IN RE: Eli Schuler (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In April of 2023, Eli Schuler, Attie Schuler, Hallie Schuler, Ellie Schuler, Will Schuler, and Kelly Schuler as custodial parent of Lily Schuler (collectively, “Appellants”) filed a claim against Michael Schuler's estate (“the Estate”), claiming to be beneficiaries of some of the Estate's property. The trial court disagreed and dismissed their claim against the Estate. The trial court also found that Appellants’ father, Scott Schuler, had breached a previously entered-into settlement agreement (“the Settlement Agreement”) by failing to defend the Estate against Appellants’ claim. Appellants contend on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing their claim against the Estate and in finding that Scott had breached the Settlement Agreement. Concluding that the trial court correctly found that Appellants lacked standing to file the underlying estate claim but erred in finding that Scott had breached the Settlement Agreement, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Deborah Schuler, Deanna Schuler, Michael, and Scott are the children of John P. (“J.P.”) and Mary Geraldine (“Geri”) Schuler. From the early 1990s through July 31, 2014, Michael, J.P., and Scott farmed together in several counties. Appellants are Scott's children.

[3] On April 22, 2008, J.P. and Geri executed the John P. Schuler and Geri Schuler Family Trust (the “Family Trust”). The Family Trust provided that

[u]pon the death of the first of the Grantors to die, the Trust Estate shall be divided into two equal shares. These shares may include undivided interests in the real estate owned by the trust estate and may include undivided interests in other property if necessary to achieve an equal division. The equal trust share of the surviving Grantor (including a proportional share of the income of the Trust Estate to the time of its division) shall continue to be held in Trust for the surviving Grantor by the surviving original Trustee, with the income and principal thereof distributable to the surviving Grantor in accordance with the provisions of [the Family Trust]. This Trust shall then be known as Trust Number One [(“Trust No. 1”)], and upon the death of the surviving Grantor, shall be disposed of in accordance with the [trust] provisions․. If any asset of the [Family Trust] cannot qualify for the marital deduction under the federal estate tax law such asset shall be allotted to [Trust No. 1], notwithstanding any necessary unequal trust shares which result.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 32. It further provided that “[u]pon the death of the first of the Grantors to die, the equal trust share of the deceased Grantor shall be conveyed and delivered to the successor Trustee, as hereinafter identified, and shall be known as Trust Number Two [(“Trust No. 2”)].” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 32. The Family Trust included a “spendthrift clause”¹ that provided as follows:

[n]o interest of any beneficiary under any Trusts created herein either in income or in principal shall be subject to pledge, assignment, sale, or transfer in any manner, nor shall any beneficiary have the power in any manner to anticipate, charge, or encumber his interest, either in income or principal, nor shall such interest of any beneficiary be liable or subject in any manner for the debts, contracts, liabilities, engagements, or torts of such beneficiary.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 40. The Family Trust further provided that

[t]he Grantors reserve the right, at any time and from time to time, by instrument in writing delivered to the Trustees, to amend, modify, or revoke this Trust in whole or in part. The surviving Grantor reserves the right to add additional assets to [Trust No. 1] and to amend, modify[,] or revoke [Trust No. 1] as such survivor may in his or her uncontrolled discretion choose to do. [Trust No. 2] shall be irrevocable upon [the] death of the first Grantor to die.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 42.

[4] Geri died on December 29, 2013, after which the Family Trust was divided in accordance with its provisions, establishing Trust No. 1 and Trust No. 2. Following Geri's death, Scott filed a claim against Geri's estate and numerous legal actions against various family members, including J.P. and Michael.

[5] After nearly four years of litigation, in exchange for a monetary settlement, on February 14, 2018, Scott entered into the Settlement Agreement, by the terms of which he agreed to dismiss the lawsuits that he had filed against The Family Trust, J.P., and Michael. He further specifically agreed to the following:

Release by Scott Schuler. Scott Schuler knowingly and voluntarily releases Michael Schuler, [J.P.] Schuler, Pro-AG LLC, Andrea Schuler, the John P. Schuler and Geri Schuler Family Trust, the J.P. Schuler IRRV. Trust, and the children of Michael Schuler and Andrea Schuler, as well as their subsidiaries, parents, divisions, partners, predecessors, successors, attorneys, agents, and assigns, and any present or former officers, directors, partners, shareholders, members, attorneys, employees, and agents, from any and all legal or equitable claims, causes of action, debts, accounts, damages, liabilities, losses, costs, and rights to payment or performance, whether known or unknown, asserted or not yet asserted, vested or contingent other than the obligations otherwise contained in this Agreement. Notwithstanding anything in this paragraph to the contrary, Scott Schuler does not release or waive any claims he may have against Deanna Schuler, including but not limited to claims relating to the 2014 farming season. Further, notwithstanding anything in this paragraph to the contrary, if at the time of his death, [J.P.] Schuler has identified Scott Schuler as a beneficiary of any trust or of his estate, this release does not preclude Scott Schuler from participating in the trust or trusts addressed and adjudicated as result of binding arbitration. Further, Scott Schuler will not initiate or participate, directly or indirectly, in any investigation with any local, state, or federal government bodies regarding actions or positions taken by the Parties prior to the execution of this Agreement unless compelled to do so by written request from a government body, subpoena, or court order.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 67 (emphasis in original). The Settlement Agreement also contained multiple releases from the other parties in Scott's lawsuits, releasing any claims they may have against Scott and his descendants. The Settlement Agreement further provided that

Indemnification. Scott Schuler agrees to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless Michael Schuler, [J.P.] Schuler, Pro-Ag, LLC, and/or Andrea Schuler from and against any and all claims that Scott Schuler's and Kelly Schuler's children may assert or bring against Michael Schuler, [J.P.] Schuler, Pro-Ag, LLC, and/or Andrea Schuler for any actions or inactions relating to farming activities that occurred prior to the execution of this Agreement. Further, Michael Schuler agrees to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless, Scott Schuler and Kelly Schuler from and against any and all claims that Michael Schuler's and Andrea Schuler's children may assert or bring against Scott Schuler and/or Kelly Schuler for any actions or inactions relating to farming activities that occurred prior to the execution of this Agreement.

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Entire Agreement. This Agreement, along with the Arbitration Award attached to this Agreement as Exhibit A, constitutes the entire agreement between the Parties as to the subject matter hereof, and no covenants, representations, or warranties have been made or are being relied upon by any Party except as expressly set forth in this Agreement. Any prior negotiations, discussions, or agreements are merged into this Agreement, shall not operate to alter, modify, impair, or affect this Agreement or the interpretation of this Agreement, and are inadmissible as evidence in any legal proceedings. This Agreement supersedes any prior agreements, written or oral, respecting the subject matter of this Agreement.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 70–71 (emphases in original). Effective July 27, 2018, J.P. amended Trust No. 1 to remove Scott and his descendants as beneficiaries of Trust No. 1. J.P. died on April 5, 2019.

[6] On April 24, 2020, Scott filed a lawsuit in which he sought to be declared a beneficiary of Trust No. 2, despite the Settlement Agreement. In an order dated February 7, 2022, the trial court rejected Scott's argument that the Settlement Agreement did not remove him as a beneficiary of Trust No. 2 because spendthrift trust provisions in the Family Trust limited his ability to release his interest in the Family Trust, of which Trust No. 2 was a subsidiary trust. The trial court also rejected Scott's claim that he had disclaimed, rather than released his interest in the Family Trust. The trial court found

Scott's argument that he had no knowledge of the existence of [Trust No. 2] unpersuasive and contradicted by other evidence. First, Scott was aware of the Family Trust because it is specifically named in the release he executed. Second, after Geri's death and prior to the execution of the release, J.P., as Surviving Trustee of the Family Trust, transferred several parcels of real estate from the Family Trust to [Trust No. 2]. This Trustee's Deed was recorded in the Office of the Wabash County Recorder on February 23, 2015.․ Finally, the clear language of the Settlement Agreement provides that Scott releases the Family Trust, its subsidiaries, divisions, successors from any equitable claims, and the right to payment or performance, whether known or unknown.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 104. In finding that Scott was not a beneficiary of Trust No. 2, the trial court stated that “[Trust No. 2] of the Family Trust is a subsidiary or division of the Family Trust. Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Scott released his interest and any rights he might have had in the Family Trust and its divisions, subsidiaries or successors.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 108.

[7] Michael died on December 25, 2022. Michael's wife, Andrea Schuler, was appointed as personal representative of the Estate.

[8] On April 24, 2023, Appellants filed a claim against the Estate. Appellants alleged that Michael, as co-trustee of Trust No. 2, had “disposed of certain Trust assets, including farm equipment, in a manner that violated his duties to the Trust, his duties to the beneficiaries of the Trust, including [Appellants], and his duties imposed under Indiana Trust Code and the Trust.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 119. Appellants asserted that their claims against Michael included “but [were] not limited to, a claim for breach of Trust, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud[,] and conversion.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 119. Appellants further asserted that “[a]s a result of Michael's actions, [they] have been damaged.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 119.

[9] In bringing their claim against the Estate, Appellants asserted that prior to the execution of the Settlement Agreement, Scott had been a beneficiary of the Family Trust and had been granted a “per stirpes” interest in the Family Trust. Appellants’ App. Vol. p. 118. Appellants further asserted that his “per stirpes” interest meant “that if Scott died or disclaimed the [Family] Trust interest, the interest would not lapse, but rather would then pass to Scott's living descendants at that time, in equal shares.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 118. Thus, Appellants claimed that they were beneficiaries of the Family Trust. On May 10, 2023, the Estate issued a “full denial” of Appellants’ claim. Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 152 (emphasis omitted).

[10] On November 15, 2024, the trial court issued an order in which it found that Appellants’ assertion that the spendthrift clause contained in the Family Trust limited Scott's ability to “contract away” his interest in the Family Trust was without merit because “[t]he plain language of the spendthrift clause contained in the [F]amily [T]rust makes it clear the purpose of the clause is to protect the beneficiary from Scott's creditors” and Indiana Code chapter 30-4-7 et seq. “contains no restriction for the settlement of a matter involving a trust that contains a spendthrift clause.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 26 (brackets and emphasis added). The trial court further found that the Settlement Agreement was not ambiguous, stating that

5. The language of the [S]ettlement [A]greement clearly shows the parties waived all claims they had against each other while also serving to decouple the parties from any further dealings, but above all, ensure that what Scott Schuler received as far as assets from the [F]amily [T]rust was final. To allow Scott Schuler's children to now inherit from the family trust opens the door that lineal descendants of all parties to a settlement agreement could then make a future argument.

6. The Court finds no language in the [S]ettlement [A]greement that would suggest it was the intention of the parties that Scott Schuler's descendants would have the right to make a claim against the [F]amily [T]rust.

7. The Court finds that Scott Schuler gave up any and all future rights, claims, or privileges as to the family trust, including its subsidiary Trust No. 2. Scott released his interest in the [F]amily [T]rust in exchange for monetary compensation. The claimants were not party to the [S]ettlement [A]greement because they were not beneficiaries of the [F]amily [T]rust. Their father, Scott Schuler, was the beneficiary.

8. The clear terms of the [S]ettlement [A]greement show that the parties all agreed to the release and waive each other and their claims in exchange for various property rights.

9. The Court finds that the claimants lack standing to bring a claim related to Trust No. 2, as they were not parties to the original settlement agreement because they were not beneficiaries of the [F]amily [T]rust, including subsidiary Trust No. 2, because their father, Scott Schuler, was the surviving beneficiary.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 27. The trial court also found that the Settlement Agreement qualifies as a compromised settlement under Indiana Code chapter 30-4-7. Finally, the trial court found that Scott had breached the Settlement Agreement by failing to defend the Estate from his children's claims as required by the Settlement Agreement.

Discussion and Decision

[11] “Where the issue presented on appeal is a pure question of law and there are no disputed facts, we review the matter de novo.” SSD Control Tech. v. Breakthrough Techs., Inc., 685 N.E.2d 1136, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis omitted), trans. denied. The parties agree that the relevant facts are undisputed. As such, we review the trial court's order de novo.

I. Whether Appellants Have Standing to File a Claim Against the Estate

[12] The trial court found that Scott had released his interest in the Family Trust, including his interest in its subsidiary, i.e., Trust No. 2. In challenging the trial court's order, the Appellants contend that Scott had disclaimed his interest in Trust No. 2, which had been effective prior to his release. For its part, the Estate contends that the trial court properly found that Scott had released his interest in Trust No. 2. The parties agree that the distinction matters because if Scott had disclaimed his interest, his interest in Trust No. 2 would have passed to Appellants, but on the other hand, if Scott had released his interest, then neither Scott nor his lineal descendants would have any further interest in Trust No. 2. Thus, this case ultimately turns on the question of whether Scott released or disclaimed his interest in Trust No. 2.

A. Disclaimer vs. Release

[13] Appellants argue that Scott disclaimed his interest in Trust No. 2 and the effective date of said disclaimer took effect prior to his release of said interest. The Estate argues that Scott released, not disclaimed, his interest in Trust No. 2. In order to review whether Scott disclaimed or released his interest, it is helpful to review the distinctions between the two.

1. Disclaimer

[14] “ ‘Disclaimer’ means a refusal to accept an interest in or power over property.” Ind. Code § 32-17.5-2-4. “ ‘Disclaimed interest’ means the interest that would have passed to the disclaimant had the disclaimer not been made.” Ind. Code § 32-17.5-2-3. “A person may disclaim, in whole or part, any interest in or power over property[.]” Ind. Code § 32-17.5-3-1. “A disclaimer must: (1) be in a writing or other record; (2) state that it is a disclaimer; (3) describe the interest or power disclaimed; (4) be signed by the person making the disclaimer; and (5) be delivered or filed in the manner provided in IC 32-17.5-7.” Ind. Code § 32-17.5-3-3(b). “A disclaimer becomes irrevocable upon the occurrence of the later of the following to occur: (1) The disclaimer is delivered or filed as set forth in IC 32-17.5-7.[² ] (2) The disclaimer becomes effective as set forth in IC 32-17.5-4 through IC 32-17.5-6.” Ind. Code § 32-17.5-3-5. A disclaimer “is not a transfer, an assignment, or a release.” Ind. Code § 32-17.5-3-6.

[15] The following rules generally apply to a disclaimer of an interest in property:

(1) A disclaimer takes effect:

(A) when the instrument creating the interest becomes irrevocable; or

(B) upon the intestate's death if the interest arose under the law of intestate succession.

(2) A disclaimed interest passes according to any provision in the instrument creating the interest:

(A) that provides for the disposition of the interest should the interest be disclaimed; or

(B) that concerns disclaimed interests in general.

(3) If the instrument creating the disclaimed interest does not contain a provision described in subdivision (2), the following rules apply:

(A) If the disclaimant is an individual, the following rules apply:

(i) Except as provided in items (ii) and (iii), the disclaimed interest passes as if the disclaimant had died immediately before the time of distribution.

(ii) If, by law or under the instrument, the descendants of the disclaimant would share in the disclaimed interest by any method of representation had the disclaimant died before the time of distribution, the disclaimed interest passes only to the descendants of the disclaimant who survive at the time of distribution.

(iii) If the disclaimed interest would have passed to the disclaimant's estate had the disclaimant died before the time of distribution, the disclaimed interest passes by representation to the descendants of the disclaimant who survive at the time of distribution. If no descendant of the disclaimant survives the time of distribution, the disclaimed interest becomes part of the residue under the instrument creating the disclaimed interest.

(B) If the disclaimant is not an individual, the disclaimed interest passes as if the disclaimant did not exist.

(4) If the disclaimed interest arose under the law of intestate succession, the disclaimed interest passes as if the disclaimant had died immediately before the intestate's death.

(5) Upon the disclaimer of a preceding interest:

(A) a future interest held by a person other than the disclaimant takes effect as if the disclaimant had died or ceased to exist immediately before the time of distribution; and

(B) a future interest held by the disclaimant is not accelerated in possession or enjoyment.

(6) If a beneficiary of a transfer on death transfer (as defined in IC 32-17-14-3(17)) disclaims an interest in the property, the disclaimant's interest in the property passes as follows:

(A) In the case of a disclaimant who is an individual, as if the disclaimant had died immediately before the death of the owner (as defined in IC 32-17-14-3(7)).

(B) In the case of a disclaimant who is not an individual, as if the disclaimant did not exist before the death of the owner (as defined in IC 32-17-14-3(7)).

Ind. Code § 32-17.5-4-1.

2. Release

[16] A “release” is “the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary p. 1542 (11th ed. 2019). It has further been defined as “[t]he relinquishment or concession of a right, title, or claim[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary p. 1543 (11th ed. 2019). A release can be general or limited in scope. A general release is

[a] broad release of legal claims that is not limited to a particular claim or set of claims, such as those at issue in a pending or contemplated lawsuit, but instead covers any actual or potential claim by the releasing party against the released party based on any transaction or occurrence before the release.

Black’s Law Dictionary p. 1543 (11th ed. 2019).

B. Whether Scott Disclaimed or Released His Interest in Trust No. 2

[17] Appellants have not alleged that Scott executed any disclaimer or release apart from that contained in the Settlement Agreement. They rely on the February 7, 2022 order in Scott's prior lawsuit involving Trust No. 2 in support of their claim that Scott had disclaimed his interest in Trust No. 2. While we acknowledge that the trial court stated in the February 7, 2022 order that “Scott disclaimed his interest as a beneficiary[,]” the trial court appears to have treated a disclaimer and a release as one and the same, stating that “[t]he Court believes [Scott's] distinguishing between a disclaimer and release is purely semantics.”³ Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 105, 107. Regardless of the propriety of the trial court's determination, our review of the instant matter is de novo, and as such, we are not bound by the trial court's determination. See Bassett v. Scott Pet Prods., Inc., 194 N.E.3d 1185, 1192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (providing that we are not bound by the trial court's findings and conclusions when conducting a de novo review), trans. denied.

[18] The Settlement Agreement is the only document cited by the parties in which Scott executed a release or disclaimer of his interest in Trust No. 2. “Indiana strongly favors settlement agreements[.]” MH Equity Managing Member, LLC v. Sands, 938 N.E.2d 750, 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. “Settlement agreements are governed by the same general principles of contract law as other agreements.” Id. A settlement agreement is “[a]n agreement ending a dispute or lawsuit[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary p. 1649 (11th ed. 2019). Further, Indiana's trust code provides that the terms of a compromise, such as a settlement agreement, “must be set forth in an agreement that is: (1) in writing; and (2) executed by all persons ․ who: (A) have an interest in the trust; or (B) have a claim against the trust.” Ind. Code § 30-4-7-6. If the trial court enters an order on a settlement or compromise agreement, “all further disposition of the trust that is within the scope of the agreement shall be made under the terms of the agreement.” Ind. Code § 30-4-7-10.

[19] Review of the Settlement Agreement reveals that Scott agreed to a general release. The plain language of the Settlement Agreement indicated that Scott released his interest in Trust No. 2. The word “disclaim” is not included in the Settlement Agreement, and nothing in the Settlement Agreement suggests that Scott's release was intended to be treated as a disclaimer rather than a release of his interests. The Settlement Agreement, therefore, does not create a valid disclaimer of Scott's interest. See Ind. Code § 32-17.5-3-3(b)(2) (providing that a disclaimer must state that it is a disclaimer). Again, the plain language of the Settlement Agreement indicated that Scott released his interest in the Family Trust, including its subsidiary trust, i.e., Trust No. 2. The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding that Scott had released his interest in Trust No. 2.

[20] At the time he entered into the Settlement Agreement, Scott was a beneficiary of Trust No. 2, not his lineal descendants. Scott's release extinguished his interest in Trust No. 2. Scott has no remaining interest in Trust No. 2 to pass on to his lineal descendants. As such, we agree with the trial court that Appellants “lack standing to bring a claim against the [E]state[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 29.

II. Whether Scott Breached the Settlement Agreement

[21] Appellants also contend that the trial court erred in finding that Scott had breached the Settlement Agreement by failing to defend the Estate. With regard to breach, the trial court found as follows:

1. Paragraph 18 on page 10 of the [S]ettlement [A]greement provides, in part, as follows: “Scott Schuler agrees to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless Michael Schuler, [J.P.] Schuler, Pro Ag. LLC, and/or Andrea Schuler from and against any and all claims that Scott Schuler and Kelly Schuler's children may assert or bring against Michael Schuler, [J.P.] Schuler, Pro Ag, LLC, and/or Andrea Schuler for any actions or inactions related to farming activities that occurred prior to the execution of this agreement.” Clearly, the parties foresaw that the parties’ children could bring claims in the future, or else this provision would not have been included in the settlement agreement.

2. There was no dispute that [Appellants] are the children of Scott Schuler. As such, there exists a duty on the part of Scott Schuler to indemnify, defend (emphasis added), and hold harmless Michael Schuler, which flows to his estate.

3. Scott Schuler has not defended the [E]state from the claims brought by his children, the [Appellants], in which he clearly, by the terms of the [S]ettlement [A]greement, is bound to do. As such, this Court finds he is in breach of the [S]ettlement [A]greement in that he did not abide by the terms of the [S]ettlement [A]greement and is liable for attorney fees and the costs of the [E]state in defending the claim that his children have brought.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 29. The trial court ordered that

based upon the plain language of the [S]ettlement [A]greement and requirement that Scott Schuler defend and indemnify Michael Schuler from claims brought by the children of Scott Schuler, of which he did not do so, he is in breach of the [S]ettlement [A]greement. However, Scott Schuler is not a party in this case, therefore, the request of the [E]state that Scott Schuler be responsible for attorney's fees and costs is hereby denied. As such, the [E]state may file such a claim and corresponding attorney fee affidavit should the [E]state choose to pursue a claim to recover the expense of defending itself from [Appellants] in a separate cause of action.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 30. Thus, by its order, the trial court denied the Estate's request to impose an attorney's fees award against Scott but indicated that, if it chose to do so, the Estate could pursue a claim against Scott in a separate cause of action.

[22] In challenging the trial court's order, Appellants argue that Scott only had a duty to defend the Estate for acts that had occurred prior to the execution of the Settlement Agreement, and it “was impossible” for the trial court to address because “no party to this case presented any facts or evidence to establish the timing of Michael's actions that gave rise to [Appellants’] Estate Claim. Without such evidence, the Trial Court erred in concluding that Scott breached the Settlement Agreement.” Appellants’ Br. pp. 22–23. For its part, the Estate asserts that

arguably the Estate Claim would pertain to actions which took place between December 29, 2013 and February 14, 2018 by Michael as Successor Trustee. The Trial Court correctly concluded that Scott failed to indemnify Michael's Estate for it being forced to expend funds in defending itself against claims already compromised and settled in the Settlement Agreement.

Appellee's Br. p. 24.

[23] Upon review, we agree with Appellants that “there are no findings of fact in the Trial Court Order as to the timing of Michael's actions that gave rise to [Appellants’] Estate Claim.” Appellants’ Reply Br. p. 20. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Scott only had a duty to defend Michael, and by extension the Estate, “for any actions or inactions relating to farming activities that occurred prior to the execution of this Agreement.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 70. Appellants’ claim against the Estate does not indicate when Michael was alleged to have committed the allegedly damaging acts and the trial court made no findings in this regard. Thus, we are unable to determine whether the allegedly improper acts by Michael occurred prior to or after the execution of the Settlement Agreement. As such, we conclude the trial court erred in concluding that Scott had breached the Settlement Agreement, and therefore reverse the trial court on this issue.⁴

[24] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A spendthrift clause in a trust limits the beneficiaries’ ability to “ ‘transfer, assign, or alienate his right to future payments of income or principal, and which provides the beneficiary's creditors are unable to subject the beneficiary's interest to the payment of their claim while in the hands of the trustee.’ ” Roberts v. Roberts, 219 N.E.3d 767, 774 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting U.S. v. Grimm, 865 F. Supp. 1303, 1311 (N.D. Ind. 1994)).

2.   Indiana Code section 32-17.5-7-3 provides that[a] disclaimer of an interest in a testamentary trust must be:(1) delivered to the trustee then serving;(2) delivered to the personal representative of the decedent's estate if no trustee is then serving; or(3) filed with a court having jurisdiction to enforce the trust if no personal representative is then serving.

3.   In this case, the trial court appears to have recognized that a disclaimer is not the same as a release, finding that the Settlement Agreement qualified as a compromised settlement under Indiana Code chapter 30-4-7 rather than a disclaimer.

4.   In arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that Scott had breached the Settlement Agreement, Appellants point out that Scott was not a party to the underlying lawsuit, did not join with Appellants in their claim against the Estate, and did not have an opportunity to defend himself against the Estate's claim that he had breached the Settlement Agreement. Given our conclusion that the trial court erred in finding Scott to be in breach of the Settlement Agreement because the Appellants’ claim against the Estate did not specify whether the alleged harm occurred prior to or after the execution of the Settlement Agreement, we need not consider whether the trial court also erred in finding Scott, a non-party, to be in breach of the Settlement Agreement without including him as a party to the underlying case.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Kenworthy concur. Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.