Larzaus A. McKinney, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Following a bench trial, Larzaus McKinney, Jr., was convicted of dealing in cocaine and dealing in a narcotic drug, both Level 2 felonies. McKinney appeals and claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at McKinney's home. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues

[2] McKinney presents two issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence obtained during the execution of a warrant to search McKinney's home.

II. Whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.

Facts

[3] In November 2022, Tru Lee was in the St. Joseph County Jail on charges of unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of marijuana. Lee was also wanted on a warrant in South Carolina for attempted murder. Lee attempted to curry favor with the State and, on November 16, 2022, was interviewed by South Bend Police Department (“SBPD”) Officer Damon Lim. On November 30, 2022, Officer Lim applied for a warrant to search a home on Marine Street based on the information provided by Lee. The probable cause affidavit Officer Lim submitted in support of the search warrant provided in relevant part:

I interviewed [Lee] on 11/16/2022 at approximately 1100hrs with Officer Diggins after it was relayed to me that [Lee] was willing to provide useful information regarding criminal activities in South Bend. [Lee] was in [the] St. Joseph County Jail and was transported to SBPD Interview Room C132 for a voluntary interview. Below is only a summary and synopsis of the interview. For the full and accurate depiction of the interview, see the audio and video recordings of the interview.

[Lee] stated he knew of an individual with the nickname of “Black” whom he knew to sell “hard” (a common slang for “crack cocaine”) and “powder” (a common slang for “cocaine”). [Lee] reported he had bought [an] “eight ball” for $100 which he sold to his “fiends” (a common slang for illegal drug users) as he stated his family and he were originally from South Bend, but that he had moved to South Carolina where he was wanted on an attempted murder charge before he fled back to South Bend. [Lee] is currently held in St. Joseph County Jail for a firearm charge and the arrest warrant.

[Lee] guessed Black to be younger than 35. [Lee] described Black to be “heavy-set, but not fat” and “chubby” around 6-foot tall. [Lee] also reported Black to have “nappy Afro” hair” and [to be] “dark-skinned”. [Lee] reported Black had a red Pontiac Grand Prix and a dark green Grand Prix with “Jolly Rancher” color on some parts as it had been in a crash.

[Lee] stated there was also Black's “babymama” staying at the house, who was skinny and “light-skin” with glasses and [a] “nappy afro”. [Lee] stated Black had two children with her. He also mentioned a younger male about 22-years-old with a big pistol on his hip whom he assumed Black used for transactions or as a “right-hand man”, although he was unsure of their relationship. He stated the younger male was from Michigan. [Lee] stated he saw the female braiding the younger male's hair before. He also stated there was a “white guy” around his 50's that stayed there as a “fiend” that Black kept around.

[Lee] stated that he had seen Black in the red Pontiac as it pulled up to the GoLo gas station on Miami and Bowman ․ with him in it. [Lee] stated Black dealt out of a house near the GoLo and Bowman. [Lee] did not have the exact address and street name, but he identified the house to be 1914 S Marine St., South Bend when Officer Diggins and I drove him around in the area. In front of the house was a red Pontiac Grand Prix or Grand Am displaying the license plate of “UAB295”, registered to Jamaria Latriest Ware-Curtis at 1914 Marine St., which [Lee] stated to be the same red Pontiac he was talking about. There was no green Pontiac in the area, but he stated maybe Black got rid of it because he had told him before that he was thinking about selling the vehicle. Later sometime during the interview, Officer Diggins showed a BMV photograph of Jamaria Ware-Curtis (in longer braided hair, not as initially described by [Lee] from his encounters with her) to [Lee], and asked if he knew who it was, at which time [Lee] stated the person looked like Black's baby mother. It should be noted [Lee] was also talking about multiple individuals in the city, not just Black.

[Lee] also provided the information that when one of the “fiends” told him the batch of the crack was not good, [Lee] then told Black about it at which time Black told [Lee] to bring it back to the house to cook a new batch on the stove. [Lee] stated when walking into the house, there is a big flat screen TV and a couch, walking through, there is a big black folding table with a bunch of powder and residue on it, along with a TV with cameras around the house he watches. [Lee] stated he saw Black with a “big rock” while gesturing an object bigger than the size of a fist. [Lee] also stated Black came out of the back with four pistols and two big “choppers like AR's” (chopper is a common slang for rifles and rifle-style pistols) with drum magazines on them. [Lee] stated Black also had a “QP” (a common slang for a quarter-pound) of marijuana that he smoked.

On 11/17/2022, SFU[1] Officers conducted surveillance at 1914 Marine St. at which time a younger male (unable to observe the face) exited the residence, got in the driver's seat of the red Pontiac alone, drove to a residence on 29th St. of South Bend, and exited the vehicle. A female from a nearby house then got in the driver's seat, the male in the front passenger seat, and a small child got in the vehicle and went eastbound past Capital Av[e]. in Mishawaka when the surveillance was terminated.

On 11/29/2022, SFU Officers obtained trash from the garbage bin set out on the road in front of 1914 Marine St. Upon transporting back to SBPD station and rummaging through the trash, an orange prescription pill bottle for Jamaria Ware-Curtis (on the label) was located. There was also plastic (which retained some of its packaging shape) and black rubber packaging material along with brown packaging tape, all wrapped in a blue rubber glove with white residue on them. Swabbing from the rubber and the plastic/packaging tape with a field-test cocaine wipe, they both field-tested positive to be cocaine. There were also “roaches” (a common term for the end piece of paper-rolled marijuana for smoking and inhaling of marijuana) located within another plastic baggie which mostly contained tobacco, and the roaches field-tested positive to be THC/marijuana by Officer Tobias. There was also a paperwork for [E.M.2] at 1914 Marine St. with the date of birth of [E.M.]. The “DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS” stated “***SEND WITH [L.M.3]***”. The “PCG” on the paperwork listed “Jamaria Ware-Curtis [telephone number]”. The “Delivery Date” was listed to be 10/27/2022.

Jamaria Ware-Curtis had former Elkhart addresses on file, and Elkhart ICE Unit was contacted regarding possible information. When Elkhart ICE was asked about Jamaria Ware-Curtis and the nickname “Black”, they immediately identified Black to be Larzaus McKinney, matching the last name McKinney found on the paperwork. They also provided a report stating on June 7th of 2021, the Investigators followed McKinney to the GoLo on Miami St. then to 1914 Marine St. in South Bend. It also stated Jamaria was believed to reside with McKinney at his previous residence on Indiana Ave. in Elkhart.

On 11/29/2022, [Lee] picked out Larzaus McKinney from a photographic line-up (performed by Investigator Pogotis of SBPD Detective Bureau) in SBPD Interview Room C134, stating that the person was 100% “Black”. Later that day, SFU Investigator Rush positively identified McKinney who was standing on the porch of 1914 Marine St.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 71-74 (emphasis added). The trial court granted the search warrant application that same day.

[4] Law enforcement officers executed the warrant the same day it was issued. Inside the house, officers found a folding table, which held a shoe box, white residue, and a digital scale. Inside the shoe box was 126 grams of a substance that tested positive for cocaine and 132 grams of a substance that tested positive for heroin. In the kitchen, the officers found an additional 696 grams of a substance that tested positive for cocaine. The officers also recovered six firearms, packaging materials, forty-eight grams of marijuana, a variety of pills, and a large sum of cash. McKinney was interviewed by the officers, waived his Miranda rights, and admitted that all of the items found in the house belonged to him and that he had been selling illicit drugs for the past year.

[5] On December 2, 2022, the State charged McKinney with dealing in cocaine, a Level 2 felony; possession of cocaine, a Level 3 felony; dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 2 felony; possession of a narcotic drug, a Level 3 felony; and possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. Before trial, the State dismissed the misdemeanor marijuana charge.

[6] On September 6, 2023, McKinney filed a motion to suppress in which he claimed that the trash search was unconstitutional and that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress on January 26, 2024, and later denied the motion to suppress via an order that provides in pertinent part:

15. The Defendant argues that the information given to police by Lee was stale since he had been in custody for almost two months at the time of his interview.

* * * * *

19. In this case, Lee was an individual in custody with a turbulent criminal history and a motive for providing information to the police, namely, to get favorable consideration for his St. Joseph County criminal matter. Although Lee gave false information when he was initially arrested in October 2022, he ultimately identified himself to police and made a number of statements contrary to his own interests (e.g. that he had fled to South Bend to evade a warrant for attempted murder, and that he purchased drugs from Black and used drugs). Lee spoke with police officers face-to-face, and investigating officers corroborated his assertions prior to the trash pull by having Lee identify the Defendant, the Defendant's residence, and the mother of the Defendant's children.

20. The Court finds that under the totality of the circumstances, the information Lee provided to investigating officers was sufficient to establish articulable individualized suspicion for the trash pull at the Defendant's residence.

21. The Court further finds that the officers in this case obtained the trash in substantially the same manner as a trash collector would—from a bin in the road in front of the house—as required by Litchfield, supra.[4] Retrieval of the trash in these circumstances appears to have had little intrusion upon the daily life or privacy of the Defendant.

22. Because Lee's information regarding the Defendant was corroborated by the surveillance and the evidence collected in the trash pull, the Court finds that there was a sufficient probable cause for Officer Lim to specify the location to be searched (1914 S. Marine Street) and the nature of the objects to be seized (illicit drugs and related paraphernalia and records).

23. The Court finds that Officer Lim's inclusion of Lee's criminal history and Lee's statements against interest in the probable cause affidavit suggests that the omissions at issue in this motion were not made in bad faith or in reckless disregard for the truth.

Conclusions of Law

The trash pull was permissible under Article [1], Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution because officers had articulable individualized suspicion and conducted the search similarly to a trash collector.

Officer Lim did not omit information in the affidavit in support of the search warrant at issue in bad faith or with reckless disregard for the truth, and sufficient probable cause exists to support the validity of the search warrant under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article [1], Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 37-38. McKinney did not seek to challenge the trial court's order via an interlocutory appeal.

[7] A two-day bench trial began on September 3, 2024. At trial, the trial court overruled McKinney's objections to the admission of the evidence seized as a result of the trash search and search warrant. The trial court found McKinney guilty as charged, but entered judgment of conviction only on the two dealing counts and did not enter judgment of conviction on the possession counts. On October 9, 2024, the trial court sentenced McKinney to concurrent terms of twenty years on both convictions, with five years executed in community corrections and the remaining fifteen years suspended with five years of formal probation. McKinney now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] McKinney argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence found during the execution of the search warrant because, he claims, the trash search was not supported by reasonable suspicion and the search warrant, which was based in part on evidence found during the trash search, was not supported by probable cause.

I. Standard of Review

[9] A trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence, and we review the trial court's evidentiary decisions only for an abuse of that discretion. Taylor v. State, 223 N.E.3d 260, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014)). A trial court abuses its discretion when its evidentiary decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, and we will reverse only when the error affects a party's substantial rights. Id. “When an appellant's challenge to such a ruling raises a constitutional issue, it is a ‘question of law, and we consider that question de novo.’ ” Id. (quoting Guilmette, 14 N.E.3d at 40).

II. Reasonable Suspicion to Conduct Trash Search

[10] McKinney first argues that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to search his trash. We explained in Shell v. State:

[I]n Indiana, a trash search cannot be randomly conducted and must instead be based on a reasonable suspicion. In Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 363 (Ind. 2005), our supreme court held that random trash searches, or searches of those individuals whom the officers merely hope to find in possession of incriminating evidence, are unreasonable and improper under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The court therefore held that trash searches must be supported by “articulable individualized suspicion, essentially the same as is required for a ‘Terry stop’ of an automobile[.]” Id.

927 N.E.2d 413, 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Here, McKinney claims that the information provided to the police by Lee was unreliable, stale, and uncorroborated and that the search of his trash was improper. We disagree.

A. Lee's Credibility

[11] McKinney first attacks Lee's credibility as a source of information. McKinney argues that Lee had no history of providing reliable information to the police and did not provide the police with any information that predicted McKinney's conduct. McKinney notes that, when determining whether information supplied by a confidential informant is sufficient to establish probable cause, our Supreme Court has explained that:

the officer's knowledge may be based on reliable information he receives from an informant. The reliability of such information depends upon many factors, including whether (1) the informant has provided accurate information before, (2) the criminal allegations are corroborated by independent facts, (3) there is a demonstrated basis for the informant's knowledge, (4) the informant correctly predicts the suspect's otherwise unpredictable conduct or activity, and (5) the informant has made a declaration against her own penal interest.

Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1051-52 (Ind. 2013) (citations omitted).

[12] Here, however, the question is not whether the police had probable cause, but whether they had reasonable suspicion to conduct the trash search.

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence, but it still requires at least a minimal level of objective justification and must be based on more than an inchoate and un-particularized suspicion or “hunch” of criminal activity. When reviewing a determination of reasonable suspicion to support a warrantless search, we examine the totality of the circumstances of the case to see whether the police had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. Reasonable suspicion is established when the facts known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur.

Shell, 927 N.E.2d at 419 (citation omitted).

[13] Although “a tip from an identified or known informant may not be sufficient to support a probable cause finding, such tips are sufficiently reliable” to establish reasonable suspicion. Kellems v. State, 842 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ind. 2006) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972)), reh'g granted on other grounds, 842 N.E.2d 352 (Ind. 2006). “One of the reasons for this is that ‘a known or identified informant's reputation can be assessed and ․ [he may] be held responsible if [his] allegations turn out to be fabricated․’ ” Washburn v. State, 868 N.E.2d 594, 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Kellems, 842 N.E.2d at 355), trans. denied. “ ‘Whether a tip has sufficient indicia of reliability to establish reasonable suspicion is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances.’ ” Id. at 599 (quoting Kellems, 842 N.E.2d at 355).

[14] Concerning Lee's credibility, we note that:

[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. Even though different, reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both quantity and quality are considered in the totality of the circumstances, i.e., the whole picture that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.

Shell, 927 N.E.2d at 419-20 (citation and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).

[15] Considering the totality of the circumstances present here, we conclude that the information Lee provided to Officer Lim was sufficiently reliable to establish reasonable suspicion to support the search of the trash at McKinney's house. Lee was not an unknown or anonymous informant; his identity was known to the police and he could, therefore, be subjected to criminal liability if he provided false information to the police. See Kellems, 842 N.E.2d at 355 (noting that tips from identified informants are sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion because such informants’ may be held accountable if they provide false allegations) (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000)). McKinney makes much of the fact that Lee gave a false name to the police when he was initially arrested. But Officer Lim testified that he could not remember if he was even aware of this at the time he interviewed Lee. More importantly, Lee had already been identified, and Lee's true identity was known to the police when he spoke with Officer Lim.

[16] Lee's statements were also contrary to his own penal interests; he admitted to buying cocaine from McKinney and selling that cocaine to other buyers. Lee also admitted to being wanted on a warrant for attempted murder in South Carolina. Although he was obviously attempting to curry favor with the police, he still admitted to a felony that was unrelated to the charges for which he was being held. Cf. State v. Spillers, 847 N.E.2d 949, 956 (Ind. 2006) (noting that when an informant is caught “red handed” with drugs in her possession before naming her supplier, her statement was “less a statement against h[er] penal interest than an obvious attempt to curry favor with the police.”). The police also corroborated some of Lee's statements. The police verified that McKinney lived at the house Lee identified; they verified that McKinney's girlfriend, Ware-Curtis, was the registered owner of the red Pontiac parked in front of that house; and Lee identified Ware-Curtis from her driver's license photo and identified McKinney from a photo lineup.⁵ Accordingly, we conclude that the information Lee provided was sufficiently reliable to establish reasonable suspicion to support the search of the trash at McKinney's house.

B. Staleness of Information from Lee

[17] McKinney also argues that the information provided by Lee cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion because it was stale. In Teague v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1121, 1129 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), we noted that “ ‘[t]he general rule is that stale information cannot support a finding of probable cause.” (quoting Washburn, 868 N.E.2d at 600). When evaluating the constitutionality of a trash search, however, the State need only show that the police had reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. Id. (citing Washburn, 868 N.E.2d at 601; Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 363). Thus:

instead of reviewing the purported staleness of the information as a separate and independent factor to evaluate the reasonable suspicion requirement ․ the better approach is to assess the age of the information as an element contributing to the totality of the circumstances.

Washburn, 868 N.E.2d at 601 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)); accord Teague, 891 N.E.2d at 1129.

[18] McKinney claims that the information Lee provided was stale because Lee had been in custody since October 10, 2022. Officer Lim, however, interviewed Lee on November 16, 2022, and surveilled McKinney's home the next day, when they observed a young man drive away from the home in a red Pontiac. Twelve days later, on November 29, 2022, Lee identified McKinney from a photo lineup. Only then did the police conduct a search of the trash at McKinney's home. McKinney notes that, by the time the trash search occurred, at least fifty days had passed since Lee was incarcerated; McKinney, therefore argues that any information provided by Lee was stale and the evidence seized must be suppressed. But the age of Lee's information is only one factor in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed by considering the totality of the circumstances to warrant a trash search.

[19] In Washburn, the information provided by the informant was over two months old, but we still held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct the trash search. 868 N.E.2d at 601; see also Teague, 891 N.E.2d at 1130 (information provided by informant was one or two weeks old but still sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to conduct trash search). Here, the activity Lee described was one of continuing and ongoing criminal activity—manufacturing crack cocaine and selling cocaine—rather than a transient criminal act. Thus, “the passage of time is not of critical importance.” Scott v. State, 883 N.E.2d 147, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that observations consistently linking defendant to drug dealing activity, even if weeks or months old, were not stale where there was evidence of an ongoing criminal operation).

[20] Mindful that the police did not have to establish probable cause and considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that McKinney was involved in the trafficking of illicit drugs sufficient to justify a search of McKinney's trash. Lee was a known informant and subject to additional criminal liability if he provided false information; he provided information that was against his own penal interests by admitting to additional, serious criminal offenses; and he correctly identified McKinney's home, car, and girlfriend.

[21] Under these circumstances, the police had a reasonable, articulable, and individualized suspicion—not merely an inchoate and un-particularized suspicion or “hunch”—that McKinney was selling illicit drugs. This justified the search of the trash outside McKinney's home. See Fuqua v. State, 984 N.E.2d 709, 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (police had reasonable suspicion to search defendant's trash where detectives shared and compiled information received from a confidential informant and two named informants, both of whom had been arrested in connection with a cocaine investigation, and both stated that defendant was dealing cocaine from his home), trans. denied; Eshelman v. State, 859 N.E.2d 744, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (police had reasonable suspicion to search defendant's trash where investigating officer heard from another officer that the deputy chief had an informant who stated defendant was possibly manufacturing methamphetamine at his home or business and investigating officer spoke to a jail inmate who stated that defendant was a “big time cook” of methamphetamine), trans. denied; see also State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (Ind. 2011) (information received from named caller reporting a driver suspected of drunk driving was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop where the caller provided the color and make of the vehicle, the location where police found the vehicle, and the police arrived shortly after the 911 dispatch).

III. Probable Cause to Support Search Warrant

[22] McKinney also claims that the warrant to search his home was not supported by probable cause. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that all search warrants be “based on probable cause.” Bunnell v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1231, 1234 (Ind. 2021). Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and the Search Warrant Statute, Indiana Code Section 35-33-5-2,⁶ also require search warrants to be supported by probable cause.⁷ Probable cause is a “ ‘fluid concept’ ” that is shown when the search warrant application “establishes ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” Heuring v. State, 140 N.E.3d 270, 273 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 238 (1983)).

[23] In discussing the role of probable cause in the issuance of a search warrant, our Supreme Court has explained:

The duty of the reviewing court—whether a trial court ruling on a motion to suppress or an appellate court evaluating that decision—is to determine whether the warrant-issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. A substantial basis requires the reviewing court, with significant deference to the warrant-issuing judge's determination, to focus on whether reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence support the determination of probable cause.

Bunnell, 172 N.E.3d at 1235 (citations and internal quotations omitted).

[24] When determining whether a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause exists, “ ‘we consider only the evidence presented to the issuing magistrate’ and not post hoc justifications for the search.” Heuring, 140 N.E.3d at 273 (quoting Figert, 686 N.E.2d at 830). “ ‘[S]ufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.’ ” Figert, 686 N.E.2d at 833 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 239).

[25] McKinney argues that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause because the probable cause affidavit omitted the fact that Lee provided a false name when he was first apprehended.

A probable cause affidavit must include all material facts known to law enforcement, which includes facts that cast doubt on the existence of probable cause. Although it may not be practical to include all information related to an investigation in a probable cause affidavit, the best course for police to follow is to include any information that could conceivably affect a probable cause determination. When material information is omitted from a probable cause affidavit, such omission will invalidate a warrant if (1) the police omitted facts with the intent to make the affidavit misleading or with reckless disregard for whether it would be misleading, and (2) the affidavit supplemented with the omitted information would have been insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.

Gerth v. State, 51 N.E.3d 368, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

[26] Officer Lim testified that he could not recall if he was aware at the time of the interview that Lee had initially provided a false name. Moreover, Officer Lim's probable cause affidavit included that Lee had fled South Carolina because he was wanted on a warrant for attempted murder in that state and that Lee was, at the time, being held in the St. Joseph County jail on firearms charges and the warrant from South Carolina. We cannot say that Officer Lim recklessly excluded from the probable cause affidavit the fact that Lee had initially provided a false name when arrested. And, even if we assume that this omission from the probable cause affidavit was made with reckless disregard, we conclude that the affidavit, when supplemented by the omitted information, would still have been sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.

[27] The information McKinney claims was improperly omitted from the probable cause affidavit goes to Lee's credibility and reliability as an informant. But any issues with Lee's credibility or reliability as an informant does not alter the fact that, during the trash search, the police found the remnants of burnt marijuana cigarettes and packaging material that contained cocaine residue.⁸ This information alone supports a finding of probable cause. See Edwards v. State, 832 N.E.2d 1072, 1079-80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that marijuana stems and seeds found in trash search supported a finding of probable cause to search the house where the trash was obtained); Bowles v. State, 820 N.E.2d 739, 748-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that probable cause supported issuance of search warrant for home after police found marijuana seeds and stems, plastic baggies, and cocaine residue during search of trash outside the home).

[28] McKinney also argues that the information received from Lee was stale by the time of the issuance of the search warrant. But the marijuana and cocaine residue found in the trash search—not merely the information provided by Lee—support a finding of probable cause to support the decision to issue the warrant to search McKinney's home. See id. The police also applied for the search warrant the day after the trash search, and the warrant was granted and executed that same day. Thus, the information regarding the marijuana and cocaine found during the trash search was fresh.

[29] In sum, we conclude that under the Fourth Amendment, Article 1, Section 11, and the Search Warrant statute, there was probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant to search McKinney's house. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence seized during the execution of the search warrant.

IV. Good Faith Exception

[30] Even if we agreed with McKinney that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, we would still affirm based on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. “Exclusion of evidence recovered pursuant to a search warrant issued by a judge or magistrate is not required when the officer obtaining the warrant has acted in objective good faith and within the scope of the warrant.” Gerth, 51 N.E.3d at 375 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984)); see also Ind. Code § 35-37-4-5 (codifying the good faith exception)).

[31] McKinney claims that the good-faith exception does not apply because “Officer Lim's reliance on a warrant issued on essentially uncorroborated hearsay from a confidential informant was objectively unreasonable.” Appellant's Br. p. 18.; see also Heuring v. State, 140 N.E.3d 270, 277 (Ind. 2020) (noting that the good faith exception does not apply if the indicia of probable cause are so lacking in probable cause that reliance thereon is “objectively unreasonable”). As noted above, however, Lee provided information contrary to his penal interest and was subject to additional criminal liability if he gave the police false information. Moreover, the police found evidence of illicit drugs during the trash search, which was based on reasonable suspicion. Thus, even if Officer Lim's affidavit was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, his reliance on the warrant was not objectively unreasonable.

Conclusion

[32] Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the police had reasonable suspicion to search McKinney's trash. And the evidence found during the trash search and the facts of the investigation provided support for a finding of probable cause to support the search warrant. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence seized during the search of the home. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[33] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This appears to be a reference to the Strategic Force Unit of the SBPD. Tr. Vol. II p. 30.

2.   The person identified here is apparently McKinney's minor child, so we have omitted his name and date of birth.

3.   The person identified here is possibly McKinney's minor child, so we have also omitted her name.

4.   Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005).

5.   McKinney claims that the information the police corroborated was readily available to the general public and, therefore, insufficient to establish Lee's credibility. McKinney cites Cartwright v. State, 26 N.E.3d 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), and Hayworth v. State, 904 N.E.2d 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), in which we noted that, to establish an informant's credibility, the police must do more than corroborate publicly available facts. But those cases concerned whether an informant's statements could establish probable cause, a more demanding standard than reasonable suspicion, which is all that was required to justify the search of McKinney's trash under Litchfield.

6.   This statute provides that generally, “no warrant for search or arrest shall be issued until there is filed with the judge an affidavit”:(1) particularly describing:(A) the house or place to be searched and the things to be searched for; or(B) particularly describing the person to be arrested;(2) alleging substantially the offense in relation thereto and that the affiant believes and has good cause to believe that:(A) the things sought are concealed there; or(B) the person to be arrested committed the offense; and(3) setting forth the facts known to the affiant through personal knowledge or based on hearsay, constituting the probable causeI.C. § 35-33-5-2.

7.   McKinney makes no separate argument that the search was impermissible under Article 1, Section 11 or the Search Warrant statute. He merely argues that probable cause is required by the Fourth Amendment, Article 1, Section 11, and the Search Warrant Statute, and that the State failed to establish probable cause to support the search warrant.

8.   The search of the trash also revealed papers containing the name and date of birth of a child that shares McKinney's surname and the telephone number of the mother of McKinney's children.

Tavitas, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Felix concur. Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.