.E.2d 551, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), a case cited by Jones, we observed that positions of trust are often found in the context of nuclear family relationships but may exist outside of that. Even though Rodriquez was not a family member, we held that he was in a position of trust as he frequently cared for the victim in his home while her mother was out at work.

[19] In Edgecomb v. State, 673 N.E.2d 1185 (Ind. 1996) the Supreme Court held that a neighborly relationship without more was insufficient to establish a position of trust. Id. at 1198. Edgecomb was merely a neighbor who occasionally borrowed things from the victim and casually conversed with her when they would see each other. Further, while neighbors, the victim did not trust Edgecomb and had instructed her to never visit again due to her earlier theft of the victim's money. Id. at 1198.

[20] Here, Jones and T.G. worked together daily at a warehouse and the two became friends and socialized in group settings on multiple occasions. After reconnecting, T.G. trusted Jones enough to drink alone with him in his car in the early morning hours. This pattern of interaction suggests a relationship that, while not equivalent to a familial bond, involved a degree of mutual trust greater than that found in casual or clearly untrusting neighborly relationships. The trial court addressed the position of trust as follows:

The people involved were work colleagues. There was I think a sense of trust based on socializing outside the work environment. So I can see that to some degree. It's not the kind of position of trust where you're placing trust in a person because they're responsible for you. So I'm not putting that much weight into that, but it is something. You trust your friends, you should want to trust your friends, and when you can't, that's a harm. And it's something that doesn't let our community work very well if it comes into play. So those are aggravating circumstances as I see them.

[21] Transcript Vol. 4 at 163. On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in identifying position of trust as an aggravating factor.

[22] Jones next argues that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by assigning aggravating weight to an uncharged and unrelated prior bad act that was unsupported by credible evidence. In particular, he contends that the State merely referenced a DNA report in a sentencing memorandum without submitting the actual report or presenting any testimony or forensic evidence linking Jones to the alleged prior act. Jones directs us to Turnstill v. State, 568 N.E.2d 539, 544 (Ind. 1991), where the court stated that a defendant's criminal history must be established by conviction, admission, or properly admitted trial evidence in order to be used as an aggravator.

[23] Here, in addressing the uncharged bad act, the trial court expressly recognized the limited evidentiary value. The court noted that while the proffered information may have constituted probable cause for potential charges, it did not rise to the level of a conviction or fully substantiated criminal activity. The court explained: “I'm not going to ignore it, but I'm not going to give it just the kind of additional weight that I would if there were a conviction on the same kind of offense. And so it is factored in, but it's not a determinative factor.” Transcript Vol. 4 at 162. Not only was this factor specifically given limited weight, but the court also expressly considered Jones's lack of criminal history to be a mitigating factor. In fact, the trial court expressly found that Jones had no criminal history.

[24] The court's reasoning demonstrates a measured and discretionary use of all information presented. Any weight given to the challenged aggravators was minimal at most, and the sentence imposed was below the advisory sentence of nine years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5. Under the circumstances, we are confident that the outcome would not have differed had the challenged aggravators been excluded from consideration. See Kayser v. State, 131 N.E.3d 717, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“If a trial court abuses its discretion by improperly considering an aggravating circumstance, we need to remand for resentencing only ‘if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.’ ”) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491).

[25] Judgment affirmed.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.