Valcharles Davonta Murry, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Valcharles Murry was convicted of unlawfully carrying a handgun, a Level 5 felony, and resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor. Murry appeals and argues that the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting testimony from law enforcement officers that, on the day of the offenses, they recognized Murry and had seen him before. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Murry raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting law enforcement officers’ testimony that, on the day of the offenses, they recognized Murry and had seen him before.

Facts

[3] In the evening of June 14, 2023, law enforcement officers with the Evansville Police Department (“EPD”) were on patrol when they observed four individuals jaywalking and heading toward the Star Market in Evansville. The officers recognized Murry as an individual they had “seen” before. Tr. Vol. II p. 22. After the individuals left the Star Market, they again crossed the street without using a crosswalk. The officers approached in their vehicle and activated their police lights. Murry and one of the other individuals immediately fled from the officers.

[4] The officers pursued the fleeing individuals, and a short time later, EPD Detective Phillip Goodman observed Murry in the backyard of a residence that contained a wooden deck. Murry was “crouching” down and “clutching” a firearm in his waistband. Id. at 52. Detective Goodman then lost sight of Murry. Later that evening, the officers discovered a Glock handgun under the wooden deck of the residence where Murry had been seen crouching. One side of the handgun was “distinctly clean” whereas the other side had “mud and dirt caked in various crevasses,” which led the officers to believe the gun had recently been thrown under the deck. Id. at 56. Murry was later located and arrested. The owner of the residence confirmed that he had not placed a gun under the deck.

[5] Testing of DNA present on the handgun trigger indicated that it was “24 billion times more likely” that the DNA “originated from Valcharles Murr[ ]y and three unknown individuals than if it originated from four unknown, unrelated individuals,” and testing of DNA present on the grip of the handgun indicated that it was “at least 1 trillion times more likely” that the DNA “originated from Valcharles Murr[ ]y and two unknown individuals than if it originated from three unknown, unrelated individuals.” Ex. Vol. III pp. 22, 24. This testing provided “very strong support” for the inclusion of Murry's DNA on the handgun. Id. at 24.

[6] On June 22, 2023, the State charged Murry with: Count I, unlawfully carrying a handgun, a Class A misdemeanor; and resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor.¹ The State sought to enhance Count I to a Level 5 felony based on Murry's previous conviction for carrying a handgun without a license.

[7] Murry was tried before a jury in October 2024, and the jury found him guilty as charged. Murry then admitted to having a prior conviction that elevated the unlawful carrying of a handgun charge to a Level 5 felony. The trial court entered judgments of conviction and ordered Murry to serve concurrent sentences of four years for unlawfully carrying a handgun and one year for resisting law enforcement. Murry now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Murry challenges the admission of the officers’ testimony that they recognized Murry as a person they had seen previously. We ordinarily review challenges to the admission of evidence for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 990 (Ind. 2021). Murry, however, did not object to the admission of the challenged testimony at trial, so he must demonstrate that the admission of the evidence constitutes fundamental error. Strack v. State, 186 N.E.3d 99, 103 (Ind. 2022). “[F]undamental error occurs only when the error ‘makes a fair trial impossible or constitutes clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.’ ” Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009)). The appellant bears a “heavy burden of showing fundamental error on appeal.” Id. (citing Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623, 651 (Ind. 2021)).

[9] Murry argues that the officers’ testimony that they recognized Murry violated Evidence Rule 404(b). This rule provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Evid. R. 404(b)(1). “[T]he purpose behind Evidence Rule 404(b) is to ‘prevent[ ] the State from punishing people for their character, and evidence of extrinsic offenses poses the danger that the jury will convict the defendant because ․ he has a tendency to commit other crimes.’ ” Hardiman v. State, 222 N.E.3d 1049, 1055 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Bassett v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (Ind. 2003)), trans. denied.

[10] Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act, however, may be admissible if it is introduced for a purpose other than demonstrating character propensity, “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident[.]” Id. at 1056 (citing Evid. R. 404(b)(2)). In such cases, the trial court:

First ․ must determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act. Second, the court must determine that the proponent has sufficient proof that the person who allegedly committed the act did, in fact, commit the act. And third, the court must balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403.

Id. (quoting D.R.C. v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 223 (Ind. 2009)). In balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the evidence pursuant to Rule 403, the trial court determines whether the probative value is “substantially outweighed” by the prejudicial effect. Evid. R. 403.

[11] Here, even if we assume that the challenged testimony constitutes evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act and contravenes Evidence Rule 404(b), we conclude that the error was not fundamental. Murry argues that “evidence of prior offenses is as prejudicial as evidence can possibly get.” Appellant's Br. p. 11 (citing Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 235 (Ind. 1997)). But the officers’ testimony that they recognized Murry does not necessarily indicate that Murry engaged in prior criminal activity. See Whiteside v. State, 853 N.E.2d 1021, 1030-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (observing that the fact that the officer testified he knew the defendant “on a first-name basis” did not lead “unerringly to the conclusion that the two were acquainted solely as a result of [the defendant's] prior misconduct.”).² We are not persuaded that the admission of the officers’ testimony made “a fair trial impossible or constitute[d] clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm” such that it constituted fundamental error. Strack, 186 N.E.3d at 103 (citation omitted).

[12] Moreover, the evidence of Murry's guilt was overwhelming. Murry fled immediately after the officers activated their police lights. See Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1077 (Ind. 2015) (“ ‘[E]vidence of flight may be considered as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.’ ”) (quoting Brown v. State, 563 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind. 1990)). During the officers’ pursuit, Detective Goodman saw Murry crouched in the backyard of the residence and in possession of a gun. A gun was later found under the deck of the residence, appeared to have recently been left there, and did not belong to the owner of the residence. DNA testing provided strong support for the inclusion of Murry's DNA on the gun.

[13] In light of the totality of evidence presented at trial, Murry has not demonstrated that the officers’ testimony resulted in fundamental error, and any error was harmless. See Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 889 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (rejecting argument that trial court committed fundamental error by admitting testimony regarding the defendant's post-Miranda silence because the error was harmless based on “overwhelming evidence” of defendant's guilt), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[14] The trial court did not commit fundamental error by admitting the officers’ testimony. Accordingly, we affirm.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Murry was also cited in Count III with failure to use a sidewalk when available, a Class C infraction, which the State dismissed before trial.

2.   Even if the officers’ testimony offers little probative value, as Murry argues, we are not persuaded that this probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice pursuant to Evidence Rule 403.

Tavitas, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Felix concur. Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.