William J. Page, Appellant-Petitioner v. Valarie J. Page, Appellee-Respondent (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] William J. Page (“Husband”) challenges the trial court's imposition of a contempt sanction awarding $3,460.00 to his former wife, Valarie J. Page (“Wife”), where the amount corresponded to attorney fees Wife incurred in litigating her motion for rule to show cause, which was successful. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] About ten years after the dissolution of Husband and Wife's marriage, Wife filed a lis pendens notice concerning the former marital residence, as well as an emergency motion to escrow proceeds from a sale of the residence, alleging Wife was entitled to half of the proceeds pursuant to a settlement agreement. In June 2023, there was an agreed entry directing that, while the parties litigated whether Wife was entitled to half the proceeds, any proceeds would be held in Husband's attorney's trust account. The residence was sold. The trial court held a hearing and, on September 22, 2023, issued an order requiring Husband to pay $117,963.79 to Wife, ultimately directing Husband's attorney to make the payment from her trust account within ten days (“the Payment Order”). Husband unsuccessfully moved to correct error, then filed a Notice of Appeal on December 7, 2023. Husband did not pursue a stay of the Payment Order.¹

[3] On December 15, 2023, Wife filed a verified motion for rule to show cause, alleging she still had not received the $117,963.79. Wife asked the court to hold Husband in contempt for failing to comply with the Payment Order. A hearing was postponed and, on July 2, 2024, this court affirmed the Payment Order. Wife then filed a motion asking the trial court to award appellate attorney fees. Meanwhile, a hearing on Wife's contempt allegations was scheduled for late July. Ahead of the hearing, Wife filed an exhibit list identifying two attorney fee affidavits, one titled “Affidavit of Billable Fees and Expenses” and the other titled “Affidavit of Billable Fees and Expenses Incurred in Appellate Case.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 9; Ex. Vol. I pp. 4, 7. The hearing was held on July 30, 2024. Husband's attorney attended the hearing, but Husband was absent.

[4] At the hearing, the trial court was willing to hear evidence on Wife's motion for appellate attorney fees, but noted the motion was not “technically set for a hearing” that day. Tr. Vol. II p. 7. As to Wife's contempt allegations, Wife testified Husband still had not paid the $117,963.79 owed under the Payment Order. Wife sought damages as a monetary sanction, testifying that she had incurred $3,460.00 in attorney fees “since the [Payment Order] was issued[.]” Id. Shortly thereafter, Wife's counsel asked Wife whether she had “incurred [attorney] fees related to [Husband's] pursuit of an appeal” of the Payment Order, with Wife responding: “I have.” Id. at 8. Wife testified that she incurred $9,275.50 in appellate attorney fees. Wife confirmed that her attorney fees were depicted in the two attorney fee affidavits, the first of which indicated that Wife incurred $3,460.00 in attorney fees “from September 26, 2023 to the present[.]” Ex. Vol. I p. 4. The second attorney fee affidavit indicated that Wife incurred $9,275.50 in attorney fees “from December 14, 2023 to the present,” specifying that the fees were “[i]ncurred in [the] [a]ppellate [c]ase.” Id. at 7. Wife asked the court to direct Husband's attorney to pay the fees from her trust account. Counsel asked Wife if she knew “whether those funds will be remaining in [the] trust account after ․ the [proceeds are] paid to you,” and Wife said: “It appears that[,] yes, there should be adequate funds.” Tr. Vol. II p. 8. The court took judicial notice of the CCS and all filings and orders in the case.

[5] Wife ultimately asked that Husband be ordered to pay all the requested attorney fees by having Husband's attorney “release those funds to [Wife] today” from her trust account holding the sale proceeds for Husband. Id. at 9. At the hearing, Husband did not object to Wife's testimony about the attorney fees, nor did he object to either affidavit corroborating her testimony. Husband also did not cross-examine Wife as to the attorney fees and related affidavits.

[6] Later that day, the trial court issued a written order finding that Husband “willfully disobeyed [the Payment Order] by failing to pay Wife $117,[963.79].” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 15. The trial court noted that, although Husband had appealed the Payment Order, Husband “never [pursued] a Motion to Stay the [Payment] Order.” Id. The trial court found that Wife “incurred attorney fees in the amount of $3,460[.00] to pursue the Verified Motion for Rule to Show Cause.” Id. The court included a finding that “Husband has the ability to pay Wife's attorney fees in the amount of $3,460[.00] from the remainder of his funds being held in his attorney's trust account from the sale of the marital home.” Id. The court ordered Husband to “pay Wife's attorney fees in the amount of $3,460[.00]” (“the Sanction”), specifying that Husband had “an opportunity to purge himself of further contempt” by paying Wife the amount due under the Payment Order along with the $3,460.00 before noon on July 31, 2024. Id. Husband filed a motion to correct error arguing the Sanction was “contrary to the evidence and testimony” and “contrary to well-settled Indiana law[.]” Id. at 20. Husband's motion did not refer to caselaw analyzing the propriety of awarding attorney fees as a sanction for contempt. Rather, the motion referred to caselaw applying a statute that more generally allows fee shifting in dissolution cases. See id. (citing Shively v. Shively, 680 N.E.2d 877, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citing statutory authority to award attorney fees)). The court denied the motion on September 12, 2024. Husband now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] At the outset, we note that Wife did not file an appellee's brief. Under the circumstances, we may reverse upon a showing of prima facie error, which means error at first sight or on the face of it. Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). This standard relieves us from developing arguments on behalf of a party who did not file an appellate brief. Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2008). Nevertheless, this standard does not relieve us from our obligation to faithfully apply the law to the facts in the record. Ivankovic v. Ivankovic, 228 N.E.3d 1143, 1146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[8] Here, Husband does not dispute the trial court's finding that Husband was in contempt for failing to comply with the Payment Order. Rather, Husband challenges the Sanction obligating him to pay $3,460.00 for the attorney fees Wife incurred because of Husband's contempt. In general, we review an award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Minser v. DeKalb Cnty. Plan Comm'n, 170 N.E.3d 1093, 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). We also review contempt sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Hunter v. State, 102 N.E.3d 326, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). The trial court abuses its discretion if its decision was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or if the court misinterpreted the law. Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025).

[9] In challenging the Sanction, Husband has relied on dissolution caselaw where one spouse was ordered to pay the other spouse's appellate attorney fees. See Appellant's Br. p. 8 (citing Shively, 680 N.E.2d at 883); Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 20 (same). That caselaw involved a predecessor statute to Indiana Code section 31-15-10-1, which is a dissolution statute creating an exception to the general rule against fee shifting, allowing an award of reasonable attorney fees in certain scenarios. Cf. Shively, 680 N.E.2d at 883. Here, however, the trial court was not ordering fee shifting pursuant to a dissolution statute. Rather, the trial court was imposing a monetary sanction for Husband's contempt, where the Sanction corresponded to the amount of attorney fees Husband caused Wife to incur because of Husband's contemptuous violation of the Payment Order.

[10] A trial court has inherent authority to secure compliance with its orders by imposing a sanction for contempt. In re A.S., 9 N.E.3d 129, 133 (Ind. 2014). “Once a party has been found in contempt of court, monetary damages may be awarded to compensate the other party for injuries incurred as a result of the contempt.” City of Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 172 (Ind. 2005). Attorney fees are one type of damages, which a court may award “[w]ithout regard to economic resources[.]” Scoleri v. Scoleri, 766 N.E.2d 1211, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). In “determining an amount of damages” to compensate for contempt, the trial court “may take into account ‘the inconvenience and frustration suffered by the aggrieved party[.]’ ” Major, 822 N.E.2d at 172 (quoting Cowart v. White, 711 N.E.2d 523, 532 (Ind. 1999)). “The determination of damages in a contempt proceeding is within the trial court's discretion, and we will reverse an award of damages only if there is no evidence to support the award.” Id.

[11] In general, attorney fees are recoverable only if they are reasonable. Gerstbauer v. Styers, 898 N.E.2d 369, 379–80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We are deferential to the trial court in its award of attorney fees, recognizing judges have personal expertise in understanding the reasonableness of fees involved. E.g., Waterfield v. Waterfield, 61 N.E.3d 314, 332 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Trial courts may liberally draw on that expertise. See id.; Flash v. Holtsclaw, 789 N.E.2d 955, 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Indeed, “[w]hile the taking of evidence on reasonable attorney fees is a preferable practice, the trial court may take judicial notice of what constitutes a reasonable amount of attorney fees in routine cases involving relatively small amounts.” Flash, 789 N.E.2d at 960.

[12] Husband argues there was insufficient evidence establishing that Husband could pay the Sanction from the trust account as directed, suggesting there may be a shortfall in the account. But, when it comes to contempt sanctions, a trial court is not obligated to consider the financial resources of the parties. Scoleri, 766 N.E.2d at 1222. In any case, the trial court previously ordered that the proceeds from the real estate transaction be “maintained in ․ Husband's attorney trust account until further [o]rder of the [c]ourt.” Agreed Entry p. 2 (June 13, 2023).² The record reveals no further order releasing any part of the proceeds to be maintained in the trust account. Rather, when the trial court imposed the Sanction, Wife had not received half the proceeds—$117,963.79—such that, absent noncompliance with the trial court's earlier order, there would be an additional $117,963.79 available to draw upon. Further, to the extent there is a shortfall such that Husband cannot pay the Sanction in the manner prescribed, this scenario would not render the award unreasonable. Rather, Husband may simply pay the remaining sums owed from other sources or seek modification of the trial court's order.

[13] At times, Husband argues the Sanction was unsupported because “the only evidence [Wife] presented in support of the request for reimbursement for attorney fees ․ was [her] testimony and [the] 1-page Affidavit of Billable Fees and Expenses.” Appellant's Br. p. 8. Husband points out that the affidavit “did not include an itemized invoice[.]” Id. at 9. Husband also points out that counsel did not testify, and there was no evidence of counsel's years of practice or any hourly rate. Id. However, as earlier noted, this type of evidence—while helpful—is not necessarily required to establish the attorney fees are reasonable, with the trial court regarded as an expert in the matter. See, e.g., Waterfield, 61 N.E.3d at 332; Flash, 789 N.E.2d at 960. Moreover, Husband did not object to Wife's testimony or to the admission of either of the corroborating attorney fee affidavits, and Husband declined to engage in any cross-examination as to the fees. By failing to object, Husband waived any challenge to the admissibility of Wife's testimony and the fee affidavits. Ind. Evidence Rule 103(a) (requiring a timely objection to preserve a claim of error in the admission of evidence).

[14] Husband chiefly focuses on whether Wife failed to “prove an appropriate allocation of fees between issues” because the first affidavit broadly referred to the fees incurred from September 22, 2023 to present—a period that overlapped with the appellate litigation. Appellant's Br. p. 8. To the extent Husband suggests the $3,460.00 reflected in the first attorney fee affidavit included fees associated with appellate litigation, we note that Wife submitted a separate affidavit regarding the appellate attorney fees she incurred. Therefore, it is not as though the evidence failed to delineate between the legal matters at hand. Next, Husband at times points out that the first attorney fee affidavit referred to fees incurred since September, 22, 2023, the date of the Payment Order, but Wife did not file the motion for rule to show cause until December 15, 2023. Id. at 9 (noting the fee affidavit included dates more than two months “prior to the filing of the motion”). Yet, given that the Payment Order required payment within ten days of September 22, 2023, Husband does not explain why it was improper for the affidavit to encompass dates prior to the contempt motion.

[15] Husband has not demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the Sanction, where the court exercised its inherent contempt authority and there was unobjected-to evidence supporting the amount awarded to Wife.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Payment Order was not provided but is accessible in the Odyssey system. On appeal, Husband refers to a payment obligation of $117,626.33, an amount that appears to be derived from a scrivener's error in a subsequent order of the court. Compare, e.g., The Payment Order (Sept. 25, 2023) (ordering Husband to pay Wife $117,963.79) with, e.g., Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 14 (purporting to quote from the Payment Order in imposing a contempt sanction while identifying an obligation to pay $117,626.33 rather than $117,963.79). For consistency throughout this opinion, we use the figure of $117,963.79 set forth in the Payment Order.

2.   This document was not transmitted on appeal but was accessible in the Odyssey system.

Foley, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Felix concur. Mathias, J. and Felix, J., concur.