II v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Following a jury trial, Oscar L. Robinson, II (“Robinson”) was convicted of Level 3 felony ¹ and Level 4 felony ² aiding in dealing methamphetamine, and he admitted to being a habitual offender.³ On appeal, Robinson presents the following issues:

I. Whether there was sufficient evidence (A) Robinson knowingly or intentionally aided in the dealing and (B) knew his child would be present for one transaction; and

II. Whether Robinson's aggregate sentence of twenty-one years is inappropriate, warranting appellate revision.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On August 24, 2023, a confidential informant (“the CI”) working with the Huntington City Police Department (“HCPD”) participated in a controlled buy of methamphetamine. Robinson arranged the transaction by exchanging social media messages with the CI. Robinson initially agreed to sell a “ball” of methamphetamine, which referred to about 3.5 grams, but later said he only had 1.5 grams available for $80. HCPD Detective Sergeant Darius Hillman (“Detective Hillman”) supervised the controlled buy, adhering to procedures and ensuring the CI and her vehicle were searched prior to the transaction to ensure the CI possessed no contraband. Detective Hillman provided the CI with $80 in buy money and the CI was equipped with recording devices. In social media messages, the CI said she would “come get it” and Robinson told the CI that Amanda Williams (“Williams”) “ha[d] it ready[.]” Ex. Vol. 4 p. 6. Robinson was at work and told Williams—his long-time girlfriend—which drugs to give the CI, where they were located, and how much money to collect. Robinson and Williams shared a residence with their two children. At the time, their daughter (“Daughter”) was fifteen years old. Robinson arranged for the CI to arrive at the family residence between 5:00 and 5:15 p.m. that afternoon, with the CI informing Robinson she anticipated getting there around 5:15 p.m.

[4] The CI went to Robinson's residence while under police surveillance, arriving around 5:37 p.m. The CI remained in her vehicle while Williams approached the driver's side window and handed the CI a black container in exchange for $80. Williams and the CI spoke for about five minutes. Surveillance footage established that, at one point, Daughter was standing by the CI's vehicle. The CI returned to meet Detective Hillman, who recovered the black container. Laboratory testing confirmed there were 1.51 grams of methamphetamine in the black container. After the transaction, Williams gave the $80 to Robinson.

[5] On September 8, 2023, the CI participated in a second controlled buy under similar circumstances. Robinson began arranging the transaction through social media messages, then provided his phone number to the CI. Thereafter, Robinson and the CI exchanged text messages. The CI sought to purchase two “balls” of methamphetamine, but Robinson indicated he only had one available for $120. He later said that “[Williams] [was] home[.]” Id. at 25. Robinson told Williams where the drugs were and how much to charge. Meanwhile, Detective Hillman followed the same protocol used in the previous controlled buy, and the CI was provided with $120 in buy money. This time, the Huntington County Sheriff's Office assisted by deploying a drone to monitor and record the drug transaction. The CI drove to Robinson's residence, where Williams handed the CI a plastic bag in exchange for $120. Laboratory testing later confirmed that the plastic bag contained 2.82 grams of methamphetamine. After the transaction, Williams again gave the money to Robinson.

[6] On January 11, 2024, the State charged Robinson with two counts of aiding in dealing in methamphetamine. The State sought a Level 4 felony conviction for the September 2023 transaction. As for the August 2023 transaction, the State sought an elevated conviction as a Level 3 felony due to Daughter being present at the residence during the transaction. The State later sought a habitual offender sentence enhancement based on Robinson's prior felony convictions for attempted burglary in 2001 and possession of methamphetamine in 2017.

[7] While Robinson and Williams were incarcerated after their arrests, Robinson made several phone calls from jail. When speaking with some family members, Robinson denied his involvement. Robinson used other family members to facilitate his direct communication with Williams by having them hold two phones together. On two occasions in February 2024, Robinson spoke with his son and encouraged him to contact Williams while she was incarcerated and tell Williams that “what happens to [Robinson] depends on her, and that it depends on what she chooses to tell law enforcement.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 15.

[8] A jury trial was scheduled for early October 2024. Ahead of trial, the State petitioned for use immunity to compel Williams to testify against Robinson. The trial court granted use immunity, and Williams testified at the trial. She explained how Robinson orchestrated the transactions, including telling her where the drugs were located and how much money to collect. Detective Hillman testified about the social media account used to arrange the drug transactions, which displayed Robinson's picture and biographical information. When Williams was shown a screenshot of the social media account, Williams testified that she recognized the account as one belonging to Robinson. At trial, Robinson presented testimony from his mother, who was shown a screenshot of the social media account on cross-examination. Robinson's mother testified that she recognized the account as Robinson's and that it displayed his picture.

[9] Williams testified about the household schedule, noting that Daughter attended school in August 2023 and had gotten off the bus around 3:20 p.m. the day of the first transaction. Daughter generally returned home off the bus around 3:20 p.m., unless she had a Future Farmers of America (“FFA”) meeting after school. If Daughter had an FFA meeting, Williams would pick up Daughter after the meeting. That pickup would take place between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m.

[10] The jury found Robinson guilty of both counts and he then admitted to being a habitual offender. The trial court held the sentencing hearing in November 2024, which included evidence that Robinson had been the primary financial provider for his family. There was also testimony from Robinson's family members, who spoke highly of Robinson's involvement in providing for his family and raising his children. The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) indicated that Robinson was forty-four years old at the time of sentencing. When Robinson was about fifteen years old, he engaged in delinquent conduct that led to confinement at the Indiana Boys School. As an adult, Robinson was previously convicted of two felonies—Class C felony attempted burglary in 2001 and Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine in 2017—such that he had the status of habitual offender. He had also been convicted of three misdemeanors, including Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. The PSI also indicated that, in the past, Robinson violated a condition of probation in three of four cases in which he had been placed on probation, resulting in the revocation of probation in all three of those cases.

[11] The trial court identified as a mitigating circumstance that Robinson admitted to the habitual offender enhancement. The court said it was “very evident” Robinson “ha[d] strong support from [his] family” and said it had “no doubt that [Robinson was] a good father and ․ a good son,” but that Robinson's positive relationship with his family “d[id not] excuse [his] conduct” and that the court ultimately “th[ought] [Robinson] ha[d] h[is] family fooled.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 21. The aggravating circumstances included that Robinson “did not take responsibility for [his] actions” and had a “prior criminal history” that involved “six prior petitions to revoke [his] probation.” Id. at 20. At one point, the court referred to a portion of the PSI related to Robinson's relationship with drugs and alcohol, where Robinson admitted to using alcohol and marijuana but denied having ever used methamphetamine. The court pointed out that Robinson had previously been convicted of possession of methamphetamine, which led the court to believe Robinson had been dishonest in his response. The trial court found it “very concerning” that Robinson used family to “put pressure” on Williams in the case. Id. at 21. The court also noted Robinson was “not a candidate for probation considering [his] six prior petitions to revoke[.]” Id. The court ultimately imposed an aggregate term of twenty-one years in the Indiana Department of Correction. The sentence consisted of twelve years for the Level 3 felony with a nine-year enhancement and a concurrent term of eight years for the Level 4 felony. Robinson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[12] Robinson argues there was insufficient evidence he committed Level 3 felony and Level 4 felony aiding in dealing methamphetamine. When reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we neither reweigh evidence nor reassess witness credibility. Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. 2012). Rather, we view the evidence—and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence—in a light most favorable to the judgment, looking to whether there was substantial evidence of probative value as to each element of the offense. Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090 (Ind. 2025); Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ind. 2013). The evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007). So long as a reasonable fact-finder could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we must affirm. Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000).

[13] At the outset, we note that Robinson “concedes several elements of both of these offenses” in appellate briefing. Appellant's Br. p. 16. That is, Robinson does not dispute (a) “he is the alleged culprit,” (b) Williams “is his long-term significant other,” (c) the two alleged transactions “took place at his residence,” (d) Daughter, his minor child, “reside[d] at th[at] home,” (e) and Daughter “was at the home” on August 24, 2023, when Williams sold between one and five grams of methamphetamine to the CI at the residence. Id. Rather, Robinson points out that “he was not at [the] home” during the August 2023 transaction and disputes “he had any part of these two transactions and in any way aided, directed, or participated with [Williams] in th[e] transactions.” Id.

A. Aiding in the Transactions

[14] Robinson claims there was insufficient evidence he aided, induced, or caused Williams to deal in methamphetamine. Indiana Code section 35-41-2-4 establishes a person's culpability for aiding another in committing a criminal offense, specifying that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense”—even if the other person “has not been prosecuted for the offense,” “has not been convicted of the offense,” or “has been acquitted of the offense.” A person engages in conduct “knowingly” if, “when the person engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). A person engages in conduct “intentionally” if, “when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a).

[15] Here, the State was obligated to prove that Robinson knowingly or intentionally aided, induced, or caused Williams to commit dealing in methamphetamine on two occasions where the amount of methamphetamine involved was between one and five grams. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 46–47. This required proof that Williams knowingly or intentionally delivered the specified quantity of pure or adulterated methamphetamine. See I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1 (establishing the offense is a Level 4 felony when the amount is between one and five grams).⁴

[16] The trial involved evidence of the CI's participation in both transactions, where the CI met with Williams and exchanged money for methamphetamine. Further, subsequent laboratory testing confirmed the first transaction involved 1.51 grams of methamphetamine and the second transaction involved 2.82 grams of methamphetamine. Williams testified that Robinson set up both transactions and relayed specific details to her, including the location of the methamphetamine and how much to charge. Moreover, there were screenshots of correspondence indicating that Robinson used his social media account to exchange messages with the CI as he ultimately arranged each drug transaction.

[17] On appeal, Robinson asks us to reweigh the evidence, speculating that the social media account involved might have been a fake account or was hacked and used by someone else. Robinson argues that courts “should demand more from the State in proving the legitimacy of an online social media account,” claiming the State “failed to definitively prove, via IP address logs, subpoena records to Facebook, or a search of Robinson's phone(s), that this account was actually opened, maintained, and operated by Robinson.” Appellant's Br. p. 17. We note, however, that the evidence favorable to the convictions included Williams’ testimony that she was communicating with Robinson, who instructed her on completing the hand-to-hand transactions. Moreover, to the extent Robinson questions Williams’ credibility—arguing that she gave self-serving testimony and “[i]t is very easy to understand why [she] would place the blame on [him] as participating in these illegal transactions,” id. at 19—Robinson does not address evidence his cell phone number was used to correspond with the CI.

[18] Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the convictions, as we must, we conclude that the record contains substantial evidence of probative value that Robinson communicated with Williams and arranged both transactions. We therefore conclude there was sufficient evidence that Robinson knowingly or intentionally aided, induced, or caused the commission of both offenses.

B. Knowledge of Child's Presence

[19] Next, Robinson contends there was insufficient evidence to elevate one count of dealing in methamphetamine to a Level 3 felony based on the presence of Daughter. Dealing in methamphetamine is elevated to a Level 3 felony where the amount of the drug is between one and five grams, as was the case here, and “an enhancing circumstance applies.” I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(d)(2). Indiana Code section 35-48-1-16.5 contains a list of “enhancing circumstances,” among them: “The person committed the offense in the physical presence of a child less than eighteen (18) years of age, knowing that the child was present and might be able to see or hear the offense.” Moreover, as earlier discussed, a person is deemed to have committed a criminal offense if the person knowingly or intentionally aided, induced, or caused another person to commit that criminal offense. See I.C. § 35-41-2-4. Thus, in this case, the State had to prove Robinson knowingly or intentionally aided Williams in committing the Level 3 felony, which could be possible only by establishing Robinson himself knew Daughter was present at the residence and might be able to see or hear the transaction he facilitated.

[20] Robinson claims there was insufficient evidence for a fact-finder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Robinson knew Daughter would be present when Williams dealt 1.51 grams of methamphetamine to the CI on August 24, 2023. We disagree. Notably, the “knowingly” mens rea is satisfied if the State proves the defendant engaged in conduct while aware of a high probability he was doing so. See I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). Here, there was evidence Robinson set up the transaction for between 5:00 and 5:15 p.m. that day at his residence, with the CI telling Robinson that she anticipated arriving around 5:15 p.m. As Robinson concedes, he shared that residence with Williams and Daughter, and a fact-finder could reasonably infer a father would know the general household schedule impacting his partner and child, who was at school that day. Williams testified that Daughter generally got home from school around 3:20 p.m. by taking the school bus. This was generally the case unless Daughter had an FFA meeting, in which event Williams would pick up Daughter after the meeting. This pickup would take place between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m. Here, Robinson arranged for the transaction to take place around 5:15 p.m., specifying that Williams would be the one dealing the methamphetamine to the CI at that time. Williams could not be in two places at once, both picking up Daughter from an FFA meeting and also meeting with the CI at the planned time.

[21] In this case, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that, by arranging for the transaction to take place at his family residence around 5:15 p.m., Robinson was aware of a high probability Daughter was physically present at the home and might be able to see or hear the transaction. Robinson points to the possibility that Daughter, a teenager, might leave the residence and go elsewhere after school. But this is a request to reweigh the evidence in that Williams testified Daughter was generally home after school unless attending an FFA meeting, which could not have been the case based on the time Robinson directed Williams to deal in methamphetamine at his home. Moreover, the State presented video evidence indicating Daughter was indeed home during the first transaction, at one point standing by the CI's vehicle.

[22] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the State presented sufficient evidence of an enhancing circumstance to support Robinson's Level 3 felony conviction.

II. Sentence Review

[23] Robinson challenges his aggregate sentence of twenty-one years, claiming the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Appellate Rule 7(B) permits us to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we] find[ ] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Under this rule, the defendant bears the burden of persuading us the sentence is inappropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012).

[24] As our Supreme Court has explained, “sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). Therefore, appellate sentence revision is reserved for exceptional cases. Konkle, 235 N.E.3d at 1092. In conducting our review, we focus on “the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. Moreover, we remain mindful that our role is not to decide whether a different sentence is more appropriate, but to instead decide whether the trial court imposed an inappropriate sentence. Conley, 972 N.E.2d at 876.

[25] As to the offenses involved, the advisory sentence is the starting point our legislature has selected as appropriate for the crime committed. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g. Here, Robinson was convicted of a Level 3 felony, which carried a sentencing range of three to sixteen years with an advisory sentence of nine years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5(b). Robinson was also convicted of a Level 4 felony, which carried a sentencing range of two to twelve years with an advisory sentence of six years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5. Moreover, Robinson was found to be a habitual offender, which in this instance meant he was subject to a sentence enhancement of eight to twenty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-8(i). Here, the trial court imposed aggravated sentences for each felony, ordering twelve years for the Level 3 felony and eight years for the Level 4 felony. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences—with an enhancement of nine years applied to the Level 3 felony—such that Robinson ultimately received an aggregate sentence of twenty-one years in the DOC.

[26] “The nature of [an] offense is found in the details and circumstances of the commission of the offense” and “the defendant's participation in it.” Washington v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1220, 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Generally, the nature of an offense supports sentence revision only if there is compelling evidence portraying it in a positive light, such as where the offense was “accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1271 (Ind. 2023). Here, Robinson orchestrated separate drug transactions in August and September 2023. He arranged these transactions through social media and text messages, determined the quantities, set the prices, and instructed the CI to come to his residence where his long-term girlfriend, Williams, would complete the hand-to-hand transactions. Robinson gave specific instructions to Williams and, after receiving payment, Williams delivered the money to Robinson. One such transaction occurred while Daughter was at home, when Robinson was aware of a high probability Daughter would be at home and might be able to see or hear the transaction.

[27] Robinson claims sentence revision is warranted in this case because the amount of methamphetamine was 1.51 grams in the first transaction and 2.82 grams in the second, amounts that exceeded the statutory threshold of one gram for the Level 3 and Level 4 felonies but did not approach the upper limit of five grams. Robinson also asserts that “he only aided in this dealing and did not conduct the actual transactions themselves,” at one point asserting the State failed to demonstrate “particularized harm” resulting from his offenses. Appellant's Br. pp. 22, 23. We note, however, that regardless of whether a specific victim is identified in a drug-dealing case, dealing in any amount of methamphetamine constitutes a harm to the community, particularly when conducted at a residence when a child is present. Further, the fact that Robinson did not personally complete the transactions is not compelling evidence when he was the one who orchestrated them. All in all, we discern nothing compelling about the nature of Robinson's offenses that would support revising his sentence.

[28] “The character of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender's life and conduct.” Washington, 940 N.E.2d at 1222. Generally, the defendant's character supports sentence revision only if there is compelling evidence portraying his character in a positive light, such as where there are “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character.” Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. Moreover, we may regard a person's criminal history, including probation violations, as reflecting “poor[ly] ․ on [their] character,” in that “such a record ․ may reveal that [they] ha[ve] not been deterred after having been subjected to the police authority” of the state. Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1094 (quoting Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).

[29] Robinson characterizes his criminal history as “slight.” Appellant's Br. p. 23. We note, however, that in addition to contacts with the juvenile justice system, Robinson had been convicted of two felonies and three misdemeanors. The felony convictions for attempted burglary and possession of methamphetamine formed the basis for the habitual offender enhancement. Further, the PSI reflected that Robinson violated a condition of probation in three of four cases where he was placed on probation—conduct generally indicative of Robinson's unwillingness to conform to legal requirements even when under court supervision. Moreover, there was evidence Robinson tried to undermine the truth-seeking function of the justice system by pressuring Williams to take blame for the offenses, going so far as to involve his child in these efforts.

[30] As to his character, Robinson points out that he admitted to being a habitual offender, which the trial court identified as a mitigating circumstance. But this admission does not strike us as compelling evidence favoring sentence revision in light of other evidence of Robinson's poor character, including that Robinson had the status of a habitual offender due to prior transgressions. Robinson also contends he had “obvious substance abuse issues” that support revising his sentence. Id. at 24. Yet, when Robinson was interviewed for the PSI report, Robinson reported that he “has never had a problem with drugs other than alcohol” and that “it ha[d] been fourteen (14) years since his last drink.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 131. Finally, Robinson points to his role as a financial provider for his family and claims that “hardship on his family supports a lesser sentence than what he received.” Appellant's Br. p. 25. Nevertheless, although there was evidence of Robinson's positive contributions to the household, that evidence must be considered against his decisions to arrange drug transactions at the family residence, including while his minor child was present. Those decisions reflected disregard for the family's welfare. Along these lines, Robinson decided to involve his son in an attempt to have Williams—the child's mother—take full responsibility for the offenses, which is indicative of selfishness as opposed to a desire to promote the family's welfare.

[31] Having considered the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender, Robinson has not identified compelling evidence that would support disturbing the sentence imposed by the trial court. In the end, Robinson has not met his burden of persuading us that the trial court imposed an inappropriate sentence.

Conclusion

[32] The State presented sufficient evidence Robinson aided in both transactions and knew his child would be at home during the August 2023 transaction, where the child might see or hear Williams dealing in methamphetamine. Moreover, the sentence is not inappropriate in light of the offenses and Robinson's character.

[33] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1), (d)(2); 35-48-1-16.5(6); 35-41-2-4.

2.   I.C. §§ 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1), (c)(1); 35-41-2-4.

3.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8(b).

4.   We later review the sufficiency of evidence to support elevating one count due to Daughter's presence.

Foley, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Felix concur. Mathias, J. and Felix, J., concur.