SMITH v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jaylen Smith appeals his sentence and the trial court's imposition of costs following his conviction for Level 5 felony reckless homicide. Smith presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.

2. Whether remand is necessary to correct an error in the sentencing order.

[2] We affirm and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On October 11, 2020, Smith and Meghan Schwab connected online via an escort service website. After Schwab arrived at Smith's apartment, he paid her $15, and she performed oral sex on him. Smith then asked Schwab to drive him to a nearby gas station so that he could get more money. Schwab agreed.

[4] At some point on the way to the gas station, Smith, who was sitting in the backseat, shot Schwab three times.¹ Smith then “jumped out” of Schwab's car and appeared to lose consciousness. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 210. With Schwab still at the wheel, her car continued down the road until it crashed into a building. A passerby who approached Smith saw a Smith & Wesson handgun on the ground next to him. Another passerby unloaded the gun and threw it across the road.

[5] When Smith regained consciousness, he seemed disoriented, but he quickly got up and ran toward his apartment, which was nearby. Police officers apprehended Smith before he got home. Officers found Schwab, who had died of her gunshot wounds, in the driver's seat of her car with a gun in her lap.

[6] The State charged Smith with murder and Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. After the court declared a mistrial in his first trial, a jury in his second trial found Smith guilty of the lesser included offense of Level 5 felony reckless homicide and acquitted him of carrying a handgun without a license. The trial court identified two aggravators and a single mitigator and sentenced him to six years executed. In addition, the trial court ordered Smith to pay $10,000 in restitution to Schwab's family. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Sentence

[7] Smith contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted).

[8] A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind.), clarified on reh'g on other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).

[9] The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is between one and six years, with the advisory sentence being three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). The trial court identified two aggravators, namely: “the injury to the victim was significant”; and Smith's criminal history, including the fact that he was on home detention when he killed Schwab. Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 168-69. And the court identified a single mitigator, namely, Smith's expression of remorse. The court found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigator and imposed a six-year sentence.

[10] On appeal, Smith argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ignored three of his proffered mitigators. Smith also contends that, given that Schwab's death was an element of the offense, the trial court abused its discretion when it identified as an aggravating factor that her injury was significant. We address each contention in turn.

[11] It is well settled that “[a] trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's argument as to what constitutes a mitigating factor, and a trial court is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors as does a defendant.” Healey v. State, 969 N.E.2d 607, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “A trial court does not err in failing to find a mitigating factor where that claim is highly disputable in nature, weight, or significance.” Id. “An allegation that a trial court abused its discretion by failing to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant on appeal to establish that the mitigating evidence is significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id.

[12] Here, Smith maintains that the trial court should have found his young age (eighteen) and his drug dependency to be mitigating, as well as the hardship his incarceration would impose on his mother. However, while Smith cites the record where proof of each proffered mitigator can be found, he makes no argument regarding their significance. Absent this showing, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not identify these three proffered mitigators. In any event, our review of the record does not show that these proffered mitigators are particularly significant and warrant mitigating weight here.

[13] As to the trial court's identification of Schwab's significant “injury” to be an aggravator, we need not decide whether the court erred in that regard. Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 168-69. Assuming without deciding that Smith is correct that this aggravator impermissibly considers an element of the offense, namely, Schwab's death, he is still not entitled to relief.

[14] It is well settled that, where the trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing a defendant, we need not remand for resentencing if we can “say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Here, in addition to the challenged aggravator, the court also identified as aggravating Smith's criminal history, which is extensive. Smith, eighteen-years old at the time of the offense, had two juvenile adjudications that would have been Level 6 felonies and two that would have been Class A misdemeanors, including possession of a firearm. And Smith was on home detention following a conviction as an adult for Level 5 felony possession of a firearm at the time of the instant offense. Based on that criminal history, especially the violation of home detention, we can say with confidence that, had the court considered only Smith's criminal history, it would have imposed the same sentence. We therefore affirm Smith's six-year sentence.

Issue Two: Sentencing Order

[15] Smith also contends, and the State agrees, that the sentencing order erroneously lists a $10,000 restitution order as the amount of “Court Costs and Fees.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 31. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Smith to pay “a judgment in favor of Ms. Schwab as a restitution order.” Tr. Vol. 4, p. 169. But that restitution order is not reflected in the written sentencing order.

[16] Due to the obvious error in the written sentencing order, we remand to the trial court with instructions to correct the written order to reflect the $10,000 restitution order, as well as clarifying to whom Smith will pay that amount pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-5-3(c).

[17] Affirmed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Smith alleged that a man was sitting in the front passenger seat at the time, but an eyewitness testified that there were only two people in the car.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.