Kelly B. Medlin, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In this interlocutory appeal, Kelly Medlin argues the trial court should have granted her motion to suppress evidence she claims police obtained in violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Detecting no violation of such rights, we affirm the denial of Medlin's motion.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Shortly after ten o'clock on the evening of May 19, 2024, Officer Blake Crull of the Greenfield Police Department stopped a pickup truck because it lacked a visible license plate and a license plate light. The driver of the truck—Dennis Lakes—turned into the unlit parking lot of a closed gas station and stopped. Officer Crull approached the truck, spoke with Lakes, and collected the vehicle's registration. Lakes did not provide Officer Crull with his license or proof of insurance. Officer Crull noticed Lakes was “fidgeting in his seat” and the passenger—who identified herself as Medlin—was “breathing heavily,” which the officer interpreted as signs of nervousness. Tr. Vol. 2 at 23.

[3] Upon returning to his police vehicle, Officer Crull reviewed the vehicle's registration and checked to see if Lakes had a valid driver's license and if Lakes or Medlin had outstanding warrants. While entering this information into his computer, Officer Crull kept watch of the truck and noticed Medlin “making movements all around the vehicle.” Id. at 26. He considered the movements “out of the ordinary.” Id.

[4] Finding no issues with Lakes’ license or the vehicle's registration, Officer Crull reapproached the truck to gather proof of insurance. When he arrived, Officer Crull saw Medlin “reaching underneath the folded down center console area” of the truck. Id. Medlin explained she was searching for Lakes’ glasses, which Officer Crull saw lying on the dashboard. Officer Crull asked whether anything illegal was in the truck and whether Lakes would consent to Officer Crull searching the truck. Lakes said there was nothing illegal in the truck and did not consent to a search. Officer Crull then returned to his police vehicle.

[5] Back in his vehicle, Officer Crull requested a police K-9 due to “the nervous criminal behavior [he] observed, and ․ the fact that [Medlin] was reaching all around the vehicle.” Id. at 27. Officer Crull then continued to input information into the online ticketing system because he planned to issue Lakes a warning for not having a working license plate light on his truck. During this time, Officer Crull noticed Medlin still moving around inside the truck. Officer Crull returned to the truck and asked Lakes and Medlin to step out because of officer safety concerns and Medlin's movements. Around ten minutes had elapsed since Officer Crull stopped the truck. Following a quick pat-down of Lakes, Officer Crull turned his attention to Medlin. Before patting down Medlin, Officer Crull asked whether she had anything in her pockets. Medlin said no, and Officer Crull followed with, “You okay if I look real quick?” Ex. Vol. 3, page 3 at 15:02–03 (Officer Crull's body camera footage). Medlin immediately responded, “Yeah, go ahead.” Id. at 15:04. Officer Crull then reached into a pocket of Medlin's overalls and removed what he referred to as a “dugout”—a small metal tube used to smoke illegal drugs like marijuana. Tr. Vol. 2 at 29. Upon Officer Crull's discovery, Medlin said, “F***, I forgot that I had that.” Ex. Vol. 3, page 3 at 15:24–25.

[6] Now believing he had probable cause to search the truck, Officer Crull cancelled his request for a K-9. Officer Crull searched the truck and located a pair of white prescription pills in Medlin's purse. Medlin was arrested and transported to jail. At the jail, Medlin shared she had more drugs, which led to the recovery of marijuana, methamphetamine, and a glass pipe from “inside” her. Id. at 47:47.

[7] After the State charged Medlin with four offenses,¹ she moved to suppress evidence obtained from the searches of the truck and her person. The trial court denied her motion. Medlin then sought an interlocutory appeal, the trial court certified its order, and this Court accepted jurisdiction. See Ind. Appellate Rule 14(B).

The trial court properly denied Medlin's motion to suppress.

[8] Medlin contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress. We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress “deferentially, construing conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling.” Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. 2014)), cert. denied. Although we review the trial court's factual findings for clear error and do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility, we “consider any substantial and uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant.” Id. (quoting Robinson, 5 N.E.3d at 365). But if the defendant's suppression motion presents a question of law, like the constitutionality of a search or seizure, we review the trial court's determination de novo. Id.

[9] Medlin raises claims under both the United States and Indiana Constitutions. Medlin's federal argument has a few layers.² First, Medlin contends police unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop by inquiring about weapons and drugs, soliciting Lakes’ consent to search the vehicle, and requesting a K-9 to conduct a dog sniff, all after the initial purpose of the traffic stop had been satisfied. See Appellant's Br. at 10–11. Next, Medlin argues she did not consent to the search of her pockets, instead positing she “merely submit[ed] to the supremacy of the law.” Id. at 8. Assuming we agree, Medlin then claims police lacked the requisite concern she was armed and dangerous to justify a pat down search. Ultimately, we reject each of Medlin's Fourth Amendment arguments. We then turn to Medlin's Article 1, Section 11 claim, which we reject as well.

A. Police did not violate Medlin's Fourth Amendment rights.

[10] The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The “basic purpose of this Amendment ․ is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018) (citation omitted). Under the Fourth Amendment, any warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable, subject only to a handful of recognized exceptions. Johnson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1199, 1203 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied. Once it is shown police conducted a search or seizure without a warrant, the burden shifts to the State to show the search fits within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Jacobs v. State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 850 (Ind. 2017).

1. Police did not impermissibly prolong the traffic stop.

[11] A seizure “justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). The “tolerable duration” of a seizure for a traffic violation is shaped by the stop's “mission”—addressing the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attending to related safety concerns. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). “Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer's mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop,’ ” like checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance. Id. at 355 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408) (brackets omitted). Once the “tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed[,]” police authority for the seizure ends. Id. at 354. That is, police “may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop,” but they “may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop[.]” Id. at 355. Police may, however, prolong the traffic stop to conduct a check unrelated to the stop's “mission” if they have reasonable suspicion to believe the motorist is engaged in criminal activity. See id.

[12] Officer Crull did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop. Officer Crull first approached the truck and obtained a copy of the truck's registration and the verbal identifications of Lakes and Medlin. Back in his police vehicle, Officer Crull inspected the truck's registration, ensured Lakes had a valid driver's license, and checked whether either occupant had an outstanding warrant. Officer Crull reapproached the truck to obtain proof of insurance. While standing alongside the truck, Officer Crull asked a few brief questions then returned to his vehicle. See State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006) (noting police inquiry into whether a driver has a weapon is within the scope of reasonable detention). There, Officer Crull began filling out an electronic warning to be issued to Lakes for not having a license plate light on his truck. As he was doing so, Officer Crull continued to observe Medlin moving throughout the passenger seat. When Officer Crull returned to the truck around ten minutes into the stop, he had not yet completed the warning. That is, Officer Crull was still wrapping up ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop. Because Officer Crull's investigation was ongoing and being diligently pursued, the traffic stop was not unlawfully prolonged. See Dunem v. State, 254 N.E.3d 559, 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (holding police did not impermissibly prolong a traffic stop when the challenged conduct occurred while police were still completing a written warning for a traffic offense).

2. Medlin consented to the search of her pockets.

[13] Medlin next contends her consent to the search of her pockets was involuntarily given. Without the suspect's voluntary consent, police may conduct a pat down only if they have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. State v. Cunningham, 26 N.E.3d 21, 23 (Ind. 2015). “Whether consent to a search was given voluntarily ‘is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.’ ” Id. at 25 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)). The State bears the burden of showing consent to search “was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.” Id. (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248); Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905, 918 (Ind. 2003) (“[A] consent to search is valid except where procured by fraud, duress, fear or intimidation or where it is merely a submission to the supremacy of the law.”).

[14] The record lacks any indicators suggesting Medlin's consent was the product of fraud, duress, fear, or merely a submission to the supremacy of the law. After finding out whether the truck contained various illegal substances, Officer Crull asked whether Medlin had anything illegal in her pockets. Once Medlin denied she did, Officer Crull sought Medlin's permission to look for himself. Officer Crull asked once and did not raise his voice or say or imply refusing to consent was not an option. Medlin immediately told Officer Crull, “Yeah, go ahead.” Ex. Vol. 3, page 3 at 15:04. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Medlin's consent was voluntarily given as it was the product of her free and unfettered will.³

B. Police did not violate Medlin's Article 1, Section 11 rights.

[15] Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution guarantees, in relevant part: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated[.]” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. Although the language of Section 11 is nearly identical to its federal counterpart, our courts interpret the state provision “independently and ask whether the State has shown that a particular search or seizure was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 191 (Ind. 2021). We determine the reasonableness of a law-enforcement officer's search or seizure by balancing three factors: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005). “When weighing these factors as part of our totality-of-the-circumstances test, we consider the full context in which the search or seizure occurs.” Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 943 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied.

1. Degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred

[16] We begin by evaluating the law-enforcement officer's “degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred.” Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361. To do so, we consider “the reasonableness of the officers’ assumptions, suspicions, or beliefs based on the information available to them at the time.” Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 18 (Ind. 2010).

[17] The interaction began after Officer Crull noticed Lakes’ truck did not have a functioning license plate light. This was a traffic infraction. See Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 340 (“A police stop and brief detention of a motorist is reasonable and permitted under Section 11 if the officer reasonably suspects that the motorist is engaged in, or about to engage in, illegal activity.”). Then, as Officer Crull approached Lakes’ truck, he noticed Lakes “fidgeting in his seat” and Medlin “breathing heavily.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 23. Officer Crull viewed these behaviors as signs of nervousness. In some instances, nervousness may signal potential wrongdoing. But we give such behavior minimal weight because it is “not at all unusual that a citizen may become nervous when confronted by law enforcement officials[.]” Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 341. We therefore require other evidence suggesting a person may be engaged in criminal activity “before the nervousness will evoke suspicion necessary to support detention.” Id. Here, there was other evidence. Officer Crull observed Medlin incessantly moving about in the passenger seat throughout the traffic stop. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 26 (Officer Crull describing Medlin's movements as “out of the ordinary”). At one point, for example, Medlin claimed to be looking for Lakes’ glasses near the center console, even though Officer Crull readily located them on the dashboard. As our Supreme Court has recognized, certain conduct innocent to the untrained observer may acquire significance when viewed by a trained law enforcement officer. See Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 343. Taken as a whole, these circumstances contributed to the reasonableness of Officer Crull's concerns and suspicions that led him to search Medlin's pocket.

2. Degree of intrusion

[18] Next, we consider “the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities.” Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361. We measure the degree of intrusion from the defendant's point of view, considering the “intrusion into both the citizen's physical movements and the citizen's privacy.” Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 944. Additionally, we focus on the degree of intrusion caused by the method of search or seizure. Id. at 945. That is, “how officers conduct a search or seizure matters.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

[19] Starting with the big picture, a short traffic stop typically amounts to a small intrusion on a citizen's ordinary activities. Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1262. Narrowing our focus to Medlin's true grievance, the search at issue here was much like a pat-down search or frisk, which panels of this Court have described as “a fairly limited intrusion for the purposes of the Indiana Constitution.” Berry v. State, 121 N.E.3d 633, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quotation omitted), trans. denied. It is true, however, that by reaching into Medlin's pocket, Officer Crull's search went beyond an “ordinary” pat down of the outside of a suspect's clothing. Yet Medlin gave Officer Crull permission to do so, and the search was brief and did not extend beyond the scope of Medlin's consent. The degree of intrusion was minimal.

3. Extent of law enforcement's needs

[20] Under the final Litchfield factor, we review the extent of law enforcement's needs “to act in a general way” and “to act in the particular way and at the particular time they did.” Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 946–47. Law enforcement has “at least a legitimate, if not a compelling, need to enforce traffic-safety laws[.]” Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1262. And our Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized law enforcement needs related to drug interdiction are significant. See, e.g., State v. Timbs, 169 N.E.3d 361, 373 (Ind. 2021) (“[D]istributing or possessing even small amounts of drugs threatens society.”). The extent of law enforcement's needs was at least moderate.

[21] On balance, Officer Crull's actions were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and did not violate Medlin's Article 1, Section 11 rights.

Conclusion

[22] The trial court properly denied Medlin's motion to suppress.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine (Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a), (b) (2014)); Level 6 felony unlawful possession or use of a legend drug (I.C. §§ 16-42-19-13, -27(a) (2021)); Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana (I.C. § 35-48-4-11(a)(1) (2018)); and Class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia (I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1) (2015)).

2.   Perhaps equally as helpful as setting forth Medlin's appellate claims is noting those she does not raise. For example, Medlin does not challenge the propriety of the traffic stop or the officer's decision to remove her from the vehicle during the stop. Nor does Medlin argue the search of the vehicle after the search of her pockets or the search of her person at the jail were somehow improper. And lastly, Medlin does not contend she was entitled to a Pirtle warning. See Pirtle v. State, 323 N.E.2d 634, 640 (Ind. 1975) (requiring police to warn a suspect in custody of the right to consult with counsel before securing that suspect's consent to search). We heed our role as an appellate court and address only the issues Medlin adequately raises. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375–76 (2020).

3.   This conclusion is equally applicable if the issue was analyzed under Indiana's Constitution. See Cunningham, 26 N.E.3d at 25 (noting whether consent was given voluntarily is one of the many search and seizure issues resolved in the same manner under both the Indiana and Federal Constitutions); Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 600 (Ind. 2008) (“A warrantless search based on lawful consent is consistent with both the Indiana and Federal Constitutions.”). Moreover, our disagreement with Medlin on this point makes addressing whether police reasonably believed she was armed and dangerous unnecessary.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Pyle concur. Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.