IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of T.L. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The Lake Superior Court terminated D.L.’s (“Mother's”) parental rights to her three children.¹ Mother appeals and argues that the juvenile court's finding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the children's removal or the reasons for placement outside of her home will not be remedied is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On March 29, 2022, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that Mother's three children, T.L., born in February 2013, L.L., born in December 2014, and A.L., born in February 2018, were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). DCS alleged that Mother had neglected the children because she was addicted to fentanyl and that the children had excessive unexcused absences from school. The children were removed from Mother's care and placed with relatives. Mother denied the allegations in the petition.

[4] The court held the CHINS fact-finding hearing on July 27. Approximately one month before the hearing, DCS placed the children in foster care. At the hearing, Mother admitted that the children were CHINS. The court ordered Mother to participate in a substance abuse assessment, a clinical assessment, random drug screens, and homebased casework. Mother attended inpatient substance abuse treatment and participated in Family Recovery Court. However, she continued to test positive for fentanyl. As a result, her supervised visitation with the children was suspended. Mother's visitation with the children continued to be suspended because she was not fully compliant with random drug screening and was unable to provide a month of clean drug screens. Mother was discharged unsuccessfully from Family Recovery Court in October after she left an inpatient program against medical advice.

[5] Mother failed to comply with the court's directive to participate in inpatient drug treatment programs and the court's order to complete random drug screens three times per week. Over two years, Mother completed only sixty-seven drug screens, and sixty-five of those were positive for fentanyl.

[6] On May 3, 2024, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights over the children. The court held fact-finding hearings on October 16 and November 6. Due to her continued drug use, Mother had not been authorized to have visitation with her children for over two years on the date of the hearing. Mother also tested positive for fentanyl in early October, and she admitted that she used fentanyl two days before the hearing. Tr. p. 164. Mother's therapist testified that Mother had only recently admitted that she suffers from substance abuse addiction and that she is still in the beginning of her treatment. Id. at 141.

[7] The family case manager testified that Mother was unable to care for the children because of her continued substance abuse issues. Id. at 72, 78. The case manager believed that terminating Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests. Id. at 73. The children's therapist testified to the trauma the children had experienced due to Mother's substance abuse, including their parents’ intoxicated driving, which resulted in many car accidents, finding Mother unconscious on several occasions, and the children's fears that they would be left alone with no food. Id. at 103. The therapist testified that the children did not want to have a relationship with Mother or her relatives and that they needed the stability their foster family had provided for them. Id. at 30, 33, 104-05.

[8] The juvenile court issued an order terminating Mother's parental rights on December 2. The court found that there was a reasonable probability that the reasons that resulted in the children's removal from Mother's home would not be remedied because of her continued substance abuse issues. The court further issued the following relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Mother was offered numerous services[,] including inpatient substance abuse treatments. Mother attended inpatient treatment in May of 2022 and August of 2022. Mother entered another inpatient treatment program in October of 2022 but left against medical advice. Mother attempted another inpatient treatment program in June of 2024, but was hospitalized due to mental health issues. Mother has been unable to obtain and maintain sobriety.

Parent's therapist testified that she recommends that Mother go to inpatient treatment as a first step towards sobriety․

Parents have been unable to address the elephant in the room which is their substance use issues. The [DCS] provided services for over two years and [P]arents are no closer to obtaining sobriety or reunification. These CHINS cases were initiated due to the [P]arents[’] substance use and the [P]arents have not rectified the reasons for the children's removals.

Parents are unable to safely parent their children due to their continued drug use.

Parents were offered supervised visitations with the children. Parents never progressed in those visits and the visits were actually suspended due to the [P]arents’ continued drug use. Parents were sporadic with complying with the random drug screens. Parents were unable to provide thirty days of compliance and clean drug screens to reinstate visitations with the children. Parents have not had any visits in over two years.

The children were removed on March 25, 2022[,] and the children have not been returned to parental care or custody. The children are very bonded in their foster home and removal from that home would be detrimental to the children's well-being. The children are 11, 10[,] and 6 years old, and they have been removed from parental care for over two and a half years. The children deserve permanency and it is unlikely that any additional time would result in the children's reunification with any parent.

The children's therapist testified that the children suffered from trauma and required therapy. The children were affected by the [P]arent[s’] drug use. The children were afraid of driving in cars due to being in an excessive amount of car accidents. Children were traumatized by finding [M]other in bathroom unconscious on a number of occasions. The children are currently progressing and doing well. The children do not want to have any relationship with the [P]arents or any relatives. The children had to take care of each other while the children were in the [P]arent[s’] care. The children are stable and thriving in their current placement and have worked through their trauma and triggers. These children deserve permanency and normalcy.

Neither parent is providing any emotional or financial support for the children. Parents have not completed any case plan for reunification. Neither parent is in a position to properly parent these children.

The children remain outside of the [P]arents’ care. Parents are unable to safely parent the children. Parents are unable to independently parent the children and provide the necessary care, support and supervision.

The children continue to reside in stable placement which has indicated both a willingness and ability to adopt the children. It would be unfair to the children to delay such permanency on the very remote likelihood of the [P]arents becoming available and committing to and completing services.

The Indiana Supreme Court has held that at some point in time a child's right to permanency outweighs a parent[’]s ever important right to parent. The Court finds that in these cases, [T.L., L.L., and A.L.] certainly have a right to permanency.

There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the children in that: because of the reasons stated above. Additionally, the children deserve a loving, caring, safe, stable, and drug free home.

It is in the best interest of the children and their health, welfare and future that the parent-child relationship between the children and their [P]arents be forever fully and absolutely terminated.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 80-81.

[9] Mother now appeals the order terminating her parental rights.

Standard of Review

[10] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the juvenile court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[11] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the juvenile court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied, (quoting Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996)). If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[12] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship by requiring DCS to prove the requisite statutory elements by clear and convincing evidence. DCS is required to allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for [the] care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c).² Subsection (d) requires the existence of one or more circumstances, including:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d).

[13] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

[14] Mother argues that DCS failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the children's removal or the reasons for placement outside of her home will not be remedied.³ When we consider the likelihood of remediation of conditions, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). In the first step, we consider not only the initial reasons for removal, but also the reasons for continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

[15] However, the court must also “evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Moore v. Jasper Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted); see also In re M.S., 898 N.E.2d 307, 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting the “trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his physical, mental, and social development are permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship”). In evaluating the parent's habitual patterns of conduct, the court may disregard efforts made shortly before the termination hearing and weigh the history of the parent's prior conduct more heavily. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234 (Ind. 2013). And DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. Moore, 894 N.E.2d at 226.

[16] Mother relies on her recent admission that she has a substance abuse addiction and that she is making some progress in her treatment to support her argument that, with more time, she could reunite with her children. However, Mother admitted to using fentanyl two days before the fact-finding hearing, and she tested positive for fentanyl approximately two weeks before the hearing. Mother was offered services and substance abuse treatment for two years before DCS filed the petitions to terminate her parental rights. Mother failed to take advantage of the opportunity for treatment and continued to use substances. And for this reason, she was not allowed to participate in visitation with the children. DCS's evidence of Mother's habitual patterns of conduct and her continued drug use support the court's finding that there is a reasonable probability that the reason for the children's continued placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied.

Conclusion

[17] The juvenile court's order terminating Mother's parental rights is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The court also terminated father's parental rights, but he does not participate in this appeal.

2.   This statute was amended effective March 11, 2024. DCS filed its petition in May 2024, under the new version of the statute.

3.   Mother also argues that DCS failed to prove that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the children's well-being. However, DCS was only required to prove one of the elements in 31-35-2-4(d), and, therefore, we do not address both arguments on appeal. We also note that Mother has not challenged the court's finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children's best interests.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.