IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.A. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] J.A. (“Father”) and K.A. (“Mother”) (together, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's order terminating their parental rights to D.A., K.A., Ke.A., and Ka.A. (“the Children”). Parents raise the following restated issues for our review:

I.  Whether there was sufficient evidence supporting certain findings; and

II. Whether the trial court's judgment was clearly erroneous.

[2] Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Prior to the termination proceedings, Parents, who were married, had been together for nineteen years and had five children together: J.A., a seventeen-year-old not subject to the termination proceedings; D.A., born in December 2008; K.A., born in April 2016; Ke.A., born in December 2018; and Ka.A., born in March 2022. Prior to the current proceedings, Parents were involved in a previous case with the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) that began in July 2017 and involved two of the Children, who were adjudicated as Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). That CHINS matter concluded in April 2018 with a successful reunification.

[4] The current CHINS cases began on March 29, 2022, when DCS removed the Children from Parents’ care on an emergency basis due to allegations of neglect and abuse. Shortly after her birth, Ka.A.’s cord blood tested positive for marijuana, amphetamine, methamphetamine, and hydrocodone. Mother admitted to ongoing marijuana use but denied having used methamphetamine in the prior two years. Despite her admission, Mother continued to breast feed Ka.A. Mother also told DCS that Father had been charged with possession of methamphetamine a few months prior, in December 2021, and Mother was concerned that he was still abusing the drug. During DCS's investigation, it was noted that the family had an extensive history of substance abuse, including a previous drug-related Informal Adjustment. That same day, DCS filed a petition alleging the Children were CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 as to all of the Children, involving an allegation of the Parents’ inability, refusal, or neglect to provide proper care for the Children without court intervention, and section 31-34-1-10 as to Ka.A., involving an allegation that she was born with controlled substances in her cord blood.

[5] At the May 16, 2022 CHINS fact-finding hearing, Parents admitted “to substance abuse issues where services could be beneficial.” Ex. Vol. 1 p. 45. The trial court accepted Parents’ admissions and granted the CHINS petition, adjudicating the Children to be CHINS. On June 19, 2022, the trial court issued its dispositional order, which, in pertinent part, ordered Parents to: maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing; secure and maintain a legal and stable source of income; keep all appointments with service providers; obey the law; submit to random drug screens; not use illegal substances; complete a substance abuse assessment and successfully complete all treatment recommendations; participate in home-based counseling as recommended; and participate in individual counseling.

[6] On June 30, 2022, Father was sentenced after pleading guilty in cause 48C05-2112-F6-3339 to Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of two years with sixty-two days executed and the balance suspended to probation. At the September 28, 2022 CHINS review hearing, the trial court found that Parents had not complied with the case plan, had not enhanced their parental abilities, and had not cooperated with DCS. Mother had completed a substance abuse assessment and had been referred for individual therapy, group therapy for her substance abuse, recovery coach/skills instruction, homemaker services, and drug screens. At the time of the hearing, she was at risk of being closed out of individual therapy due to her inconsistency with services. Mother had submitted to three drug screens, two of which were negative, and one was positive for THC. Father had been incarcerated “for most of June” and had not made an appointment for his substance abuse assessment. Id. at 53. Mother attended visits with the Children, but Father's attendance was infrequent due to his incarceration and work schedule.

[7] In May 2023, the trial court conducted a permanency hearing and approved a concurrent permanency plan of reunification and adoption for the Children after finding that Parents had not complied with the case plan. The trial court found that Mother began individual therapy in September 2022 but then disengaged following her first appointment. She re-engaged in therapy in February 2023 and attended one session, but she had not started group therapy as referred because she had to engage first in individual therapy. Mother had tested positive for THC on February 27, 2023. The trial court found that Father completed a substance abuse assessment and was recommended “to participate in extensive outpatient group therapy and individual therapy.” Id. at 57. However, he did not engage in these services between December 2022 and February 2023, and he was scheduled to attend group therapy orientation in February 2023. Father also inconsistently submitted to drug screens.

[8] In August 2023, DCS initially filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to the Children, but that case was dismissed because family case manager Tiffany Quilter (“FCM Quilter”), who had been managing the case since May or June 2023, was out of the country and could not attend the termination hearing. That same month, on August 10, 2023, Father returned to jail after being arrested for a probation violation and for a domestic violence incident with Mother as the victim. In addition, a no-contact order was issued prohibiting Father from contacting Mother.

[9] In its September 2023 CHINS review order, the trial court found that Parents had not complied with the case plan, had not enhanced their ability to fulfill their parental obligations, and had not cooperated with DCS. Mother had “engaged and disengaged in services throughout” the CHINS cases, had not consistently participated in substance abuse treatment, and had not consistently called in for drug screens. Id. at 59. Father also had not consistently called in for drug screens and had not participated in substance abuse treatment.

[10] In October 2023, Father admitted that he violated his probation in cause 48C05-2112-F6-3339 as a result of a positive drug screen from February 6, 2023, for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC. The criminal court revoked his previously suspended sentence of 303 days and ordered him to serve that sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction. Also in October 2023, Paternal Grandparents evicted Parents from the home they had purchased for Parents. Parents had lived there rent-free for seven and a half years, and Paternal Grandmother had paid for the insurance. Prior to Parents’ eviction, the home's conditions were not suitable for the Children.

[11] On October 27, 2023, DCS filed its petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to the Children. The trial court held the termination fact-finding hearing on January 22, 2024, and April 1, 2024. At the hearing, testimony was presented that throughout Parents’ relationship, they had relied heavily on family and friends for housing and financial support. Both Maternal Grandmother and Paternal Grandparents had purchased homes for the family at different times. Paternal Grandmother testified that she and her husband decided to purchase one of the homes for Parents because such a living arrangement was preferable to having Parents stay with them because “things were coming up missing,” including guns, when Parents lived with them. Tr. Vol. I p. 120. Parents also lived in a friend's camper on property owned by the friend after one of the homes purchased for them was destroyed by a house fire. Mother briefly received Section 8 housing assistance in 2014 while Father was previously incarcerated. In addition to being evicted by Paternal Grandparents, Mother had previously been evicted from another home.

[12] FCM Quilter testified that Mother maintained weekly contact with her but had not kept all appointments with DCS and the service providers as ordered in the dispositional decree. FCM Quilter testified that Mother completed a substance abuse evaluation “only after the second time around.” Id. at 28. The assessment recommended outpatient classes and individual counseling. Mother completed outpatient counseling in December 2023, which was after DCS filed the petition for termination. She had partially complied with individual counseling, and FCM Quilter noted that, at times, Mother had “many no shows,” but after the initial termination petition was filed in August 2023 “is when she really started engaging.” Id. at 23.

[13] Evidence was presented that Mother did not consistently submit to drug screens. Her drug screen records from the drug testing facility showed that she had fifty-one unforgiven missed tests and fifteen abnormal tests between May 2022 and August 2023. Between March 25, 2022, and July 18, 2023, Mother consistently tested positive for THC when she did screen. Since August 2023, Mother had been submitting to screens and testing negative.

[14] DCS had referred Mother to home-based services to address Mother's housing and employment issues, and that referral was still active at the time of the hearing. Mother admitted that she had difficulties keeping in contact with the provider but stated that “we both played a part in it.” Id. at 152. FCM Quilter testified that Mother had not complied with home-based services between the January 2024 and April 2024 hearing. Throughout the case, Mother's visitation with the Children remained supervised, and Mother had been consistently visiting K.A., Ka.A., and Ke.A. for six to eight months prior to the hearing. She had not visited D.A. for approximately a year because D.A. “did not want supervised visits,” but Mother spoke with D.A. weekly by phone. Id. at 160.

[15] Throughout the case, Mother had not maintained a residence on her own that was safe, suitable, and stable for herself and the Children. After the eviction in October 2023, Mother lived with Maternal Grandmother in a studio efficiency apartment, but Mother was not on the lease and Maternal Grandmother and her fiancé paid the weekly $140 rent. By the January 2024 termination hearing, FCM Quilter had not been to Mother's apartment because Mother and Maternal Grandmother “always cancelled the day of” the scheduled appointment. Id. at 67. By the date of the April 2024 hearing, FCM Quilter had visited the apartment and described it as having the bedroom and living room in the same space, plus a kitchen and bathroom. The apartment did not have sufficient bedrooms or living space for the Children. The court appointed special advocate, Aubrey Ramsey (“CASA Ramsey”), testified that she had also been to the apartment and had safety concerns that the Children would not have their own rooms. By the April 2024 hearing, Maternal Grandmother had moved out of the apartment but continued paying the rent. She was not going to renew the lease, which ended at the end of April, and she did not know where Mother was going to live afterward.

[16] At the time of the hearing, Mother was thirty-five years old and unemployed. She did not report any mental or physical disability that would prevent her from working, nor did service providers identify any such condition during Mother's limited participation in services. She had not been employed throughout the case, except for a temporary seasonal job. Mother relied on family to support her financially. In March 2024, Mother had applied for employment at a temporary staffing agency, and she testified that she had applied at several other places over the life of the case but was never hired. Mother had filed dissolution proceedings against Father in September 2023, which were still pending at the time of the termination hearing.

[17] At the termination hearing, evidence was presented that, before his August 2023 incarceration, Father did not maintain weekly contact with FCM Quilter and did not keep her updated with his address. He participated in some services, including supervised visitation and completing a substance abuse evaluation. Although he completed the substance abuse evaluation, Father did not complete the services recommended from the assessment, including outpatient and individual therapy. He also did not ask FCM Quilter to refer him to services or consistently visit Children. When he did visit, he supplied food and diapers, but there were also negative reports from his supervised visits that caused DCS to have safety concerns. Father also testified that, at the time of the hearing, he had not provided any financial support to the Children for more than a year.

[18] Evidence was presented regarding Father's compliance with drug screens that showed he failed to call 200 times, had sixty-two unforgiven missed tests, and had five abnormal tests. When he submitted to screens between October 6, 2022, and December 9, 2022, he consistently tested positive for THC, and his screen from October 6, 2022, was also positive for hydrocodone, 6-Acetylmorphine, and fentanyl in addition to THC.

[19] Father was incarcerated for a probation violation from August 10, 2023, until January 11, 2024, with approximately five months served in the Madison County Jail and the remainder at the Indiana Department of Correction. While Father was incarcerated at the Madison County Jail, DCS could not refer services to him because service providers are not allowed at the facility. After his release, Father did not reach out to FCM Quilter to provide his contact information. At the time of the April 2024 hearing, Father had contacted FCM Quilter about visits with the Children, and she had attempted to find a visitation supervisor for him because the no-contact order prevented his visiting the Children at the same time as Mother. At the time of the hearing, Father did not have housing and had been “couch surfing” at friends’ homes. Id. at 80. He was unemployed and looking for work.

[20] Although DCS had referred Father for another substance abuse assessment, Father had not completed it at the time of the hearing. At the time of the termination hearing, Father had a pending misdemeanor domestic violence charge with Mother as the victim as well as a pending misdemeanor theft charge with Paternal Grandmother as the victim.

[21] Evidence was presented that the Children were doing well in their placements. D.A. was placed with Paternal Grandparents (along with the older sibling not subject to termination), while K.A., Ka.A., and Ke.A. were placed in foster care and were “very bonded” to their foster parents. Id. at 81. The foster parent of K.A., Ka.A., and Ke.A. testified that, if the trial court granted termination, the foster parents planned to adopt all three younger children. Paternal Grandmother had teenaged D.A. in her care “three different times” over his life. Id. at 117. She was willing to adopt D.A. and believed that it was not safe for D.A. to return to Parents’ care because they had traumatized him in the past and returning him again would re-traumatize him. She also stated that she believed that it was not in the best interests of the younger Children to return to Parents’ care. She did not believe that providing more time to Parents would increase the probability that they would be able to safely parent the Children.

[22] FCM Quilter testified that, in the past, the Children had displayed concerning behaviors. There was some indication the behaviors stemmed from trauma. DCS had provided individual therapy for D.A., K.A., and Ke.A. and developmental therapy for Ka.A. Based on conversations with the Children, CASA Ramsey testified that “the way they kind of speak about ․ the case” made her believe that there was “kind of trauma-built ․ within them.” Id. at 81.

[23] FCM Quilter recommended termination because Parents had not completed all the services they were required to complete and because Mother did not start complying with services until after the initial termination petition was filed in August 2023. FCM Quilter testified that Parents were unable to provide suitable housing or for the needs of the Children, and there were still concerns for substance abuse and domestic violence. When asked why the CHINS case should not remain open for another year or two, FCM Quilter testified that it was “extremely harmful” to keep the Children “in the system ․ because[,] although they are placed somewhere[,] it doesn't really give them full stability ․ and it takes a toll on their mental health overall.” Id. at 36.

[24] CASA Ramsey also recommended termination based on Mother's lack of suitable housing and stable income. She stated that while Mother planned to “find a job and a bigger house” that would accommodate the Children, Mother could have done so, since the CHINS cases were filed in 2022, and had not. Id. at 95. CASA Ramsey testified that Father had been incarcerated “most of the time,” and he did not have employment or a home either. Id. at 80. CASA Ramsey testified that giving Parents additional time would be harmful to the Children because for some of the Children, it was their second CHINS case “for the same situation,” and the uncertainty of whether they would be taken away again would cause the Children harm. Id. at 81. She also stated that being involved long-term in the child welfare system “harms children.” Id.

[25] On September 5, 2024, the trial court entered its order terminating the parental rights of Parents. The trial court concluded that “[t]here [was] no point during the underlying CHINS case that either parent has made substantial progress toward reunification.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 26. The trial court further concluded that “there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the [C]hildren's removal or the continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by either Mother or Father” and that “the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the [C]hildren in that it leaves [them] dangling in the child-welfare system, without a permanent home and without any realistic hope of achieving a timely permanent, safe, and stable living arrangement with their biological mother or father.” Id. The trial court further concluded “by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the [C]hildren's best interest that [Mother's] and [Father's] parental rights be terminated so that [the C]hildren are free to be adopted.” Id. Lastly, the trial court found that DCS's plan of adoption for the Children was appropriate and a satisfactory plan. Parents now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[26] While the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise their children, the law allows for the termination of parental rights based on a parent's inability or unwillingness to meet parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005); In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Thus, parental rights are subordinated to the child's interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re. J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the child. In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1231. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[27] As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts ․” E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). In evaluating the trial court's findings and conclusions in an order terminating parental rights, we review only for clear error, and we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” Id. If the evidence and reasonable inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

I. Findings Not Supported by the Evidence

[28] A finding is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom which support it. Stewart v. Randolph Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 804 N.E.2d 1207, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Even erroneous findings are not reversible error if they are harmless. See, e.g., In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“We may reverse a trial court's judgment ․ only if its findings constitute prejudicial error ․ A finding of fact is not prejudicial to a party unless it directly supports a conclusion.”), trans. denied. An erroneous finding is “merely harmless surplusage” when the unchallenged findings “provide ample support for the trial court's ultimate conclusion.” Id.

A. Mother

[29] Mother asserts that several of the trial court's findings were not supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. Specifically, she lists the following six findings as not having support in the record:

11. She has failed to fully engage in the offered services, picking and choosing the ones in which she cared to participate and to what extent she would do so, and has not sufficiently enhanced her parenting so that the children could safely be returned to her care now, or in the near future.

12. She failed to participate in fifty-one (51) screens through Cordant, inferring that she would test positive for an illegal substance.

13. Of those screens she did submit, fifteen (15) were noted as being abnormal.

14. Mother submitted samples which were positive, upon confirmatory testing, for THC, including but not limited to those on July 18, 2023; May 12, 2023; April 14, 2023; March 28, 2023; March 16, 2023; February 26, 2023; December 21, 2022.

15. Mother did not complete the substance abuse assessment on the first attempt. After completing the assessment, she did not follow through with all the treatment recommended.

16. Mother does not have safe and adequate housing in which to parent the children.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 23. Initially, we note that, although Mother lists Findings 12 and 14—the findings related to the number of missed screens and the number of positive screens—as findings she is challenging, Mother does not make any specific argument as to why these findings were not supported by the evidence. She has therefore waived any challenge to Findings 12 and 14 for failure to develop a cogent argument. Stark v. State, 204 N.E.3d 957, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[30] As to Finding 13, which identified fifteen abnormal screens, Mother argues that there was no basis in the record for the trial court to assume that the abnormal findings equate to positive drug screens. However, her argument reads too much into the finding. The finding merely states that there were fifteen screens that were noted as being abnormal, and Mother's compliance report did contain information that she had fifteen abnormal screens. Ex. Vol. 1 p. 63. Therefore, Finding 13 was supported by the record and not clearly erroneous.

[31] Regarding Findings 11 and 15 that describe the extent of Mother's engagement in services, including lack of follow up after a substance abuse assessment, Mother appears to take issue with the statements that she did not fully engage in services and complete certain services. However, she does not fully develop such an argument, and instead, quotes a portion of FCM Quilter's favorable testimony from the hearing where she testified that Mother did maintain contact with DCS, keep them informed of address changes, completed outpatient counseling, and partially completed individual counseling while noting that Mother did not keep appointments with service providers. Mother seems to challenge the findings on the basis that she had at least some participation in services. We note, however, that the challenged findings state that Mother did not “fully engage in the offered services” and “did not follow through with all the treatment recommended” after her substance abuse evaluation. Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 23 (emphasis added). The evidence presented at the hearing indeed revealed that Mother did not fully engage in services and did not follow through with all recommended treatment. FCM Quilter testified that, while Mother completed the outpatient counseling recommended by her substance abuse assessment in December 2023, she had only partially complied with the recommended individual counseling and had “many no shows” and had only started engaging after the first termination petition was filed. Tr. Vol. I pp. 23, 28. Evidence was also presented that Mother did not comply with her home-based services, which were put in place to assist with her housing and employment issues. Mother, herself, admitted that she had not followed through with those services and did not meet with her service provider for “an extended period of time.” Id. at 152. Findings 11 and 15 were not clearly erroneous.

[32] Finding 16 states that Mother does not have safe and adequate housing in which to parent the Children. Mother argues there was no evidence that her apartment was unsafe for the Children and that CASA Ramsey testified that she had no safety concerns regarding Mother's housing. The record reflected that, at the time of the hearing, Mother was living in a studio apartment that was rented by Maternal Grandmother and that the apartment's lease was ending soon. Although CASA Ramsey did testify initially that after she viewed Mother's apartment that she did not have any safety concerns, she later testified that “the fact that the kids wouldn't have their own bedrooms would be my safety concern.” Id. at 83. Thus, the evidence revealed that, at the time of the hearing, Mother did not have safe and adequate housing in which to parent the Children. Contrary to Mother's contentions, the challenged findings were all supported by the record, and the trial court did not err in making such findings.

B. Father

[33] Father also contends that several of the trial court's findings were not supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. Specifically, he takes issue with Findings 30c, 34, 36, 38, 39, 41, and 42. Finding 30c stated, “Throughout the CHINS case, Father has done nothing to ensure the [C]hildren's basic needs are being met.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 25. Father points to FCM Quilter's testimony that Father provided food and diapers when he visited the Children to support his argument. While he is correct that FCM Quilter testified that when Father had visits with the Children, he provided food and diapers, the evidence revealed that since Father was incarcerated in August 2023 until the hearing dates in January and April 2024, he had not been visiting the Children, and Father, himself, testified that, at the time of the hearing, he had not provided any financial support to the Children for more than a year. The evidence established that although Father provided some support in the form of food and diapers during the visits he attended prior to August 2023, he did nothing else to ensure the Children's basic needs were met while the case was pending. Therefore, Finding 30c may be erroneous to the extent that it states that Father did nothing to ensure Children's basic needs were met, but this erroneous language is “merely harmless surplusage” as the unchallenged findings “provide ample support for the trial court's ultimate conclusion” as we will explain in greater detail below. See In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d at 20.

[34] Father next challenges Finding 34, which stated, “Father presented no independent evidence that he engaged in any rehabilitative or self-developmental services during his time in jail/prison.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 24. Father asserts that there was no evidence that any such programs were offered either in jail or prison. He, therefore, does not argue that finding is clearly erroneous, just that DCS did not provide him with programming while incarcerated. FCM Quilter testified that DCS did not offer Father services while he was incarcerated because DCS was not allowed to put service providers in jails, and the record reflected that Father did not provide any independent evidence that he engaged in case-related services or other programming while incarcerated. Thus, the record supported Finding 34.

[35] Father's next challenge is to Finding 36, which stated, “While Father completed the initial substance abuse assessment, he has not engaged in the extensive outpatient and individual therapy that was recommended.” Id. (emphasis added). He contends that no evidence was presented that he was required to participate in extensive outpatient and individual therapy. However, at the May 22, 2023 permanency hearing, the trial court found that Father completed a substance abuse assessment in November 2022, and he “was recommended to participate in extensive outpatient group therapy and individual therapy.” Ex. Vol. 1 p. 57. (emphasis added). Thus, there was evidence presented to support Finding 36.

[36] Father next challenges Findings 38, 39, 41, and 42, which state in pertinent part:

38. This failure to drug screen implies that Father was using an illicit substance in violation of his dispositional decree to not use or consume illegal substances.

39. During the pendency of the CHINS cases, Father has submitted screens that were confirmed positive for hydrocodone, THC, and fentanyl.

․

41. Father has been in and out of the criminal justice system as a result of his conviction under cause 48C05-2112-F6-3339, for Possession of Methamphetamine and Paraphernalia on June 30, 2022.

42. Since that time, he admitted to having violated his probation by submitting a specimen to probation on February 6, 2023, that was positive for Amphetamine, Methamphetamine and THC, and a portion of his sentence was revoked to the Indiana Department of Correction[ ].

Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 24–25. As to these findings, Father only asserts that “[t]here was only one screen that showed anything besides THC.” Appellants’ Br. p. 21. While Father is correct that only one of his screens was positive for hydrocodone, THC, and fentanyl, he fails to explain how the challenged findings are clearly erroneous. Evidence was presented that Father missed sixty-two random screens, and our caselaw is clear that a parent whose drug use led to a child's removal cannot refuse drug testing and later claim that DCS has failed to prove continued drug use. E.g., In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The evidence at the hearing also showed that when Father did submit to screens, he tested positive for THC on several screens as well as for THC, hydrocodone, and fentanyl on a screen on October 6, 2023. Ex. Vol. I pp. 178–93. Additionally, Father admitted that he violated his probation in part because his February 6, 2023 screen was positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC. Id. at 226–27. The evidence supported Findings 38, 39, 41, and 42. Contrary to Father's contentions, the challenged findings were all supported by the record, and the trial court did not clearly err in making such findings.

II. Sufficient Evidence for Judgment

[37] Parents next challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's conclusions that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the removal of the Children and the reasons for placement outside of the home would not be remedied and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the Children.

[38] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State must allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a [CHINS];

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).¹ The State's burden of proof for establishing these allegations is one of clear and convincing evidence. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Moreover, “if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added). Further, because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written such that, to properly effectuate the termination of parental rights, the trial court need only find one of the three requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) has been established by clear and convincing evidence, we need not address all of the requirements if we find that one has been proven. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B); A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1157 n.6.

A. Conditions Not Remedied

[39] We, therefore, first look to determine if DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in removal and continued placement outside of Parents’ care would not be remedied. In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, a court engages in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, the court must determine what conditions led to the child's placement and retention in foster care, and second, the court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id.

[40] In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing a parent's recent improvements against “ ‘habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.’ ” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). Under this rule, “[trial] courts have properly considered evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment.” In re D.B., 942 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[41] In addition, DCS need not provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it must establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “We entrust th[e] delicate balance to the trial court, which has [the] discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. When determining whether the conditions resulting in removal would be remedied, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the offers of help from DCS or the service providers. D.B., 942 N.E.2d at 873.

[42] A trial court may “properly consider the services offered to the parent by [DCS] and the parent's response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied.” D.B., 942 N.E.2d at 873. Evidence of a pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing services supports a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted), trans. denied. Additionally, “the failure to exercise the right to visit one's children demonstrates a ‘lack of commitment to complete the actions necessary to preserve [the] parent-child relationship.’ ” Id. (quoting In re A.L.H., 774 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)).

[43] Here, the Children were removed from Parents’ care on an emergency basis on March 29, 2022, due to allegations of abuse and neglect because they lacked a sober caregiver. Shortly after her birth, Ka.A.’s cord blood tested positive for marijuana, amphetamine, methamphetamine, and hydrocodone, and Mother admitted to ongoing marijuana use but denied having used methamphetamine in the prior two years. Despite her admission, Mother continued to breast feed Ka.A. Mother also informed DCS that Father had been charged with possession of methamphetamine a few months prior, and Mother was concerned that he was still abusing the drug. During its investigation, DCS discovered that the family had an extensive history of substance abuse, and a previous drug-related Informal Adjustment. At the time of the termination hearing, the Children had continued to remain outside of Parents’ care for over two years since the date of removal. The reasons for their continued placement outside of Parents’ care were Mother's unsafe and unstable housing, which had been provided by family and was not suitable for the Children, and her instability in financial matters, with Mother being unemployed at all times during the proceedings except for brief seasonal work, Father's incarceration and unresolved substance abuse issues, and both Parents’ failure to fully engage in court-ordered services. Further, neither parent ever progressed past supervised visitation while the case was pending.

1. Mother

[44] The evidence presented at the termination hearing revealed that Mother had a history of long-standing issues with providing herself and the Children with independent housing and consistently relied on family and friends to provide housing and financial assistance. Mother's lack of safe and suitable housing for the Children, her unemployment, and her historical and present reliance on family supported the trial court's judgment. The evidence revealed that Parents had lived in a home for seven and a half years rent free provided for them by Paternal Grandparents, who also paid the insurance. However, in October 2023, Paternal Grandparents evicted them. Mother then lived with Maternal Grandmother in a studio apartment, which did not have sufficient space or bedrooms for the Children. Maternal Grandmother moved out, and Mother continued to live there with Maternal Grandmother continuing to pay rent. Mother continued to reside there at the time of the termination hearing, but she was not on the lease and Maternal Grandmother was not going to renew the lease and was unsure where Mother was going to live. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother did not have employment and had not been employed during the underlying CHINS proceedings, except for a seasonal temporary job. Mother said her plan was to find a job and bigger house, which she could have done since the CHINS cases opened in 2022 but had not. Mother's lack of housing that was safe and suitable for the Children and lack of employment and stable income supported the trial court's judgment. See, B.H. v. Ind. Dep't. of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 355, 358–65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (terminating parental rights in part because the parent failed to resolve housing and employment issues and, throughout the case, lacked stable or significant employment).

[45] The evidence at the hearing also demonstrated that Mother did not fully comply with court-ordered services. DCS had referred her to home-based services to assist her with her housing and employment issues, and Mother admitted that she was at least partially responsible for the difficulties she had maintaining contact with the service provider. The service provider's records reflected that Mother had not complied between the January and April 2024 hearing dates. Mother did complete a substance abuse assessment on the second attempt and completed the recommended outpatient classes in December 2023, which was over one and a half years after the CHINS case was opened and after DCS had filed a termination petition. Indeed, Mother only partially complied with individual counseling and, as one service provider put it, only “really started engaging” after DCS petitioned for termination in August 2023. Tr. Vol. I p. 23. Although Mother complied with drug screens after the termination petition was filed and tested negative thereafter, over the lifetime of the case, she did not consistently submit to drug screens, failing to participle in fifty-one screens, submitting fifteen abnormal screens, and testing positive seven times.

[46] The evidence established that Mother had not demonstrated changes in her life such that the Children could be safely returned to her care. Although Mother participated in some of the court-ordered services, the majority of her participation occurred after DCS had filed its petition for termination of parental rights in August 2023. The trial court could properly give more weight to Mother's historical conduct than her recent efforts made after the termination petition was filed. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (stating that we entrust the delicate balance of weighing a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation to the trial court). Further, although there had been DCS involvement and services available for over two years, Mother had not rectified her habitual lack of safe and suitable housing and employment so that she could provide a safe and nurturing environment for the Children. She, therefore, did not demonstrate any meaningful and lasting change such that DCS could return the Children to her care. Over the course of the case, Mother demonstrated an unwillingness and lack of commitment to address the issues preventing reunification with the Children, which supported the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the condition that resulted in removal and continued placement outside her case will not change.

[47] Mother's arguments to the contrary are merely requests to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642. Mother also asserts that it would be “impossible for her to do” many of the things ordered in the dispositional order because she did not have custody of the Children. Appellants’ Br. p. 19. To the extent that she is arguing that these requirements were improper, we first note that Mother has waived any argument regarding the propriety of the requirements for failure to object to them to the trial court, both at the CHINS dispositional hearing and anytime thereafter. See In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 834 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding an issue waived in the context of a termination case because a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal). Further, it does not appear that the trial court based any of its findings on these challenged requirements. Based on the foregoing, we identify sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside the home would not be remedied.

2. Father

[48] As to Father, the evidence revealed that although he participated in some of the ordered services, including attending supervised visits at times and completing a substance abuse evaluation at the beginning of the CHINS case, he was not consistent in his participation throughout the case. After completing the substance abuse evaluation, Father did not complete the services recommended as a result of the evaluation, including outpatient and individual therapy. He also did not consistently visit the Children and admitted that, at the time of the hearing, he had not provided any financial support to the Children for more than a year. When Father had visits with the Children, there were negative reports that caused DCS to have safety concerns. Evidence was presented regarding Father's non-compliance with drug screens that indicated he failed to call 200 times, had sixty-two unforgiven missed tests, and had five abnormal tests. He tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC in February 2023 and consistently tested positive for THC between October 6, 2022, and December 9, 2022; on October 6, 2022, he also tested positive for hydrocodone, 6-Acetylmorphine, and fentanyl in addition to THC. While the case was pending, Father was incarcerated for a probation violation from August 10, 2023, until January 11, 2024. During this time, DCS could not refer services to him, and there was no indication Father otherwise participated in pertinent programming while incarcerated, and after his release, Father did not reach out to FCM Quilter to provide his contact information. At the time of the hearing, Father did not have housing and had been “couch surfing” at friends’ homes. Tr. Vol. I p. 80. He also did not have employment but stated he was looking for work. Further, at the time of the hearing, DCS had referred Father for another substance abuse assessment, but Father had not yet completed it. Father also had two pending misdemeanor charges at the time of the hearing, a domestic violence charge with Mother as the victim and a pending theft charge.

[49] Participating in and completing the required services and abstaining from drug use were necessary for Father to reunify with the Children. However, Father only minimally participated in such services and never demonstrated that he had addressed his substance abuse issues, especially in light of the fact that he had not yet completed another substance abuse assessment as referred by DCS. Father, therefore, never established that he could safely parent the Children or demonstrate any meaningful and lasting change such that DCS could safely return the Children to his care. The trial court could reasonably conclude that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside the home would not be remedied.

[50] Father's arguments to the contrary are merely requests to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642. Father also asserts that there was no evidence that his substance abuse had an adverse effect on his parenting ability. However, the evidence established that, at the CHINS factfinding hearing, he admitted to “substance abuse issues where services could be beneficial” and admitted that the Children were CHINS. Ex. Vol. 1 p. 45. Further, contrary to Father's assertions, the trial court did not terminate his parental rights solely based on his incarceration, and a parent's criminal history is properly considered in termination proceedings. See. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235–36 (“Individuals who pursue criminal activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop positive and meaningful relationships with their children.”). Based on the foregoing, there was sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside the home would not be remedied.

[51] Parents also seem to assert that there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the Children. However, we need not address this argument because of the disjunctive nature of the subsection (b)(2)(B), where this portion of the statute is satisfied because we identified clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court's determination that the conditions for the Children's removal and continued placement outside of the home would not be remedied.

B. Best Interests

[52] Parents also assert that there was insufficient evidence that terminating their parental rights was in the best interests of the Children. In determining what is in the best interests of the child, a trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. dismissed. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of a parent to those of the child. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. (citing In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable, stable home environment along with the parent's current inability to do so supports a finding that termination is in the best interests of the child. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d at 82. Testimony of the service providers, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, also support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. As earlier noted, before terminating the parent-child relationship, the trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child. Id. (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

[53] Our review of the totality of the evidence leads to the conclusion that, at the time of the termination hearing, Parents had not appreciably improved their ability to safely care for the Children. Indeed, although the Children had been removed from the home for over two years, Parents never progressed to unsupervised visitations with the Children. As discussed above, DCS presented sufficient evidence that there was a reasonable probability that Parents would not remedy the reasons for the Children's removal and continued placement out of their care. Additionally, both FCM Quilter and CASA Ramsey testified that they believed that termination was in the best interests of the Children. FCM Quilter recommended termination because Parents had not completed all the services they were required to complete and because Mother did not start complying with services until nearly one and a half years after the CHINS cases were opened, and the initial termination petition was filed in August 2023. She testified that Parents were presently unable to provide suitable housing for the Children and were unable to provide for their needs, plus there were still concerns for substance abuse and domestic violence. She also testified that it was “extremely harmful” to keep the Children “in the system [for additional time] because[,] although they are placed somewhere[,] it doesn't really give them full stability ․ and it takes a toll on their mental health overall.” Tr. Vol. I p. 36. CASA Ramsey also recommended termination based on Parents’ lack of suitable housing and stable income. She also testified that giving Parents additional time would be harmful to the Children because for some of the Children, it was their second CHINS case for similar circumstances, and the uncertainty of the situation and being involved in the child welfare system long term would cause the Children harm. Further, there was some indication the Children exhibited behaviors indicative of trauma in Parents’ care. To the extent the Children would need additional supports or services for their emotional health, it is worth noting that Parents remained unable or unwilling to comply with court-ordered services aimed to support their own needs.

[54] The trial court “need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 649 (Ind. 2015). The Children should not have to wait any longer for Parents to make changes to demonstrate that they are able to safely parent the Children. The trial court's conclusion that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in the Children's best interests was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

C. Satisfactory Plan

[55] Parents also appear to take issue with the placement of the Children and DCS's plan for adoption of K.A., Ke.A., and Ka.A. by the foster parents. “[T]he plan for the care and treatment of a child need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated.” In re C.D., 141 N.E.3d 845, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), (trans. denied), trans. denied. “A DCS plan is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find suitable parents to adopt the children.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007. To find that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child, there does not need to be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive home. Id.

[56] Here, the trial court found that the plan for the care and treatment of the Children was adoption with Paternal Grandmother planning to adopt D.A. and the foster parents adopting the three younger children. This was a satisfactory plan. See id. Parents do not deny that adoption is a satisfactory plan. Instead, they assert that an adoption by unmarried people, one of whom did not testify, is not in the best interests of the Children. However, we need not address whether the foster parents are suitable adoptive parents, because that is a matter within the purview of the adoption court. See A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007 (citing In re M.B., 921 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. 2009)). Sufficient evidence was, therefore, presented to support that there was a satisfactory placement for the Children, which was adoption.

Conclusion

[57] We, therefore, conclude that the challenged findings were either supported by sufficient evidence or amounted to mere surplusage under the circumstances, and the trial court did not err in its judgment terminating Parents’ parental rights to the Children.

[58] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 has been amended since DCS filed its termination petition on October 27, 2023. Effective March 11, 2024, subsection (b)(2)(B)(i), (ii), and (iii) has been rewritten as subsection (d)(3), (4), and (5). See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4. Although the trial court issued its order terminating parental rights after March 11, 2024, neither party argues that the new version alters our analysis.

Foley, Judge.

Mathias, J. and Felix, J., concur.