Dustin Lee Grogan, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Dustin Grogan appeals his conviction of two counts of causing serious bodily injury when operating a vehicle while intoxicated, arguing the State's evidence was insufficient to prove that he was driving at the time of the collision. Concluding the State's evidence was sufficient, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 10, 2023, Officer John Maples with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department was on patrol when he encountered a white Volkswagen sedan. The Volkswagen was traveling in front of Officer Maples’ vehicle and, after it went through an intersection, it performed a U-turn. A male, later identified as Grogan, leaned out of the window of the Volkswagen, pointed to a home on one side of the street and told the officer to hurry because his family was overdosing in a van there. Officer Maples exited his car to speak with Grogan and assess the situation. When the officer began walking toward the house Grogan had indicated, Grogan said, “[N]o, no, not tha[t] one; this one[.]” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 143. As the officer approached the house, Grogan did not stop but drove off down the street, accelerating to a high rate of speed. Upon finding no emergency at the residence, Officer Maples returned to his vehicle and headed in the same direction as the Volkswagen. When the officer reached the intersection of Epler and East Streets, he saw that the Volkswagen and another vehicle had been in a collision. When Officer Maples approached the Volkswagen, he saw Grogan in the driver's seat. The woman who was in the car with Grogan was face down laying over the center console almost in Grogan's lap with her legs through the windshield.

[3] Subsequent testing revealed fentanyl, norfentanyl, amphetamine, and methamphetamine in Grogan's system. The State charged Grogan with two counts of causing serious bodily injury when operating a vehicle while intoxicated, Level 5 felonies; two counts of causing serious bodily injury when operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II substance in the blood, Level 5 felonies; operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the blood, a Class C misdemeanor; unlawful carrying of a handgun, a Class A misdemeanor; and operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor. A jury found Grogan guilty of all the charges except unlawful carrying of a handgun. The trial court vacated all the convictions except the two Level 5 felonies of causing serious bodily injury when operating a vehicle while intoxicated and sentenced Grogan to an aggregate sentence of six years. Grogan now appeals his convictions.

Discussion and Decision

[4] When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable fact finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed. Labarr v. State, 36 N.E.3d 501, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his convictions after a jury verdict, “the appellate posture is markedly deferential to the outcome below ․” Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1181 (Ind. 2016). More particularly, “[t]he identity of the perpetrator of a crime is a question of fact, not law, and the weight given to identification evidence and any determination of whether it is satisfactory or trustworthy is a function of the trier of fact.” Watkins v. State, 551 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (Ind. 1990).

[5] Grogan contends that his convictions are based upon a “faulty assumption,” rather than evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that at the time of the crash he was the driver of the Volkswagen. Appellant's Br. p. 15. He disputes Officer Maples’ estimation of the time between their interaction and the crash. Although Grogan acknowledges the officer's testimony that only thirty to forty-five seconds passed between the time Grogan left the neighborhood and the time the officer arrived at the crash scene, he points to a remark the officer made to argue that the collision occurred thirty minutes after their interaction, giving Grogan and his passenger time to switch places at some point prior to the collision.

[6] While Officer Maples mentioned a thirty minute time period at one point in his testimony, it seems he was referring to when he first saw the Volkswagen in traffic that evening prior to any interaction with Grogan. Officer Maples testified: “I believe it was a Volkswagen that I had actually seen prior to me pulling up to this intersection, I don't know, maybe a half-hour or so back[.]” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 141. Conversely, the officer's testimony concerning the amount of time between Grogan leaving the neighborhood and the officer's arrival at the crash scene was clear and unequivocal. On direct examination, the prosecuting attorney asked him how much time passed between his interaction with Grogan and his arrival to the accident scene, and Officer Maples responded: “So I'm out of my vehicle. I watch [the Volkswagen] basically almost drive out of sight. I get into my car. I'm guessing that it was under a minute. I mean, I would say probably between 30 to 45 seconds.” Id. at 148. And on cross-examination, the officer confirmed that timing.

Q Officer, when you -- I think you had estimated that it was approximately 30 to 45 seconds from the moment that you saw Mr. Grogan in that white sedan to the moment that you came across the accident; is that correct?

A Say approximately. In that window.

Q And you acknowledge that's an approximation, correct?

A Yes, sir.

Id. at 161.

[7] Grogan also calls into question the testimony of the officer and another witness that he was in the driver's seat and a woman was in the passenger seat. However, the testimony on that point is clear and unequivocal as well.

[8] When asked what he saw inside the Volkswagen when he arrived at the crash scene, Officer Maples testified he could see “the male sitting in the driver's seat[.]” Id. at 151. On redirect, the officer was again questioned:

Q When you first were able to look into the white sedan, was there anyone seated in the driver's seat?

A In the driver's seat?

Q Yes.

A Yes, sir.

Q And was that a male or female?

A It was a male.

Q Is that the same person who you saw earlier driving the vehicle?

A Yes, it was.

Id. at 162-63. In addition, a woman who witnessed the crash and immediately was on the scene testified that in the Volkswagen there was a male driver and a female passenger. Id. at 173. Again on cross-examination, she confirmed her statement. Id. at 175. Even Grogan concedes that “[a] conviction may be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness[.]” Baltimore v. State, 878 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied; see Appellant's Br. p. 14.

[9] Grogan's argument is merely an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess the credibility of the witnesses, which we cannot accept. See Sandleben, 29 N.E.3d at 131. For us to do otherwise would invade the exclusive province of the jury. See Gantt v. State, 825 N.E.2d 874, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing jury's province to accept or reject evidence as it sees fit). Based on the evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Grogan was driving the Volkswagen at the time of the crash.

Conclusion

[10] We conclude the State produced sufficient evidence to show that Grogan was the driver of the Volkswagen at the time of the crash. Accordingly, we affirm his convictions.

[11] Affirmed.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Judges Felix and Scheele concur. Felix, J., and Scheele, J., concur.