Elick T. Allen, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] After a physical altercation with his neighbor Johnny Day, Elick Allen walked into his home to retrieve a handgun and an extra magazine full of rounds before walking across the driveway to Johnny's house, where he broke in through the backdoor; shot Brenda Day, injuring her; and shot Johnny, killing him. Allen was charged with and found guilty of murder and attempted murder. Allen now appeals, raising one issue for our review: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Allen's claim of sudden heat.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In May 2021, Allen, Brenda, and two other neighbors shared a private drive giving them access to their respective homes. On May 13, 2021, Abby Day visited her grandmother Brenda at Brenda's house. After the visit, as Abby was walking out to her car, Allen confronted her about partially blocking the shared driveway. Brenda observed the heated confrontation and called Johnny, her son and Abby's father, to tell him about it. Shortly thereafter, Johnny arrived at the shared drive and started yelling at Allen before threatening a neighbor, Stephen Sandlin, who then called 911. During the confrontation, Allen's nose was broken by Johnny. The physical fight lasted less than one minute.

[4] After the fight, Johnny retreated to Brenda's house, and Allen went into his own home. Approximately one minute later Allen walked out of his home, crossed the driveway, and broke into Brenda's house. Allen encountered Brenda in the kitchen and shot her multiple times, before proceeding to the living room where he shot and killed Johnny. As he exited the house, Allen told Brenda, “Your son's dead.” Tr. Vol. II at 79.

[5] Outside the home, Allen calmly stopped to talk to Sandlin, handed Sandlin his keys, and asked Sandlin to watch his dog. Law enforcement officers arrived, aware there had been shots fired. Officer Reggie Miller saw Allen covered with blood and approached him. Allen told Miller either that “he beat my ass or they beat my ass.” Tr. Vol. II at 183. When Miller asked where the shooter was, Allen responded, “I shot at them.” Id. Miller then noticed that Allen had a handgun in his pants pocket.

[6] The State charged Allen with murder ¹ and attempted murder as a Level 1 felony ² . At trial, Allen claimed his shooting of Johnny was done in sudden heat because it occurred just minutes after Johnny physically attacked him. Nevertheless, the jury found Allen guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced Allen to 85 years of incarceration. Allen now appeals.³

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Negate Allen's Sudden Heat Claim

[7] Allen challenges the sufficiency of the evidence rebutting his claim of sudden heat. Our Supreme Court has recently explained our standard of review for such a claim as follows:

Our standard for reviewing evidentiary sufficiency challenges is well established, as we have made clear that “[i]t is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783.

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025).

[8] Allen contends that the State failed to rebut his claim of sudden heat and, therefore, his murder conviction should be reduced to voluntary manslaughter. A person commits murder when the person “knowingly or intentionally kills another human being.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. A person commits voluntary manslaughter when the person “knowingly or intentionally ․ kills another human being ․ while acting under sudden heat.” Id. § 35-42-1-3(a)(1). Our Supreme Court has described sudden heat as follows:

Sudden heat exists when a defendant is “provoked by anger, rage, resentment, or terror, to a degree sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection.” Brantley [v. State], 91 N.E.3d [566,] 572 [(Ind. 2018)] (quoting Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 486 (Ind. 2015)). The issue of whether adequate provocation legally exists is an objective—not a subjective—measure. See Stevens v. State, 691 N.E.2d 412, 426 (Ind. 1997); Suprenant v. State, 925 N.E.2d 1280, 1282–83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Indeed, “[e]vidence of sudden heat may be found in either the State's case or the defendant's.” Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 572. And because juries are in the unique position to assess the veracity of evidence, they must decide whether the evidence contained in the record “constitute[s] sudden heat sufficient to warrant a conviction for voluntary manslaughter.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Carmack v. State, 200 N.E.3d 452, 459–60 (Ind. 2023) (fourth and sixth alterations in original).

[9] Sudden heat “is a mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise would be murder ․ to voluntary manslaughter.” I.C. § 35-42-1-3(b). In other words, sudden heat is not an affirmative defense, so once it “has been ‘injected’ into the heart of the case, ‘the burden is on the State to negate its existence.’ ” Carmack, 200 N.E.3d at 459 (quoting Bane v. State, 587 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ind. 1992), reh'g denied). To inject sudden heat into the case, “the defendant must point to some evidence in the record supporting sudden heat.” Id. (citing Watts v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1228, 1234 n.2 (Ind. 2008)). “Because sudden heat functions as an ‘evidentiary predicate,’ it requires the [factfinder] to decide whether the record evidence supports it.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

[10] Allen injected sudden heat into the case during opening statements, and trial testimony revealed a physical altercation between Johnny and Allen occurred before the shooting; the trial court appropriately instructed the jury on sudden heat. Allen argues that he shot Johnny in sudden heat because the shooting occurred mere minutes after the fight. Allen's argument focuses on the short duration of the separation, but he fails to acknowledge that the existence of a cooling off period can negate sudden heat, no matter how short. Our Supreme Court has held that “[i]f there was any identifiable break in the factual sequence between the onset of the provocation and the commission of the homicide, a jury could reasonably find evidence of deliberation and cool reflection, which together would forthrightly defeat any claim of sudden heat.” Carmack, 200 N.E.3d at 462. Likewise, the presence of premeditation, “even if nearly instantaneous, negates any notion of sudden heat.” Id. at 460 (citing Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 572).

[11] Here, the State presented sufficient evidence to negate sudden heat, including the following: (1) After the physical altercation, both Johnny and Allen retreated to their respective homes; (2) Allen spent approximately one minute inside his home retrieving his weapon and ammunition before walking across the driveway to enter Brenda's house; (3) Allen had the presence of mind after shooting Brenda and Johnny to ask Sandlin to take care of his dog; and (4) Allen's statement about shooting Johnny because Johnny beat him up suggests the reason for the shooting was premeditated revenge—not due to the loss of reason, deliberation, or cool reflection. See Carmack, 200 N.E.3d at 459–60.

[12] Given these circumstances, it was reasonable for the jury to reject Allen's sudden heat claim. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to negate sudden heat. We therefore affirm Allen's murder conviction.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

2.   Id. §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-41-5-1(a).

3.   On appeal, Allen does not challenge his attempted murder conviction.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Foley concur. Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.