Isaac Maowed, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Braxton Gray, Appellee-Defendant (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Isaac Maowed appeals the small-claims court's order that he pay Braxton Gray $1,500 in attorney's fees. We agree with Maowed that attorney's fees aren't warranted and therefore reverse the award.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In July 2024, Maowed, represented by counsel, filed a “Small Claims Eviction Complaint” against Cory and Braxton Gray, who are father and son. The complaint alleged that “Defendants have failed, without sufficient excuse, to pay rent for more than three months as required by the parties’ executed ‘Residential Lease’ dated February 25, 2024.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. The lease was for a house in Westfield. A copy of the lease, which named both Braxton and Cory as lessees but was ultimately signed only by Cory, was attached to the complaint. See id. at 16. The lease term was March 15, 2024, to March 14, 2025. See id. at 10. The small-claims court set an “eviction trial” for August 22. See id. at 8, 19.

[3] The night before the eviction hearing, Braxton, represented by counsel, filed an Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the action as to him because he did not sign the lease and allegedly lived elsewhere. He requested an award of “reasonable attorney fees” for having to defend the case, alleging that “his inclusion in this current action is both frivolous and vexatious in nature.” Id. at 22. Cory and Braxton also filed a counterclaim against Maowed for breach of lease agreement and retaliatory eviction. See id. at 24.

[4] The eviction hearing was held on August 22. There is no transcript of that hearing, so we don't know what was discussed about Braxton. What we do know is that the small-claims court issued an order that same day directing both Cory and Braxton to vacate the premises by September 21. See id. at 32; see also Appellee's Br. p. 5 (Braxton acknowledging that the court evicted both him and his father). Despite ruling against Cory and Braxton on the eviction, the court set a hearing on their counterclaim for October 31.

[5] Meanwhile, on October 10, Maowed filed an opposition to Braxton's Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss as well as an answer and affirmative defenses to Braxton and Cory's counterclaim. Maowed claimed that dismissal under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) was not warranted but that he had “no objection and stipulate[d] to [Braxton's] dismissal without prejudice as a defendant ․ [under] T.R. 41(A)(1)(b), which authorizes dismissal without prejudice if both parties agree.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 38. Trial Rule 41(A)(1) provides:

(A) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.

(1) By Plaintiff--By Stipulation. Subject to contrary provisions of these rules or of any statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court:

(a) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs; or

(b) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.

[6] At the October 31 hearing, Maowed again argued that Braxton's Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion should be denied but that he would “agree to a voluntary dismissal” of Braxton from the case under Trial Rule 41(A)(1)(b), which needed Braxton's consent. Tr. p. 5. However, Maowed claimed that Braxton was not entitled to any attorney's fees because “[t]here's been no vindictiveness, there's been no nastiness ․” Id. at 6.

[7] Braxton said he “consent[ed] to dismissal” but would like “fees for [them] having to appear here today” and “prep for hearing.” Id. at 10. The small-claims court told him he couldn't have it both ways and therefore there was no stipulation under Trial Rule 41(A)(1)(b). The court then took testimony from the parties. At the end of the hearing, the small-claims court stated, “The Court[,] ․ after further considering the Defendant Braxton Gray's motion to dismiss, grants Defendant Braxton Gray's motion to dismiss. Court does not award fees.” Id. at 41. Although the court appeared to orally grant Braxton's Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion, the written order it issued states differently:

1. Braxton's T.R. 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

2. Braxton's request for attorney's fees is DENIED.

3. Braxton is DISMISSED as a defendant without prejudice in accord with T.R. 41(A)(1)[.]

4. No attorney fees are awarded.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 87. The court set a hearing for January 2025 to address Maowed's damages and Cory's counterclaim. See id.; Tr. p. 41.

[8] Thereafter, Braxton moved to correct error, alleging that the small-claims court erred in granting the Trial Rule 41(A)(1) dismissal and in denying his Trial Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal. He also argued that he was entitled to attorney's fees under Indiana Code section 34-52-1-1. The court granted Braxton's motion to correct error:

[T]he Court now VACATES the portions of its 10/31/2024 Order Denying Braxton's T.R. 12(B)(6) Motion and Request for Fees and finds the same shall be GRANTED. The Court further finds that the Plaintiff brought his claim for Eviction frivolously and continued to litigate the same in bad faith against Defendant, Braxton Gray and now Orders the Plaintiff to pay $1,500 in reasonable attorney fees to the Defendant, Braxton Gray within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Order.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 112.

[9] Maowed now appeals.¹

Discussion and Decision

[10] Maowed contends the small-claims court erred in dismissing his eviction complaint as to Braxton under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) instead of Trial Rule 41(A)(1) and in awarding Braxton $1,500 in attorney's fees. Braxton responds that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint under Trial Rule 12(B)(6). Since both parties agree that Braxton was properly dismissed, we need not determine what rule the dismissal was proper under. The real dispute between the parties is whether attorney's fees were appropriate under Section 34-52-1-1, which provides:

(b) In any civil action, the court may award attorney's fees as part of the cost to the prevailing party, if the court finds that either party:

(1) brought the action or defense on a claim or defense that is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless;

(2) continued to litigate the action or defense after the party's claim or defense clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; or

(3) litigated the action in bad faith.

(Emphasis added). We review a trial court's award of attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion. River Ridge Dev. Auth. v. Outfront Media, LLC, 146 N.E.3d 906, 912 (Ind. 2020).

[11] Maowed first argues that Braxton is not entitled to attorney's fees because he is not a “prevailing party” under Section 34-52-1-1. See Appellant's Br. pp. 13-14. Under this statute, “a party must obtain a favorable judgment on the merits or comparable relief to qualify as a ‘prevailing party.’ ” River Ridge Dev. Auth., 146 N.E.3d at 914. Maowed claims that a dismissal under either Trial Rule 41(A)(1) or 12(B)(6) is not a favorable judgment on the merits. As Maowed points out, Braxton did not respond to this argument in his brief. See Appellant's Reply Br. p. 8 (“Braxton has not challenged [Maowed's] showing that Braxton is not a ‘prevailing party’ for purposes of IC 34-52-1-1[.]”). We could reverse the award of attorney's fees on this basis alone. But even assuming that Braxton is a prevailing party, he is still not entitled to attorney's fees.

[12] The basis of Braxton's request for attorney's fees is that “because [he] was not a party to the Lease Agreement[,] he was not contractually obligated to pay rent to [Maowed]. And because [he] did not live at the leased residence, he was not able to be evicted from the same.” Appellee's Br. p. 14 (emphasis added). Braxton claims that he moved out of the house in May 2024, two months before the eviction action was filed. But as explained above, the small-claims court evicted both Cory and Braxton in its August 22, 2024 order, and Braxton did not challenge that order. Perhaps the transcript of the August 22, 2024 eviction hearing would shed some light on this issue, but again there is no transcript from that hearing. Moreover, the fact that Braxton did not sign the lease is not necessarily dispositive. “[I]f a lease has been signed by the lessor and accepted and acted upon by the lessee, it may be binding on both parties even though it is not signed by the lessee.” Wang v. Sun, 212 N.E.3d 1252, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Accordingly, since the court evicted both Cory and Braxton, we cannot say, as the court found, that Maowed “brought his claim for Eviction frivolously.” Had there been no basis for evicting Braxton, presumably the court would have evicted Cory only.

[13] The small-claims court also found that Maowed “continued to litigate the same in bad faith.” But in Maowed's response to Braxton's Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion, he agreed to a dismissal under Trial Rule 41(A)(1). And at the hearing three weeks later, Maowed again agreed to a Trial Rule 41(A)(1) dismissal, but Braxton would not stipulate to such a dismissal without attorney's fees. Given that Maowed was successful in getting Braxton evicted and offered to dismiss him from the case under Trial Rule 41(A)(1), we cannot find that he continued to litigate the case in bad faith. We therefore reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees.

[14] Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Maowed says this is an appeal of an interlocutory order taken as of right under Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A). There is a hearing scheduled for September 2025 to address Maowed's damages and Cory's counterclaim.

Vaidik, Judge.

Judges Tavitas and Felix concur. Tavitas, J., and Felix, J., concur.