IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of C.P. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] M.H. (Mother) appeals the trial court's termination of her parental rights to C.P. (Child). Mother raises one issue on appeal which we restate as whether the uncontested findings clearly support the trial court's conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interests of Child. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and T.P. (Father) are the biological parents of Child, born in September 2011.¹ Child resided with Father until sometime in 2022, when Child moved in with Mother. At that time, Mother resided in a one bedroom, one bathroom home with Mother's wife and their eight other children.

[3] In 2020, Mother first became involved with the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) for her lack of supervision when Child's sibling was struck by a car on State Road 37. Mother became involved with DCS in the present case in October 2022, when DCS received a report alleging Mother was verbally abusive to the children, the children were frequently left unsupervised, and Child was engaged in sexual activity with his younger siblings. DCS created a safety plan with Mother to ensure Mother kept Child separated from his siblings and the children were always adequately supervised. In November, DCS received another report alleging sexual activity was occurring between the children and Mother was aware of the sexual activity.

[4] On December 2, Child was removed from Mother's home and placed with paternal grandmother, where Child has since remained. The same day, DCS filed a petition alleging Child to be a child in need of services (CHINS). At a hearing on December 7, Mother admitted the allegations and the trial court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS.

[5] In January 2023, the trial court issued a dispositional order requiring Mother to, among other things: complete a parenting assessment and successfully complete all recommendations therefrom; attend individual, couples, and family therapy; attend all scheduled visitations with Child; and comply with all visitation rules and procedures. The court found Mother's participation “in the plan for [Child] is necessary to[ ] provide [Child] with a safe home free of sexual abuse.” Ex. Vol. IV p. 40. The court also ordered Child to receive therapy services, a psychosexual evaluation, and all treatment recommendations therefrom.

[6] Throughout the CHINS case, Mother struggled to consistently engage with Child during visitation. Visits with Child occurred in Mother's home, where the other children were present. Mother was supposed to provide constant supervision of Child to ensure he was not left alone with his siblings. Yet, during some two-hour visits, Mother left Child unattended with his siblings for between fifteen and thirty minutes at a time, requiring the visitation supervisor to intervene. Mother also cancelled visits throughout the case.

[7] In addition, Child was negatively affected by visits. Throughout the spring of 2023, Family Case Manager (FCM) Nathan Powell supervised at least seven visits. FCM Powell observed the younger children to engage in “sexual talk” when Child was present, with Mother smirking when trying to stop that behavior. Tr. Vol. II. pp. 48-49. When Child became physically or verbally aggressive, FCM Powell had to intervene because Mother was occupied with supervising the other children.

[8] Child's aggressive behaviors during visits had not improved by the fall of 2023. The visitation supervisor, Linnea Krasutsky, observed Child push and shove Mother, flicker the lights, throw items around the house, and hit the family dog with a broom. Krasutsky had to intervene at times to stop Child's aggressive behaviors because Mother was not supervising Child. Several visits ended early due to these incidents. Child disclosed to Krasutsky that he intentionally tried to end the visits early “[b]ecause he wanted to go back to his cousin's house.” Id. at 202. Throughout the CHINS case, visitations never graduated from supervised to unsupervised: in fact, visitations escalated to therapeutically supervised in February 2024 before being suspended for a short time in the summer of 2024.

[9] Mother also struggled to consistently participate in services. She refused to complete a psychological evaluation and did not consistently participate in individual or family therapy because she did “not believe it is necessary.” App. Vol. II p. 61. Mother did not begin participating in monthly family therapy until January 2024. Additionally, Mother struggled to maintain meaningful employment to support her family.

[10] On March 28, 2024, DCS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother's relationship with Child. The termination hearing took place on June 26 and September 13. Mother completed the intake for her individual therapy on September 11—two days before the second day of the termination hearing.

[11] Child's therapist “opined that it is not in [Child's] best interest to return to [Mother's] home at this time as recidivism relating to sexual acts is based on the family and whether they are going to continue with treatment and supervision.” Id. Child's Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) Jane Christophersen testified termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests because Child needed permanency and a definite home. FCM Aarika McKinsey also testified it was DCS's position that termination of parental rights was in Child's best interests.

[12] On October 29, 2024, the trial court issued its order terminating the parent-child relationship between Mother and Child. The court found: Mother failed to take appropriate steps towards reunification; Mother has done little to remedy the situation that led to Child's removal; Child should not have any contact with his victim except in therapy and as approved by the court; and Child should continue living in his current placement so he is not residing with his victim in the family home. Among other things, the court concluded: the permanency plan of adoption is a satisfactory plan of care for Child; there is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of Mother will not be remedied; there is a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Child; and termination is in the best interests of Child. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[13] We recognize “[a] parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “[A]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) reh'g. denied. Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and therefore “termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id.

[14] “We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights.” In re C.A., 15 N.E.3d 85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

In considering whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment, and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. [Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)]. In evaluating whether the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.

In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ind. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[15] A petition to terminate a parent-child relationship must allege and prove, in relevant part:

the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

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(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)-(4) (2024).² In addition, DCS must allege and prove:

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)-(3) (2024). DCS must prove each element by “clear and convincing evidence.” R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 629; Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2 (1997). If the trial court finds the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (2012).

II. Best Interests

[16] Mother does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact. Mother's sole argument on appeal is that the uncontested findings do not clearly support the trial court's conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interests of Child. We disagree.

[17] Unchallenged findings of fact are accepted as true by this Court. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 609 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). As such, if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; T.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[18] To determine whether termination is in the best interests of a child, “trial courts must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (citations omitted), cert. denied. “Central among these interests is children's need for permanency[,]” as “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Id. (citations omitted). “[W]e have previously held that the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[19] Here, FCM McKinsey and CASA Christophersen both testified that termination is in Child's best interests. Child's therapist also opined it was not in Child's best interests to return to Mother's home because the likelihood of recidivism of sexual behaviors is based on the family's participation in treatment and supervision. And, as explained above, Mother has not shown that the reasons for Child's removal will be remedied. Mother has not engaged in family therapy consistently throughout the case and has not demonstrated an ability to appropriately supervise Child during visits to meet his need to be separated from or continuously supervised when with his siblings.

[20] This evidence is sufficient on its own to support the trial court's best-interests conclusion. But permanency is also a central consideration in determining Child's best interests. Child was removed from Mother's home on December 7, 2022. Since then, Child has resided with his paternal grandmother who intends to adopt him. As CASA Christophersen testified, Child is thirteen years old and “this is a time where he needs to be able to have a definitive home[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 227. The totality of the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that termination is in Child's best interests. We affirm.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father passed away on April 13, 2023. Mother indicates in her brief that Father passed away in April 2022. The record is clear that Father was appearing for hearings until he was dismissed as a party in April 2023. We use the date reflecting within the appealed order—April 13, 2023—as Father's date of death.

2.   Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4 was substantially amended effective March 11, 2024. DCS filed its petition in this case on March 28, 2024, citing to the amended version of the statute, so we do the same.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.