IN RE: F.J. (Minor Child) B.J. (Father) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] While serving a suspended sentence for battering S.A. (Mother), B.J. (Father) allegedly smacked Mother while she was holding their three-month-old son, F.J. (Son). According to Mother, Father then urinated on her as she sat on the floor changing Son's diaper. Father was criminally charged for this alleged conduct. Following a petition by the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS), the trial court determined that Son was a child in need of services (CHINS) and imposed a dispositional order requiring Mother and Father (collectively, Parents) to engage in various services.

[2] Father appeals,¹ raising multiple issues relating to the CHINS determination and the dispositional order. We affirm.

Facts

[3] Father was first charged with domestic battery in June 2023 after he grabbed Mother's arm and smacked her in the ear while Mother was pregnant with Son. Father later pleaded guilty to domestic battery resulting in bodily injury to a pregnant woman and was sentenced to a one-year suspended sentence, which included a condition prohibiting Father from contacting Mother. In January 2024, Son was born. Two months later, the no-contact order was vacated.

[4] In April 2024, Mother reported another instance of domestic violence by Father. Her initial reports revealed the following. Mother and Father were engaged in a heated argument, and when Mother tried to walk away, Father grabbed Mother's arm. While he held Son, Father smacked Mother in the head and the face. Father then handed Son to Mother and smacked her again. After the incident, Mother sat on the floor to change Son's diaper, and Son urinated on Mother. Father then allegedly urinated on Mother while stating “that's what we do[,] son[,] to raggedy b****es.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 25. At that time, Father was still serving his suspended sentence for his prior battery of Mother.

[5] Based on this incident, Father was charged with domestic battery and domestic battery by bodily waste. The criminal court entered a no-contact order prohibiting Father from contacting both Mother and Son. Meanwhile, DCS received a report of the April 2024 incident and opened an assessment as to Son's well-being. DCS Family Case Manager (FCM) Jaymar Dickerson spoke with Mother during the assessment, and she recounted the incident to him.

[6] As FCM Dickerson continued his investigation, he found Mother and Father violating the no-contact order on multiple occasions. When visiting Father's home one day, FCM Dickerson found Mother inside and explained to her that the order was still in place so contact between them was prohibited. Not long after, FCM Dickerson was having trouble locating Mother and went to Father's residence to investigate. There, Father told FCM Dickerson that he would text Mother to see where she was, and when he did, Mother promptly responded. FCM Dickerson reminded Father that they were not permitted to communicate with each other. Before leaving, FCM Dickerson noticed Mother's car parked at Father's residence. When FCM Dickerson later confronted Mother about seeing her car there, she initially denied it but then admitted she had been with Father despite the no-contact order.

[7] Based on this non-compliance with the no-contact order and Parents’ unremedied domestic violence, DCS filed a petition in June 2024 alleging Son was a CHINS. DCS also requested to take Son into custody, and the trial court ordered Child's placement in kinship care. A month later, Mother entered into an agreement with DCS in which she admitted that Son was a CHINS and that she “needs assistance providing a safe and stable home environment free from domestic violence and thus the coercive intervention of the court is required.” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 20. Father denied the CHINS allegations.

[8] At a fact-finding hearing, FCM Dickerson testified that Mother recounted to him the events of the April 2024 incident. But Father pointed out that Mother had recanted these accusations in a separate proceeding relating to an alleged violation of the suspended sentence he was serving. When Mother was questioned about the recantation, she repeatedly invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Mother testified that, at one point, she asked her mother to call the police so she could make false allegations of abuse against Father. But she confirmed that Father had hit and smacked her while she was pregnant with Son.

[9] DCS confirmed that, at the time of the fact-finding hearing, the April 2024 domestic battery charges against Father were still pending and the no-contact order was still in place between Mother and Father. DCS also presented evidence that Parents had repeatedly violated the order, despite multiple warnings from FCM Dickerson. And though DCS workers explained that Son had not been referred to any specific services, they remained concerned about Son's need for a safe and stable home.

[10] Following the fact-finding hearing, the trial court adjudicated Son a CHINS. The court then conducted a dispositional hearing, during which DCS presented a predispositional report recommending services for Father. Father explained that his criminal charges for the April 2024 domestic battery were dismissed after the CHINS fact-finding hearing. Yet DCS expressed continued concerns for Son's safety based on Father's history of domestic violence and Parents’ inability to comply with the no-contact order.

[11] The trial court entered a dispositional order requiring Father to participate in various services, including individual counseling and a domestic violence assessment; to stay in contact with DCS; to maintain a stable home and job; and to ensure Son receives medical care and adequate supervision. Father appeals both the CHINS finding and the dispositional order.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Although Father's brief lacks organizational clarity, we understand him to raise three issues on appeal: (1) whether sufficient evidence supports the CHINS determination; (2) whether the dispositional order is contrary to law because it fails to include specific written findings required by statute; and (3) whether the dispositional order imposes requirements that are impossible for Father to fulfill. Unpersuaded by any of these claims, we affirm.

I. Sufficient Evidence Supports the CHINS Determination

[13] When, as here, a CHINS determination is accompanied by findings of fact, we review it under a two-tiered standard of review: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). We consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and neither reweigh evidence nor reassess witness credibility. Id. at 577-78. We will reverse a CHINS determination only for clear error, which occurs when the record facts do not support the findings or when the wrong legal standard is applied. Id. at 578.

[14] Though Father fails to clearly delineate his sufficiency claims, we understand him to argue that DCS presented insufficient evidence to support: (1) one of the trial court's findings of fact; and (2) the conclusion that Son is a CHINS. We disagree, addressing each argument in turn.

A. Factual Findings

[15] Father challenges just one of the trial court's factual findings: Finding 9. We accept the remaining unchallenged findings as true. See M.M. v. A.C., 160 N.E.3d 1133, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). In reviewing Father's challenge, we “defer substantially” to the trial court's factual findings and set them aside only if they are clearly erroneous. Matter of W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Id.

[16] Finding 9 states that, in April 2024, Father grabbed and smacked Mother while he held Son, handed Son to Mother and hit her again, and then urinated on Mother while she changed Son's diaper. Father claims that “no evidence support[ed] this finding” and that “[t]here was no evidence of any bodily waste of [Father] being placed on [Mother].” Appellant's Br., p. 14. But Father appears to conflate conflicting evidence for lack of evidence.

[17] FCM Dickerson testified that, soon after the incident was reported, Mother recounted to him that Father had smacked her and “urinated on her as well.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 25. This testimony directly supports Finding 9, and it is neither negated nor erased by contrary evidence, including Father's denial of the allegations, Mother's alleged recantation in a separate proceeding, or Mother's invocation of her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination at the fact-finding hearing. This merely creates a conflict in the evidence. We leave it to the finder of fact—here, the trial court—to weigh conflicting evidence and determine witness credibility. See, e.g., In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 644 (Ind. 2014). Father's argument acts merely as an invitation to reweigh evidence and reassess credibility, which we will not do. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577-78.

[18] Father's next argument—that Finding 9 is erroneous because the charges resulting from this April 2024 incident were eventually dismissed—is also unavailing. First, the charges were still pending at the time of the fact-finding hearing, which was when the trial court made its findings and CHINS determination. See id. at 580 (noting that courts “consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard”). Second, cases are dismissed for various reasons, and no explanation for this dismissal is provided in the record. Finally, even if the charges were dismissed for insufficient evidence, CHINS proceedings employ a much less rigorous standard of proof than that required in criminal cases. See Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893, 896 (Ind. 1996) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt to support criminal conviction); Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3 (requiring CHINS findings be “based upon a preponderance of the evidence”). Therefore, the fact that evidence is insufficient to support a criminal conviction does not necessarily preclude a CHINS finding based upon the same conduct.

[19] Finding no error in the trial court's factual findings, we now determine whether the findings support the conclusion that Son was a CHINS. See In re A.M., 121 N.E.3d 556, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

B. Conclusion that Son is a CHINS

[20] DCS alleged Son to be a CHINS under Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1, which requires DCS to prove by a preponderance of the evidence:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent ․ to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; ․ and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[21] As appellate courts have previously observed, “[t]he statute contains three basic elements: (1) the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child; (2) the child's needs are unmet; and (3) those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” Matter of N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). Father claims DCS presented insufficient evidence to prove these elements. But considering the evidence most favorable to the trial court's judgment, we find no error in the trial court's determination that Son was a CHINS.

[22] The record shows that Father engaged in multiple instances of violence against Mother. He first pleaded guilty to assaulting Mother when she was pregnant with Son. Then, while serving a suspended sentence for that offense, he was alleged to have assaulted Mother in front of Son. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, the domestic battery charges resulting from the second incident were pending. The record also demonstrates at least three violations of the resulting no-contact order: (1) Mother was at Father's home when FCM Dickerson visited; (2) Father and Mother exchanged text messages in front of FCM Dickerson; and (3) Mother admitted to being with Father after FCM Dickerson saw her car at Father's home. DCS alleged that this conduct endangered Son, depriving him of a safe home free from domestic violence, and that Parent's defiance of the no-contact order showed that court coercion is necessary to ensure Parents’ compliance.

[23] Father argues that this evidence is insufficient because it reflected only one instance of violence in front of Son—the second incident in April 2024—and showed no adverse effect on the three-month-old child. However, our caselaw is clear that “a single incident of domestic violence in a child's presence may support a CHINS finding.” Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). DCS is not required to “wait until a child is physically or emotionally harmed to intervene.” K.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 24 N.E.3d 997, 1003 Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Additionally, Son's young age does not immunize him from the negative consequences of exposure to domestic violence. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 644 (“[A] developing brain is most vulnerable to the impact of traumatic experiences before age one.”). Though DCS employees testified that Son was physically healthy and not enrolled in services, they emphasized a concern for Son's lack of a safe and violence-free home as his remaining unmet need.

[24] We are also unpersuaded by Father's reliance on the fact that the no-contact order between himself and Son had been vacated before the fact-finding hearing. The separate order prohibiting contact between Mother and Father was indisputably still in effect at that time. Parents ignored that order on multiple occasions, despite the unresolved domestic violence between them. This again demonstrates that court coercion is necessary to ensure Father addresses his violent conduct and provides a safe home for Son.

[25] In his reply brief, Father raises a new argument that the domestic violence between Parents is no longer a concern because Mother died in January 2025. Appellant's Reply Br., p. 9. (“[Mother's] death removes the basis for the domestic violence assessment.”). Aside from Father's troubling suggestion that the death of a domestic violence victim cures an aggressor's violence, Mother's passing did not occur until months after the fact-finding hearing and the imposition of the dispositional order. As this fact was not before the trial court, we do not consider it. See Matter of L.T., 145 N.E.3d 864, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (noting that CHINS adjudications must be based on the evidence presented to the court).

[26] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment—including Father's repeated domestic violence and violation of the resulting no-contact order—we find that sufficient evidence supports the trial court's determination that Son was a CHINS. We next address Father's challenges to the dispositional order.

II. Dispositional Order's Findings of Fact

[27] In CHINS cases, Indiana Code § 31-34-19-10 requires juvenile courts to accompany dispositional orders with written findings concerning a child's needs, the need for parental participation, efforts to reunify the family, services offered, and reasons for the disposition. Father contends the trial court's dispositional order is contrary to law because it does not include these required findings.

[28] Father, however, fails to recognize that the same statute also explicitly allows courts to “incorporate a finding or conclusion from a predispositional report as a written finding or conclusion upon the record in the court's dispositional decree.” Ind. Code § 31-34-19-10(b). Here, the trial court did exactly this, as the dispositional order states:

Based on the information presented in the Predispositional Report(s) and provided at the hearing, the Court makes the following dispositional orders ․

Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 6. This statement indicates that the court reviewed the predispositional report and based its order on information contained therein and from prior hearings. See Matter of W.H., 254 N.E.3d at 557-58 (noting that findings from predispositional report were incorporated in dispositional order based on similar language in order).²

[29] The predispositional report here detailed the domestic violence between Parents, Son's needs, efforts to reunify the family, and specific recommendations for services for Parents. This provides sufficient explanation for the requirements imposed by the trial court's dispositional order, enabling us to effectively review it. See Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 1999) (holding that findings of fact are sufficient when they “enable this Court to dispose of the issues upon appeal”); Jones v. Gruca, 150 N.E.3d 632, 640-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (noting that the principal purpose of findings of fact is to ensure the record captures the court's reasons for its decision to allow for informed appellate review).

[30] Father also argues that it is “reversible error for a trial court not to make findings of fact when there has been a request for them under [Indiana] Trial Rule 52.” Appellant's Br., p. 12 (citing Carmichael v. Siegel, 670 N.E.2d 890 (Ind. 1996)). But Father points to no instance in which he ever made such request. Instead, he insists that a request was not necessary because Trial Rule 52 requires the court to make “special findings of fact without request ․ in any other case provided by these rules or by statute.” Tr. R. 52(A)(3). However, that language merely directs us back to the CHINS statute, Indiana Code § 31-34-19-10, which expressly permits the incorporation of findings from the predispositional report, as discussed above.

[31] Father has failed to show error in the incorporation of findings in the dispositional order.

III. Dispositional Order's Requirements of Father

[32] Father finally challenges the dispositional order's requirements that he maintain suitable housing, allow DCS access to Son's home, and ensure Son receives proper care in terms of food, clothing, supervision, and medical care. He claims these requirements are impossible given his lack of custody over Son, who resided in kinship care at the time of the dispositional hearing.

[33] Although trial courts have “broad discretion” in imposing requirements upon parents, “the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstance that was revealed by the evidence.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012) (quoting In re A.C., 905 N.E.2d 456, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). This is because “forcing unnecessary requirements upon parents whose children have been adjudicated as CHINS could set them up for failure” and risks termination of their parental rights. Id. (same).

[34] Here, the challenged requirements directly relate to circumstances revealed by the evidence: Father's domestic violence and Son's resulting need for a safe and stable home environment. The evidence showed that Father's violent conduct actively disrupted Son's care: Father hit Mother while holding Son, struck her again after handing Son to her, and later urinated on Mother while she changed Son's diaper. Therefore, requiring Father to ensure proper supervision, housing, and care for Son directly addresses the evidence that Father lacked the ability to provide safe, uninterrupted parental care without violent disruptions. C.f. In re V.H., 967 N.E.2d 1066, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (vacating requirements unrelated to evidence, such as maintaining stable housing when home was deemed appropriate and allowing DCS home visits to ensure child's safety when evidence showed child was the aggressor).

[35] The dispositional order's requirements are not impossible but forward-looking, designed to prepare Father for reunification with Son. Dispositional orders are periodically reviewed and can be modified, meaning custody arrangements can evolve towards reunification. See Ind. Code § 31-34-21-1 (requiring periodic review of progress made on dispositional order and allowing for review at any time). In fact, the order's permanency plan explicitly calls for reunification, and Father has the ability to maintain suitable housing and ensure readiness to meet Son's needs in preparation for increased parenting time. We therefore find the dispositional order's requirements are supported by the evidence.

Conclusion

[36] We first conclude that the evidence supports the trial court's determination that Son is a CHINS. We then find the trial court's dispositional order is not contrary to law because it incorporated findings from a predispositional report, as permitted by statute, and its requirements are supported by the evidence.

[37] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother does not participate in this appeal and, according to Father, Mother passed away a few months ago.

2.   In his reply brief, Father also appears to argue, without citing authority, that any reference in the order to a prior proceeding was invalid because “[t]he court officer who entered the dispositional order had not heard the evidence at the fact finding hearing.” Appellant's Reply Br., p. 7. This argument lacks merit. Here, Juvenile Referee Jason Jamerson conducted the hearings and then made findings and recommendations that Judge Stephen Koester approved and ordered. This procedure is expressly permitted by Indiana Code § 31-31-3-6(2), which authorizes juvenile court referees to “submit findings and recommendations in writing to the juvenile court, which shall enter such order as it considers proper.” The same judicial officer who conducted the hearings also made the findings and recommendations that the trial judge adopted. Cf. In re I.P., 5 N.E.3d 750, 752 (Ind. 2014) (finding due process violation where magistrate who presided over termination hearing resigned before making any findings or recommendations, and successor magistrate who never heard evidence attempted to make findings based solely on record review).

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges May and Scheele concur. May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.