Arthur C. McNeeley, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] After pleading guilty, Arthur C. McNeeley (“McNeeley”) was convicted of reckless homicide,  ¹ a Level 5 felony, and sentenced to four years in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”), with three years executed and one year suspended to probation. McNeeley appeals and we address the following restated issues for review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing McNeeley;

II. Whether McNeeley's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender; and

III. Whether the trial court erred in awarding credit time.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On November 20, 2020, McNeeley was driving his vehicle in a reckless fashion on U.S. Highway 20 in LaPorte County, Indiana—exceeding the speed limit and crossing the center line in a no passing zone—which led him to collide with a vehicle waiting to make a left turn. After colliding with the vehicle waiting to make a left turn, McNeeley then struck an oncoming vehicle which was occupied by Brian Klingerman (“Brian”), Joyce Klingerman (“Joyce”), and Jessica Klingerman (“Jessica”). As a result of the collision, Brian died while in transit to the hospital. Both Joyce and Jessica suffered non-fatal injuries.

[4] On May 10, 2021, McNeeley was charged with Count I: reckless homicide, a Level 5 felony; Count II: involuntary manslaughter, a Level 5 felony; and, reckless driving, a Class A misdemeanor. That same day, a warrant was issued for McNeeley's arrest. On May 12, 2021, a cash bond amount totaling $1,505 was posted on McNeeley's behalf. As a part of his Cash Bond Agreement, McNeeley agreed that he “w[ould] attend all of [his] scheduled court dates until all pending matters are disposed of.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 35.

[5] After McNeeley was released on bond, he failed to appear for a status conference, and the trial court issued a bench warrant. McNeeley was arrested on the warrant and eventually released on bond with the additional requirement of GPS monitoring. The State later petitioned to revoke McNeeley's bond due to a positive drug screen and an incident report indicating McNeeley had repeatedly been out of geographical boundaries of his GPS monitoring. The trial court concluded that McNeeley violated the terms of his bond as alleged and “reset [his] bond at the standard bond of [$]15,000.” Tr. Vol. II p. 93.

[6] McNeeley reached a verbal agreement to resolve the case, characterized by his attorney as “no agreement per se[,]” but if McNeeley pleaded guilty to Count I and Count II “the State [was] willing to dismiss the misdemeanor.” Tr. Vol. II p. 98. On May 3, 2024, McNeeley pleaded guilty without the benefit of a formal plea agreement or sentencing recommendation to Count I: reckless homicide, a Level 5 felony and Count II: involuntary manslaughter, a Level 5 felony, and the State agreed to the dismissal of Count III: reckless driving, a Class A misdemeanor. The parties left sentencing open to the court. The trial court took the plea under advisement and set the matter for a sentencing hearing.

[7] On June 7, 2024, the court conducted a sentencing hearing. At the outset of the sentencing hearing the court accepted the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) as neither McNeeley nor the State offered any objections, corrections, or modifications to the report. The court received a victim impact statement in the form of a letter from Brandi Wampler (“Brandi”), Brian and Joyce's daughter. Brandi emphasized the effect the collision had on her family, the anxiety she now faces when driving a vehicle due to the collision, and the inability to share her pregnancy announcement with her father. In addition to the loss of her father, Jessica, who also provided a victim impact statement, shared that she now suffers from panic attacks and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of the collision. She also stated that her mother, Joyce, suffered “a traumatic brain injury from the accident.” Id at 112. Jessica explained that Joyce's injuries exacerbated Joyce's vascular dementia condition resulting in her mother becoming “completely dependent on a care giver[,]” and resulting in strain on her relationship with her mother. Id. at 113.²

[8] McNeeley testified that he was “sorry. [He] never meant for it to happen․ [he] wish[es] [he] could go back in time and take all this back. [He's] sorry that it happened[.]” Id. at 115. A drug screen administered to McNeeley at the hospital immediately after the collusion revealed that McNeeley had “[s]ome marijuana and—[he] c[ouldn't] remember what else[ ]” in his system. Id. at 117.

[9] The State argued that the only statutory aggravator that applied was that: “[T]he harm or injury or loss suffered by the victim of an offense is significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense.” Id. at 119. The State discounted the weight of McNeeley's proffered mitigators, characterizing his remorse as “eleventh-hour remorse[,]” but acknowledged McNeeley was “entitled, statutorily, to acceptance of responsibility.” Id. at 119, 120. The State requested that “the Court not ․ even consider [McNeeley's request for GPS or work release] as a possibility as an element of whatever his sentence is[ ]” and requested the court impose an advisory sentence of three years imprisonment. Id.

[10] McNeeley acknowledged that “under the circumstances that there is aggravation here.” Id. at 121. Indicating that the injuries Joyce suffered, and the entire family's injuries were “an appropriate aggravator.” Id. McNeeley's counsel also stated “[w]e can't dispute that [McNeeley] recently violated the terms of pretrial supervision.” Id. (emphasis added). His counsel further stated he “know[s] that [McNeeley] screwed up Community Corrections bad.” Id. In mitigation, McNeeley offered that he expressed remorse, that the crime is unlikely to recur, and that he had “a substantial period as a law-abiding citizen.” Id. McNeeley asked the court for a six-year sentence, the maximum possible term, but order the sentence served on a combination of work release and GPS monitoring through LaPorte County Community Corrections (“LPCCC”).

[11] The trial court found two aggravating factors, namely that McNeeley “recently violated the terms of [his] bond on more than one occasion. The impact of the harm caused by his actions was greater than simply the death that he caused because [he] caused both physical injuries in victims and mental injuries in victims.” Id. at 122. With respect to the violation of his terms of release, the court stated, “I cannot stress how important the recent violation of the terms of his bond when he was not charged with but found to have had these drugs in his bloodstream when he committed this reckless act[.]” Id. at 122–23. The trial court declined to find McNeeley's criminal history as an aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Lastly, as to mitigators, the trial court concluded that “he is remorseful[,] and he pled guilty.” Id. at 122.

[12] The trial court elected to only enter a sentence as to Count I, sentencing McNeeley to a total of four years to the DOC, with three years executed and one year suspended to probation. The trial court orally ordered “180 days [of] credit in Credit Class B toward his sentence.” Id. at 123. When the trial court subsequently issued its written judgment of conviction and abstract of judgment, it awarded McNeeley “one hundred and seventy-seven (177) days [of] credit under Credit Class B toward the sentence of imprisonment for time spent in confinement as a result of this charge.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 77. McNeeley now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[13] “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), (citing Smallwood v. State, 773 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind. 2002)), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. “A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to issue a sentencing statement, gives reasons for imposing a sentence that are not supported by the record, omits reasons clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or considers reasons that are improper as a matter of law.” Higginson v. State, 209 N.E.3d 15, 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490–91). “Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to properly weigh such factors.” Id. “The trial court may assign aggravating weight to the harm, injury, loss or damage suffered by the victim if such harm was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense.” Sharkey v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Filice v. State, 886 N.E.2d 24, 39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied)).

[14] McNeeley claims the trial court abused its discretion when it identified the following aggravating factors: (1) that McNeeley recently violated conditions of pre-trial release, and (2) the harm or injury caused by McNeeley's crime was greater than elements necessary to convict him of the offense. McNeeley argues there was no evidence to support the first aggravator and that the second aggravator “establish[ed] only that the victim's family suffered the impact normally associated with the offense of [r]eckless [h]omicide.” Appellant's Br. p. 12. We note, however, that McNeeley specifically represented to the trial court that these were proper aggravators.³ Indeed, with regard to his pre-trial release violations, McNeeley said: “We can't dispute that [McNeeley] recently violated the terms of pretrial supervision.” Tr. Vol. II p. 121. (emphasis added). And as to the injuries or harms suffered by Joyce, Jessica, and Brandi, counsel for McNeeley stated: “I do agree with [the State] ․ under the circumstances that there is aggravation here. [Brian's] widow suffered injuries and the whole family suffered injuries, so I do believe that [the State] is right in argument that that is an appropriate aggravator.” Id.

[15] Beyond McNeeley's acknowledgment of the aggravating factors at sentencing, there was ample evidence in the record and the court's CCS to support the challenged aggravating factors. The record clearly demonstrates that McNeeley violated the terms of his release and bond by failing to appear at hearings, testing positive for illicit drugs, and being outside of the designated geographical boundaries of his GPS monitoring. The PSI report reflected that McNeeley violated the conditions of his bond by failing to appear on two occasions and by testing positive for amphetamine, buprenorphine, methamphetamine, and norbuprenorphine. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 62, 65. Where, as here, the defendant declined to offer corrections to the PSI report, the defendant is generally precluded from claiming for the first time on appeal that the PSI report was inaccurate. See Robeson v. State, 834 N.E.2d 723, 725 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining “[t]he information in the PSI is presumed to be accurate unless the defendant registers an objection to the information contained therein, and the failure to so object waives appellate review of this issue”). Evidence from the Court's CCS and the record of pretrial proceedings clearly establish that McNeeley failed to appear on September 8, 2023, and an incident report filed April 11, 2024 established that McNeeley tested positive for amphetamine, buprenorphine, methamphetamine, and norbuprenorphine. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 62, 65.

[16] The testimony from Jessica and Brandi provided support for the conclusion that the harm suffered by family was greater than the elements necessary to prove the offense. Jessica and Brandi set forth the physical and emotional injuries the family incurred because of McNeeley's actions, which included PTSD, anxiety, panic attacks, traumatic brain injury, and the exacerbation of Joyce's dementia to the point of requiring constant care. While the death of a family member will clearly result in some manner of emotional loss for the family, the specific nature of the collision and the resulting physical and emotional harms suffered by the survivors of the crash and the Klingerman family are sufficient to meet the requirements of the aggravating factor.

[17] There was ample evidence in the record to support the challenged aggravating factors, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding the existence of those aggravating factors.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[18] McNeeley argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and character of the offender. The Indiana Constitution authorizes appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing decision. See Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020). Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), this court may revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the [c]ourt finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”

[19] Our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) “should focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1181 (Ind. 2020) (citing Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). The Indiana Supreme Court has long said that “sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222 (citing Morgan v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (Ind. 1996)). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). We note that “[t]he defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted.” Shields v. State, 248 N.E.3d 1246, 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[20] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we are mindful that “the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Turkette v. State, 151 N.E.3d 782, 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Pierce v. State, 949 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind. 2011)). Here, McNeeley pleaded guilty to reckless homicide as a Level 5 felony. A conviction for a Level 5 felony carries a sentencing range of one year to six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). The trial court imposed a four-year sentence with one year suspended to probation.

[21] When reviewing the nature of the offense, this court considers “the details and circumstances” of the commission of the offense. Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Washington v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1220, 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied). The nature of McNeeley's criminal conduct reflects that, on the date of the offense, he was operating his vehicle in a reckless fashion, in that he was driving at an excessive speed and crossed the center line in a no passing zone. As a result of his conduct, he collided with another vehicle and then struck the Klingerman's vehicle, killing Brian. The crash also resulted in injuries to the other occupants of the Klingerman vehicle. Joyce suffered a traumatic brain injury and became dependent on a caregiver for the rest of her life, and Jessica developed PTSD and panic attacks as a result of the collision. See Appellee's App. Vol. 2 pp. 2–4. Although McNeeley admits to causing the fatal collision, he argues that “he did so to avoid the victim's vehicle.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. McNeeley's argument deflects from his culpability for driving at an excessive speed and attempting to overtake a vehicle in a no passing zone and attempts to justify the resulting crash as merely an attempt to avoid an accident and a momentary poor driving decision. Ultimately, we conclude that McNeeley has failed to present compelling evidence that portrays the nature of his offense in a positive light, accompanied by restraint or regard. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[22] When reviewing the character of the offender, his character “is found in what we learn of his life and conduct.” Merriweather, 151 N.E.3d at 1286. McNeeley argues that his aggravated sentence is inappropriate because he entered a plea of guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement and expressed deep remorse for the harm that he caused to the victim and his family. While we acknowledge that McNeeley pleaded guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement, and showed remorse during sentencing, we note that McNeeley's repeated bond violations do not place his character in a good light. Indeed, the record reflects that McNeeley failed to appear at hearings and during a period of just over a month of monitoring by the LPCCC, McNeeley was found outside his designated GPS boundaries for almost twelve hours over a span of nineteen instances. Furthermore, McNeeley tested positive for amphetamine, buprenorphine, methamphetamine, and norbuprenorphine while on pretrial release.

[23] Additionally, McNeeley's criminal history, albeit remote, also demonstrates poor character. McNeeley has been arrested seven times, including the present offense. These arrests led to one felony conviction, arson as a Class B felony, and two misdemeanor convictions, driving while suspended and driving under the influence. Consequently, McNeeley has failed to identify “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” to support appellate revision of his sentence. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[24] Therefore, McNeeley has failed to demonstrate that his aggravated sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. See Shields, 248 N.E.3d at 1276.

III. Credit Time Calculation

[25] McNeeley argues that the trial court improperly calculated his credit time because, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court orally stated that he was due 180 days credit for incarceration or confinement prior to sentencing, but the written sentencing order and abstract of judgment both reflected that he was only given 177 days. However, in his reply brief, rather than addressing the merits of the State's calculation—where the State specifically established and explained that McNeeley is only entitled to 177 days—he instead conceded that the “State may be correct that 180 days is a miscalculation or Judgment of Conviction may contain a clerical error.” Appellant's Reply. Br. p. 10. Thereafter, McNeeley argued that, “remand is appropriate to clarify the discrepancy.” Id. As our Supreme Court has explained, “[r]ather than presuming the superior accuracy of the oral [sentencing] statement, we examine it alongside the written sentencing statement to assess the conclusions of the trial court. [We have] the option of crediting the statement that accurately pronounces the sentence or remanding for resentencing.” McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ind. 2007) (citing Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 446 n.8 (Ind.1999)).

[26] We begin with the abstract of judgment, which specifically calculated that McNeeley spent sixty-nine actual days incarcerated. The timeframe McNeeley spent incarcerated totaled one single day on May 12, 2021; fifteen days from December 14, 2023, to December 28, 2023; and fifty-three days from April 15, 2024, to June 6, 2024. The abstract of judgment next calculated that he spent 108 total days on GPS monitoring from December 29, 2023, to April 14, 2024, resulting in an aggregate total of 177 actual days, not 180. Next, we turn to the PSI, which erroneously attributed both December 28, 2023, and April 15, 2024, as a day of incarceration and GPS monitoring. Finally, the PSI erroneously included June 7, 2024, the day of the sentencing hearing, as a pre-trial day of incarceration, rather than the first day of McNeeley's sentence. We therefore conclude that the trial court relied upon the erroneous calculation contained in the PSI when it made the verbal pronouncement of the sentence.

[27] McNeeley's credit time was properly calculated in the trial court's written sentencing order, therefore we recognize the written order as an accurate pronouncement of McNeeley's sentence and credit time.

Conclusion

[28] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing McNeeley, his sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character, and the trial court properly calculated McNeeley's credit time.

[29] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-5.

2.   We note that Joyce Klingerman died on April 28, 2024. Joyce suffered a “traumatic brain injury” as a result of the collision and was “diagnosed with vascular dementia (a type of dementia that is caused and perpetuated by strokes)[.]” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 p. 3.

3.   The State argues that McNeeley's acknowledgement of the aggravating factors waived his claims of error, but whether the acknowledgement constitutes waiver or invited error, we elect to address his claims. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (explaining we prefer to resolve cases on the merits instead of on procedural grounds like waiver) (internal quotations omitted).

Foley, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Felix concur. Mathias, J. and Felix, J., concur.