Adam Lopez, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] During a traffic stop, the investigating officer became suspicious of possible other crimes when Adam Lopez and Ester Osegueda explained their odd travel plans. After a short detention, Osegueda consented to a search of the vehicle, which revealed methamphetamine and fentanyl. Lopez was found guilty of dealing in a narcotic drug, dealing in methamphetamine, possession of a narcotic drug, and possession of methamphetamine. Lopez appeals and presents a single issue for our review: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence at trial.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 26, 2021, Trooper Yan Dravigne of the Indiana State Police was patrolling Interstate 70 in Hendricks County, Indiana, when he witnessed a van make “an abrupt and sudden lane change” without using a turn signal. Tr. Vol. II at 105. Trooper Dravigne conducted a traffic stop and found Osegueda had been driving the van with Lopez as her passenger.

[4] Osegueda and Lopez told Trooper Dravigne that they were travelling from California to visit Lopez's brother in Indianapolis, but because they accidentally purchased tickets to Memphis, they rented a car in Memphis to finish the trip. Trooper Dravigne then had Osegueda exit the van and asked her to sit in the front of his vehicle. There, during further questioning, Osegueda was unable to provide a name for Lopez's brother. Then, Trooper Dravigne walked back to the van to ask Lopez for his ID. While he was walking back to his vehicle, Trooper Dravigne noticed “large black trash bags” in the back of the van. Tr. Vol. II at 113. Osegueda stated that the bags were full of their clothes, and Trooper Dravigne sent Osegueda back to her vehicle so he could finish writing the warning. Trooper Dravigne was “suspicious of ․ the story [and] the travel plans,” so, before writing the traffic warning, he called in for assistance, requesting a K-9 unit. Id. at 114.

[5] While Trooper Dravigne was writing the traffic warning and running a warrant check on Osegueda and Lopez, the K-9 officer arrived and told Osegueda to exit the van, and she again sat in the front seat of Trooper Dravigne's vehicle. There, Trooper Dravigne asked, “Do you have anything illegal inside of the car? Drugs or anything?” Ex. 1 at 15:40–15:43. Osegueda replied, “[H]onestly ․ we stopped at Memphis in a hotel. And there was some guys that put some bags in our car then told us to drive․ they said they were going to kill us.” Id. at 15:43–16:04. Trooper Dravigne read Osegueda her Miranda rights and asked to search the van; Osegueda consented to the search.

[6] The search revealed that the trash bags contained 58.3 kilograms of methamphetamine and 39.27 kilograms of fentanyl. The State charged Lopez with dealing in a narcotic drug as a Level 2 felony, dealing in methamphetamine as a Level 2 felony, possession of a narcotic drug as a Level 3 felony, and possession of methamphetamine as a Level 3 felony. Lopez filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that Trooper Dravigne unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop, and the trial court denied this motion. At trial, Lopez renewed the arguments from his motion to suppress and objected to any evidence obtained after law enforcement prolonged the stop; the trial court overruled his objection. A jury found Lopez guilty as charged. Lopez now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting Certain Evidence

[7] Lopez challenges the admission of evidence that he claims was obtained as a result of a seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, Lopez does not identify the evidence that was erroneously admitted, his objection or lack thereof to the admission, or the place in the record where the evidence was admitted. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(d) (requiring citations to pages of the Transcript where the challenged evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected). Rather, Lopez claims only to “challenge[ ] the admission of evidence from the stop on constitutional grounds.” Appellant's Br. at 5 (citing Miller v. State, 201 N.E.3d 683, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)). We will not search the record to find a basis for a party's argument. Carter ex rel. CNO Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Hilliard, 970 N.E.2d 735, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Nealy v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 910 N.E.2d 842, 845 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied). Because Lopez does not identify the evidence he now challenges on appeal, his noncompliance with our appellate rules substantially impedes our review, and he has waived his claim for our review, see Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Guardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)).

[8] Waiver notwithstanding, even if we assume Lopez's singular objection upon the admission of Exhibit 1 (the Trooper's dash cam video) now challenges all the evidence following the allegedly prolonged stop, he has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in admitting evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. We review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion and will reverse only “when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017) (citing Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997)). “However, when a challenge to such a ruling is predicated on the constitutionality of the search or seizure of evidence, it raises a question of law that we review de novo.” Id. (citing Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 2013)).

[9] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” U.S. Const. amend. IV, and “[t]he basic purpose of this Amendment ․ is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials[,]” Dunem v. State, 254 N.E. 3d 559, 565–66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018)). Lopez claims that law enforcement unreasonably detained him during the traffic stop.

[10] We have recently explained the Fourth Amendment implications for a seizure to issue a warning during a traffic stop:

A seizure “justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834. In other words, the Fourth Amendment does not countenance an indefinite seizure. Instead, the “tolerable duration” of a seizure for a traffic violation is shaped by the stop's “mission”—addressing the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attending to related safety concerns. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). “Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer's mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop,’ ” like checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance. Id. at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. 834) (brackets omitted). Once the “tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed[,]” however, police authority for the seizure ends. Id. at 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609.

Dunem, 254 N.E.3d at 566–67. Once it is determined that law enforcement prolonged the scope of a traffic stop, the State must show that law enforcement had a reasonable suspicion to justify prolonging the detention past the “mission” of the traffic stop. See id. at 567. “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, but it still requires at least a minimal level of objective justification and more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity.” State v. Schlechty, 926 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ind. 2010) (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–24 (2000)). Further, the Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement to “stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot, even if the officer lacks probable cause.” Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ind. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, (1989)). Lopez claims that the scope of the detention exceeded that of a normal traffic stop and that law enforcement lacked the reasonable suspicion to do so.

[11] Here, the record clearly shows that law enforcement did not prolong the detention past the scope of the initial traffic stop. Lopez claims that Trooper Dravigne “conceded” that the traffic stop “shifted to a criminal investigation about five minutes into the stop,” suggesting that Trooper Dravigne “abandon[ed] the investigation into the traffic violation.” Appellant's Br. at 6. Lopez grossly mischaracterizes Trooper Dravigne's testimony. Lopez points to the following testimony from the motion to suppress hearing to further his claim:

Q ․ So, really, at about at least seven (7) minutes, this traffic stop ceased to be about writing a warning ticket and started to be about you investigating possible narcotics, isn't that right?

A Uh, well the warning was not completed.

Q Well, but around that time, around seven (7) minutes, it ceased to be just about a warning ticket. You were calling in a K-9 officer. The K-9 officer wasn't with you, is that right?

A That's, that's, yes, that's right.

Q Okay. So, you were calling one in. So, it, it ceases to be just about a warning ticket at that point, isn't that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And, so, when we are at 10 minutes and 50 seconds (00:10:50) into it, and you're calling the El Paso Intelligence Center, that is not just because you're writing a warning ticket, isn't that right?

A That, that's, that's part of it. The, the warning has not been completed yet ․

Tr. Vol. II at 21–22. The testimony shows that Trooper Dravigne was continuing to complete the traffic warning when he called for the K-9. We conclude that, five minutes into the traffic stop, Trooper Dravigne was still furthering the “mission” of the traffic stop and did not prolong the detention. See Dunem, 254 N.E.3d at 566–67.

[12] Even if law enforcement had prolonged the stop, Trooper Dravigne had reasonable suspicion to do so. Trooper Dravigne “became suspicious right away” when, a few minutes into the stop, Osegueda and Lopez told him that they had accidentally flown to Memphis. Tr. Vol. II at 11. Shortly thereafter, Trooper Dravigne noticed black trash bags in the back of the vehicle, which Osegueda claimed had been used to transport their clothes. Because of “the nonsensical statements [Lopez and Osegueda] had provided about their travels,” Trooper Dravigne “suspected ․ criminal activity was afoot.” Id. at 16. Thus, Trooper Dravigne had reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention. See Armfield, 918 N.E.2d at 319. We conclude that the State did not conduct an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting any search-related evidence at trial. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[13] Affirmed.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Foley concur. Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.