Steven Lamont Kendall, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Steven Lamont Kendall appeals his conviction for dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death, as a Level 1 felony.¹ We affirm.

Issues

[2] Kendall raises two issues for our review, which we reorder and restate as follows:

1. Whether the court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss because the statute under which he was convicted, Indiana Code Section 35-42-1-1.5 (the “Dealing Resulting in Death Statute”), is unconstitutional.

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In June 2020, Joel Heinzelman sustained a serious injury to his leg in a boating accident. Following his injury, Heinzelman underwent several surgeries and therapy, and he dealt with chronic pain and sleep issues. Doctors prescribed Heinzelman Pregabalin for nerve pain, Buspirone hydrochloride for anxiety, Celecoxib for inflammation, and Propranolol.² In addition, doctors prescribed Heinzelman Oxycodone. But Heinzelman “became dependent on” the Oxycodone, and it became “problematic[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 41. Heinzelman sought treatment for his substance abuse twice, but each time he would resume taking Oxycodone. Heinzelman's mother would manage his prescription, and she kept the Oxycodone “hidden” so she could “administer it as prescribed.” Id. at 43. As a result of his drug use, Heinzelman's driver's license was suspended, and his only modes of transportation were his parents or ride-share services.

[4] In May 2022, when Heinzelman was twenty-six years old, he met Kendall. On May 4, Heinzelman and Kendall had their first text conversation “regarding narcotics transactions[.]” Id. at 231. Heinzelman and Kendall had several text conversations regarding drugs over the next few weeks. Then, on May 26, the two “discuss[ed] a narcotics transaction” involving “percs.”³ Tr. Vol. 3 at 9. Heinzelman used the ride-sharing service Lyft to get a ride from his home to the parking lot of a Geico office where Kendall worked. Heinzelman then obtained thirty-two pills from Kendall.

[5] That evening, Heinzelman texted Kendall: “Damn pills smack the hell outta me[.]” Ex. Vol. 5 at 43.⁴ Kendall responded: “That's a good thing right,” and Heinzelman stated: “I'm hoping.” Id. at 44. Heinzelman then texted Kendall that he hoped the pills “ain't got no fetty whop,” meaning that he hoped the pills did not contain fentanyl. Id. at 46. Kendall stated that they “shouldn't but handle with care.” Id. at 47. Heinzelman then texted that he was sweating a lot and that the pills felt “dirty.” Id. at 49.

[6] The next afternoon, Heinzelman's father, Jeff, texted Heinzelman to make sure he was awake for school. When Jeff did not receive a response, he went to Heinzelman's room. There, Jeff discovered that Heinzelman was “blue” and “unconscious.” Id. at 46. Jeff called 9-1-1 and administered CPR to Heinzelman. When medics arrived, Heinzelman was deceased.

[7] Medics transported Heinzelman to the morgue, and officers searched his room. There, officers found an “assortment” of pills and pill bottles with Heinzelman's prescriptions for Oxycodone, Pregabalin, Buspirone hydrocholoride, Celecoxib, and Propranolol. A few days later, a pathologist performed an autopsy on Heinzelman and collected bodily fluids for toxicology testing.

[8] The toxicology results revealed that Heinzelman had an “insignificant” amount of ibuprofen in his system as well as levels of Pregabalin that were “just a shade above” the therapeutic range. Tr. Vol. 2 at 160-61. Heinzelman also had diphenhydramine, an antihistamine, in his system at levels that were in the “toxic to adverse effects range.” Id. at 163. And Heinzelman had fentanyl in his system at levels that were “more than double” the upper limit of the therapeutic range for fentanyl. Id. at 198. A forensic pathologist determined that Heinzelman's cause of death was “[a]cute Pregabalin, diphenhydramine, and fentanyl intoxication[.]” Id. at 197. The toxicology results led the officers to investigate Heinzelman's phone, where they discovered the texts between Heinzelman and Kendall.

[9] In June 2023, officers arrested Kendall. During an interview, Kendall admitted to having met with Heinzelman on May 26, 2022, but stated that Heinzelman had obtained pills from a third party.

[10] The State charged Kendall with one count of dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death, as a Level 1 felony. Thereafter, Kendall filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him on the ground that the Dealing Resulting in Death Statute is unconstitutional. In particular, Kendall asserted that the statute “relieve[d] the State” of the burden of proving causation, denied him of his right “to present a complete defense,” and is unconstitutionally vague. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 87, 90. The court denied Kendall's motion.

[11] The court then held a two-day bench trial beginning on August 5, 2024. During the trial, a forensic toxicologist testified that Heinzelman's fentanyl levels were 42.6 nanograms and that levels “between 3 and 20 are observed in fatality and toxicity.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 171. Further, Detective Patrick Valentine with the Carmel Police Department testified that, during the month of May 2022, “there was only one individual that [Heinzelman] discussed narcotic transactions with,” which was Kendall. Id. at 216. At the conclusion of the trial, the court found Kendall guilty and entered judgment of conviction against him. Following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Kendall to thirty-five years, with twenty-five years executed in the Department of Correction and ten years suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Motion to Dismiss

[12] Kendall first contends that the court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss. “Although we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss a charging information for an abuse of discretion, we review constitutional challenges to a statute de novo.” Kimbrough v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1280, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Further, a

“challenge to the validity of a statute must overcome a presumption that the statute is constitutional.” Brown v. State, 868 N.E.2d 464, 467 (Ind. 2007) (citing State v. Lombardo, 738 N.E.2d 653, 655 (Ind. 2000)). It is the burden of the party challenging the statute to prove otherwise. Brown, 868 N.E.2d at 467 (citing Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981, 984 (Ind.1991)).

Morgan v. State, 22 N.E.3d 570, 573 (Ind. 2014).

[13] On appeal, Kendall challenges the constitutionality of the Dealing Resulting in Death Statute on several grounds. That statute provides:

(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally manufactures or delivers a controlled substance or controlled substance analog, in violation of: ․

(4) IC 35-48-4-2 (dealing in a schedule I, II, or III controlled substance);

that, when the controlled substance is used, injected, inhaled, absorbed, or ingested, results in the death of a human being who used the controlled substance, commits dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death, a Level 1 felony.

* * *

(d) It is not a defense to an offense described in this section that the human being died:

(1) after voluntarily using, injecting, inhaling, absorbing, or ingesting a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog; or

(2) as a result of using the controlled substance or controlled substance analog in combination with alcohol or another controlled substance or with any other compound, mixture, diluent, or substance.

Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.5.

[14] Kendall contends that this statute is unconstitutional because it denied his due process rights by eliminating the need for the State to prove causation, it infringed on his right to present a defense as guaranteed by various provisions of both the United States and Indiana Constitutions, and it is unconstitutionally vague. However, this Court has previously addressed the same arguments and rejected them.

[15] In Yeary v. State, 186 N.E.3d 662 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), Yeary challenged the constitutionality of the Dealing Resulting in Death Statute on the same grounds that Kendall does here. Regarding the allegations that the statute relieved the State of the burden of proving causation, this Court held that “the plain language of subsection (a) of the [Dealing Resulting in Death] statute requires the State to prove a causal connection between the controlled substance delivered by the defendant and the victim's death.” Id. at 673. This Court continued that subsection (d) did not relieve the State of that burden because “subsection (d)(1) only precludes a defendant from raising as a complete defense that the person who died made the voluntary choice” to use the drug delivered by the defendant and that, as applied, “the defense exclusion in subsection (d)(1) merely prevented Yeary from seeking acquittal solely because [the victim] chose to ingest the drug that Yeary sold him.” Id. Similarly, we held that the plain language of subsection (d)(2) “merely bars a defendant from raising as a complete defense that the person's death resulted from the person's combined use of the distributed drug and alcohol or another controlled substance,” but that the State “still must prove that the death resulted from the drug distributed by the defendant.” Id. at 674. Thus, we held that the statute “does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” because “it does not relieve the State of the burden of proving causation.” Id.

[16] As to the argument that the statute unconstitutionally infringes on the right to present a defense, this Court held that the statute “does not prohibit the defendant from ever arguing the user's voluntary actions broke the chain of causation” but “prohibits the defendant from only arguing that one particular voluntary decision by a user—to ingest the substance—breaks the chain of causation.” Id. at 675. It does not “bar a defendant from arguing that another drug alone caused the death—not ‘the combination’ of the distributed drug and the other controlled substance(s) or alcohol.” Id. at 675-76. Thus, we held that it did not infringe on a defendant's right to present a defense.

[17] Finally, regarding the argument that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, this Court held that the “statute's parameters are clear and easy to understand. A person of ordinary intelligence reading the [Dealing Resulting in Death] statute would understand that it prohibits the knowing or intentional manufacture or delivery of a specified controlled substance that when ingested, kills the user.” Id. at 677. And this Court held that “it is foreseeable that someone who receives a large amount of fentanyl or other opioid will die from an overdose.” Id. As such, this Court held that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.

[18] For the same reasons that this Court in Yeary rejected Yeary's claims that the Dealing Resulting in Death Statute is unconstitutional, we reject Kendall's arguments here. The statute is not unconstitutional, and the trial court did not err when it denied Kendall's motion to dismiss.

Issue Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[19] Kendall next asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Our standard of review on a claim of insufficient evidence is well settled:

For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[20] To convict Kendall, the State was required to prove that he had knowingly or intentionally delivered fentanyl to Heinzelman and that Heinzelman's ingestion of the fentanyl caused his death. See I.C. § 35-42-1-1.5(a). On appeal, Kendall contends that the State failed to prove that he delivered fentanyl to Heinzelman and whether the drugs delivered caused Heinzelman's death. We address each argument in turn.

Fentanyl

[21] Kendall asserts that the State failed to prove that he delivered fentanyl because, while there were “a variety of transactions” between him and Heinzelman, fentanyl was never “explicitly identified or discussed as a substance involved” in those transactions. Appellant's Br. at 11. He further contends that the physical evidence “is notably lacking” because the State never recovered any fentanyl. Id. at 12. And he maintains that the “evidence presented does not show that [he] was aware that [the] contents of any substance allegedly delivered included fentanyl.” Id. at 13.

[22] However, the evidence most favorable to the judgment demonstrates that Heinzelman arranged to buy Percocet from Kendall on May 26, 2022, and that the two met in the parking lot at Kendall's place of employment that evening. Further, the evidence shows that Heinzelman left his home only one time that day and that Kendall was the only person with whom Heinzelman spoke about drug transactions that month. That evidence supports a reasonable inference that Kendall had delivered pills to Heinzelman.

[23] Then, after Heinzelman received the pills, he texted Kendall that they had “smack[ed] the hell outta me.” Ex. Vol. 5 at 43. Kendall did not question the text but simply responded by asking if that was “a good thing.” Id. at 44. Then, when Heinzelman texted that he hoped the pills did not contain fentanyl, Kendall responded that they “shouldn't” but nonetheless instructed Heinzelman to “handle with care.” Id. at 47. Stated differently, Kendall was not surprised by the strength of the pills, and he instructed Heinzelman to handle them carefully. A reasonable fact-finder could infer from that evidence that Kendall knew that the pills contained fentanyl and that he knowingly or intentionally delivered fentanyl to Heinzelman. Kendall's argument is simply a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

Cause of Death

[24] Still, Kendall contends that the State failed to prove that the fentanyl delivery “was the actual and proximate cause of Heinzelman's death.” Appellant's Br. at 14. The Dealing Resulting in Death Statute “requires the State to prove a causal connection between the controlled substance delivered by the defendant and the victim's death.” Yeary, 186 N.E.3d at 673. “The State must prove both that the decedent's death resulted from the drugs the defendant distributed and that the death was reasonably foreseeable.” Russell v. State, 217 N.E.3d 544, 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. “It is reasonably foreseeable that a person who receives a drug will consume it, and therefore, the person's ingestion of the drug is not an intervening cause sufficient to break the chain of causation.” Id.

[25] Kendall asserts that Heinzelman's cause of death was acute pregabalin, diphenhydramine, and fentanyl intoxication and that the toxicology results do “not attribute the death solely to fentanyl overdose.” Appellant's Br. at 14. And Kendall maintains that Heinzelman's death “was not the direct and foreseeable result of Kendall's actions” but was, instead, the result of “Heinzelman's decision to ingest multiple substances in dangerously excessive quantities.” Id. at 15-16.

[26] However, it “is not a defense” that Heinzelman died “as a result of using the controlled substance ․ in combination with alcohol or another controlled substance[.]” I.C. § 35-42-1-1.5(d). Rather, when multiple drugs are in the victim's system, proof of causation “may consist of evidence that the drug distributed by the defendant was enough, by itself, to cause the death.” Yeary, 186 N.E.3d at 674. And, here, the State proved that the fentanyl distributed by Kendall was enough, by itself, to cause Heinzelman's death. Indeed, Heinzelman's fentanyl levels were 42.6 nanograms, and blood concentrations “between 3 and 20 are observed in fatality and toxicity.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 171. Stated differently, Heinzelman's fentanyl levels were more than “double the upper limit of [the] therapeutic range” for fentanyl. Id. at 198. A reasonable fact-finder could determine from that evidence that the extremely high level of fentanyl in Heinzelman's system was enough on its own to cause Heinzelman's death. As such, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Kendall's conviction.

Conclusion

[27] The Dealing Resulting in Death Statute is not unconstitutional. As such, the court did not err when it denied Kendall's motion to dismiss. And the State presented sufficient evidence to support Kendall's conviction. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.5(a).

2.   Propranolol is a beta blocker that is used to treat high blood pressure and “other cardiovascular issues,” but it also “helps with bringing down anxiety.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 166-67. It is not clear from the record whether doctors prescribed this medication to Heinzelman for his heart or anxiety.

3.   “Percs” refers to Percocet. Tr. Vol. 2 at 237.

4.   The text messages that are contained within the Exhibits Volume that was filed by the Clerk's Office are almost completely illegible. However, the State quoted the texts in its Appellee's Brief without response from Kendall. And to the extent we are able to read the texts, it appears as though the State correctly quoted them.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and DeBoer concur. Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.