Rashun A. Carter, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Rashun A. Carter appeals following his conviction of murder.¹ Carter presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:

1. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error in its jury instructions on accomplice liability by failing to define “acting in concert with” as alleged in the charging information; and

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence that Carter committed murder.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 2, 2023, Yusef Muhammad was working at a recording studio located in Fort Wayne, with his girlfriend, Jocelyn Bolf. That evening, two or three men arrived at the studio and wanted to speak with Muhammad, telling the studio owner they had “beef” with him. (Tr. Vol. II at 221.) The men left without entering, but later that night, someone shot at the recording studio.

[3] The following day, Carter was drinking alcohol with Swanyea Taylor, Raphael Brown, Yessenia Zamorano, and Cloe Braasch at Braasch's apartment. The group discussed Muhammad and expressed anger that Muhammad was dating Bolf, with whom Taylor had a child. They also talked about disputes with Muhammed concerning “some guns or some property.” (Id. at 235.)

[4] At approximately 6:30 p.m., Carter, Brown, and Taylor asked Zamorano to drive them to a gas station. Carter sat in the back seat with Taylor, while Brown occupied the front passenger seat. All three men carried firearms: Brown had an AR-15, Carter carried a Glock .40 caliber handgun, and Taylor had a 9mm handgun. After visiting the gas station, Brown and Taylor directed Zamorano to drive slowly past the recording studio where Muhammad worked. As they passed the studio, all three men fired their weapons at the building – Brown shooting through the sunroof and Carter and Taylor firing through the rear windows.

[5] On the way back to Braasch's apartment, Brown spotted Muhammad and Bolf sitting in a black Lincoln parked in the parking lot at the Corner Store. Brown instructed Zamorano to park behind the Corner Store, and all three men exited the vehicle. Carter “had his shirt kind of going over his head to cover his head” and the two other men “had their hoods on from their jackets and hoodies.” (Id. at 243-4.) Surveillance video from the Corner Store captured the ensuing events: three individuals approached Muhammad's vehicle, with one person carrying an AR-style rifle and firing multiple shots into the Lincoln as the victims attempted to drive away. The video showed Carter walking away from the vehicle with his back turned during the shooting. Carter did not fire his weapon during the attack on the Lincoln.

[6] Following the shooting, the three men returned to Zamorano's vehicle and instructed her to “race off.” (Id. at 243.) They went to Braasch's apartment, where they concealed Zamorano's car, changed clothes, and placed their clothing in a trash bag for disposal. The men also used “a little bit” of bleach to remove gunpowder residue from their hands. (Id. at 249.)

[7] Police responded to reports of gunfire at approximately 7:00 p.m. and discovered the damaged black Lincoln crashed through a fence. Muhammad had been shot and was transported to the hospital in critical condition. Bolf was dead in the passenger seat, having sustained six gunshot wounds, including a fatal shot to the back of her head. Officers recovered six .556 caliber shell casings at the scene that had been fired from an AR-15 rifle.

[8] As part of their investigation, police determined the suspects were at Braasch's apartment. When officers surrounded the building, Carter and Taylor were gone, but Brown, Zamorano, and Braasch were present and taken into custody. Officers executed a search warrant and recovered three firearms, including the AR-15 rifle later determined to be the one used in the shooting, along with ammunition and clothing. Police subsequently apprehended Carter and Taylor during a traffic stop.

[9] On January 9, 2023, the State charged Carter with Bolf's murder, Level 1 felony attempted murder ² for the attack on Muhammad, Level 6 felony criminal recklessness ³ for the shooting at the recording studio, and a sentence enhancement for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.⁴ In the information charging Carter with murder, the State alleged Carter, “while acting in concert with another person, to wit: Swanyea Taylor or Rapheal Brown, did knowingly kill another human being, to wit: Jocelyn Bolf.” (App. Vol. II at 18.)

[10] In April 2024, the trial court held a jury trial. The jury returned guilty verdicts for murder and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness, and also determined the firearm enhancement allegation was true. The jury could not reach a verdict on the attempted murder charge, and the State subsequently dismissed that count without prejudice. On June 3, 2024, the trial court sentenced Carter to a term of sixty-three years for murder and increased that term by twenty years as a result of the firearm enhancement. The trial court also sentenced Carter to a term of two years for criminal recklessness. The trial court ordered Carter to serve the two sentences consecutively, for an aggregate term of eighty-five years.

Discussion and Decision

1. Jury Instructions

[11] Carter argues the trial court erred by failing to define “acting in concert with” as alleged in the charging information for murder, while instructing the jury on accomplice liability. Our standard of review regarding a claim of instructional error is well-settled:

The purpose of jury instructions is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict. In reviewing a trial court's decision to give a tendered jury instruction, we consider (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law, (2) is supported by the evidence in the record, and (3) is not covered in substance by other instructions. The trial court has discretion in instructing the jury, and we will reverse only when the instructions amount to an abuse of discretion. To constitute an abuse of discretion, the instructions given must be erroneous, and the instructions taken as a whole must misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury. We will consider jury instructions as a whole and in reference to each other, not in isolation.

Yeary v. State, 186 N.E.3d 662, 679-80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Murray v. State, 798 N.E.2d 895, 899-900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (internal citations omitted)).

[12] Carter concedes he did not object at trial to this alleged instructional error regarding accomplice liability and asks us to review his argument under the lens of fundamental error. A trial court commits fundamental error when it commits an error so prejudicial that the defendant is precluded from receiving a fair trial. Ferree v. State, 124 N.E.3d 109, 115 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. Such error occurs only when a defendant's substantial rights are affected; otherwise, it is harmless. Id. Carter argues that the trial court's failure to define “acting in concert with” while instructing on accomplice liability created confusion that made a fair trial impossible.

[13] During the jury instruction phase of Carter's trial, the trial court reiterated the language in the State's charging information for murder. As is relevant here, the trial court stated:

On or about the 3rd day of January, 2023, in the County of Allen and in the State of Indiana, Rashun A. Carter, while acting in concert with another person, to wit: Swanyea Taylor or Rapheal Brown, did knowingly kill another human being, to wit: Jocelyn Bolf, being contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided.

(App. Vol. II at 107.) Regarding that charge, Jury Instruction 5 stated:

Aiding, inducing or causing Murder is defined by law as follows:

A person who, knowingly or intentionally aids, induces or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense.

Before you may convict the Defendant, the State must have proved each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. The Defendant

2. knowingly or intentionally

3. aided or induced or caused

4. Swanyea Taylor or Raphael Brown to commit the offense of Murder, defined as killing another human being.

If the State failed to prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant not guilty of aiding, inducing, or causing Murder, a Felony, charged in Count I.

Before you may convict the Defendant of this crime, you must find there is evidence of the Defendant's affirmative conduct, either in the form of acts or words, from which an inference of a common design or purpose may be reasonably drawn. The Defendant's conduct must have been voluntary and in concert with the other person(s).

The Defendant's mere presence at the scene of the crime, or mere acquiescence in the commission of the crime, is insufficient to convict for aiding, inducing or causing the crime charged in Count I.

A person may be convicted of Murder, aiding, inducing or causing Murder even if the other person(s) has not been prosecuted for the Murder, has not been convicted of the Murder or has been acquitted of the Murder.

In determining whether a Defendant aided another in the commission of a crime the jury may consider the following: (1) presence at the scene of the crime[;] (2) companionship with another engaged in the criminal activity; (3) failure to oppose the commission of the crime; and (4) the course of conduct before, during, and after the occurrence of the crime.

(Id. at 112-13.)

[14] Jury Instruction 5 was a correct statement of the law. Pursuant to Indiana law, a person “who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense, even if the other person: (1) has not been prosecuted for the offense; (2) has not been convicted of the offense; or (3) has been acquitted of the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. The jury instruction required the State to prove Carter knowingly or intentionally aided or induced or caused Taylor or Brown to commit the offense of Murder. The instruction further required proof of “affirmative conduct, either in the form of acts or words, from which an inference of a common design or purpose may be reasonably drawn” and that Carter's “conduct must have been voluntary and in concert with another person(s).” (App. Vol. II at 112) (emphasis added).

[15] In addition, during his closing argument, Carter told the jury that it needed to decide if “the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he aided or acted in concert with 2 people” to murder Bolf. (Tr. Vol. IV at 72.) Carter used the terms “aided” and “acted in concert with” as terms that the jury should consider when deciding Carter's guilt. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court did not commit fundamental error when it gave Jury Instruction 5. See Paul v. State, 189 N.E.3d 1146, 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (no fundamental error occurred when trial court gave an instruction regarding accomplice liability that did not include the words “acting in concert” as alleged in Paul's charging information), trans. denied.

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[16] Carter also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of murder. When evaluating insufficient evidence claims, we must consider only the evidence that supports the verdict and any reasonable inferences from that favorable evidence. Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020). Evaluating witness credibility and deciding the weight of the evidence is left to the fact-finder. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). A conviction will be affirmed unless “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. 2016).

[17] A person commits murder when that person knowingly kills another human being. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. The State charged Carter with murder under an accomplice liability theory. Under Indiana's accomplice liability statute, a person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another to commit an offense is liable for that offense. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. In discussing the accomplice liability statute, our Indiana Supreme Court has explained:

[E]vidence that the defendant participated in every element of the underlying offense is not necessary to convict a defendant as an accomplice. There is no bright line rule in determining accomplice liability; the particular facts and circumstances of each case determine whether a person was an accomplice. We consider four factors to determine whether a defendant acted as an accomplice: (1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with another at scene of crime; (3) failure to oppose commission of crime; and (4) course of conduct before, during, and after occurrence of crime. That a defendant was present during the commission of a crime and failed to oppose the crime is not sufficient to convict her. But, presence at and acquiescence to a crime, along with other facts and circumstances may be considered.

Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 466 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further, the evidence must show “affirmative conduct” by the defendant, “either by acts or words, from which the jury could draw a reasonable inference of common design or purpose to effect the” offense. Parrish v. State, 166 N.E.3d 953, 959 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. The State does not need to prove that the defendant “ ‘was a party to a preconceived scheme; it must merely demonstrate concerted action or participation in an illegal act.’ ” Griffin v. State, 16 N.E.3d 997, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Rainey v. State, 572 N.E.2d 517, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)).

[18] Carter argues the evidence shows only that he was present during the shooting but was walking away with his back turned and, thus, was unaware of Brown's intentions. However, Carter was present at the recording studio where Muhammad worked and at the crime scene where Bolf and Muhammad were shot. He acted in concert with Brown and Taylor throughout the evening's events. Before the fatal shooting, Carter participated in planning and executing an armed attack on the recording studio where Muhammad worked, demonstrating a shared animosity toward the victim. When the group armed themselves and drove to the studio, Carter actively participated by firing his weapon at the building where Muhammad worked.

[19] Further, after Brown spotted Muhammad's vehicle at the Corner Store, Carter immediately exited Zamorano's car with the other two men. All three men were armed with firearms, and all attempted to conceal their identity by covering their heads and faces. The surveillance video shows Carter advancing on the victims’ vehicle alongside Brown and Taylor. While Carter did not fire the fatal shots, his presence as an armed participant in the attack provided support to Brown's actions. Carter made no attempt to prevent the shooting, render aid to the victims, or distance himself from the other men's conduct. After the crime, Carter fled the scene with Brown and Taylor, helped dispose of evidence by changing clothes and seeking chemicals to remove gunpowder residue, and remained with his associates rather than contacting authorities. Carter's alternate characterization of the facts is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge credibility of witnesses). Thus, we conclude the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Carter as an accomplice to Bolf's murder.⁵ See, e.g., Shields v. State, 248 N.E.3d 1246, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (evidence sufficient to convict Shields of murder and robbery under accomplice liability theory when she was present at the scene of the crimes, was a companion of the other perpetrators, and did not oppose the crimes), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[20] Carter did not demonstrate fundamental error in Jury Instruction 5, and the State presented sufficient evidence that Carter was an accomplice to Bolf's murder. Accordingly, we affirm.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (murder); Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1 (attempt).

3.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(b)(1).

4.   Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11.

5.   Carter also indicates he intends to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his sentence enhancement for using a firearm in the commission of the crime. However, Carter does not actually provide an argument regarding the enhancement. Accordingly, he has waived that issue for appeal. See, e.g., Izaguirre v. State, 194 N.E.3d 1224, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (failure to make cogent argument results in waiver of issue). Waiver notwithstanding, as the State presented sufficient evidence that Carter was an accomplice to Bolf's murder by gunfire, any such argument by Carter would have failed. See, e.g., Barnett v. State, 24 N.E.3d 1013, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding application of sentence enhancement for firearm was proper when firearm was used in the commission of the offense).

May, Judge.

Judges Tavitas and DeBoer concur. Tavitas, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.