S.O., Appellant-Respondent v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Sixteen-year-old S.O. (“S.O.”) appeals the juvenile court's order that granted his wardship to the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”) for placement in an appropriate juvenile facility. S.O. specifically argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it granted his wardship to the DOC. Finding no abuse of the juvenile court's discretion, we affirm the juvenile court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it granted S.O.’s wardship to the DOC.

Facts

[3] On December 2, 2024, S.O. and his friends stole a car. When law enforcement officers began pursuing the car, S.O. accelerated to speeds over 100 miles per hour and disregarded several traffic signals and signs. Following a nearly fifteen-minute pursuit, S.O. crashed the car and disregarded the officers’ commands to stop and show his hands. Instead, S.O. ran from the officers and did not stop until a police canine apprehended him.

[4] In December 2024, the State filed a petition alleging that S.O. was a delinquent child for committing acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute two felonies and five misdemeanors. The petition further alleged that S.O. had committed the status offense of curfew violation. At a December 2024 hearing, S.O. admitted that he had committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement ¹ and Level 6 felony auto theft.² The juvenile court granted the State's motion to dismiss the remaining allegations and adjudicated S.O. to be a delinquent child.

[5] At a January 2025 dispositional hearing, the juvenile court asked the probation officer and the prosecutor for their recommendations regarding S.O.’s disposition. The probation officer responded as follows:

․ Your Honor, probation's recommendation is for [S.O.] to be committed to the Indiana Department of Corrections. He is a sixteen year old before the Court for Resisting Law Enforcement as a Level 6 Felony and the Auto Theft as a Level 6 Felony. He has ․ an extensive unsuccessful history with this Court. He's been offered extensive probation on the informal level, the formal level and then informal level with the electronic monitoring program[,] ․ which is our strictest form of probation. He had a ․ prior commitment to the Department of Corrections in which he was released in September of 2024 and that was also for a Auto Theft offense․ [S]ince he was out of the Department of Corrections, he did commit the new auto offense which is before the Court today․ His case was staffed at a placement board and it was a unanimous recommendation for him to be committed to the Department of Corrections.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 31-32).

[6] In addition, the prosecutor responded as follows:

The State concurs with probation's unanimous recommendation. At this point, we do consider him to be a danger to the community․ He has exhausted community-based services and ․ as noted ․ in the predispositional report he has also been committed to the Department of Corrections previously. What's concerning the most to the State is that he was released from the Department of Corrections [September] 30th of 2024 and the new case that he was back in on was December 2nd of 2024 for the same offenses that he's been adjudicated in the past. So at this point we don't believe that ․ we have any additional options and we request that you ․ accept the recommendation from probation.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 32-33).

[7] S.O. asked the juvenile court to give him “a last chance[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 34). Specifically, S.O. asked the juvenile court to place him on probation with electronic monitoring.

[8] After hearing the probation officer's and the prosecutor's recommendations as well as S.O.’s request, the juvenile court stated as follows:

․ these acts which bring [S.O.] to the attention of the Court here today are both felonies which are ․ violent offenses, at least the Resisting Law Enforcement ․ would be a violent offense under Indiana law. So[,] he's classified as a violent offender. He has an extensive history of incorrigible behavior as is detailed within the ․ predispositional report․ In fact, his behavior is chronic and it's escalating and he's had ample opportunity in my view to alter that behavior․ As has been stated[,] he's previously been committed to the Department of Corrections. I agree with the State ․ and probation that services that we can offer through probation or community services have been exhausted or they will be ineffective to effectuate his care, treatment, and rehabilitation․ It was the unanimous recommendation of the placement board that he be ․ committed to the Indiana Department of Corrections and the disposition that I'm about to enter is appropriate due to the seriousness of the offense and the ․ the prior record of the ․ offender. He has failed all levels of supervision as far as I'm concerned, as far as the record would indicate. So [S.O.], I'm going to commit you to the Indiana Department of Correction.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 36-38). That same day, the juvenile court issued a written order that granted wardship of S.O. to the DOC for placement in an appropriate juvenile facility.

[9] S.O. now appeals.

Decision

[10] S.O. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it granted his wardship to the DOC. A juvenile court is accorded wide latitude and great flexibility in its dealings with juveniles. J.T. v. State, 111 N.E.3d 1019, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. The choice of a specific disposition of a juvenile adjudicated to be a delinquent child will only be reversed if the juvenile court abuses its discretion. Id. The juvenile court's discretion in determining a disposition is subject to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the safety of the community, and the policy favoring the least harsh disposition. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court's action is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual inferences that can be drawn therefrom. M.C. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 453, 458 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied, cert. denied.

[11] Indiana Code § 31-37-18-6 sets forth the following factors that a juvenile court must consider when entering a dispositional decree in a juvenile matter:

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and

(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;

(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.

I.C. § 31-37-18-6.

[12] Although the statute requires the juvenile court to select the least restrictive placement, the statute allows for a more restrictive placement under certain circumstances. M.C., 134 N.E.3d at 459. That is, the statute requires placement in the least restrictive setting only “[i]f consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child.” I.C. § 31-37-18-6. Thus, the statute recognizes that, in certain situations, the best interest of the child is better served by a more restrictive placement because “commitment to a public institution is in the best interest of the juvenile and society.” M.C., 134 N.E.3d at 459 (cleaned up).

[13] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that less restrictive efforts have failed to produce positive changes in S.O.’s behavior. Specifically, he has violated both informal and formal probation, including probation with electronic monitoring, in previous juvenile delinquency adjudications. In addition, the juvenile court had previously adjudicated S.O. to be a delinquent child for committing an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute auto theft. Less than three months after being released from the DOC for that offense, S.O. committed the exact same offense. We further note that the juvenile court found that S.O. was a threat to the community, and the placement board, the probation officer, and the prosecutor all recommended that S.O. be placed in the DOC. In light of S.O.’s history and the failure of less restrictive efforts, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it granted S.O.’s wardship to the DOC. See, J.T., 111 N.E.3d at 1027.³

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1.

2.   I.C. § 35-43-4-2.

3.   S.O.’s reliance on D.P. v. State, 783 N.E.2d 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), reh'g denied, is misplaced. In the D.P. case, we concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in sentencing D.P. to the DOC because “it ha[d] not been demonstrated that D.P. w[ould] not respond to probation in a positive fashion[.]” Id. at 771 We explained that until D.P. demonstrated that he would not respond positively to probation, the trial court should have instituted the less-harsh disposition of suspending D.P.’s confinement to the DOC. Id. Here, however, S.O. has not responded to probation in a positive fashion. Specifically, as set forth above, he has violated both informal and formal probation, including probation on electronic monitoring. Indeed, the juvenile court found that probation and community services had either been exhausted or would be ineffective.

Pyle, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and DeBoer, J., concur.