Cory L. Uhrlaub, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] While on probation for a previous conviction, Cory Uhrlaub was charged with four new offenses related to a domestic violence incident. After the State petitioned to revoke Uhrlaub's probation, the trial court found he had violated the terms of his probation by committing the new offenses and revoked sixty days of his probation. Uhrlaub appeals, claiming there was insufficient evidence to prove he committed the new offenses. Finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's determination, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2020, Uhrlaub pled guilty to Level 5 felony intimidation ¹ and was sentenced to four years imprisonment, with two years suspended to probation. While on probation, Uhrlaub visited the store where his wife worked. Uhrlaub, appearing angry, stayed for about thirty minutes before leaving. Wife followed him out of the store and Uhrlaub informed her that he had evidence of her infidelity. Wife returned to work and Uhrlaub left. He then called the store multiple times to say that he would return with proof of her infidelity.

[3] About three hours later, Uhrlaub returned in a car driven by Bill Short, who parked in the farthest parking spot on the east side of the lot. Uhrlaub and Wife walked around the west corner of the building to talk. He used Wife's phone to play a video that he alleged showed her cheating and, as she held the phone and watched it, he became angry. He asked her to give him her phone and told her, “if [she] didn't admit [she] was cheating that he was gonna [sic] bust all the windows out in [her] mom's car” and “blow [her] house up and blow [her] mom's house up with her [mom] inside of it.” Transcript at 36. Wife started walking to the store's back entrance while she attempted to call 9-1-1. Uhrlaub tried to grab her phone, and in doing so, wrapped her in “a bear hug,” causing them to hit the side of the building. Id. When Uhrlaub managed to take the phone from her, he “dropped” her to the ground, causing her to hit her head on the pavement. Id. She also sustained a scratch on her arm from trying to break her fall. Wife then stood up and grabbed his shirt to try to retrieve her phone to call 9-1-1 but quickly let go. Uhrlaub returned to Short's vehicle with Wife's phone, and Wife went into the store and called 9-1-1, reporting that Uhrlaub assaulted her, threatened her, and took her phone.

[4] Uhrlaub was arrested and charged with Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, Class A misdemeanor intimidation, Class A misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime (interference), and Level 6 felony domestic battery.² The State later petitioned to revoke Uhrlaub's probation, alleging that he violated the terms of his probation by committing these four new criminal offenses. At the evidentiary hearing ³ on August 9, 2024, Uhrlaub denied hitting or pushing Wife and testified that she hit him. Short testified that he saw Wife hit Uhrlaub, but he confirmed that he could not see them when they were around the corner on the west side of the building. Wife denied striking Uhrlaub.

[5] The trial court found Wife's testimony more credible and found that the State had met its burden of proving that Uhrlaub committed each of the four offenses alleged and violated his probation. As a result, the court revoked sixty days of Uhrlaub's probation. Uhrlaub appeals the trial court's revocation order, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he committed the new offenses.⁴

Discussion and Decision

[6] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). We review the trial court's probation revocation for abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.

[7] In a probation revocation case, the trial court must determine whether a condition of probation was violated, and if so, what sanctions to impose. Pierce v. State, 44 N.E.3d 752, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). A single violation of a condition of probation is sufficient to support the revocation of probation. Id. Revocation proceedings are “civil in nature,” and the State need only prove its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f). As such, when the alleged violation is the commission of a new crime, conviction of the new crime is not a prerequisite to revocation. Pierce, 44 N.E.3d at 755. Without reweighing the evidence or assessing witness credibility, we will affirm the probation revocation if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's finding of a violation. Id.

[8] Uhrlaub asserts that the trial court's determination was unsupported by the evidence. Specifically, he argues that the trial court's consideration of the testimony given at the evidentiary hearing is “fatally defective” because the trial court “ignored”: 1) Short's testimony that he saw Wife hit appellant; 2) the State's failure to call the lead police officer as a witness; and 3) the implausibility of Wife's testimony regarding her injuries.⁵ Appellant's Br. at 9. Uhrlaub is simply seeking a reweighing of the evidence, which our standard of review precludes. See Pierce, 44 N.E.3d at 755.

[9] In any case, Uhrlaub primarily challenges the evidence as it pertains to the two domestic battery offenses. However, the trial court found that the State sufficiently proved all four offenses it claimed Uhrlaub had committed—the two domestic battery offenses as well as intimidation and interference. Uhrlaub provides no cogent arguments as to why the evidence supporting the intimidation and interference offenses was insufficient to support revocation. Furthermore, while Uhrlaub denied hitting and pushing Wife, he did not deny taking Wife's phone or threatening to break her mom's car windows and blowup Wife and her mother's homes. Therefore, he's waived any right to argue as to the intimidation or interference offenses. See Shwartz v. Schwartz, 773 N.E.2d 348, 352 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (failure to make cogent argument as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) results in waiver of issue on appeal). Because the commission of a single new crime is enough justification for revocation of Uhrlaub's probation, sufficient evidence supported the trial court's revocation even if, as Uhrlaub suggests, the court erred in finding the two domestic battery offenses were not proven. See id.

Conclusion

[10] Because Uhrlaub has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation based on insufficient evidence, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Uhrlaub's wife was not the victim in the 2020 intimidation case.

2.   The elements of Level 6 felony domestic battery are the same as Class A misdemeanor domestic battery with the addition of the person who committed the offense having a previous, unrelated battery conviction under the same chapter. See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3.

3.   There were two evidentiary hearings on the probation revocation petition. The first evidentiary hearing was on July 26, 2024, at which Wife testified. See Tr. at 23. The second evidentiary hearing was on August 9, 2024, at which Uhrlaub and Short testified. See Tr. at 45.

4.   Although the record on appeal does not reflect the disposition of the new charges brought against Uhrlaub as a result of this incident, and we do not consider this disposition in our analysis, we note that on September 27, 2024, Uhrlaub pled guilty to Count I: Domestic Battery, Class A misdemeanor, Count II: Intimidation, Class A misdemeanor, Count III: Interference with the Reporting of a Crime, Class A misdemeanor, and Count IV: Domestic Battery, Level 6 felony. He was sentenced to two years of imprisonment, both of which were suspended to formal probation.

5.   In attacking Wife's testimony, Uhrlaub contends that the incredible dubiosity rule applies and permits us to reassess her credibility. Appellant's Brief at 11. This rule applies when there is: “1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015). “Application of this rule is rare and the standard to be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002)).While Wife was the State's only witness, elements two and three of the test are not met here. Her testimony was not inherently contradictory or equivocal as it was consistent on both direct and cross examination, and there was no evidence that it was the result of coercion. The State introduced her 9-1-1 call, corroborating her testimony. Uhrlaub also admitted that he left with her phone, further corroborating her story. See Tr. at 66. There was nothing about her testimony or her injuries that was “so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Fajardo, 859 N.E.2d at 1208. Any inconsistencies between witnesses’ testimonies are a matter of credibility for the trier of fact to decide. Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 758. Ultimately, Uhrlaub is asking us to reassess the credibility of Wife's testimony, and we will not.

DeBoer, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Vaidik concur. Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.