In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: P.B., C.H., and R.H. (Minor Children) A.B. (Mother) and W.B. (Father), Appellants-Respondents v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] A.B. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights as to her three children: P.B. (age 2), R.H. (age 5), and C.H. (age 8) (collectively, Children). Mother is joined by P.B.’s father, W.B. (Father), who appeals the termination of his parental rights as to P.B.¹ Mother and Father (collectively, Parents ² ) argue only that the trial court erred by concluding termination was in Children's best interests. But during the two years that Children were removed from Parents’ care, Parents regularly used methamphetamine, failed to engage in services aimed at addressing their substance abuse, and frequently skipped or cancelled visits with Children without explanation. Finding the trial court's best interests conclusion was not clearly erroneous, we affirm.

Facts

[2] The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) became involved with Parents and Children in November 2022, when P.B. was born with methamphetamine in her system and Mother tested positive for the same drug. DCS opened an assessment into Children's well-being, and P.B. was discharged from the hospital into Parents’ care on the condition that Parents stop using methamphetamine.

[3] Mother and Father both tested positive for methamphetamine multiple times during the assessment period. DCS also learned that there was “ongoing” domestic violence by Father against Mother and that both Parents had expressed suicidal ideations in front of Children. Tr. Vol. II, p. 75. For these reasons, DCS removed Children from Parents’ care in December 2022 and petitioned to have Children deemed children in need of services (CHINS).

[4] The trial court ruled Children were CHINS in January 2023. A month later, the court issued its dispositional orders, setting permanency plans of reunification and requiring, among other things, that Parents:

• abstain from using illegal substances and submit to random drug screens;

• complete substance abuse assessments and follow all recommendations;

• complete psychological evaluations and follow all recommendations;

• follow all recommendations from any domestic violence assessment; and

• attend all scheduled visitations with Children.

[5] Over the course of the CHINS cases, Parents were mostly noncompliant with the trial court's dispositional order. Though both completed the required substance abuse assessments, neither followed through with the resulting treatment recommendations. And they either missed their random drug screens or tested positive for methamphetamine. Parents also did not meaningfully participate in recommended psychological therapy, home-based counseling, and domestic violence services, and their visits with Children did not go well. Parents frequently skipped or cancelled visits and sometimes ended visits early. There were occasions when Father fell asleep during visits, and others when Parents would argue with each other. The trial court eventually halted Parents’ visits with C.H. due to their negative emotional impact on the child.

[6] At DCS's request, the trial court changed Children's permanency plans to adoption in August 2023. Four months later, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights as to Children. The trial court conducted a fact-finding hearing on DCS's termination petitions in October 2024. At this hearing Children's court-appointed special advocate (CASA) and the family's DCS family case manager (FCM) both testified that termination was in Children's best interests.

[7] After the hearing, the trial court issued an order terminating Parents’ parental rights as to Children. In this order, the court specifically concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal from Parents’ care would not be remedied and that continuing Parents’ relationships with Children posed a threat to Children's well-being. The court also concluded that termination was in Children's best interests and that adoption was a satisfactory plan for their care and treatment.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Parents jointly appeal the termination of their parental rights as to Children. When seeking a termination of parental rights, DCS has the burden of both alleging and proving:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023).³ If the trial court finds the allegations proven by clear and convincing evidence, it shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code §§ 31-35-2-8, -37-14-2 (2023).

[9] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we generally apply a three-tiered standard of review. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact. Id. Second, we determine whether those findings support the court's conclusions of law. And third, we determine whether those conclusions support the court's ultimate judgment. Id.

[10] Here, however, Parents concede that the evidence supports the trial court's factual findings. See generally Matter of De.B., 144 N.E.3d 763, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“Any unchallenged findings stand as proven.”). Additionally, Parents do not contest the trial court's conclusions that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal were not likely to be remedied or that continuing Parents’ relationships with Children posed a threat to Children's well-being. Parents only challenge the trial court's conclusion that termination was in Children's best interests.

Clear and Convincing Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Conclusion that Termination Was in Children's Best Interests

[11] In determining the best interests of a child, “trial courts must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the child[ ].” Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019). In this case, Children's CASA and the family's FCM both testified that terminating Parents’ parental rights was in Children's best interest. Such testimony is generally sufficient to support the conclusion that termination was in a child's best interests where, as here, the conditions that resulted in the child's removal were not likely to be remedied. See, e.g., A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[12] Additionally, “[a] parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do so supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child.” Matter of G.M., 71 N.E.3d 898, 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Here, Children were removed from Parents’ care, in part, because of Parents’ methamphetamine use and resulting child neglect. Parents, however, did not follow through with recommended substance abuse treatment as required by the trial court's dispositional order. As the trial court found, Parents “continued to actively use methamphetamine for the entirely (sic) of the life of this case.” App. Vol. II, p. 116; App. Vol. III, pp. 27, 117. They also “continue[d] to minimize and/or deny their continued methamphetamine use.” App. Vol. II, p. 115; App. Vol. III, pp. 26, 116.

[13] The trial court therefore found that there was “a reasonable probability that [Parents] will continue to abuse methamphetamine.” App. Vol. II, p. 116; App. Vol. III, pp. 27, 117. The court also found that “[Parents’] methamphetamine use constitutes a clear and continuing danger to the safety of the children if they were to be placed in the care of [Parents]” because “[t]he children would not have a safe or appropriate caregiver ․” Id. Ultimately, the court found that “[Children] require[ ] a permanent home free from ․ neglect” and “[Parents] are unable to provide that home.” App. Vol. II, p. 121; App. Vol. III, pp. 32, 122.

[14] Parents essentially argue that they should be given more time to complete the reunification services ordered by the court. But the trial court's unchallenged findings show that Parents made no meaningful progress with those services during the two years Children were removed from their care. “The court need not wait until the child[ is] irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158.

[15] Because clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that termination was in Children's best interests, we affirm the trial court's termination of Parents’ parental rights as to Children.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A third person, D.F., is the “alleged father” of C.H. and the “legal father” of R.H. Appellants’ App. Vol. III, pp. 25, 115. But D.F.’s parental rights as to those children are not at issue in this case.

2.   Though Father has no parental rights as to C.H. and R.H., we refer to him as a “parent” of all Children for simplicity.

3.   Not long after DCS filed its termination petitions, the Indiana General Assembly significantly amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 to alter the allegations that DCS must include in a petition to terminate parental rights. See Ind. Public Law 70-2024, SEC. 4 (eff. Mar. 11, 2024). Although the amendment took effect before the trial court issued its termination orders, it did not change the requirement that DCS show termination is in the child's best interest, and it still permits termination where the conditions resulting in the child's removal are not likely to be remedied or where continuing the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the child's well-being. Parents cite to the old statute in their Appellants’ Brief, and the State does not contend that the amended statute applies. Given the material similarities between the two in this case, we cite to the old statute to match Parents’ briefing.

Memorandum Decision by Judge Weissmann

Judges Bailey and Brown concur. Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.