Adam Joseph Wakefield, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury found Adam Joseph Wakefield guilty of Level 4 felony dealing in a narcotic drug,¹ and he admitted to being a habitual offender.² On appeal, Wakefield argues that the trial court erred in denying his trial counsel's motion to withdraw and in not allowing him to discharge counsel. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Based on two controlled buys that occurred in August 2023, the State charged Wakefield with Level 4 felony dealing in a narcotic drug and Level 5 felony dealing in a narcotic drug ³ on January 11, 2024. The trial court issued a body attachment warrant, which was served on April 17. The State later alleged that Wakefield was a habitual offender and dismissed the Level 5 felony charge. On June 4, Wakefield requested a public defender, and the trial court appointed one the same day. On July 30, the trial court set a three-day jury trial for December 4.

[3] On November 25, Wakefield, who was incarcerated in the Huntington County Jail, mailed to the trial court a pro se “Motion for In-effective Counsel” in which he requested the appointment of a replacement public defender. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 90. In his motion, Wakefield alleged that counsel had “neglected to do depositions and subpoenas” and was “untruthful to [him] on more than one occasion” and that he had “not received [his] full discovery[.]” Id. Wakefield's motion was file-stamped on December 2. In the meantime, on November 27, defense counsel had filed a motion to withdraw appearance in which she alleged a breakdown in the attorney/client relationship.

[4] The trial court held a hearing on both motions on Monday, December 2. Defense counsel stated that she had a meeting with Wakefield the previous Wednesday that “did not go well” and that, “at the end of the meeting, [she] did not feel as though [they] were in a position to continue moving forward.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 42. Counsel avoided “getting into details and talking about specific conversations” with her client. Id.

[5] Wakefield told the court that he and counsel were “not seeing eye to eye” and were “not on the same page.” Id. at 43. The court told Wakefield, “You don't get to pick what attorney you have as a public defender. [I]f you want to hire your own attorney, you can pick your own attorney, but as a public defender, you do not get to pick. Do you understand that?” Id. at 44. Wakefield replied, “Yeah, I understand that.” Id. Wakefield then mused about the possibility of hiring private counsel, and the court replied, “I don't think you're going to be able to ․ hire an attorney that's going to be ready for trial in two days. I mean, you can't just come in at the last minute and say I don't like my attorney, so I want to continue the trial.” Id. at 45.

[6] Wakefield stated, “I don't even have the full discovery to this day right now.” Id. The court responded, “I want you to tell me specifically what you don't have.” Id. Wakefield stated, “The lab reports. I've asked for a couple people to be subpoenaed and it's not happening.” Id. The court questioned defense counsel and the prosecutor about the reports and told Wakefield, “So you would have received everything that the State submitted with regard to the lab reports, it sounds like. It doesn't sound like there's anything else with regard to the reports themselves, but you think there is?” Id. at 47. Wakefield replied, “I don't know. I'm done with this.” Id. Defense counsel remarked, “So I think [Wakefield] has concerns about trusting me, my truthfulness, and that was an issue we were going through during our meeting last week.” Id. The court stated, “[T]here's not been a good enough reason given to me, other than it sounds like the two of you aren't getting along, to continue a jury trial and take [defense counsel] off the case.” Id. at 48.

[7] The trial began as scheduled on December 4, and Wakefield was represented by his public defender. The jury found him guilty of Level 4 felony dealing, and he admitted to being a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-one years. Wakefield now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Wakefield contends that the trial court erred in denying his counsel's motion to withdraw and in not allowing him to discharge counsel. “Whether to allow counsel to withdraw is within the trial court's discretion, and we will reverse only ‘when denial constitutes a clear abuse of discretion and prejudices the defendant's right to a fair trial.’ ” Bronaugh v. State, 942 N.E.2d 826, 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Strong v. State, 633 N.E.2d 296, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)), trans. denied. “[A] defendant must demonstrate that he was prejudiced before we may reverse because the trial court denied counsel's motion to withdraw.” Id. at 830. The State asserts, and we agree, that “Wakefield has not shown that the denial of the withdrawal had any impact whatsoever on his case[.]” Appellee's Br. at 10.⁴

[9] As for the trial court's denial of his request to discharge counsel, Wakefield mentions the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court's observation that “the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Appellant's Br. at 17 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)). He then suggests that his counsel was ineffective due to the breakdown of their relationship, but he offers no cogent argument in this regard. Accordingly, this argument is waived, Hileman v. State, 224 N.E.3d 321, 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), and the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

[10] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1), (c)(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8(b).

3.   I.C. § 35-48-4-1(a)(1).

4.   Wakefield argues that “fundamental error occurred” when defense counsel failed to renew her motion to withdraw at the start of trial, Appellant's Br. at 16-17, but he cites no authority for the proposition that such a renewal was required. Wakefield also argues that the trial court violated Indiana Code Section 35-36-8-2(b), which provides that a trial court “shall allow counsel for the defendant to withdraw from the case” at any time after the omnibus date “if there is a showing that ․ there is a manifest necessity requiring that counsel withdraw from the case.” This argument is waived because Wakefield failed to raise it below. Hochstetler v. State, 215 N.E.3d 365, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Brown and Weissmann concur. Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.