Victor Alvin Johnson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In June of 2020, over the course of two days, Victor Johnson conducted a string of attacks on several women in Indianapolis. After a jury trial, Johnson was convicted of eleven counts of criminal activity, which included one count of Level 1 felony attempted murder, one count of Level 1 felony attempted rape, and four counts of Level 5 felony intimidation. The trial court sentenced Johnson to an aggregate term of eighty-seven years of incarceration. Johnson contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for three of the counts of intimidation, that his aggregate eighty-seven-year sentence is inappropriate, and that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him by imposing consecutive sentences for two of the counts. Because we disagree with each of Johnson's contentions, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 17, 2020, A.G. and her friend A.T. left A.G.’s downtown Indianapolis apartment to go to dinner. Upon leaving the apartment, A.G. and A.T. saw Johnson urinating on a bush near an alleyway. Johnson turned around, noticed the two women, and asked “what are you girls doing tonight[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 54. Johnson also said “come over here,” to which A.G. said “no[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 54. Johnson “ran up to [A.G.]” and “grabbed [her] with his right arm around the neck, and he threw [her] to the ground.” Tr. Vol. III p. 54. After throwing A.G. to the ground, Johnson started toward A.T., who ran away to look for help.

[3] Later the same evening, another woman, C.T., was approached by Johnson while she was at a downtown recycling center to drop off recyclables. As she was unloading materials from the trunk of her vehicle, Johnson approached her and asked if she had five or ten minutes of time for him, to which she replied that she did not. At some point, Johnson asked C.T. for a hug. C.T. responded “no” and attempted to get into her vehicle. Tr. Vol. III p. 67. Johnson hugged C.T. anyway. Feeling uncomfortable, C.T. returned to her car to leave. As she did so, C.T. saw Johnson with a towel in his hand. C.T. “saw something shiny in the towel” consistent with a knife. Tr. Vol. III p. 69.

[4] As C.T. attempted to close her car door, Johnson grabbed it and held it open. As Johnson was holding the door in one hand, he was “holding the object” in the other. Tr. Vol. III p. 72. Johnson “kept [the door] open and at the same time he was using that metal thing against [her].” Tr. Vol. III p. 72. Johnson was “trying to hit her” with the knife but was not ultimately able to touch her with it. Tr. Vol. III p. 72. At that point, C.T. started screaming and kicking Johnson. C.T. offered to give Johnson money, and Johnson asked her how much money she had. Responding to C.T.’s screaming, several bystanders intervened, causing Johnson to flee.

[5] On June 18, 2020, A.F. and her mother J.M. were sitting on a bench in a downtown park in Indianapolis when they were approached by Johnson. As Johnson approached the two women, he was tossing a serrated knife wrapped in a towel back and forth between his hands. Johnson told A.F. and J.M. that he had just killed three persons. Johnson “started saying other things about how he wanted friends and how he wanted [the women] to go away with him,” and he mentioned “getting a ․ room somewhere at some point and wanting ․ hugs and kisses[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 144. Johnson also implied “that he wanted [the women] to go away with him.” Tr. Vol. III p. 144.

[6] A.F. felt threatened by Johnson's sexually-charged comments and began to panic. Johnson sat down between A.F. and J.M. on the bench, separating them. J.M. told A.F. to call 911, and the two stood up to walk away. Johnson followed the women and began calling them “filthy whores.” Tr. Vol. III p. 126. J.M. and A.F. saw a woman sleeping on a blanket in the park and woke her up. The woman “woke up angry, screaming and yelling at [Johnson,]” at which point, Johnson “snapped” and started kicking and punching the woman. Tr. Vol. III p. 127. Johnson then “charged at J.M.” and pushed her to the ground. Tr. Vol. III p. 127.

[7] Johnson told A.F. that she needed to wear more clothing and called her a “stupid whore” before grabbing her by her hair, punching her, and dragging her across the ground. Tr. Vol. III p. 148. After dragging A.F., Johnson walked off. As a result of the attack, J.M. had a sprained ankle and A.F. had a bloody nose, bruised lip, and scraped legs.

[8] Immediately after the attack of J.M. and A.F., Johnson began pursuing another woman, E.B., who was on her daily midday walk downtown. As E.B. stopped to stretch, E.B. could hear Johnson from behind her, asking if they could “spend some time together.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 22. Johnson said, “I just want to spend, say, 15 minutes with you.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 23. E.B. noticed that Johnson was “getting into [her] personal space” and towering over her. Tr. Vol. IV p. 23. E.B. put her hands up and said “please ․ get away from me[.]” Tr. Vol. IV p. 23. Johnson then said “he'd like to have sex with” E.B. Tr. Vol. IV p. 23.

[9] After E.B. asked Johnson not to hurt her and to stay away from her and lifted her hands up, she froze. Ignoring her requests, Johnson grabbed E.B. and threw her into the hedges on the side of the trail. Johnson, standing over E.B., continued to say “I'm going to have sex with you. I'm going to have sex with you.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 25. E.B. replied “no, you're not.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 25.

[10] Johnson then told E.B. “I'm going to have sex with you, I have a knife.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 25. Terrified, E.B. responded “please – I'm sorry” and “please don't hurt me.” Tr. Vol. IV pp. 25–26. At that point, E.B. saw Johnson “fumbling in his front pocket” and pulling out a “grayish brown nasty rag[,]” which had a knife inside. Tr. Vol. IV p. 26. Johnson took the knife out of the rag, and E.B. continued to say “please don't hurt me[.]” Tr. Vol. IV p. 26. Ignoring her again, Johnson began stabbing E.B. over and over again.

[11] After stabbing E.B., Johnson ran off, leaving E.B. behind, bleeding on the trail. When E.B. came to, she attempted to scream. Eventually, individuals nearby heard E.B.’s screams and came to her aid. E.B. was transported to Methodist Hospital, where she underwent surgery to stop her bleeding. E.B. remained on the trauma floor for two days. Four years after the attack, E.B. remains in treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder, severe depression, and anxiety. E.B. also suffers from GI symptoms related to the trauma. Meanwhile, bystanders had subdued Johnson and held him until police arrived.

[12] On June 24, 2020, the State charged Johnson with a total of twenty-two offenses. On September 12, 2024, after four days of trial, a jury found Johnson guilty of thirteen of the charges. On October 18, 2024, the trial court vacated the guilty findings on two counts to avoid potential double-jeopardy implications. Ultimately, Johnson was convicted of eleven counts of criminal activity, including Level 1 felony attempted murder (Count I), Level 1 felony attempted rape (Count II), and four counts of Level 5 felony intimidation (Counts VI, IX, XIII, and XX).

[13] The trial court sentenced Johnson to an aggregate term of eighty-seven years. Specifically, the trial court imposed a thirty-five-year sentence for attempted murder (Count I) and a consecutive thirty-year sentence for attempted rape (Count II). The trial court also imposed a nine-year sentence for Level 3 felony criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon (Count III), to run concurrently with Count II; a three-year sentence for Level 5 felony intimidation (Count VI), to run consecutively with Count II; a three-year sentence for Level 5 felony intimidation (Count IX), to run consecutively with Count VI; a four-year sentence for Level 5 felony intimidation (Count XIII), to run consecutively with Count IX; a two-year sentence for Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate bodily injury (Count XIV), to run concurrently with Count XIII; a ten-year sentence for Level 3 felony criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon (Count XVIII), to run consecutively with Count XIII; a three-year sentence for Level 5 felony intimidation (Count XX), to run concurrently with Count XVIII; a two-year sentence for Level 6 felony confinement (Count XXI), to run consecutively with Count XVIII; and a thirty-day sentence for Class B misdemeanor battery (Count XXII), to run concurrently with Count XXI.

[14] While the trial court identified Johnson's mental illness as a mitigating factor, it noted that Johnson had understood what he was doing when he committed his crimes. Johnson's mental illness was the only mitigating factor identified by the trial court. In addition to the significant harm Johnson had caused E.B., the trial court identified three other aggravating circumstances: Johnson's escalating history of criminal behavior, Johnson's recent violation of conditions of pre-trial release, and that Johnson had victimized multiple individuals over multiple days.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

[15] On appeal, Johnson contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for three counts of Level 5 felony intimidation.¹

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (internal brackets, citations, and quotations omitted). Stated differently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016).

[16] “A person who communicates a threat with the intent [ ] that another person engage in conduct against the other person's will” commits intimidation, which is a level 5 felony if “while committing it, the person draws or uses a deadly weapon[.]” Ind. Code §§ 35-45-2-1(a)(1), -(b)(2)(A). Johnson contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he communicated threats to J.M., A.F., or C.T., the respective victims of Counts IX, XIII, and XX.

[17] The intimidation statute defines a “threat” as “an expression, by words or action, of an intention to[,]” among other things, “unlawfully injure the person threatened or another person, or damage property[,]” “unlawfully subject a person to physical confinement or restraint[,]” or “commit a crime[.]” Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(c). “Whether a statement is a threat is an objective question for the trier of fact.” Whitaker-Blakey v. State, 248 N.E.3d 617, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quotation and citation omitted). “In determining whether a statement was intended as a true threat, we consider the content of the statement, its context, and the reaction of the listeners.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted).

A. Counts IX and XIII

[18] With regards to Counts IX and XIII, Johnson contends that while he displayed a knife, “he did not point or wave or otherwise threaten to use it against J.M or A.F.” and “[n]owhere in his words or actions did he express an intent to injure either J.M. or A.F., subject them to physical confinement or restraint, or commit a crime.” Appellant's Br. pp. 15, 16. Johnson relies on Gaddis v. State, 680 N.E.2d 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), to support his contention that he did not “threaten” his victims. Gaddis, however, is readily distinguished. In Gaddis, we held that “under the intimidation statute the mere display of a handgun does not express an intention to unlawfully injure a person or his property.” Id. at 862. Johnson, however, went far beyond merely displaying his knife: Counts IX and XIII were charged with regard to Johnson's interaction with J.M. and A.F., in which he approached the two women sitting on a bench, told them that he had just stabbed and killed three persons, while tossing a knife wrapped in a towel back and forth between his hands.

[19] J.M. testified that, while Johnson had the knife in his hand, he told the women he “wanted to hook up” meaning that he wanted to “go somewhere and have sex.” Tr. Vol. III p. 122. A.F. testified that when she had realized that Johnson had a knife, Johnson had “started saying other things about how he wanted friends and how he wanted us to go away with him, and that he mentioned getting a -- a room somewhere at some point and wanting like hugs and kisses and just implying that he wanted us to go away with him.” Tr. Vol. III p. 144.

[20] Johnson proceeded to sit down between the two women on the bench. At that point, J.M. told her daughter to “call 911” and the women stood up and began to walk away. Tr. Vol. III p. 122. J.M. felt “scared” as they were moving away from Johnson. Tr. Vol. III p. 136. Johnson followed them. A.F. testified that she “definitely” felt threatened when Johnson was making sexual suggestions with the knife present. Tr. Vol. III p. 146.

[21] Based on the foregoing, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Johnson had communicated a threat to J.M. and A.F., i.e., that he would stab them if he was not granted the sexual favors or companionship that he was seeking. Again, a threat is “an expression, by words or action, of an intention to[,]” among other things, “unlawfully injure the person threatened or another person, or damage property[,]” “unlawfully subject a person to physical confinement or restraint[,]” or “commit a crime[.]” Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(c). Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to Johnson's convictions on these counts, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Johnson had communicated a threat by his words and actions of an intention to unlawfully injure J.M. and A.F. See Whitaker-Blakey, 248 N.E.3d at 621.

B. Count XX

[22] Johnson further contends that the State failed to prove that a threat was communicated when it charged Johnson with Count XX, relating to his interaction with C.T. With regard to these events, the evidence shows that Johnson, a stranger, approached C.T. from behind and asked her if she had five or ten minutes of time for him, to which she replied that she did not. Johnson then asked C.T. for a hug. C.T. responded “no” and attempted to get to her vehicle. Tr. Vol. III p. 67. Johnson hugged C.T. anyway. As C.T. returned to her car to leave, she saw Johnson with a towel in his hand. C.T. “saw something shiny in the towel” consistent with a knife. Tr. Vol. III p. 69. Specifically, C.T. “thought it could have been a knife.” Tr. Vol III p. 69.

[23] As C.T. attempted to close the door to her vehicle, Johnson grabbed the door and held it open; as Johnson was holding the door in one hand, he was “holding the object” in the other. Tr. Vol. III p. 72. Johnson “kept [the door] open” while, at the same time using “that metal thing” against C.T. Tr. Vol. III p. 72. C.T. testified that Johnson had been “trying to hit her” with the knife but had not ultimately been able to touch her with it. Tr. Vol. III p. 72.

[24] Again, despite Johnson's characterization of the events, it is clear that he went beyond simply holding a knife when, after asking C.T. for her time and a hug, and hugging C.T. even though she had said no, Johnson began to open up the towel with the knife inside. As C.T. attempted to leave, Johnson took out the knife, and, being faster than C.T., kept her car door open. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to Johnson's conviction on Count XX, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Johnson had communicated a threat to C.T., that being that he would stab her with the knife if she did not engage with him in the way he wanted. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Johnson had, by his words and actions, communicated a threat to unlawfully injure C.T. See Whitaker-Blakey, 248 N.E.3d at 621.

II. Sentencing—Appropriateness

[25] Johnson contends that his aggregate eighty-seven-year sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “concentrate less on comparing the facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant's character.” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotation omitted), trans. denied. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[26] The nature of the offense is “found in the details and circumstances of the commission of the offenses and the defendant's participation.” Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Furthermore, “we focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Norton v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1285, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quotation and citation omitted).

[27] For Johnson's two-day crime spree that involved attacks on multiple individuals, he was convicted of eleven crimes: Level 1 felony attempted murder, Level 1 felony attempted rape, two counts of Level 3 felony criminal confinement, four counts of Level 5 felony intimidation, Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, Level 6 felony criminal confinement, and Class B misdemeanor battery. Johnson's exposure at sentencing exceeded 100 years, yet he received an eighty-seven-year aggregate sentence. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4-(b) (providing that the sentencing range for a Level 1 felony is twenty to forty years, with the advisory sentence being thirty years); Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b) (providing that the providing that the sentencing range for a Level 3 felony is three to sixteen years, with the advisory sentence being nine years); Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b) (providing that the sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is one to six years, with the advisory sentence being three years); Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b) (providing that the sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is 180 days to two-and-a-half years, with the advisory sentence being one year); Ind. Code § 35-50-3-3 (providing that the sentence for a Class B misdemeanor may not exceed 180 days).

[28] Johnson contends that the nature of his offenses was “not that of a person set on attacking or injuring anyone, but rather of someone not able to think right who wanted companionship[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 21. We disagree. Not only is there a lack of evidence in the record to support Johnson's claim that he was merely seeking companionship and did not know how to process the rejections, there is ample evidence in the record to show that Johnson appreciated what he was doing when he attacked each of his victims. Johnson fled the scene after each of his attacks, he attempted to conceal the evidence of his attacks by wrapping his knife and later attempting to discard it completely, and of Johnson's four competency evaluators, three of them indicated that he was malingering in an attempt to avoid prosecution for his offenses.

[29] Moreover, Johnson's offenses demonstrate a violent, predatory, and sexual nature of actions that were completed in close temporal proximity. Over the course of two days, Johnson approached and made advances to several different women. When each woman made it clear that she was not interested, Johnson became violent: he put A.G. in a chokehold and threw her to the ground; he prevented C.T. from leaving her vehicle and attempted to stab her; he knocked J.M. over; he punched A.F. and dragged her on the ground; he threw E.B. down, attempted to rape her, and stabbed her in the throat and chest. As the trial court noted at sentencing, without the intervention of the citizens who had chased Johnson and tackled him, one of whom he had threatened to stab, there is no indication that he would have stopped his attacks.

[30] With regard to his character, while Johnson attempts to portray himself in a more favorable light by highlighting his mental illness,² he presents no evidence showing a nexus between his mental illness and his criminal conduct. See Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1249 (Ind. 2024) (“[T]hough [the defendant] was diagnosed with bipolar disorder in early adolescence and with anti-social personality after the murders, he provides no evidence showing a nexus between those diagnoses and his criminal conduct.”). Furthermore, there is evidence in the record suggesting that Johnson attempted to exaggerate his mental illness to his benefit and could recognize the wrongfulness of his conduct.

[31] We note that “[t]he character of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender's life and conduct.” Croy, 953 N.E.2d at 664. For the majority of his life, Johnson has been involved in the juvenile or criminal justice system. Johnson admits that he “has a considerable criminal history.” Appellant's Br. p. 21. Johnson's criminal history includes five delinquency adjudications, three misdemeanor convictions, and two felony convictions. Several of those offenses were violent. Johnson has previously been committed to the Department of Correction twice, once in 1997 as a juvenile and once in 2004 as an adult. Johnson has also twice been on probation as an adult, including during the time when he committed these offenses. Despite over thirty years of judicial attempts at intervention, Johnson's criminal conduct had not ceased, but rather appears to have become more frequent and more violent. These facts reflect poorly on Johnson's character. In light of the nature of his offenses and his character, Johnson has failed to convince us that his sentence is inappropriate. See Sanchez, 891 N.E.2d at 176.

III. Sentencing—Abuse of Discretion

[32] Johnson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Specifically, Johnson challenges only the trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences for Counts I and II. As an initial matter, Johnson seems to argue in part that the sentences for Counts I and II should have been concurrent because the events in Counts I and II were “one continuous, relatively brief encounter.” Appellant's Br. p. 24. However, as the State observes, the Indiana statute which limits the aggregate sentence a trial court may impose for felony convictions arising out of “an episode of criminal conduct” does not apply to crimes of violence, and therefore, does not apply here. Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(c); see also Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731, 737 (Ind. 2000).

[33] “Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quotation omitted).

[34] We review for an abuse of discretion the court's finding of aggravators and mitigators to justify a sentence, but we cannot review the relative weight assigned to those factors. When reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified by the trial court in its sentencing statement, we will remand only if the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record, and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law.

Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations and quotation omitted), trans. denied. The trial court must find at least one aggravating circumstance in order to impose consecutive sentences. Morgan v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1067, 1073 (Ind. 1996). We have also held that there is “no basis for holding that a trial court is restricted to a one-step balancing process when sentencing a defendant for multiple crimes.” Frentz v. State, 875 N.E.2d 453, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Rather, a trial court is permitted to “consider aggravators and mitigators in determining the sentence for each underlying offense and then to independently consider aggravators and mitigators in determining whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences.” Id.

[35] While the trial court identified Johnson's mental illness as a mitigating factor in sentencing, it noted that Johnson had understood what he was doing when he committed his crimes. In addition to the significant harm that Johnson caused E.B., the trial court identified three other aggravating circumstances: Johnson's escalating history of criminal behavior, Johnson's recent violation of conditions of pre-trial release, and that Johnson had victimized multiple individuals over multiple days.

[36] When the trial court imposed consecutive sentences for Counts I and II, it stated as follows:

I do believe that the harm, both physically under the attempted murder, and both mentally and emotionally under the attempted rape are very different. I do believe that with the ongoing counseling and trauma, and the fact that she couldn't even leave her secure apartment, and the fear that you placed in her, that Counts I and Counts II should run consecutive.

Tr. Vol. IV p. 241. The finding of the harm suffered by E.B. was supported by the record. At trial, E.B. testified that, after arriving at the hospital, she had undergone surgery to “stop the bleeding of one of the stab wounds[,]” and was eventually moved to the trauma floor of the hospital for two days to “make sure I could swallow and that everything was okay because he nicked my jugular.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 31. E.B. also testified that she attends counseling and sees a doctor for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, depression, anxiety, and GI symptoms she developed because of the trauma she experienced associated with the attack. While Johnson concedes that the harms suffered by E.B. are “awful” and “support the above-advisory 35-year sentence,” for Count I, he contends that the record does not support the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court to justify the consecutive sentences for Counts I and II. Appellant's Br. p. 24.

[37] It is well-settled that it is perfectly appropriate to consider the same aggravating circumstances to both impose enhanced and consecutive sentences. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 569 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“The same factors that support imposing enhanced sentences can support consecutive service of them.”), trans denied. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences for Counts I and II. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490.

[38] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent that Johnson argues that the charging information was insufficient on these counts, such argument is waived as he did not raise it below. See Grimes v. State, 84 N.E.3d 635, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (providing that “failure to timely challenge an allegedly defective charging information results in waiver unless fundamental error has occurred”).

2.   Johnson's September 12, 2022 competence report shows that he had possible diagnoses of schizophrenia, borderline intellectual functioning, and malingering. On September 21, 2022, the trial court found Johnson incompetent to stand trial and ordered him to be transported to Logansport State Hospital for competency restoration. On December 29, 2022, the hospital determined that Johnson was competent to stand trial, and Johnson was eventually ordered to be transported back.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges May and Mathias concur. May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.