IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of M.R.G. (Minor Child) and T.R.G. (Mother) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] T.G. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her minor child, M.G. (Child), and claims insufficient evidence supports that ruling.¹ Finding there was an abundance of clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In October 2021, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) received and confirmed a report that Mother and nine-year-old Child were homeless and living in Mother's car “in an abandon[ed] parking lot when temperatures were below or around 30 degrees Fahrenheit.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 80. When asked to submit to a random drug screen, Mother admitted that she had consumed “marijuana/THC.” Id. Between November 1 and 8, the trial court initially removed Child from Mother's care to Father's, but then it changed her placement to foster care. On November 3, DCS petitioned the trial court to find Child to be a Child in Need of Services (CHINS).

[3] At the disposition hearing on November 30, Mother admitted to DCS's allegations that she was homeless and abused substances. Finding Child to be a CHINS, the trial court entered orders that required Mother to refrain from all criminal activity; maintain a clean, safe, appropriate, and sustainable home; submit to random drug screens; appropriately participate in all visits with Child; participate in reunification services, such as cooperating with DCS; submit to a separate diagnostic assessment, psychological evaluation, and drug and alcohol assessment; and enroll in and complete home-based services.

[4] Mother generally failed to engage in these services and failed to submit to random drug screens between November 2021 and May 2023. Of the court-mandated services, Mother only successfully completed the psychological assessment. Mother also had issues with DCS's assigned case workers. The first assigned caseworker was removed from the case by DCS due to threats from Mother. Another caseworker obtained a workplace protective order after receiving death threats from Mother. See Exhibits Vol. 1 at 173-176.

[5] When it came to visitation with Child, Mother's attendance at the therapeutically supervised facility was inconsistent. She was often late, attempted to intimidate the visitation providers, and threatened them with physical harm when a visit was cancelled because she arrived more than twenty-five minutes late.

[6] Mother also struggled with homelessness. In May 2022, Mother secured an apartment and paid the first month's rent. Although DCS covered Mother's rent for June and July, she was evicted in September because she failed to pay her rent for August. Although Mother leased another apartment in October, she failed to pay rent in November and December despite DCS again providing some financial assistance and was homeless until she was arrested on a warrant in May 2023.

[7] Mother remained incarcerated from May 2023 through March 2024 after she pled guilty to Level 4 felony arson and was sentenced to ten years–with two years executed and eight years suspended, three of which were to be served on probation. While incarcerated, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights on December 28, 2023. On March 26, 2024, Mother was released from jail and placed on electronic monitoring. She began working at Buffalo Wild Wings on April 24, earning $15 per hour, and moved into Genesis House ² the following month.

[8] After Mother was released from jail, DCS resumed her supervised visits with Child. DCS ultimately suspended Mother's visits when she continued to violate the visitation rules. Mother used inappropriate language, talked about the case in Child's presence, tried to call an unauthorized third party, and gave Child a card before its content was approved by the service provider. When Mother was redirected by the service provider, she became irritated and ignored the attempt. Child's caseworker observed that Child's behavior regressed when her visits with Mother resumed; she became frustrated and began pulling her hair out—a behavior Child had previously exhibited when they visited each other before Mother's incarceration.

[9] On July 17 and 20, 2024, the trial court heard evidence on DCS's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. DCS caseworkers confirmed that between being released from jail in March 2024 and the termination hearing that July, Mother re-engaged in services, enrolled in individual counseling and home-based casework, and maintained housing and employment. Although Mother had completed her psychological evaluation before she was arrested, she had not completed the services recommended within the evaluation or services previously ordered. This included “individual therapy, medication management, family therapy, skills building, home[-]based services, drug and alcohol screens, and individual and group substance use treatment.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 51.

[10] Mother testified that she had signed a lease for an apartment and that her rent would be $1,100 monthly. Her plan was to move into the apartment immediately after the termination hearing. However, as of the second day of the termination hearing, Mother still hadn't developed a budget based on her hourly pay to calculate how she would manage her rent, utilities, and other monthly expenses.

[11] The trial court heard evidence from Child's Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) that Child was thriving in foster care and successfully working on mental health issues through casework services and individual therapy. Initially, when DCS became involved with this family, Child was only allowed to attend school half-time because of her behavioral issues.³ By the time of the termination hearing, however, Child was attending school full-time, and she was on the honor roll. Both DCS's caseworker and Child's CASA recommended terminating the parent-child relationship. While acknowledging Mother had worked hard since her release from jail, the CASA supported her recommendation for termination of Mother's parental rights citing to Mother's “extremely spotty” cooperation with DCS which demonstrated her lack of “any history of compliance with housing, with therapy, [and] with home-based services.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 176.

[12] On September 10, 2024, the trial court issued a twenty-six-page order with one hundred eighty-two findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's removal or continued placement outside the home would not be remedied, that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's wellbeing, and that terminating Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Mother appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[13] When seeking a termination of parental rights, DCS has the burden of proving:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a [CHINS];

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2019).⁴ DCS must prove each of the foregoing elements “by clear and convincing evidence[,]” which requires the existence of a fact to “be highly probable.” C.A. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting In re D.W., 969 N.E.2d 89, 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)).⁵

[14] When reviewing the trial court's termination of parental rights, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). “First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second we determine whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010)). Without reweighing the evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses, we will set aside the trial court's judgment only if clearly erroneous. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). A judgment is clearly erroneous if the trial court's findings of fact do not support its conclusions of law, or if the court's legal conclusions do not support its ultimate decision to terminate parental rights. See Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2835 (2020).

1. Findings of Fact

[15] Mother argues Findings of Fact 157, 160, and 168-171 are unsupported by the evidence.  ⁶ See Appellant's Brief at 17. She then claims that because the evidence does not support the findings, the findings “do not support Conclusions of Law 174-177[.]”⁷ Id. Beyond this generalized claim, Mother does not develop her argument or include any citations to the record, transcript, or legal authority to corroborate her statement and to preserve the issue for appeal. “[I]n Indiana, appellate law is fortified by its established procedural rules: ‘[a] litigant who fails to support [her] arguments with appropriate citations to legal authority and record evidence waives those arguments for our review.’ ” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015)); see Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) (appellant's brief must support each claim with cogent reasoning, and citations to relevant authorities, statutes, and the record). We find Mother failed to sufficiently explain and support her arguments as to these findings and conclusions, so they are waived.

2. Reasonable Probability of Remedying Conditions

[16] Mother claims that DCS failed to present clear and convincing evidence to support a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's placement outside Mother's home would not be remedied.

[17] When reviewing such a claim, we first consider “the conditions that led to Child's placement and retention in foster care” and, second, “whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., Dearborn Co. Off., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013) (quoting I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1134). During the second step in this analysis, we “judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions, and balancing any recent improvements against ‘habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.’ ” S.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 37, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014)), trans. denied. “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

[18] The trial court removed Child from Mother's care and placed her in foster care because of Mother's admitted homelessness and drug use. At the close of Mother's termination hearing two-and-a-half years later, the trial court concluded a reasonable probability existed that these conditions would not be remedied as Mother had only just begun to engage with DCS, but she still had not completed any service nor had she shown any consistency in maintaining her sobriety, housing, or employment.

[19] Mother concedes that between the filing of the CHINS petition on November 3, 2021 and the beginning of her incarceration in May 2023, she was non-compliant with the trial court's dispositional orders. While she was incarcerated, DCS moved to terminate Mother's parental rights. Mother described the filing of the termination petition as motivation for her to change her behavior after hitting “rock bottom” during her incarceration—claiming she became “a completely different person” when she was released in March 2024. Tr. Vol. 3 at 217; Appellant's Br. at 14. Between May 13 and July 17, 2024, when Mother restarted DCS services and the fact-finding hearing, Mother enrolled in services, became employed, found housing, and temporarily participated in supervised visitation. She points to these final weeks as support that the conditions of homelessness and substance abuse that led to Child's continued placement in foster care had been remedied and she essentially argues that she should be given more time to prove that she can be a good parent to Child.

[20] But the reality is that from November 2021 through the beginning of her incarceration in May 2023, Mother repeatedly ignored DCS's attempts to help. Mother found housing, but even with DCS paying her rent, she was still evicted twice and wound up homeless again until she was incarcerated. DCS found treatment for Mother's gambling and substance abuse at Quality Counseling, but Mother was discharged after one visit. Mother had referrals for several services at the Bowen Center, but the only one she completed was a psychological evaluation, and she refused to work with the Bowen Center's home-based therapists. Mother also threatened two DCS employees and continued her past patterns of criminal conduct: pleading guilty to arson, a Level 4 felony.

[21] Once she was released from jail in March 2024, Mother showed improvement: she restarted counseling, began home-based casework, and found a job. But despite the financial difficulties Mother experienced throughout the pendency of her CHINS and termination cases, Mother still had not created a budget to help her manage her finances. Mother's history established that even when she secured housing for a few months, she had required outside assistance to cover her rent and then she still was evicted. The fact that she had lived on her own for one month before the termination hearing didn't alleviate concerns about her ability to sustain housing on an ongoing basis.

[22] Mother argues that the strides she has made since her release weigh against termination. The cases she cites to support her position, however, are distinguishable. For example, in In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. 2009), reh'g denied, our Supreme Court reversed a trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights after G.Y.’s mother was incarcerated for an offense that took place before his conception. Id. at 1262. G.Y.’s mother cared for G.Y. during the first twenty months of his life, and the Court noted that there were no allegations she had been an unfit mother during this time. The Court also found that the mother maintained a “commitment to reunification with G.Y. from the very point of her arrest” and showed no indication that she was “anything but a fit parent.” Id. at 1265, 1262. Here, by contrast, Child had not been removed from Mother's care because of her incarceration as in G.Y. Being incarcerated was only one piece in a large puzzle of missteps in Mother's life that led to the termination of her rights. Even since she was released and supervised visitation with Child had resumed, Mother's visits had been suspended again because she violated the visitation rules and Child's behavior regressed to expressing frustration and pulling out her own hair.  ⁸

[23] The trial court's Order evaluated Mother's claim of improved circumstances but ultimately found that Mother's habitual patterns of conduct supported the inference that these improvements were likely short-lived and not permanent. Although Mother testified that she has made a “significant change” and should be given one more chance, it comes too late. Tr. Vol. 3 at 218. The trial court was well within its discretion to give more weight to Mother's habitual conduct than to her recent improvements. See Matter of C.M., 675 N.E.2d 1134, 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (Although C.M.’s mother argued “she had started to comply with the dispositional order shortly before the termination hearing, it was within the province of the trial court ․ to ignore or discredit this evidence.”).

[24] Mother failed to avail herself of the numerous programs and services offered her before her incarceration. Mother not only refused to participate in programming, but she alienated service providers and threatened others to the point of them seeking protective orders from the court. She violated supervised visitation rules and her contact with Child precipitated Child's habit of pulling her own hair out, prompting suspension of visitation. Finally, Mother presented no evidence that “she would be able to manage a job[,]” “manage her finances on her own[,]” and maintain a home without ongoing assistance from outside sources. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 58. These factors demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a reasonable probability exists the conditions that resulted in Child's removal will not be remedied.

3. Best Interests

[25] Mother contests the trial court's finding that termination was in Child's best interests. In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans dismissed. “A parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability, and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.” Id. at 221 (quoting Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied). “Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.” Id. at 224.

[26] DCS's caseworker testified that Child is now “thriv[ing]” in a safe, secure, and stable foster care environment. Tr. Vol. 3 at 133. Child's behavior improved and her grades improved from “atrocious” to qualifying for the honor roll. Id. at 176. Child's practice of pulling out her hair ended while Mother was incarcerated and their visits were stopped. Child's CASA observed similar changes in Child's life. Since her placement in foster care:

She has [ ] blossomed. She is on honor roll. She's able to be in a full day of school. She has friends. She has done so well in her current environment and has really overcome a lot of her struggles from where she was to where she is now. She has all of her needs met.

[27] Id. at 176-177. But once Child's visits with Mother resumed, Child's behavior negatively regressed again. While Mother had engaged in services after her release from incarceration, her visits with Child had to be suspended due to Mother's “violations of the supervised parenting time guidelines.” Id. at 42.

[28] At the time of the termination hearing, Child had been removed from Mother's care for over two-and-a-half years. Child's CASA opined that Mother was not able to meet Child's needs. By contrast, Child's CASA testified that Child's foster care placement has “advocated fiercely” for Child's needs and recommended they adopt Child. Id. at 178. Child's CASA also testified that termination of Mother's parental rights would be in Child's best interest. Mother's long history of non-compliance with DCS's provided services, her criminal activity and housing instability, and the testimony from Child's caseworker and CASA, support the court's determination that termination of Mother's rights is in Child's best interests. We therefore affirm the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights.

Conclusion

[29] Based on the circumstances before us, we affirm the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   J.N. is the biological father of Child. Father's parental rights were also terminated by the trial court's Order of September 10, 2024. He does not appeal the termination of his rights.

2.   Genesis House's mission is to foster long-term recovery for women addicted to alcohol and other substances.

3.   Because Child was unable to attend school in person for a full day, she was supposed to be participating in on-line school. The trial court also heard evidence that Child's grades were “atrocious” before her removal and placement into foster care. Transcript Vol. 3 at 176.

4.   Effective March 11, 2024, our General Assembly amended Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4. See Ind. Legis. Serv. Pub. L. 70-2024. Because the amended statute took effect after the petition to terminate Mother's parental rights was filed on December 28, 2023, we apply the previous version of the statute.

5.   Mother does not challenge the trial court's finding that a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child exists, thus, we do not address this factor.

6.   Findings of Fact 157, 160, and 168-171 are part of the trial court's summation of the facts supporting its ruling. They contain findings adverse to Mother, such as that Mother “was inconsistent in attending her visitation with her daughter” prior to incarceration, that “valid concerns for the safety of the minor child in Mother's care” exist, and that Mother shows a “lack of insight into her own behaviors towards others, criminal behavior, substance use issues, gambling addiction, instability and lack of contact with the minor child for the last 31 months[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 54-56.

7.   Conclusions of Law 174-177 are a voluminous collection of the trial court's application of the law to the facts of the case. These include conclusions that “the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child,” due to Mother's substance abuse, and that the CASA and DCS case worker “have concluded that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 59-60.

8.   Mother's reliance on In re J.M., 908 N.E.2d 191 (Ind. 2009) is equally misplaced. Like the child in G.Y., the child in J.M. was removed because of the parents’ incarceration. However, unlike our case here, there were no allegations in J.M. that the parents were unfit in any way before their incarceration. See id. at 192.

DeBoer, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Vaidik concur. Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.