Rodney Barr and Kelli Barr, Appellants-Defendants v. LLC (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Rodney and Kelli Barr (collectively, the Barrs) appeal the trial court's sanctions against them in favor of Bridgeport Homes, LLC (Bridgeport) on their claims against Bridgeport including breach of contract, slander of title, and conversion. The Barrs maintain that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding testimony of their expert witness and the reports he prepared that purportedly documented Bridgeport's defective construction work, and relieved Bridgeport from having to respond to additional discovery requests. The Barrs assert that the sanctions were unjust and led to an erroneous judgment, thus requiring reversal.

[2] In the alternative—assuming that the judgment stands—the Barrs argue that because the trial court found that Bridgeport committed conversion under Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1, the Crime Victims Recovery Act (CVRA), we must remand this case to the trial court for a calculation of reasonable trial and appellate attorney's fees that Bridgestone must pay with regard to that claim.

[3] Bridgeport cross-appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in excluding from evidence its Notice of Mechanic's Lien (the Lien) against the Barrs and all evidence in support of the Lien. Thus, Bridgeport maintains that this cause must be remanded for the trial court to determine that Bridgeport is entitled to foreclose on the Lien and consider the attorney's fees that should be awarded with respect to the Lien's enforcement.

[4] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History

[5] In October 2018, the Barrs contracted with Bridgeport for the construction of a 3000 square foot addition (the Project) to their Kendallville residence. As construction progressed, the Barrs identified numerous defects relating to Bridgestone's workmanship. Although the Barrs advised Bridgeport of the defects, they were not remedied.

[6] The Barrs paid Bridgeport a total of $177,212.20 for the Project, but Bridgeport demanded an additional $86,987.50. At some point, Bridgeport recorded the Lien in relation to the Project.

[7] On September 30, 2019, the Barrs filed a complaint against Bridgeport alleging breach of contract, conversion, failure to cure construction defects, and slander of title. The Barrs attached an incomplete, unsworn copy of the Lien to their complaint that it identified as Exhibit 1. Although Bridgeport claimed it was entitled to a payment of $86,987.50 for labor and materials that it had supplied to the Barrs, the Barrs asserted that Bridgeport had already been paid for the work it had performed. Thus, the Barrs alleged that the Lien was invalid and that Bridgeport committed slander of title because it “knowingly made a false statement” that they were owed additional funds. Appellants’ Appendix Vol. II at 85. Bridgeport filed a counterclaim seeking foreclosure of the Lien, but it did not attach a copy of the Lien to that pleading. Rather, the counterclaim referenced the incomplete, unsworn copy of the Lien that the Barrs had attached to their complaint.

[8] As for the conversion claim, the Barrs alleged that Bridgeport unlawfully retained items they had purchased including two doors, a window frame, and hardware. They sought treble damages and attorney's fees pursuant to the CVRA for Bridgeport's conversion of that property.

[9] On October 4, 2019, the Barrs filed a list with the trial court detailing twenty-two alleged construction defects on the Project. In that filing, the Barrs also noted that an expert witness—Jermey Bowers—intended to testify at trial about Bridgeport's defective workmanship. Thereafter, on May 1, 2020, the Barrs served their answers to Bridgeport's first set of interrogatories, which included advisements of Bowers's opinions regarding Bridgeport's defective work. The Barrs also provided Bridgeport with Bowers's first inspection report of November 6, 2018, and a letter dated August 28, 2019, regarding the defects. At that time, the Barrs reaffirmed that they intended to call Bowers to testify at trial.

[10] On March 2, 2022, the trial court scheduled a three-day bench trial to commence on August 17, 2022. At some point, Bridgeport sought to depose Rodney. The Barrs failed to cooperate with scheduling that deposition, and Bridgeport filed a motion for sanctions on May 19, 2022. The Barrs subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment that caused the trial court to vacate the trial date.¹ Following a hearing on the motion for sanctions, the trial court issued an order compelling Rodney to appear for the deposition and ordered the Barrs to pay $1,000 in attorney's fees to Bridgeport.

[11] On August 19, 2022, the parties agreed to exchange final witness and exhibit lists on or before November 30, 2022. On November 30, the Barrs provided Bridgeport with a list of three expert witnesses they intended to call to testify at trial. The Barrs listed Bowers as a potential expert witness on the subjects of “engineering, construction, and related matters.” Appellants’ Appendix Vol. IV at 141. Bowers was specifically identified as having knowledge only related to the loadbearing of the Project's garage slab. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order, noting that the parties agreed to extend the deadline for completion of all depositions and responses to discovery to February 15, 2023. The final day, however, for the Barrs to disclose their expert witnesses was to remain November 30, 2022, while the final date for Bridgeport to disclose its expert witnesses and the date for filing all pretrial motions was January 13, 2023.

[12] On January 3, 2023, Bridgeport's counsel wrote the Barrs’ attorney about scheduling depositions for the expert witnesses. That correspondence set forth potential dates for each deposition within the discovery deadline. The Barrs’ counsel responded confirming their experts’ availability. The parties also discussed an informal extension to January 20, 2023, for the court-ordered exchange of the final exhibit and witness lists.

[13] Thereafter, Bridgeport's counsel sent a Notice of Deposition and a Subpoena Duces Tecum to expert witnesses Amos Lengacher, John Police, and Bowers on January 12, scheduling each for a deposition. Bowers's deposition was scheduled for February 1, Lengacher's was scheduled for February 2, and Police's deposition was scheduled for February 3.

[14] On January 18, the parties’ counsel received a letter from Lengacher's attorney, stating that Lengacher would not participate as an expert witness for the Barrs. Bowers's deposition date was unaffected, and Bridgeport's counsel prepared for the February 1 deposition. Pursuant to the Subpoena Duces Tecum, Bowers was to provide the following information to the Barrs no later than January 25:

a. A copy of any and all documents reviewed on the construction;

b. All communications regarding the project and construction;

c. All notes prepared in connection with the project and construction; and

d. All reports prepared in connection with the project and construction.

Appellants’ Appendix Vol. III at 76.

[15] During Bowers's deposition, he provided two groups of documents to Bridgeport that included a structural report on the Project dated November 6, 2018, and an August 28, 2019 letter regarding the concrete garage slab on the property. These were identified as Exhibits 1-5 in the deposition. Exhibits 1-4 related to structural defects in the basement of the existing home on which Bridgeport did not do any work. The August 28, 2019 letter from Bowers to the Barrs related to a concrete slab in the garage area that Bridgeport constructed. Bowers testified that his reports and conclusions were based on statements from Rodney or Police. Bowers admitted that he had no independent verification of the construction, and he had no written reports regarding the garage area. Bowers specifically testified that he had not spoken with the Barrs or their counsel about providing additional opinions. The Barrs did not present any further opinions from Bowers in the January 2023 exhibit exchange.

[16] At a scheduling conference on February 27, the Barrs’ counsel stated for the first time that Bowers might expand on his original opinion and provide further reports about Bridgeport's alleged faulty workmanship. The trial court granted Bridgeport's objection to the admission of any additional evidence, and the trial court scheduled the three-day bench trial to commence on August 30, 2023.

[17] Two days later, the Barrs filed a motion for continuance because Police could not attend the trial in person. Over Bridgeport's objection, the trial court granted the Barrs’ motion and scheduled a telephonic hearing for April 10 to reschedule the trial date. Then, on March 15, the Barrs sent documents to Bridgestone's counsel that included a report from Bowers that raised alleged defects and other issues that were not identified in any of their prior claims or discovery responses. The Barrs also served Bridgeport with a fourth request for production of documents that day. In response, Bridgeport filed a motion for sanctions on March 30, seeking appropriate penalties against the Barrs and attorney's fees.

[18] Following a hearing on May 15, the trial court entered the following order:

The Court ․ FINDS and ORDERS as follows:

1. On February 6, 2023, this Court approved the parties[’] Second Amended Stipulated Pre-Trial Order, which among other deadlines, established the deadline for completion for all discovery, including deadline for depositions, as March 15, 2023. The Pre-Trial Order also established January 13, 2023 as the deadline to exchange a final witness and exhibit list.

2. Bridgeport requests sanctions to be imposed on the Barrs] as a result of [the Barrs] disclosing documents on March 15, 2023, each of which were related to their expert witness, Jermey Bowers. The following documents are at issue:

a. A report from Bowers Engineering Services dated March 15, 2023 by Jermey Bowers;

b. A residence original design provided by Jermey Bowers; and

c. Residence Combined Calculations, which is identified as a structural analysis by Bowers Engineering Services.

3. The Court finds that the disclosure of the aforementioned documents is in violation of this Court's Pre-Trial Order entered on February 6, 2023, for the reason that [the Barrs] failed to timely disclose the documents by ․ January 13, 2023, which was the agreed upon deadline for disclosing all witnesses and exhibits.

4. Bridgeport also objects to the Fourth Request for Production of Documents filed by [the Barrs] on March 15, 2023. This issue was not addressed during the hearing, but the Court concludes that tendering a request for production of documents on the day discovery has closed is a clear violation of the Pre-Trial Order. The whole essence of establishing a discovery deadline is to put a stop to the seemingly endless discovery process.

5. Bridgeport has incurred attorney fees in being forced to litigate their request for sanctions against the Barr[s].

6. This is the second time this Court has heard and ruled on a request for sanctions by Bridgeport against [the Barrs]. The first occasion resulted in this Court ordering Rodney Barr to sit for an in-person deposition within 120 days of the Court's Order and also directing Rodney Barr to reimburse Bridgeport $1000.00 in attorney fees.

7. The court has discretion as it relates to the enforcement of discovery, including the imposition of sanctions, which range from the ‘allowance of expenses to entry of dismissal or judgment by default.’ Foote v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 465 N.E.2d 219 at 220 (Ind. App. 1984). The entry of dismissal or judgment by default is extreme, as noted by the Foote Court. This Court finds the case at bar does not rise to the level necessitating dismissal or entry of judgment by default. However, the discovery violations noted herein require a sanction in order to have this matter move forward in an efficient manner.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUGED (sic) AND DECREED that

1. The documents disclosed on March 15, 2023 are stricken as possible exhibits in the trial of this matter. Moreover, Jermey Bowers is prohibited from testifying concerning the contents of the documents, except as it pertains to facts and/or opinions that were disclosed and/or discovered prior to January 13, 2023.

2. Bridgeport is relieved from answering the Fourth Request for Production of Documents, which was filed by [the Barrs] on March 15, 2023.

3. The Court finds that it is reasonable for [the Barrs] to reimburse Bridgeport the sum of $1500.00 for attorney fees as a result of the discovery violations listed above, which said sum shall be paid directly to the Bridgeport attorneys within thirty (30) days of this entry.

Appellants’ Appendix Vol. II at 29-31 (emphasis added).

[19] During the bench trial that commenced on September 20, 2023, Bowers’ reports that he submitted on March 15, 2023, and any testimony relating thereto, were excluded from the evidence. Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court issued extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law and determined that the Barrs were liable to Bridgeport in the sum of $115,808.49 with post-judgment interest accruing at the statutory rate of 8% per annum. But for two minor defects on the Project that Bridgeport admitted to at trial, the trial court concluded that the Barrs failed to show that Bridgeport had breached the construction contract.

[20] As for Bridgeport's attempt to foreclose on the Lien, the trial court excluded any evidence pertaining to it because “the document was not disclosed during discovery or in the exchange of exhibits” in accordance with the pre-trial orders. Appellants’ Appendix Vol. II at 42. In light of that exclusion, the trial court determined that Bridgeport was not entitled to foreclose on the Lien and was, therefore, precluded from recovering attorney's fees under the Lien.

[21] With regard to the Barrs’ claim for conversion, the trial court found that Bridgeport had unlawfully retained a dome light, hardware, and several doors that the Barrs had purchased. Bridgeport sold those items to a third-party purchaser during the litigation, and the trial court found that Bridgeport's act “underscore[d] the willful and malicious nature of the tort inflicted on the Barrs.” Id. at 68. The trial court determined that the Barrs sustained a total pecuniary loss in the amount of $2,856.63 as a result of Bridgestone's conversion. The trial then noted that the CVRA provides for “treble damages plus costs, including attorney fees if the victim has suffered a pecuniary loss.” Id. at 72. Thus, the trial court awarded the Barrs treble damages in the amount of “8,569.89, $2,356.63 of which is accounted for in the return of amounts paid to Bridgeport, for a total of $6,213.26.” Id.

[22] As for the Barrs’ request for attorney's fees on the conversion claim, the trial court determined:

104. The award of damages above the actual damages, including treble damages or reasonable attorney fees, under [the CVRA] is discretionary with the Court.

105. The Court has concluded that Bridgeport committed Conversion against the Barrs and therefore, the Court has discretion to award treble damages and reasonable attorney fees to the Barrs. The Court elects to award only treble damages for the reason that the amount recovered by the Barrs on the Conversion claim represents a small percentage of the overall litigation in this matter and therefore it would not be reasonable to award the entirety of the attorney fees requested by Barrs, which is $121,902.91. Moreover, it would be impossible to review the Barrs[’] attorney fee request and award attorney fees only related to the items which are found to have been converted by Bridgeport. For that reason, and in consideration of the discretion vested with the Court, the Barrs shall recover no attorney fees.

Id. at 73-74.

[23] The Barrs now appeal and Bridgeport cross appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Exclusion of Bowers's Testimony and Reports

[24] The Barrs argue that the trial court's exclusion of the reports disclosed on March 15, 2023 and Bowers's testimony relating to those reports was an “unjust” sanction and an abuse of discretion. Appellants’ Brief at 21. They contend that there was “no showing or finding of prejudice to Bridgeport” and there was no evidence of “intentional, flagrant, bad faith, reprehensible conduct, or egregious misconduct on the part of the Barrs or their attorneys.” Id. at 22.

[25] Trial courts maintain broad discretion to manage discovery that includes sanctioning parties to enforce discovery rules and orders. See State v. Lyons, 211 N.E.3d 500, 505 (Ind. 2023). A trial court's issuance of sanctions imposed as a penalty for failure to comply with court orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Wiseheart v. State, 491 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ind. 1986). We presume that the trial court will act in accord with what is fair and equitable in each case, and we will only reverse if the trial court's decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law.” Lyons, 211 N.E.3d at 505.

[26] Indiana Trial Rule 37 permits courts to impose sanctions for discovery violations that include orders that prohibit a party “from introducing designated matters in evidence.” T.R. 37(B)(2)(b); see also Fields v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1315, 1319 (Ind. 1997). The “purpose of sanctioning discovery violations is not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.” Whitaker v. Becker, 960 N.E.2d 111, 115 (Ind. 2012). The only limitation on the trial court in determining an appropriate sanction is that the sanction must be just. McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co., 605 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind. 1993).

[27] In this case, the trial court stated in its May 23, 2023 order that the Barrs’ failure to disclose documents in a timely manner and making a request for production of documents on the day that discovery closed was a clear and blatant violation of the pre-trial order. Bridgeport requested dismissal of all the Barrs’ claims in light of the violations, but the trial court imposed lesser penalties. This demonstrated the court's commitment to order just and appropriate sanctions by excluding Bowers's untimely reports and his testimony relating thereto. See, e.g., O'Banion v. Ford Motor Co., 43 N.E.3d 635, 646 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that an appropriate remedy for late disclosures of test results would be the exclusion of testimony that related to testing and theories and not an exclusion of all of the witness's testimony).

[28] In our view, the trial court acted well within its discretion in granting sanctions against the Barrs in light of their attempts to subvert discovery and disregard the trial court's orders. The Barrs had years to request that Bowers conduct further inspections and generate and review reports about the Project. Instead, the Barrs made their request for further inspection only after Bowers's testimony at his deposition proved disappointing. The Barrs’ actions, including the disclosure of additional reports after the discovery deadline had passed, demonstrated their continued disregard for the trial court's orders and rules. Allowing those reports to be admitted at trial after the expired deadline would have reopened discovery and delayed the matter even further. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding from evidence Bowers's subsequent reports and his anticipated testimony relating thereto. In short, the trial court's punitive sanction was reasonable under the circumstances, and we therefore decline to set aside the judgment for Bridgeport on that basis.²

II. Conversion

[29] The Barrs argue that the trial court erred in refusing to order Bridgeport to pay their attorney's fees that were incurred with regard to their conversion claim. Specifically, the Barrs maintain that they are entitled to recover such fees under the CVRA.

[30] The CVRA provides in part that a “person who suffers a pecuniary loss as a result of ․ [conversion] ․ may bring [an] action against the person who caused the loss for ․ an amount not to exceed three ․ times ․ the actual damages ․ the costs of the action[, and] a reasonable attorney's fee. I.C. § 34-24-3-1. This court has held that the trial court does not have discretion whether to award attorney's fees under the CVRA. See, e.g., Browning v. Walters, 616 N.E.2d 1040, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that if a claimant prevails under the treble damages statute and proves actual damages, an award of reasonable attorney's fees is mandatory when attorney's fees have been incurred). The award of attorney's fees, however, is appropriately limited to those fees incurred with respect to the basis underlying the award. Nance v. Miami Sand & Gravel, LLC, 825 N.E.2d 826, 838 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. The party requesting an assessment of attorney's fees bears the burden of proving an appropriate allocation of fees between issues for which attorney's fees may be assessed and those for which they may not. Id. And while a ‘ “perfect breakdown is neither realistic nor expected, a reasonable, good faith effort is anticipated.” ’ Id. (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 684 N.E.2d 504, 525 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), aff'd in relevant part, 705 N.E.2d 962, 981 (Ind.1998)).

[31] Here, the Barrs sought an award of attorney's fees on all claims that they brought against Bridgeport. The trial court rejected the Barrs’ request, denied the recovery of any attorney's fees, and concluded that “the amount the Barrs recovered on the conversion claim represents a small percentage of the overall litigation,” and it would “be impossible to review ․ the [$121,902.91] attorney fee request and award attorney fees only related to the items which are found to have been converted․” Appellants’ Appendix Vol. II at 74. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Barrs are entitled to some amount of attorney's fees and therefore we remand for a hearing to determine the attorney's fees incurred with respect to the conversion claim. On remand, the Barrs must attempt to allocate the attorney's fees to which they are entitled under the CVRA “from those related to or prosecuting or defending other issues” in the case. See Nance, 825 N.E.2d at 838. The trial court is then tasked with awarding reasonable attorney's fees that the Barrs incurred with regard to that claim.

[32] Similarly, the Barrs are entitled to recover reasonable appellate attorney's fees with respect to the conversion claim. See Heartland Resources v. Bedel, 903 N.E.2d 1004, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Thus, on remand, the trial court should also consider evidence of the appellate attorney's fees that the Barrs have expended in prosecuting the conversion claim.

III. Bridgeport's Cross-Appeal

[33] Bridgeport argues that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of the Lien and it therefore should be permitted to foreclose on the Lien. Bridgeport maintains that enforcement of the Lien is proper because “the Barrs’ admission in their answer to ․ Bridgeport's counterclaim constitutes a judicial admission of the filing of the ․ Lien.” Appellee's Brief at 37.

[34] The primary purpose of Indiana's mechanic's lien statute is to protect the contractor, as well as those claiming under the contractor, from the failure of payment and “to promote justice and honesty, and to prevent the inequity of an owner enjoying the fruits of the labor and material furnished by others, without recompense.” Abbey Villas Dev. Corp. v. Site Contrs., 716 N.E.2d 91, 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Moore-Mansfield Constr. Co. v. Indianapolis, N.C. & T.R. Co., 101 N.E. 296, 302 (Ind. 1913)), trans. denied.

[35] A mechanic's lien is a statutory creation. Cho v. Purdue Research Found., 803 N.E.2d 1161, 1169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). And because a mechanic's lien is purely a creature of statute, the burden is on the party asserting the lien to bring itself “clearly within the strictures of the statute.” Id. Consequently, mechanic's liens can only exist when the claimant has complied with the applicable statutory steps. Id.

[36] This court generally follows a strict construction in terms of adherence to the requirements for creating a valid mechanic's lien. Id. A critical requirement for a valid mechanic's lien is that it must be sworn by the lienholder (or verified by the lienholder's attorney). Ind. Code § 32-28-3-3(b). And in accordance with Indiana Trial Rule 9.2(A), “when any pleading allowed under these rules is founded on a written instrument, the original, or a copy thereof, shall be included in or filed with the pleading.”

[37] Here, the Barrs alleged in Count IV of their complaint that Bridgeport slandered title to their property when it recorded the Lien, which they claimed was invalid and contained false statements. The Barrs attached an incomplete and unsworn copy of the Lien to their complaint and identified the same as an exhibit. The exhibit did not include a signature page establishing that the purported lien had been signed, sworn to, or verified.

[38] In its counterclaim, Bridgeport sought to foreclose on the Lien, alleged that it was filed with the Noble County Recorder's Office, and that it was valid. In their reply to the counterclaim, the Barrs admitted that Bridgeport recorded the Lien, but argued that it was invalid because they had paid Bridgeport for all completed work. Bridgeport maintains that the Barrs’ acknowledgement that the Lien was filed constituted a judicial admission of the Lien's validity.

[39] A judicial admission is a voluntary and knowing concession of fact by a party or a party's attorney occurring at any point in a judicial proceeding. Stewart v. Alunday, 53 N.E.3d 562, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2588 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (explaining that a judicial admission is an “express waiver made in court or preparatory to trial by the party or his attorney conceding for the purposes of the trial the truth of some alleged fact”). The party purportedly making the judicial admission must clearly and unequivocally admit a fact peculiarly within that party's knowledge for it to be considered a judicial admission. Stewart, 53 N.E.3d at 568 (citing 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1649).

[40] Ambiguities in statements can prevent them from being considered judicial admissions. See, e.g.,Vigus v. Dinner Theater of Indiana, L.P., 153 N.E.3d 1150, 1158-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that the parties’ lack of clarity and the equivocation of counsel on whether a building code violation existed did not constitute a judicial admission), trans. denied. The Vigus Court observed:

We decline to cherry-pick a particular statement by counsel to the exclusion of other statements. When we consider, as we must, both the content and context of the statements by counsel, as a whole, we conclude that counsel's statements did not amount to a clear and unequivocal statement of fact. Thus, we cannot agree with Vigus's assertion, made during her opening argument at trial, that “there is no dispute there is a building code violation.”

Id. at 1159 (citations omitted).

[41] As in Vigus, we consider the Barrs’ entire reply to Bridgeport's foreclosure claim. While the Barrs acknowledged that Bridgeport filed the Lien, they consistently contested its validity throughout the litigation. Moreover, Bridgeport never presented a valid signed and verified copy of the Lien to the Barrs or to the trial court. At various times during the proceedings, the Barrs requested Bridgeport to “produce any and all documents that [it] intend [sic] to present at trial, or such documents which you might possibly present at trial” in their requests for production of documents. Cross-Appellees’ Appendix Vol. II at 2-10. Bridgeport did not produce the Lien in any of its responses to the Barrs’ requests. Further, Bridgeport failed to identify the Lien as an exhibit in its preliminary and final exhibit lists, a copy of the Lien was not exchanged by the parties, and it was not mentioned by either party as a proposed trial exhibit at the final pretrial conference.

[42] In considering the above, we reject Bridgeport's claim that the Barrs’ alleged “judicial admission ․ of the ․ Lien was unequivocal and should be deemed evidence.” Appellee's/Cross-Appellant's Reply Brief on Cross Appeal at 4. Bridgeport has failed to show that the Barrs’ acknowledgment that the Lien was filed and recorded constituted a judicial admission as to the Lien's validity. Thus, the trial court properly precluded Bridgeport from foreclosing on the Lien.

Conclusion

[43] In light of our discussion above, we conclude that the sanctions the trial court imposed against the Barrs were proper and, therefore, we decline to set aside the judgment entered for Bridgeport. We further conclude that the Barrs are entitled to reasonable trial and appellate attorney's fees as to their conversion claim against Bridgeport. We therefore remand for further hearing as to the attorney's fees the Barrs reasonably incurred in prosecuting that claim and instruct the trial court to include those amounts in the Barrs’ award. Finally, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the Barrs did not judicially admit to the validity of the Lien.

[44] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court ultimately denied Bridgeport's motion for summary judgment.

2.   Other than the exclusion of Bowers's subsequent reports and his testimony relating thereto, the Barrs do not challenge the sufficiency of the judgment entered for Bridgeport with regard to the construction defects.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Brown and Tavitas concur. Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.