IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.S. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] M.S. (“Mother”)¹ appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights over her minor child, A.S. (“Child”). Mother raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the court clearly erred when it terminated her rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The following facts are taken from the unchallenged findings in the trial court's order.² Mother gave birth to Child on July 8, 2020, who was subsequently diagnosed with autism. Prior to Child's birth, Mother had a “lengthy history” with the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) due to concerns about her other two children, M.C. and S.S. Appealed Order at 4. Mother's first case with DCS began in April 2017 and ended after Mother “successfully completed an informal adjustment[.]” Id. Then, in April 2020, DCS filed a petition alleging that M.C. and S.S. were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”) because Mother was “homeless and in and out of shelters” and had “been found in an unsafe living environment where their basic needs were not being met.” Id. There were further concerns that M.C. and S.S. lacked “sufficient food” and that Mother's boyfriend had “hit S.S. with his hand.” Id. at 4-5. Mother was ordered to participate in services, and the case was “successfully closed.” Id. at 6.

[3] In September 2021, three months after the prior case was closed, DCS investigated a report that Mother had “physically [abused]” S.S., leaving him with “bruises” around his eyes, on his cheeks, and behind an ear; scratch marks on his back; a lesion on his head; and an “acute fracture to the left posterior ninth rib.” Id. As a result of Mother's actions, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child is a CHINS. In addition, Mother was charged with and convicted of Level 5 felony battery. Following a hearing on DCS's petition, the court adjudicated Child a CHINS based on Mother's “previous[ ]” admission that she had caused S.S.’s injuries, testimony from S.S.’s and Child's father that he had seen “Mother beat the children numerous times” between December 2017 through 2019, and the fact that Mother's home was “extremely cluttered,” with “bugs flying and dishwasher pods on the floor.” Id. at 8-9. The court then held a dispositional hearing and ordered Mother to participate in various services.

[4] Following a permanency hearing on September 27, 2023, the court found that Mother was participating in services but “continue[d] to struggle to maintain a safe and appropriate home environment and consistently secure resources for herself to keep her rent paid and utilities working without a home[-]based caseworker ensuring that she does so.” Id. at 20. The court also found that Mother “continue[d] to behave inappropriately toward” service providers and members of her care team. Id.

[5] On December 22, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. Following a fact-finding hearing, the court entered the following findings of fact and conclusions thereon:

32. Mother has a lengthy history of struggling with anger management, emotional regulation, and exhibiting negative trauma responses. Mother also has a lengthy history of struggling to maintain cleanliness in her home. She also has a lengthy history of unsuccessfully discharging providers and not completing services recommended to her. Mother also negatively blames others for her problems.

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c. The court finds the following from the testimony presented during [Child's] termination case pertaining to home-based case management and similar services:

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v. [Nicole] Collins-Tunstill[, a family consultant and care coordinator who worked with Mother] testified that after completing the verbal budget she received a phone call from Mother's landlord stating she was going to be evicted and was about four months behind on rent․ Ms. Collins-Tunstill testified that Mother was not able to maintain the cleanliness of the home and there was never a time that all the rooms were clean. Ms. Collins-Tunstill testified that Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from her services.

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d. Supervised parenting time was in place to ensure [Child's] safety.

i. ․ [Renee] Garino[, a licensed therapist,] testified that Mother struggled regulating her own emotions during visits, did not understand signs of frustration or overstimulation for the children, and has not been able to maintain safety during the visits․ Ms. Garino testified that during a visit Mother asked to hug [Child] thirty-five (35) times during a single visit and [Child] said no every time but Mother hugged [Child] anyway. Mother does not understand Child's boundaries, how his boundaries apply to him, and the effects on Child when his boundaries are not respected. Ms. Garino recommended that Mother's visit[s] be moved from her home to the community and a facility because Mother's home was not appropriately cleaned resulting in safety concerns for the children․ Ms. Garino testified that Mother has not been able to establish a consistent method to ensure home cleanliness, respect for other environments, an understanding of parenting education, fully focusing on the children during visits, and being able to maintain control over herself and the children. Ms. Garino recommended that another therapeutic visitation provider join her on her six (6) hour visits because Mother is unable to self-regulate her emotions; therefore, one provider is needed to help regulate the children and another provider is needed to help regulate Mother during visits․ Ms. Garino testified that in the year she has been on the case, she has never recommended either a step down in supervision level or an increase of visitation hours.

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34. [Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Ann] Garcia testified that during her time assigned to Child's case, there was significant chaos between Mother and service providers. Mother refused to work with certain service providers and at other times would randomly “fire” the service providers. This forced FCM Garcia to place multiple referrals for home-based casework services, home-based therapy, and visitation providers. Mother's minimal progress made with service providers would have to start completely over each time a new service provider would get involved in the case.

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37. FCM Garcia observed [Child's] interactions with Mother as well as [Child's] interactions with his foster placement. [Child] was observed to be on edge and not comfortable around Mother, and would often chew on his shirt as a sign of overstimulation. Compared to placement, [Child] would appear very bonded with his placement.

38. ․ [T]he [Child and Family Team] meetings remain focused on Mother and her needs instead of the meetings being focused on [Child] and his well-being․ FCM [Danica] Thiam does not recommend that Child be returned to Mother's care because Mother has not shown stability in maintaining employment, has not been able to maintain a clean and safe home, has not shown an ability to regulate her emotions, and has generally shown an overall inability to show consistency and stability.

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40. [Linda] Thoth[, Child's Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”)] testified that adoption is in [Child's] best interest due to Mother's lack of progress in the case for the past three (3) years․

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42. When [Mother] testified, ․ [she] admitted to beating S.S. and accepting a plea deal for battery․ Mother stated that visits with the children are becoming bad for her mental health. Mother admitted to her home being dirty and it being “like a cycle.”

Id. at 24-35. The court then concluded that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by Mother, that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being, and that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Accordingly, the court terminated Mother's parental rights as to Child. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Mother challenges the trial court's termination of her parental rights over Child. We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[7] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

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(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023).³ DCS's “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-14-2).

[8] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[9] Here, in terminating Mother's parental rights, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[10] On appeal, Mother purports to challenge the trial court's conclusions that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for Child's removal or continued placement outside of Mother's home will not be remedied, that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child, and that adoption is in Child's best interests. However, Mother's entire argument regarding the court's conclusions is two pages long and contains only citations to legal principles, such as the two-step analysis a court should use to determine if the reasons for a child's removal or continued placement are likely to be remedied or that the testimony of the FCM and CASA are sufficient to sustain a finding that adoption is in a child's best interests. See Appellant's Br. at 31-32.

[11] The only parts of Mother's argument that are not citations to legal principles are her statements that “DCS has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children's best interests[ ] simply because the family case manager and the CASA willed it so” and that the “court's findings are deficient in that the majority of the findings are from a previous termination and do not take into account the change in circumstances at the time of the fact finding in this matter.” Appellant's Br. at 32. In addition, Mother makes the conclusory statement that the trial court's findings “are not supported by the evidence and the conclusions of law are not supported by the findings. The remaining findings aren't sufficient to support the court[’]s conclusions supporting termination. The findings and conclusions should be set aside as clearly erroneous, and the termination order vacated.” Id. at 32-33.

[12] However, at no point does Mother make any argument as to how the trial court erred when it concluded that the reasons for Child's removal or placement outside of Mother's home are not likely to be remedied, that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child, or that adoption is in Child's best interests. Nor does she cite to any portion of the Record on Appeal to support her contentions. As such, Mother has waived our review of the issue. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). See also Watson v. Auto Advisors, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 1017, 1027 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that “[w]hen parties fail to provide argument and citations, we find their arguments are waived for appellate review.”).

[13] Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court's unchallenged findings clearly support its conclusions.⁴ Despite being involved with the instant case for three years, Mother has not shown that she is capable of maintaining a clean home, regulating her own emotions, understanding Child's needs or boundaries, or implementing parenting skills. Stated differently, the findings demonstrate that Mother did not complete services and is not capable of parenting Child. Further, the findings demonstrate that Child is uncomfortable around Mother but very bonded with his foster placement and that, through his foster placement, Child is receiving the services he needs to assist with his autism. Those findings support the court's conclusions that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for Child's removal or continued placement outside of Mother's home will not be remedied and that adoption is in Child's best interests. The trial court did not clearly err when it terminated Mother's parental rights over Child. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A.S.’s father voluntarily terminated his parental rights, and he does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Mother challenges some of the court's findings and portions of other findings as unsupported by the evidence. However, we do not cite to or rely on any of the challenged findings.

3.   Our legislature amended this statute effective March 11, 2024. However, we cite to the prior version of the statute that was in effect at the time of the filing of the termination petition.

4.   Mother challenges portions of several of the trial court's findings. However, we need not determine whether those findings are supported by the record. It is well settled that erroneous findings do not warrant reversal if they amount to mere surplusage and add nothing to the trial court's decision. See Lasater v. Lasater, 809 N.E.2d 380, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Here, Mother does not challenge the vast majority of the court's findings, and we accept those unchallenged findings as true. L.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re S.S.), 120 N.E.3d 605, 608 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). And, while Mother has waived her argument regarding the court's conclusions for failing to make cogent argument, it is clear that the unchallenged findings support those conclusions.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.