Amos L. Manning, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Amos Manning fired multiple gunshots in a residential neighborhood, wounding two people. Though four eyewitnesses identified Manning as the shooter, he now claims this identification evidence was unreliable and thus insufficient. Manning also contends that his 17-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. Although we reject Manning's sufficiency and sentencing claims, we remand for correction of the trial court's sentencing order and the abstract of judgment, which improperly treat Manning's habitual offender enhancement as a separate sentence.

Facts

[2] In May 2024, Mijanau Eubanks, her sister Rekensha Holley, and Eubanks's daughter were driving to a store when they witnessed a commotion in an alleyway that appeared to be escalating into a fight. The three stopped to observe and were soon joined by two others who had just walked up to the scene: Eubanks's son, Elijah Ashanti, and his fiancée, Daisha Macon. While watching the disturbance, Eubanks noticed two young men who appeared to have guns. She shouted a warning, and gunfire erupted.

[3] A couple minutes after this initial burst of gunfire, Eubanks noticed Manning—whom she recognized from social gatherings and knew by his nickname “Bam”—approaching her group. According to Eubanks and the other witnesses, Manning raised an old black revolver, fired a warning shot in the air, and then aimed directly at the group before firing multiple shots. One bullet struck Holley in the thigh and another grazed Macon's arm.

[4] Responding officers interviewed Eubanks and her daughter at the scene. Eubanks told them that “Bam” was the shooter; she then called a friend to get his full name: Amos Manning. In the middle of this conversation, Eubanks turned and saw Manning walking up the street. She pointed to Manning and said: “That's the man, right there y'all, that shot her. Him, that's the man.” Exh. 60, 4:58-5:04. Officers took Manning into custody, and no weapon was found on his person at that time.

[5] Manning was charged with Level 5 felony criminal recklessness and two counts of Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon.¹ The State also alleged that Manning was a habitual offender based on his prior felony convictions.

[6] At his jury trial, multiple witnesses identified Manning as the shooter. Eubanks testified that she knew Manning because she had been at family functions or social gatherings with him at least five or six times. She further explained: “You can't forget Bam.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 200. Holley, Ashanti, and Macon each independently identified Manning as the person who fired the shots. A jury found Manning guilty on all counts, and he later admitted to the habitual offender enhancement.

[7] At his sentencing, the trial court imposed sentences of four years for criminal recklessness and six years for each battery conviction. The court also imposed a five-year habitual offender enhancement but treated it as a separate sentence rather than attaching it to one of Manning's felony convictions. The court ordered the criminal recklessness sentence to run concurrently with one of the battery sentences but consecutively to both the second battery conviction and the habitual offender enhancement, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 17 years. Manning now appeals his convictions and sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[8] On appeal, Manning first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Second, he alleges that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. Unpersuaded by either argument, we affirm. However, the State points out that the trial court improperly treated Manning's habitual offender enhancement as a separate sentence rather than an enhancement. We remand for correction of this error.

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

[9] When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict, without reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We will affirm the conviction “unless no reasonable trier of fact could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). The evidence need not “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id. at 147 (citation omitted).

[10] Manning claims the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt just one element required by all three of his convictions—that he was the person who committed the acts. In doing so, Manning challenges the reliability of the witness identifications. Considering our standard of review, which instructs us to not reweigh evidence or witness credibility, we disagree.

[11] The testimony presented at trial provides ample evidence to establish Manning's identity as the shooter. Four eyewitnesses—Eubanks, Holley, Ashanti, and Macon—all identified Manning as the person who fired the shots. Eubanks testified that she had personally known Manning for some time and recognized him at the scene immediately. She went on to provide identifications to responding officers directly after the shooting.

[12] Also, the four witnesses’ accounts contained consistent details that further bolstered their reliability. All witnesses described Manning raising a revolver, firing a warning shot, and then pointing the gun at the group before firing the shots that injured Holley and Macon. Multiple witnesses also noted Manning's distinctive old and rusty black revolver and described his camouflage or “army fatigue” shirt. Tr. Vol. III, pp. 7, 35, 51. This identifying detail was corroborated by Manning himself, who admitted he was wearing a camouflage shirt, and by footage from an officer's body-worn camera.

[13] Still, Manning claims that these identifications are unreliable because the witnesses were in a chaotic situation and could not get a clear view of the shooter. Manning also takes issue with the fact that Eubanks identified him to police by his nickname, “Bam,” and only learned his full name after asking a friend. He likens the identification to that of Murphy v. State, 555 N.E.2d 127 (Ind. 1990), citing the dissenting opinion for the proposition that “[i]t is not sufficient to simply link the crime and a name.” Appellant's Br., p. 15.

[14] Aside from the fact that we are not bound by dissenting opinions, see N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Bruner, 129 Ind. App. 271, 275, 153 N.E.2d 616, 618 (1958), Murphy is readily distinguishable. In Murphy, undercover officers testified that they had purchased drugs from someone who introduced himself as “Kenneth Murphy,” but officers could not personally identify the defendant in court because he was tried in absentia. Murphy, 555 N.E.2d at 129. Here, Manning attended his trial and four witnesses personally identified him in court—visually and by name. We see no pertinent similarities in these facts.

[15] Though Eubanks explained that she jumped into a bush after Manning took aim, Holley, Macon, and Ashanti all testified that they watched Manning fire the gun. The jury, as the trier of fact, was fully aware of the chaos of the situation and was entitled to assess the evidence given that potential limitation. We will not second-guess the jury's assessment of witness credibility and will not reweigh the evidence. Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. Accordingly, we find sufficient evidence supports Manning's convictions.

II. Appropriateness of Sentence

[16] Manning next argues that his 17-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) states that an appellate court may revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” We give “substantial deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision, attempting only “to leaven the outliers” rather than “achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence.” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014) (citation omitted). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that his sentence is inappropriate. Reid v. State, 876 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind. 2007).

[17] Regarding the nature of the offenses, “the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014). Manning's three Level 5 felony convictions each carry a sentencing range of 1 to 6 years and an advisory sentence of 3 years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). Thus, his 4-year sentence for criminal recklessness is above the advisory but below the maximum, and his 6-year sentences for each battery count are the maximum. Based on Manning's habitual offender status, the trial court also imposed an enhancement of 5 years, which is within the statutory range of 3 to 6 years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(2). The court minimized Manning's total incarceration time by ordering the criminal recklessness sentence to run concurrently with a battery sentence. We are not persuaded that Manning's 17-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate.

[18] The manner in which Manning committed his offenses was highly dangerous. He fired multiple shots in a populated residential neighborhood and struck two people. His actions created substantial risk not only to his intended targets but to anyone in the vicinity. The deliberate nature of the shooting—first firing a warning shot and then taking aim at the victims—demonstrates a purposeful intent to cause harm. Thus, his offenses were not committed in a manner showing “restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[19] Manning's character, as reflected in his extensive criminal history, also does not suggest that his sentence is inappropriate. See Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.”). Manning's criminal record includes more than 6 felony and over 10 misdemeanor convictions aside from the current offenses. His parole, probation, or suspended sentences were revoked more than 9 times. The trial court observed that Manning's history of failed attempts at rehabilitation was “the worst” the court had seen “in all [its] years.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 134. This demonstrates a continuing disregard for the law and the constraints of supervised release.

[20] Because of the dangerous manner in which he committed his offenses and his lengthy record of both committing serious crimes and squandering opportunities for rehabilitation, Manning has failed to demonstrate that his 17-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate.

III. Habitual Offender Enhancement

[21] Finally, the State correctly observes that the trial court erroneously imposed the habitual offender enhancement as a separate consecutive sentence, treating it as a charged offense rather than an enhancement. In its judgment of conviction and sentencing order, the trial court listed the habitual offender enhancement as “Count V” with a stand-alone sentence of five years.² App. Vol. II, p. 121.

[22] “A habitual offender finding does not constitute a separate crime nor does it result in a separate sentence.” Barnett v. State, 834 N.E.2d 169, 173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “Rather it results in a sentence enhancement imposed upon the conviction of a subsequent felony.” Id. Per the habitual offender statute, the court was required to “attach the habitual offender enhancement to the felony conviction with the highest sentence imposed and specify which felony count is being enhanced.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(j).

[23] We therefore remand with instructions for the trial court to attach the five-year habitual offender enhancement to one of Manning's Level 5 felony convictions for battery, rather than impose it as a separate consecutive sentence. This correction will not alter Manning's 17-year aggregate sentence.

Conclusion

[24] The evidence was sufficient to support Manning's convictions, and his sentence is not inappropriate given the nature of his offenses and his character. We affirm his convictions and 17-year aggregate sentence but remand with instructions to correct the sentencing order and abstract of judgment to show the habitual offender finding as an enhancement to a conviction, rather than a separate offense.

[25] Affirmed in part and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Manning was also charged with unlawful possession of a handgun, but the trial court later dismissed the charge at the State's request.

2.   The abstract of judgment contains the same error. It also incorrectly states that Manning was found guilty of the habitual offender enhancement. Rather, Manning admitted to it.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Brown concur. Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.