Anthony Pampalone, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Samuel H. Longoria and Carrie Longoria, Appellees-Defendants (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Once friendly neighbors, Anthony Pampalone and Samuel and Carrie Longoria are now embroiled in contentious litigation. In addition to suing the Longorias for numerous claims, Pampalone sought a preliminary injunction that would limit how the Longorias can use their backyard. After a hearing, the trial court denied Pampalone's request for injunctive relief. Pampalone now appeals and raises two issues for our review that we revise and restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court erred by denying his motion for preliminary injunction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The Longorias reside at property commonly known as 1255 Creekside Drive, Crown Point, Indiana (the “Longoria Property”). Pampalone resides at property commonly known as 1250 Springbrook Court, Crown Point, Indiana (the “Pampalone Property”). The backyards of the two properties abut:

Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time.

See Tr. Vol. II at 9; Tr. Vol. IV at 4.¹ The distance from the back of Pampalone's house to the back of the Longorias’ house is approximately 80 feet. Additionally, along the shared property line is a 40-foot-wide utility easement that extends 20 feet into each of their properties.

[4] Prior to the summer of 2022, Pampalone and the Longorias had a cordial, civil relationship. However, shortly after the Longorias began constructing a swimming pool in their backyard in May 2022, their relationship with Pampalone began to sour, with each party accusing the other of disrupting the other's enjoyment of their property as well as reporting each other to local law and code enforcement authorities. Consequently, in February 2023, Pampalone sued the Longorias.² In his amended complaint, Pampalone brought claims against the Longorias for interfering with the utility easement, trespassing on the Pampalone Property, invading his privacy, intercepting his communications, and defaming him. The Longorias countersued Pampalone for numerous claims.

[5] Pampalone filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, requesting, among other things, that the trial court order the Longorias to remove certain structures and cameras from their backyard and to refrain from certain activities.³ At the hearing on this motion, Pampalone clarified that he was essentially requesting the trial court order the Longorias to comply with Crown Point's ordinances.

[6] In support of his motion for a preliminary injunction, Pampalone testified about alleged encroachment issues based on a boundary survey he commissioned; drainage issues he believed were a result of the Longorias’ construction activities; privacy concerns regarding the Longorias’ backyard cameras; alleged trespass instances; and sleep disruptions due to the noise and lights from the Longorias’ backyard. In particular, the Longorias set up an igloo-like inflatable structure in their backyard that has lights on it, and Pampalone testified that the lights from the igloo illuminate his bedroom at night. Additionally, at some point, Pampalone replaced a light bulb on the outside of his house, and the Longorias called law enforcement because of how bright the new bulb was. When the responding officers did not take care of it that night, Samuel Longoria “made a tower and put a light on [Pampalone] because he was shining on us so bright that I just counteracted him.” Tr. Vol. III at 45. Samuel testified that he “left [his floodlight] up for maybe an hour-and-a-half, took it down and that was it․ And it's never been back since.” Id. Pampalone testified that the Longorias’ floodlight was in operation for only “a day or two.” Tr. Vol. II at 116.

[7] The trial court denied Pampalone's request for a preliminary injunction. In its order (the “Original Denial Order”), the trial court did not enter special findings of fact as required by Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). So, when Pampalone appealed the Original Denial Order, the Longorias filed a motion to temporarily stay the appeal and remand the case to the trial court so it could reissue its Original Denial Order with the necessary Trial Rule 52(A) special findings of fact.⁴ This court granted that motion, and on December 15, 2024, the trial court issued an amended order denying Pampalone's preliminary injunction motion (the “Amended Denial Order”).

[8] In the Amended Denial Order, the trial court entered the following relevant findings and conclusions:

19. Each party has cast myriad aspersions upon the other. Each has sicced law and code enforcement authorities upon the other. Each has been subject to law and code enforcement attentions, intervention and reprimand on some level․ Based upon the evidence presented on 03/16/2024, Pampalone has not shown nor can the Court now conclude that either party—including Pampalone—has a reasonable likelihood of success on any pending claims or counterclaims.

20. The requested preliminary injunction only seeks to direct the Longorias to comply with standing City of Crown Point ordinances. An ordinance enforcement mechanism already exists through local and available law and code enforcement authorities.

21. Legal remedies already exist to address the harms Pampalone now seeks to address through preliminary injunction.

22. Pampalone has not shown nor can the Court now conclude that irreparable harm will occur if the preliminary injunction is not granted.

23. The parties’ tort claims and counterclaims will be decided by a jury, including any award(s) for money damages. The Court does not now conclude that Pampalone's potential damages are not primarily economic such that money damages would be appropriate.

24. A preliminary injunction is not necessary to preserve any status quo of these parties before a full and fair and final hearing on the merits is able to occur; a preliminary injunction would not be effective in preventing harm while pending litigation takes its course; a preliminary injunction could actually cause greater harm to these parties and aggravate the litigation.

25. He who seeks equity must come into court with clean hands. Neither party, including Pampalone, has clean hands in their interactions. Both have engaged in retaliatory conduct against the other, e.g. by way of casting unwanted and bright lights into the other's yard. Both have permitted objects from one side of the literal and figurative fence to invade or encroach upon the other side—whether overhanging tree branches or waving flags or otherwise. Both have had to relocate structures—a fence and a shed, respectively—from the contested easement area. Both have been subject to varying levels of law enforcement attention and intervention and reprimand. Pampalone does not have clean hands in seeking his preliminary injunction.

26. The balance of equities does not favor Pampalone so as to warrant issuance of a preliminary injunction.

27. This Court, within its reasonable discretion, does not now conclude that the public interest favors the preliminary injunction Pampalone seeks, i.e. to order the Longorias to do what the Longorias are already required to do (follow the law).

Appellant's Am. App. Vol. II at 21–23.

[9] Thereafter, the case was returned to this court, the temporary stay was lifted, and the parties filed amended briefs.⁵

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Denying Pampalone's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

[10] Pampalone contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for a preliminary injunction.⁶ “A preliminary injunction ‘is an extraordinary equitable remedy that should be granted with caution.’ ” Willow Haven on 106th St., LLC v. Nagireddy, 252 N.E.3d 418, 422 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Combs v. Daniels, 853 N.E.2d 156, 160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). In deciding whether to grant a motion for a preliminary injunction, the trial court must make special findings of fact. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A), 65(D). Therefore, we will “not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous,” id. 52(A); that is, “we must determine ‘whether the evidence supports the findings and, if so, whether the findings support the judgment.’ ” Willow Haven, 252 N.E.3d at 422 (quoting Town of Linden v. Birge, 204 N.E.3d 229, 233 (Ind. 2023)). We also give “due regard ․ to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” T.R. 52(A). We review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo, Willow Haven, 252 N.E.3d at 422 (citing Birge, 204 N.E.3d at 234), and we review the its ultimate determination of whether to grant or refuse the preliminary injunction for an “abuse of discretion, which ‘occurs if the trial court's decision was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court,’ ” id. (internal citations omitted).

[11] To obtain a preliminary injunction, Pampalone had to show that

(1) he had a reasonable likelihood of success at trial;

(2) his remedies at law are inadequate, meaning he will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction;

(3) the potential injury without an injunction outweighs the potential harm from an injunction; and

(4) issuing the injunction will not disserve the public interest.

See Willow Haven, 252 N.E.3d at 422 (citing Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Walgreen Co., 769 N.E.2d 158, 161 (Ind. 2002)). Pampalone argues that the trial court incorrectly determined that he did not show all four of these elements. Even if Pampalone could demonstrate that he has a reasonable likelihood of success at trial,⁷ that his potential injury outweighs the potential harm to the Longorias caused by an injunction, and that the public interest would not be disserved by issuing an injunction, Pampalone's request for a preliminary injunction still must fail because he has not demonstrated that his remedies at law are inadequate.

[12] Pampalone claims his legal remedies “are inadequate in light of the ongoing harassment and the scope that the harassment takes from” the Longorias. Appellant's Am. Br. at 14 (citing Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Nickolick, 549 N.E.2d 396, 397 (Ind. Ct. App 1990)). If the party seeking a preliminary injunction has an adequate remedy at law, then injunctive relief should not be granted. Westwood One Radio Networks, LLC v. NCAA, 172 N.E.3d 294, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Walgreen, 769 N.E.2d at 162). In determining whether a party has an adequate legal remedy, the trial court must assess whether the legal remedy is “as plain and complete and adequate—or, in other words, as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration—as the remedy in equity.” Cent. Ind. Podiatry, P.C. v. Krueger, 882 N.E.2d 723, 732 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Washel v. Bryant, 770 N.E.2d 902, 907 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). Accordingly, a “party suffering mere economic injury is not entitled to injunctive relief because damages are sufficient to make the party whole.” Westwood One Radio Networks, 172 N.E.3d at 303 (quoting Walgreen, 769 N.E.2d at 162); see also Krueger, 882 N.E.2d at 732 (citing Walgreen, 769 N.E.2d at 162).

[13] In particular, Pampalone claims he “cannot sleep at night because of the floodlights the Longorias pointed into his bedroom from their backyard.” Appellant's Am. Br. at 14 (citing Tr. Vol. II at 21–23, 109–17; Tr. Vol. IV at 11). However, Pampalone testified that the floodlight the Longorias installed in their backyard was in operation for only “a day or two,” Tr. Vol. II at 116, and Samuel testified he only left that floodlight up for approximately 90 minutes. There is no relief the trial court could have given Pampalone regarding the floodlight because the Longorias had already taken it down.

[14] To the extent Pampalone—in other sections of his brief—attempts to argue that his remedies at law are inadequate because he has not gotten the results he wants from Crown Point authorities, he has failed to provide factual support and cogent reasoning for this argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Instead, Pampalone's arguments are ad hominem attacks: “Clearly, neither the Longoria's [sic] nor the City of Crown Point have ever heard of the fundamental principle for just and harmonious society that ‘my freedom ends where yours begins.’ ” Appellant's Am. Br. at 15. We decline to address such unsupported arguments. See Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)) (“We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ”). Likewise, to the extent Pampalone seeks a preliminary injunction for other alleged injuries—noise, trespass, drainage issues, shed placement—he does not explain on appeal why his legal remedies are inadequate to address them, so he has waived any such arguments. See id. (quoting Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 364).

[15] Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Pampalone's motion for a preliminary injunction. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the preliminary injunction hearing, a screenshot from the Lake County Surveyor's website was admitted into evidence. The photo provided above is substantially similar to the admitted exhibit. Most notably, we have added identifiers for each property, and we do not include other portions of the website that were part of the exhibit.

2.   Pampalone also sued the City of Crown Point for issuing the Longorias a construction permit, failing to enforce certain ordinances, and disparately enforcing certain ordinances. The trial court granted Crown Point's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Pampalone's claims against it and dismissed those claims with prejudice.

3.   Pampalone does not include in his Appendix this motion for a preliminary injunction. See Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2). We have taken judicial notice of the contents of this motion pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27.

4.   Despite filing an amended Appendix on February 9, 2025, Pampalone failed to include the Longorias’ motion for a temporary stay and remand as well as this court's order granting that motion. See App. R. 50(A)(2). We have taken judicial notice of these and any other relevant filings pursuant to Appellate Rule 27.

5.   Throughout their briefs, the parties repeatedly cite to Transcript Volume I in support of statements of fact, but that volume of the Transcript contains only six pages—a cover page plus five pages of indexes. From a brief review of the Transcript, it seems that the parties are actually citing to Transcript Volume II when they refer to Transcript Volume I. This same error also appears to be repeated for citations to the other volumes of the Transcript, of which there are four total. We remind counsel that any factual statement must be supported by a citation to the volume and page where it appears in an Appendix or the Transcript. App. R. 22(C), 48(A)(5), 48(A)(6)(a), 46(A)(8)(a).

6.   Pampalone also argues that the trial court's findings of fact in the Amended Denial Order fail to comply with Trial Rule 52(A), but the substance of that argument is actually an attack on the evidence supporting the trial court's findings and judgment, not an attack on the trial court's compliance with Trial Rule 52(A). Nevertheless, we note that the findings required to grant or deny a preliminary injunction “need not be extensive.” Costello v. Zollman, 51 N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. The trial court's findings in the Amended Denial Order sufficiently found that Pampalone failed to meet his burden of showing all four elements necessary for obtaining a preliminary injunction. The trial court's findings, which were based on the evidence presented at the hearing, are adequate for appellate review, especially as it relates to a denial of a preliminary injunction.

7.   Pampalone waived this particular issue for our review by failing to present cogent argument in support thereof. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a); Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)) (“We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ”).

Felix, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Foley concur. Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.