SPARKS v. JEFFERSON CAPITAL SYSTEMS LLC LLC (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Eve Baker Sparks, pro se, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing her amended complaint. We dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 20, 2024, Sparks filed a “Plaintiff's Complaint/Pleading” against Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC (“JCAP”). Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 2. Sparks alleged that she received a phone call from an independent contractor “inquiring about repossessing [her] 2019 Chevy Equinox” and who “stated the order came from” JCAP. Id. She alleged that she “just went through Chapter 7 bankruptcy” and “[t]here was no documentation filed by Exeter Finance or [JCAP] that the loan had been sold to [JCAP].” Id. at 3. She alleged she “has endured a lot of harassment and Breach of Peace by” JCAP. Id. at 4. On December 10, 2024, JCAP filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6).

[3] On December 11, 2024, Sparks filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. Appellant's Appendix Volume V at 2. On December 13, 2024, Sparks filed “Plaintiff's Amended Complaint” naming JCAP and Exeter Finance LLC (“Exeter,” and together with JCAP, “Defendants”) as defendants. Appellant's Appendix Volume VI at 2. Sparks alleged that Exeter was her original loan servicer, that JCAP was “the third servicer,” and that neither she “nor the Bankruptcy Court, received any communication or filings that a transfer took place and that the claims register needed to be updated to reflect the new servicer.” Id. at 2-3. She alleged “Exeter circumvented Bankruptcy laws when they did not properly report a claim against [her] Bankruptcy for subject debt.” Id. at 4. She asserted that, on or about November 2024, she discovered that her updated schedules had not been filed with the Bankruptcy Court and that she filed the correct schedules. She alleged “JCAP never filed with the Bankruptcy court claiming a debt was owed to them by [her].” Id. at 6. She alleged she “did claim her vehicle as an exemption in her Chapter 7.” Id. She requested that Defendants release all liens on her vehicle and stated she “is seeking monetary compensation in the amount of $50,000.00 [ ] per Defendant for a total of $100,000.00[.]” Id.

[4] On December 30, 2024, JCAP filed a motion for enlargement of time in which to respond to Sparks's amended complaint. On December 31, 2024, the court issued an order granting JCAP's motion and stating JCAP “shall have to and including January 22, 2025, to move/plead to” the Amended Complaint. Appellant's Appendix Volume VIII at 2. On January 2, 2025, the court issued an order granting Sparks's motion for leave to amend complaint, stating the amended complaint was deemed filed as of December 13, 2024, and providing Defendants “are each given to and including January 22, 2025 to answer or otherwise respond to [Sparks's] Amended Complaint.” Appellant's Appendix Volume IX at 2. Also on January 2, 2025, Exeter filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6). Exeter argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to resolve the allegation that it violated any Bankruptcy laws, and dismissal of Sparks's claims alleging Bankruptcy violations was warranted.

[5] On January 22, 2025, JCAP filed a motion to dismiss Sparks's amended complaint pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6). JCAP argued in part:

A review of the bankruptcy pleadings reveals that on June 23, 2023, [Sparks] filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, which was converted to a Chapter 7 on November 3, 2023. On November 28, 2023, [Sparks] filed a Statement of Intention for Individuals Filing Ch. 7 Bankruptcy, which lists the 2019 Chevrolet Equinox and, critically, states that it is not exempt. See Docket No. 84, attached hereto as Exhibit “B”.[1] [Sparks] stated that she would pay the full balance owed on or before June 30, 2024. Id. [Sparks] does not assert that she paid the balance. On or about July 29, 2024, [Sparks] filed amended schedules. [Sparks's] Amended Schedule does not list the 2019 Chevrolet Equinox as exempt. See Doc. No. 108, attached hereto as Exhibit “C”.[2]

The Bankruptcy Court's discharge order expressly states that “a creditor with a lien may enforce a claim against the debtor's property subject to that lien unless the lien was avoided or eliminated. For example, a creditor may have the right to foreclose a home mortgage or repossess an automobile.” See Doc. No. 96, attached hereto as Exhibit “D” (emphasis added).[3] Accordingly, the creditor has the right to repossess [Sparks's] non-exempt vehicle.

Appellees’ Appendix Volume II at 12. JCAP argued that Sparks failed to articulate an actionable claim. It argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over claims related to Sparks's bankruptcy and that “[t]he Bankruptcy Court expressly stated in its discharge order that [Sparks's] vehicle could be repossessed.” Id. at 14. It referred to Sparks's allegation that it “did not send [her] a notice of the transfer of ownership of her vehicle loan within 15 days” and argued that it “is unaware of any requirement under federal or state law to provide this notice for a vehicle loan, nor does plaintiff cite a statutory requirement.” Id.

[6] On January 23, 2025, Sparks filed an “Opposition to JCAP's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Default Judgment Against JCAP.” Appellant's Appendix Volume X at 2. She argued a defendant “can only make one move to dismiss” and that JCAP filed motions to dismiss on December 10, 2024, and January 22, 2025. Id. She also argued “JCAP provides schedules filed from [her] Bankruptcy case with its motion on 01/22/2025 but they failed to provide the Court with the updated versions of those schedules filed with the Bankruptcy Court[.]” Id. On January 27, 2025, Sparks filed an “Opposition to Exeter's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Default Judgment Against Exeter” arguing in part that Exeter failed to meet the court's January 22, 2025 deadline. Appellant's Appendix Volume XI at 2.

[7] On January 31, 2025, the trial court issued orders finding JCAP and Exeter's motions to dismiss were timely filed, denying Sparks's motions for default judgment, finding that Sparks's amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and granting JCAP and Exeter's motions to dismiss.

Discussion

[8] A pro se litigant is held to the same established rules of procedure that trained legal counsel are bound to follow, and the fact that a litigant proceeds pro se does not excuse the litigant from complying with appellate rules. Foster v. Adoption of Federspiel, 560 N.E.2d 691, 692 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Where an appellant fails to substantially comply with the appellate rules, dismissal of the appeal is warranted. Hughes v. King, 808 N.E.2d 146, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). This Court has discretion to dismiss an appeal for the appellant's failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Miller v. Hague Ins. Agency, Inc., 871 N.E.2d 406, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“Although we will exercise our discretion to reach the merits when violations are comparatively minor, if the parties commit flagrant violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure we will hold issues waived, or dismiss the appeal.”), reh'g denied.

[9] Sparks has failed to comply with the requirements of the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(5) governs the statement of the case and provides “[p]age references to the Record on Appeal or Appendix are required in accordance with Rule 22(C).” Appellate Rule 46(A)(6) governs the statement of facts and provides “[t]he facts shall be supported by page references to the Record on Appeal or Appendix in accordance with Rule 22(C).” Under the heading “Statement of facts,” Sparks's brief includes eight numbered paragraphs containing conclusions and includes no citations to the record.⁴ Appellant's Brief at 4. We note that, while Sparks filed an appendix, she filed each document in a separate volume, resulting in her filing thirteen volumes. The appendix did not include the trial court's chronological case summary as required by Appellate Rule 50(A)(2). The section in Sparks's brief titled “Questions presented on appeal” does not “concisely and particularly describe each issue presented for review” as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(4).⁵

[10] Further, Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) provides “[t]he argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning” and “[e]ach contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on ․” Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b) provides the argument “must include for each issue a concise statement of the applicable standard of review” and “a brief statement of the procedural and substantive facts necessary for consideration of the issues presented on appeal, including a statement of how the issues relevant to the appeal were raised and resolved by any ․ trial court.” This Court has previously stated:

We demand cogent argument supported with adequate citation to authority because it promotes impartiality in the appellate tribunal. A court which must search the record and make up its own arguments because a party has not adequately presented them runs the risk of becoming an advocate rather than an adjudicator. Keller v. State, 549 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. 1990). A brief should not only present the issues to be decided on appeal, but it should be of material assistance to the court in deciding those issues. Hebel v. Conrail, Inc., 475 N.E.2d 652, 659 (Ind. 1985). On review, we will not search the record to find a basis for a party's argument ․ nor will we search the authorities cited by a party in order to find legal support for its position.

Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (footnote omitted).

[11] Sparks's claims in the section of her brief titled “Assignment of Error” are not supported by cogent argument or citations to the record.⁶ In light of the multiple violations of the Indiana Appellate Rules and lack of a cogent argument, we dismiss Sparks's appeal. See Keller, 549 N.E.2d at 373-374 (dismissing appeal where appellant failed to provide cogent argument and adequate citation of authority).

[12] For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss.

[13] Dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Exhibit B contains a “Statement of Intention for Individuals Filing Under Chapter 7” with a file-stamped date of November 28, 2023, signed by Sparks which, under the section titled “List Your Creditors Who Have Secured Claim,” lists Exeter, states “2019 Chevrolet Equinox” under “Description of property securing debt,” and with respect to the question “Did you claim the property as exempt on Schedule C,” shows a checkmark in the box for “No.” Appellees’ Appendix Volume II at 33.

2.   Exhibit C contains a “Schedule C: The Property You Claim as Exempt,” which indicates that it was filed on July 29, 2024. Appellees’ Appendix Volume II at 35. The 2019 Chevrolet Equinox is not listed on the schedule.

3.   Exhibit D contains an “Order of Discharge” dated February 16, 2024, which stated in part:This order means that no one may make any attempt to collect a discharged debt from the debtor personally․However, a creditor with a lien may enforce a claim against the debtor's property subject to that lien unless the lien was avoided or eliminated. For example, a creditor may have the right to foreclose a home mortgage or repossess an automobile.Appellees’ Appendix Volume II at 37. The docket for Sparks's bankruptcy petition attached to JCAP's motion to dismiss indicates that the Bankruptcy Court entered its “Order Discharging Debtor” on February 16, 2024, id. at 29, and that the Bankruptcy Court entered a “Final Decree” on September 11, 2024, pursuant to which the trustee was discharged and the case was closed. Id. at 31. The docket contains subsequent entries dated December 11, 2024, after the case was closed, stating “Amended Schedule(s) C filed by Debtor [Sparks]” and “Amended Statement of Intention filed by Debtor [Sparks].” Id. The docket does not contain any entries after December 11, 2024. (31) In its motion to dismiss, JCAP stated: “As of this filing, the Bankruptcy Court has not re-opened the case in response to [Sparks's] recent filings seeking to modify her discharged bankruptcy schedules.” Id. at 13 n.1.

4.   Sparks states in part “a Defendant can only make one move to dismiss, asserting all defenses that were available when the motion was made,” “JCAP provides schedules filed from [her] Bankruptcy case with its motion on 01/22/2025 but they failed to provide the Court with the updated versions of those schedules,” and Defendants “failed to meet [the January 22, 2025] deadline.” Appellant's Brief at 4-5.

5.   Under the heading “Questions presented on appeal,” Sparks lists seven questions, including “[d]id the trial court err in ruling in favor of [JCAP] because a Defendant cannot file a Motion for Dismissal twice in the same case,” “[d]id the trial court err in ruling in favor of [JCAP] because the Motion to Dismiss on 12/10/2024 was never ruled on,” “[d]id the trial court err in ruling in favor of [JCAP] because the second Motion to Dismiss should not have counted which in turn means JCAP in fact did not meet the Court deadline to respond to [her] Amended Complaint,” “[d]id the trial court err in ruling in favor of [JCAP] when JCAP provided the incorrect bankruptcy schedules to the Court,” “[d]id the trial court err in ruling in favor of [Exeter] by not acknowledging that Exeter Breached the contract between them and [Sparks],” “[d]id the trial court err in ruling in favor of [Exeter] because they never answered [Sparks's] Amended Complaint in the time allotted by the Court,” and “[d]id the trial court err in ruling in favor of [Exeter] because Exeter hasn't reported a loan to the Credit Bureaus on [Sparks] since on or about March 2023.” Appellant's Brief at 3-4.

6.   Under the heading “Assignment of Error,” Sparks cites cases from the Oregon Supreme Court and states “[p]ublic bodies are ordinarily liable for the torts of employees acting within the scope of employment under ORS 30.265(1),” “Plaintiff in this case did not invoke a special relationship, status, or conduct which creates, defines, or limits defendant's duty,” “Defendant's [sic] in this case did not invoke a special relationship, status, or conduct which creates, defines, or limits defendant's duty,” and “[t]he trial court in this case did not invoke a special relationship, status, or conduct which creates, defines, or limits defendant's duty.” Appellant's Brief at 7. She states “[t]he complaint in Donaca [v. Curry Co., 734 P2d 1339 (Or. 1986),] had been dismissed by the trial court for failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim for relief,” “[t]o summarize the Supreme Court's guidance from Donaca, if the pleadings do not constitute a basis for invoking the ‘special relationship’ rule under Fazzolari [v. Portland School Dist., 734 P2d 1326 (Or. 1987)], ‘no duty’ defenses are either broad, seeking exclusion of categories of claimants or claims; or narrow, amounting to a claim in a particular case that no rational factfinder could find a defendant's conduct unreasonably to pose a foreseeable risk to the plaintiff.” Id. at 8-9. She further states, “[a]lthough a factfinder is free to reject imposing liability on hearing the evidence, it cannot be said that no rational factfinder, on the allegations in plaintiffs’ pleading, could find defendant's conduct unreasonably to pose a foreseeable risk to plaintiffs,” sets forth elements for a claim of negligence citing Oregon case law, and states, “Plaintiffs have pleaded facts from which a factfinder could make a determination in plaintiffs’ favor in accordance with the foregoing requirements.” Id. at 9. In her conclusion, Sparks argues “[t]he trial court erred when it ruled that the Second Amended Complaint failed to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim.” Id. at 10. To the extent Sparks presents new argument in her reply briefs, the argument is waived. See Weldon v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 896 N.E.2d 1181, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied; Ind. Appellate Rule 46(C).

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.