IN RE: A.D.J.L. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.D.J.L. (“Youth”) appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for determination of eligibility for special immigrant juvenile status (“SIJS”). Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Youth was born to G.D.J.L. (“Mother”) on July 31, 2006, in San Pedro Sula, Honduras. Youth's alleged father (“Alleged Father”) currently resides in Spain; he is not listed on Youth's birth certificate and has not sought to establish paternity. On April 22, 2024, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a verified petition alleging Youth to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”), which reads in pertinent part as follows:

4. This petition is based upon, and is supported by, the following alleged material facts:

a. [Mother] is unable to provide [Youth] with a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment with an education and necessary mental health treatment.

b. [Mother] currently lives in Honduras, and [Youth] has been in the United States for approximately one year. During his time in the U.S., he has lacked stability, gotten involved with illegal substances, and struggled with mental health issues.

c. Although [Mother] has attempted to make arrangements for family to assist with the care of [Youth] in the U.S., they have been unable to maintain [Youth] safely in their homes, [Mother] is unable to ensure [Youth] has the supervision required to ensure his safety, and she is unable to meet his educational and mental health needs at this time.

d. In March 2024, [Youth] was found in a dumpster while in Georgia, and he was in a confused mental state and taken to a treatment center in Georgia for hospitalization due to concerns regarding his mental health.

e. Arrangements were subsequently made by the family for [Youth] to return to Indianapolis to stay with a cousin [(“Cousin”)] in April 2024; however, on or about April 9, 2024, [Youth] was discovered walking on 1-69 from Indianapolis to Fishers stating he was going to walk back to Honduras.

f. He was transported to the hospital and diagnosed with unspecified schizophrenia spectrum or other psychotic disorder and is in need of therapy and medications to address his mental health issues.

g. [Cousin] has been unable to enroll [Youth] in school or ensure the child receives necessary medical care due to not having the required documentation, and the child and family are in need of services they are not receiving and are unlikely to receive without the [DCS's] and the Court's involvement.

h. [Alleged Father] has not successfully demonstrated an ability and willingness to appropriately parent the child, and he is unable to ensure the child's safety and well-being.

i. [Alleged Father's] whereabouts are currently unknown to the DCS.

j. Due to the foregoing reasons, the coercive intervention of the Court is required to ensure the child's safety and well-being.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 34-35.

[3] That same day, the trial court held an initial hearing on the petition. The court entered an order in which it appointed a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for Youth, removed Youth from Mother's care, granted temporary wardship to DCS, and stated that the permanency plan for Youth is reunification with his parents.

[4] On July 19, the trial court held a factfinding hearing on the CHINS petition, at which the following persons appeared: DCS's counsel, DCS's family case manager (“FCM”), the public defenders representing Mother and Alleged Father, the GAL, and the GAL's counsel. Afterward, the court entered an order that reads in pertinent part as follows:

An admission of the allegations of the petition having been entered by both [Mother] and [Alleged Father], [Youth] is now adjudicated a Child in Need of Services as defined by 31-34-1-1.

In support for this conclusion of law, the following findings of fact are found:

1) [Mother and Alleged Father] enter the following admission:

[Youth] is a child in need of services pursuant to Indiana Law, as defined in IC 31-34-1 because his family needs the assistance of DCS to provide [Youth] with a safe, stable living environment. For this reason, the coercive intervention of the court is necessary.

․.

[Youth] has been removed and is currently in foster care.

Id. at 41.

[5] The trial court held a dispositional hearing on August 14, 2024. The court then entered a dispositional order in which it continued Youth's placement in foster care and set a review hearing for September 11. The order states: “Parties ordered to present why (if it is their position) [Youth] should not be ordered to be returned to his mother or father at the [review] hearing. Court also orders DCS to advise the Court on steps to returning [Youth] to mother or father if the Court does so.” Id. at 46.

[6] On August 21, DCS filed a motion requesting a change to Youth's permanency plan from reunification to Another Planned Permanency Living Arrangement (“APPLA”).¹ In its motion, DCS noted that “all parties and service providers, including [Youth] himself, agree that it is in [Youth's] best interest for his plan to change from reunification to APPLA.” Id. at 43.

[7] On September 10, Youth filed a motion for determination of eligibility for SIJS. To provide some context for the motion and the trial court's order below, we note that “Congress created the SIJ classification to protect abused, neglected, and abandoned immigrant youth through a process allowing them to become legal permanent citizens.” In re Guardianship of Luis, 114 N.E.3d 855, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting In re J.J.X.C., 734 S.E.2d 120, 123 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)). “Although the final decision regarding whether a child qualifies for SIJ status is made by the federal government, the process for obtaining SIJ status requires ‘the collaboration of state and federal systems.’ ” A.J.L.B. by Lemus v. Alvarenga, 224 N.E.3d 345, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Guardianship of Luis, 114 N.E.3d at 858).

[8] “The state juvenile court, ‘as the appropriate forum for child welfare determinations regarding abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and a child's best interests[,]’ ‘is charged with making the factual inquiry relevant to SIJ status’ and entering an order regarding its findings.” Id. (quoting Guardianship of Luis, 114 N.E.3d at 858) (alteration in A.J.L.B.). “State courts play no role in the final determination of SIJ status, or ultimately, permanent residency or citizenship, which are federal questions.” Guardianship of Luis, 114 N.E.3d at 859. After the state court issues a predicate order with the required findings, the child can submit an application for SIJ status to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. A.J.L.B., 224 N.E.3d at 350. “Relief is not guaranteed and denial of the application renders [the minor] subject to deportation as an undocumented immigrant.” Id. (quoting In re Guardianship of Xitumul, 137 N.E.3d 945, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)) (alteration in Guardianship of Xitumul).

[9] As relevant here, for an immigrant to be eligible to petition the federal government for SIJS, a state juvenile court must make the following findings: (1) the immigrant is under age twenty-one, unmarried, and physically present in the United States; (2) the immigrant has been declared dependent on or placed under the custody of a state agency or individual appointed by a juvenile court located in the United States, and “reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant's parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law”; and (3) “it would not be in the alien's best interest to be returned to the alien's or parent's previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i), (ii).²

[10] Youth's SIJS motion recounts much of the foregoing background information and further states,

6. [Youth] was removed from the care of his parents under the CHINS on July 26, 2024, and wardship and placement were granted to the Indiana DCS. [Youth] was placed in foster care under DCS, was still in foster care on his eighteenth birthday on July 31, 2024, and currently remains in his foster care placement. [Youth] remains dependent on this Court by way of the CHINS under the above cause number.

․.

8. It is not in [Youth's] best interests to return to his country of origin, Honduras. The age of majority in Honduras is 21 years old; if returned to Honduras, [Youth] would be returned to Mother's care. Mother has admitted that she is unable to provide [Youth] with a safe, stable living environment. Mother does not have adequate housing in Honduras, nor can she adequately feed her remaining children residing with her. [Youth] also needs mental health treatment and medication that Mother would not be able to provide if [Youth] was returned to Honduras.

9. It is also not in [Youth's] best interests to return to Honduras because the conditions in Honduras are dangerous in general. “Criminal groups, including local and transnational gangs and narcotics traffickers, were significant perpetrators of violent crimes and committed acts of homicide, torture, kidnapping, extortion, human trafficking, intimidation, and other threats and violence directed against ․ vulnerable populations. The government investigated and prosecuted some of these crimes, but impunity was widespread.” United States Department of State, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Honduras, April 22, 2024 ․.

Id. at 51-52.

[11] At the September 11 review hearing, the trial court declined to change Youth's permanency plan and set a combined permanency hearing and evidentiary hearing on Youth's motion for SIJS eligibility. The court's review hearing order states, “The Court would like to hear specific evidence related to the social services available to [Youth] in Honduras.” Id. at 47.

[12] The trial court held the hearing on October 1. Present for that hearing were Youth and his counsel, DCS counsel and several DCS employees, the public defenders representing Mother and Alleged Father, the GAL and the GAL's counsel, and Youth's foster mother. On November 22, the trial court entered an order that reads in pertinent part as follows:

The Court heard testimonial evidence from DCS FCM Supervisor Samantha Ferrand; DCS FCM Alyssa Smith; GAL Wanda Zapata; Ms. Hernandez (Foster Mother); and Youth. The Court admitted Exhibits 2-4, and took the other exhibits under advisement. The Court was also appreciatively supplied with a post-hearing submission by Youth's counsel, along with some Indiana caselaw addressing SIJS cases.

Based on the credibility of the witnesses and the admissible evidence, the Court now enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Legal Standard

It is undisputed that Youth is unmarried; under the age of 21; presently in the United States; and is in the custody of a juvenile court located in the United States. As such, the legal standard applicable to the Motion is as follows:

1. Is reunification with one or both parents not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law; and

2. would it not be in the special immigrant's best interest to be returned to his previous country or nationality or country of last habitual residence?

[Guardianship of Xitumul, 137 N.E.3d at 951] (citing 8 U.S.C.[ ]§ 1101(a)(27)(J) and 8 C.F.R.[ ]§ 204.11(c)(1), (c)(2)).

“The language of the first finding is designed to ‘prevent youths from using this remedy for the purpose of obtaining legal permanent resident status, rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect.” In re [Guardianship of] Luis, 134 N.E.3d 1070, 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)[ ](quoting In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Neb. 2012)).

Regarding the second finding, the Court is to consider whether Youth's reunification with Mother is “viable,” which requires evidence “showing that there is a reasonable chance that reunification will succeed.” Id. at 1075. Stated otherwise, the Court must find that reunification with Mother is “not likely to succeed” for SIJ[ ] status. Id[.]

In short, “[a] state court's role in the SIJ process is not to determine worthy candidates for citizenship, but simply to identify abused, neglected, or abandoned alien children under its jurisdiction who cannot reunify with a parent or be safely returned in their best interests to their home country.” Id. at 1073.

Youth, as movant, has the burden of proving these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Having found nothing to the contrary, the Indiana Rules of Evidence apply to the Court's inquiry.

Evidentiary Issues

[The trial court ruled that an affidavit purporting to be from Mother and information proffered by Mother's counsel “relating to Honduras and its purported crime and healthcare” were not admissible. Youth does not challenge these rulings on appeal.]

The Court did admit Exhibits 2-4 (pictures [of the exterior and the interior of Mother's home in Honduras]), based on the testimony of Youth's foster parent.

The Court took judicial notice of the record in this case.

Factual Findings

Youth was adjudicated a CHINS on July 19, 2024, shortly before he turned 18, which he did on July 31, 2024. Mother and [Alleged Father] admitted (through counsel) that Youth was a CHINS on July 19, 2024, and so there was no merits trial to resolve the Petition.

Youth is an illegal immigrant. Until some time in 2023, Youth resided in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, with his Mother and (now) 6 and 14 year old sisters. There was no evidence proffered or admitted explaining how Youth made it to the United States, or why he came here. According to the Petition, Youth “has been in the United States for approximately one year․.”; Youth's Mother has “attempted to make arrangements for [sic] family to assist with the care of Youth in the U.S.․.”; after a March, 2024, incident in Georgia he was “taken to a treatment center ․. due to concerns regarding his mental health․.”; “[a]rrangements were subsequently made for Youth to return to Indianapolis to stay with a cousin․.”; after which, Youth was “discovered walking on I-69 from Indianapolis to Fishers stating he was going to walk back to Honduras.” Petition, ¶¶4(a)-(e). Nothing suggests Mother was not involved in Youth's life during this time.

According to the testimony, Youth was living with his cousin in Indiana when these events occurred in 2024. He was walking on I-69 and was delusional. DCS got involved and he was referred for substance abuse ([Y]outh had previously used cocaine and methamphetamines) and mental health services. Youth has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and a psychosis that was onset by drug use. By all accounts, his conditions are treatable with medication, if he takes it regularly. Youth is forgetful and needs someone to remind him to take his medications.

Youth was treated and placed with a foster parent, who has been taking great care of Youth. Either she or family members make sure that Youth, who is forgetful, remembers to take his medicine. Youth is presently doing well, in large part because he: (a) has medication available to him, and (b) regularly takes it.

The parties took the position that those needs are not able to be met in Honduras. But the Court was not convinced of that proposition by a preponderance of the admissible evidence based on the credibility of the witnesses.

Other than Youth, the only witness put forward who had any personal knowledge of the availability of medical/mental health treatments for Youth in Honduras was DCS FCM Alyssa Smith. She had previously repatriated two children back to Honduras to be reunified with their mother. She was in or around San Pedro Sula during a 24 hour period. She did not investigate the availability of mental health or medical services when she was there. The houses she observed in the area are not constructed as houses are in the U.S., and she characterized what she saw as reflective of an “underdeveloped” nation. Based on this, FCM Smith testified that Youth's needs are simply unable to be met in Honduras. The Court does not accept that proposition based on FCM Smith's testimony, which lacked the foundation necessary to leap from what she actually observed in her short visit to Honduras, to that conclusion.

Other witnesses testified in generalities about the lack of services available to Youth in Honduras, but none of them established a foundation of personal knowledge upon which to base those assertions. GA[L] Zapata testified Youth's medical needs would not be met in Honduras, but no foundation for that conclusion was established. FCM Supervisor Ferrand testified that Mother could not afford medical/mental health treatment, but acknowledged she had not spoken with Mother. Foster Mother testified that Mother told her that it was not easy for Mother to get medications for youth. Sometimes she could, sometimes not. That testimony was inadmissible hearsay. Even ignoring that evidentiary infirmity, being “not easy” to get medications is not the same as being unable to get them.

Youth testified that he had a doctor when he lived in Honduras. There was testimony that the issue regarding the availability of medication was financial, in part because Mother's job was on-again, off-again. But Youth testified that if he returned to Honduras he could secure employment, and there was no testimony that if he did so, whatever he would be paid would be insufficient to afford his medications.

Medical care had also been previously afforded to Youth in Honduras on an emergency basis. He had his appendix removed. This demonstrates that, at least in the one prior medical emergency confronting Youth, the Honduras medical system was available to him.

FCM Supervisor Ferrand testified she was concerned that if Youth returned to Honduras he would “possibly” be homeless, and that he would be returned to an unsafe environment. The possibility of homelessness does not pass the “more likely than not” standard applicable here, even ignoring the lack of foundational support for that proposition from FCM Ferrand.

The Court does credit the testimony about Mother's home. From the credible testimony, the Court finds that Mother's home[ ] has a dirt floor, has a leaky roof, and sometimes lacks running water. According to Youth it always has/had electricity. There is one bed in the home. Mother communicates with Youth using the internet from her home. From the evidence, this type of home is not atypical in that geographic area.

Youth told his Foster Mother that he was afraid of gangs in his hometown. Youth testified to a similar general concern, but nothing directed to him, personally. The Court credits Youth's testimony that there are gangs in Honduras. But there was nothing presented that Youth would be a particular target of them (he testified that they “might” try to approach him); and, DCS returned two other youth to the same geographic area despite this apparent gang presence, which undermines the notion that all youth/young adults are in danger of gangs if returned to Honduras. The Court concludes that it is speculative that Youth would be the subject of gang violence if he returned to Honduras.

Father

Because there was no evidence of who Youth's father is the Court cannot find in Youth's favor on the SIJS elements as it relates to Youth's father. For the Motion to be granted, Youth must prove the SIJS elements as it relates to his Mother.

Mother

Youth must prove that reunification with Mother is not viable due to (1) abuse, (2) neglect, (3) abandonment, or (4) a similar basis under Indiana law. Supra. The Court will take these up seriatim.

1. Abuse.

There was no evidence that Youth was abused, whether in Honduras or in the United States.

2. Neglect.

The neglect alleged in the April 22, 2024 [CHINS petition] is based on IND. CODE § 31-34-1-1, which states that a child is legally neglected when his/her:

[P]hysical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision: (A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or (B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that: (A) the child is not receiving; and (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

I.C. § 31-34-1-1. DCS alleges that Mother is “unable to provide the child with a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment with an education and necessary mental health treatment.” Petition, ¶4(a).

The Court finds that the Youth was neglected on April 24 [sic], 2024, but it cannot conclude that he was neglected prior to that date. There was no evidence explaining why or how Youth came to the United States. He has been with family while here (most recently his cousin in Indiana), and he has been in regular contact with his Mother. Unfortunately, while here, he had a mental health episode. But it is clear that Mother – albeit from afar – was interested in and invested in getting Youth treated. Had Youth been in Honduras when this episode happened, the Court is not persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Youth would not have been treated. The credible facts did not establish that Youth would not have medical or mental health treatment in Honduras had the episode occurred there, or if he is returned to Honduras.

At the end of the day, Youth's ongoing treatment would be provided to him if he were returned to Honduras, and if he had been returned to Honduras shortly after his acute episode in April, 2024. There was a paucity of credible admissible evidence to conclude otherwise. In this sense, this case is not unlike if an Indiana parent decided to have his child live with the child's grandparent in a different city; there was an acute medical/ mental health issue similar to this one; after which the child was returned to the parent for ongoing care and treatment. The Court could conclude that the child was “neglected” on the date of the incident, but the Court would then look to reunification with the parent provided the parent could offer (or make available) the medical and mental health treatment needed. Because DCS stepped in and the Petition was filed, Youth was not immediately reunified with his Mother (who appears to have initially wanted him home) in Honduras to obtain the necessary (and ongoing) treatment he needs.

The Court finds that, despite the neglect on April 24 [sic], 2024, Youth has not proven that reunification with Mother is not viable. There was not a preponderance of credible evidence showing that there is a reasonable chance that reunification will not succeed. Youth could be returned home, get a job, and use money from that job to get medication. Mother could monitor his medication usage. If the housing situation in Honduras remains[ ]a concern, that could be remedied by Youth's additional income for the family, or through financial assistance by DCS such as money for a new bed and money for roof repairs. If Mother was in Indiana, these types of resources would likely be offered to her, and there has been no evidence submitted that similar relief could not be afforded her just because she is in Honduras. Reunification is the current plan for Youth, and there is a reasonable likelihood it will succeed based on the evidence.

3. Abandonment.

[The trial court found that “Youth was not abandoned under Indiana law.” Youth does not specifically challenge this finding.]

4. Would It Be In Youth's Best Interest To Be Returned To Honduras?

Parental reunification is the initial and primary goal in nearly all (if not all) CHINS cases in which reunification is a possibility. It is the current plan in this case. All of the parties are unified in their desire that Youth remain in the United States. By all accounts, he is doing well here, in large part because of the mental health and medical treatment he is receiving.

The Court understands this standard to require proof of more than a general proposition that any person would be better off living in the United States than in Honduras. In Luis, the Court of Appeals compared that youth's situation in Guat[e]mala to her situation in the United States to conclude that it was in her best interest to remain in the United States. Luis, 134 N.E.3d at 1076. It is unclear to what extent the goal of parental reunification factors into this equation, but based on Luis, the Court finds that Youth would be better off in Indiana than Honduras because he has, without any doubt, access to healthcare, medication, and a nice house.

Conclusion

The Court has read many SIJS cases to do its best to get this important decision correct. A common thread through many of those cases is that the subject children left one or both parents who had either abandoned, abused, or neglected, their child in ways not evident here. Mother is a loving, engaged, concerned parent, who remains in contact with Youth. Her resources are not what she would have if she were in the United States, but they do not appear abnormal for where she lives. What she lacks can be addressed with a plan that is regularly implemented in other DCS cases that focus on reunification. At this time, none of those efforts have been attempted, and the evidence did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that if they were attempted they are likely to fail. Nor was it proven that even without resources that could be ordered by the Court, that Youth's reunification with Mother is likely to fail. There is a reasonable likelihood that reunification with Mother will succeed.

Youth's Motion is denied.

DCS'S Motion for Plan Change

The present plan for the Youth is reunification with his Mother.․ It is not yet clear that Youth's cousin who lives in Indiana could not act as Youth's guardian. Nor does the evidence establish that Youth's Mother is unable or unwilling to become a safe and appropriate caregiver. DCS's Motion is denied, and the plan remains reunification.

Appealed Order at 1-14 (footnotes omitted).

[13] Youth filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's order. DCS filed a notice of non-involvement, noting that it did not file a response to Youth's motion and asserting that DCS “is not the proper party to respond to Youth's appeal.” DCS's Notice of Non-Involvement at 3. The motions panel of this Court accepted DCS's notice. Consequently, Youth is the only party participating in this appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Youth contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to determine eligibility for SIJS. More specifically, Youth contends that the trial court should have found the following: (1) that reunification with Mother is not viable due to abuse or neglect; and (2) that it would not be in his best interest to be returned to Honduras.

[15] “Generally, when, as here, a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), we apply a two-tiered standard of review; first we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings support the judgment.” Smith v. Smith, 938 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).³ “In deference to the trial court's proximity to the issues, we disturb the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment.” Id. “We do not reweigh the evidence, but consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court's judgment.” Id. “Those appealing the trial court's judgment must establish that the findings are clearly erroneous.” Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” Id. “An appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court's judgment.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 503 (Ind. 2011).

[16] As a preliminary matter, Youth asserts that the trial court clearly erred in finding that there was no evidence that he was abused. We need not address this assertion because, even assuming for argument's sake that Youth was in fact abused, Youth has failed to establish that the trial court clearly erred in finding that he had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that reunification with Mother is not viable due to abuse or neglect. As mentioned in the trial court's order, “viable” means “having a reasonable chance of succeeding.” Guardianship of Luis, 134 N.E.3d at 1075 (citation omitted). The trial court found that “Youth could be returned home, get a job, and use money from that job to get medication. Mother could monitor his medication usage.” Appealed Order at 11.

[17] Youth's argument to the contrary is simply an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. In response to the trial court's questioning, Youth testified that he would be able to find a job in housing construction if he returned to Honduras. Youth presented no evidence that the wages from such a job would be insufficient to purchase medication.⁴ Youth points to testimony regarding the cramped sleeping quarters and leaky roof in Mother's home, the occasional lack of running water, and Mother's sporadic employment, but these conditions have no bearing on his ability to obtain employment in order to purchase medication or Mother's ability to monitor its usage. In sum, Youth has not established that he is entitled to relief on this ground, and therefore we need not address his “best interest” argument. The trial court's order is affirmed.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See I.C. § 31-34-21-7.5(c)(1)(E) (authorizing this option for a permanency plan). Typically, APPLA is implemented for “an older, teenaged child who is unlikely or unwilling to be adopted, who has no relatives able or willing to act as a custodian or guardian, and whose parents are unable or unwilling to become safe and appropriate caregivers.” In re E.W., 26 N.E.3d 1006, 1009 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

2.   “The immigrant must also be deemed eligible for long-term foster care.” Guardianship of Xitumul, 137 N.E.3d at 952 n.2 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(4)). “Eligible for long-term foster care means that a determination has been made by the juvenile court that family reunification is no longer a viable option.” Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a)). “For purposes of establishing eligibility for classification as an SIJ, a child who has been placed in a guardianship situation is considered eligible for long-term foster care.” Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a)). Here, the trial court found that this element is satisfied because “Youth is in a guardianship situation[.]” Appealed Order at 2 n.3.

3.   We remind Youth's counsel that the argument section of an appellant's brief “must include for each issue a concise statement of the applicable standard of review[.]” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b).

4.   We note that during his time in the United States, Youth apparently had the financial wherewithal to purchase illegal drugs.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and DeBoer concur. Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.