HEGG v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Michael Hegg appeals his conviction for Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine. In doing so, Hegg contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting State's Exhibit 1 (“Exhibit 1”), a sealed bag containing 83.25 grams of methamphetamine, because the amount of methamphetamine in Exhibit 1 was greater than both the amount listed on the charging information and the amount necessary to prove the Level 3 felony possession charge. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 8, 2023, Hegg and his wife, Ladonna, were passengers in a pickup truck that was being driven by Joshua Deline. Deline stopped at a gas station near Waveland. At some point, Hegg exited the truck and entered the gas station. When Hegg re-entered the truck, he placed a large bag of methamphetamine in a pizza box on Ladonna's lap and told her to “do something with this right now.” Tr. Vol. II p. 222. Ladonna placed the bag of methamphetamine in her “pants and crotched it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 222. Deline drove the truck away from the gas station.

[3] Shortly after Deline left the gas station, Montgomery County Sheriff's Deputy Braden Mitchell initiated a traffic stop after observing two equipment infractions on the truck and discovering that the truck's registration had expired. Deputy Mitchell placed Deline under arrest after learning that there was an Illinois warrant for his arrest. Deputy Mitchell asked Ladonna if he could look in her purse. Ladonna

said yes because [she] didn't think there was anything in [her] purse for him to look for, and there was a syringe in there that [her] husband had so lovingly put in there for [her] later that [she] had forgot that he had even given [her]. And so then [Deputy Mitchell] decided [that he was] going to arrest [her], and they put [her] in the back of the car, and [she] had this huge bag of dope on [her and] was freaking out, so [she] lied and said that [she] had just ingested a bunch of heroin so they would take [her] to the hospital in the hopes that [she] could dispose of the bag of meth at the hospital and nobody would get in trouble.

Tr. Vol. II p. 224. Ladonna was transported to the hospital where she hoped to throw the methamphetamine “in the garbage, throw it in the sink and turn the water on, just anything to get it away from” her. Tr. Vol. II p. 224.

[4] The methamphetamine was discovered by a nurse at the hospital after Ladonna had placed it into a pillowcase. The nurse gave the methamphetamine to Sergeant Kevin Crull of the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department. Following the discovery of the methamphetamine, Ladonna spoke to Sergeant Crull and Deputy Mitchell. At first, in an apparent effort to try to keep her husband out of trouble, Ladonna told officers that she did not know where the methamphetamine had come from. She then attempted to shift the blame to herself and Deline before ultimately admitting that the methamphetamine belonged to Hegg. Ladonna also admitted that other methamphetamine, which had been recovered from the bed of the truck, belonged to Hegg.

[5] On March 17, 2023, the State charged Hegg with Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Hegg's first jury trial ended in a mistrial because he came to court intoxicated and fell asleep during the trial. His second jury trial also ended in a mistrial because he came to court intoxicated, fell asleep, and urinated on himself. A third jury convened on September 10, 2024.

[6] During his opening argument, Hegg indicated that he was not disputing that methamphetamine had been recovered from either the pickup truck or its occupants. Hegg indicated, however, that

[w]hat we're disputing is [Ladonna's] story that she concocted at the end of this entire sequence of events, that it was her husband who tossed her the meth. That's the linchpin in this case. We talked during jury selection about credibility and demeanor. You'll have a chance to judge particularly [Ladonna's] credibility and demeanor from the witness stand.

Tr. Vol. II p. 119.

[7] During the State's presentation of evidence, Hegg objected to the admission of Exhibit 1, which was the sealed bag of methamphetamine weighing 83.25 grams that police had seized from the hospital. In making his objection, Hegg stated,

I'm going to object on relevance and this is unduly prejudicial. The charging information as filed charges [Hegg] with 35.81 grams. Preliminary Instruction Number 4 indicates he was charged with 35.81 grams. This is more than double that weight. It's not relevant to what he's charged with, and I think it creates a negative inference to the jury regarding -- the fact that this is double what he's charged with[.]

Tr. Vol. II pp. 207–08. The trial court admitted Exhibit 1 over Hegg's objection.

[8] Hegg again attacked Ladonna's credibility in his closing argument, insinuating that she had lied and her testimony was not credible. Following trial, the jury found Hegg guilty of Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine and Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe. On October 24, 2024, the trial court sentenced Hegg to twelve years of incarceration.

Discussion and Decision

[9] The admission of evidence is a matter that we generally “leave to the discretion of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259–60 (Ind. 2013). “We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. at 260 (internal citation omitted). “[W]e will not reverse the decision to admit or exclude evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground.” Carpenter v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1075, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[10] At the outset, we note that “[a] charging information must allege the elements of the crime such that the accused is sufficiently apprised of the nature of the charges against him so that he may anticipate the proof and prepare a defense in advance of trial.” Winn v. State, 748 N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ind. 2001). “The State is not required to include detailed factual allegations in the charging instrument, though it may choose to do so.” Id.

When the factual allegations in the charge are not necessary to the sufficiency of the charge, a greater variance between the allegations and the proof is tolerated before finding the variance material or fatal. To award relief on the basis of a variance between allegations in the charge and the evidence at trial, the variance must be such as to either have misled the defendant in the preparation and maintenance of his defense with resulting harm or prejudice or leave the defendant vulnerable to double jeopardy in a future criminal proceeding covering the same event, facts, and evidence.

Id. (internal citation omitted). Hegg argues that the difference between the weight of the methamphetamine listed in the charging information and the weight of the methamphetamine admitted at trial created an improper variance. Hegg, however, did not raise this argument at the trial court level and does not assert that the alleged variance resulted in fundamental error on appeal. As such, Hegg has waived this argument on appeal. See Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (Ind. 2011) (providing that an appellant waives a claim of fundamental error if it is not raised in his principal appellate brief); Reinhardt v. State, 881 N.E.2d 15, 17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“[F]ailure to make a specific objection at trial waives any material variance issue.”).

[11] Hegg also challenges the admission of Exhibit 1 by arguing that it was not relevant and, even if relevant, was unfairly prejudicial. Generally, “[a] person who ․ knowingly or intentionally possesses methamphetamine (pure or adulterated) commits possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony[.]” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a). However, “[t]he offense is a Level 3 felony if: (1) the amount of the drug involved is at least twenty-eight (28) grams[.]” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(d)(1). In charging Hegg, the State alleged that Hegg had knowingly or intentionally possessed “at least 28 grams, to-wit: 35.81 grams” of methamphetamine. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21. Pointing to the fact that the charging information referenced 35.81 grams of methamphetamine, i.e., far less than the 83.25 grams of methamphetamine comprising Exhibit 1, Hegg argues that the admission of Exhibit 1 “unfairly prejudiced [him] because [he] was not charged with possessing 83 grams of meth—he was charged with possessing 35.81 grams.” Appellant's Br. p. 10. Hegg further argues that Exhibit 1 “had no probative value because [he] was not charged with possessing that meth.” Appellant's Br. p. 10 (emphasis in original).

[12] “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Ind. Evidence Rule 401. “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Evid. R. 403. “Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.” Evid. R. 402.

[13] Hegg was charged with possessing “at least twenty-eight (28) grams” of methamphetamine. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(d). Exhibit 1 was relevant to prove this fact. Exhibit 1 was supported by Ladonna's testimony tying it to Hegg. Hegg attempted to discredit Ladonna's testimony both in cross-examination and in opening and closing arguments. Moreover, to the extent that Hegg argues that Exhibit 1 was unduly prejudicial because its weight was far greater than the amount that Hegg was alleged to have possessed, we agree with the State that it is not uncommon “to find cases that involve amounts of illegal narcotics that exceed the amounts necessary to prove the offense.” Appellee's Br. p. 12; see generally Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 938 (Ind. 2020) (affirming admission of evidence indicating that the defendant had possessed 108 grams of methamphetamine when he had only been charged with possessing with intent to deal ten or more grams of methamphetamine); Eaton v. State, 889 N.E.2d 297, 299, 301 (Ind. 2008) (affirming admission of evidence indicating that the defendant had possessed approximately four kilograms of cocaine when he had only been charged with possessing with the intent to deal more than three grams of cocaine).

[14] All evidence that is relevant to a criminal prosecution is inherently prejudicial; thus proper inquiry under Evidence Rule 403 boils down to a balance of the probative value of the proffered evidence against the likely unfair prejudicial impact of that evidence. When determining the likely unfair prejudicial impact, courts will look for the dangers that the jury will substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.

Fuentes v. State, 10 N.E.3d 68, 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied. Given the relevance of Exhibit 1 to proving that Hegg had possessed “at least twenty-eight (28) grams” of methamphetamine, see Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(d), we cannot say that it was likely that the jury would “substantially overestimate the value of the evidence” or that the evidence would “arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.” Fuentes, 10 N.E.3d at 73. As such, we cannot say that Exhibit 1 was unduly prejudicial to Hegg. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion by admitting Exhibit 1 into evidence.

[15] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.