PORTER v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Rickey Porter fired shots at Nathaniel Reed and Adolfo Armenta during a disagreement at a stoplight, causing Reed's death and injuring Armenta. Porter appeals his convictions of murder, a felony, and attempted murder, a Level 1 felony. He argues the trial court erred by rejecting his proposed jury instruction on the defense of mistake of fact. Concluding the court did not err, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Adolfo Armenta and Nathaniel Reed were cousins. Armenta knew Rickey Porter and Jacob Neathery from socializing with them on several occasions.

[3] On the afternoon of April 19, 2022, Armenta was riding with Reed in Reed's car in Richmond, Indiana. Reed told Armenta that he saw Porter and Neathery in a car as they drove through an intersection. Neathery was driving, and Porter was in the front passenger seat. Neathery turned to follow Reed. Reed stopped at a stop light, and Neathery stopped at the same light, on the left side of Reed's car.

[4] Reed got out of his car and spoke to Neathery and Porter. Armenta stayed in Reed's car, sitting in the front passenger seat.

[5] Porter was wearing a black mask that covered the top of his head and his neck. The mask could be pulled up to cover the nose and mouth, but at that point Porter's face was fully visible. He pointed a handgun at Reed as Reed spoke to him and Neathery. When Reed turned back to his car and started to get inside, Porter put his gun down, pulled up his mask to cover his mouth and nose, and picked up the gun again. Next, he shot at Reed and Armenta.

[6] Armenta ducked, trying to get down on the floor of the car. He heard thirteen shots in rapid succession and was shot in the upper right portion of his back, resulting in a flesh wound. He looked up and saw Reed fall backwards onto the ground. Neathery and Porter drove off, and Armenta got out of the car to check on his cousin. Several bystanders offered aid to Reed and called 911.

[7] A paramedic arrived and noted that Reed had multiple wounds to the left side of his torso, his left arm, and the back of his neck. Reed was transported to a hospital, where he was pronounced dead. An autopsy revealed one of the bullets struck Reed's left lung and his aorta, and a second bullet struck his kidney, spleen, and liver. Armenta was also taken to the hospital for treatment. Police officers did not find any guns on Reed or Armenta, or in Reed's car.

[8] Meanwhile, Neathery took Porter to Neathery's house, where Porter discarded his handgun and changed his clothes. He left in a different car.

[9] Later that afternoon, Porter went to his mother's house and called his grandfather, Gary Berhalter. He asked Berhalter to help him get out of the state, perhaps to Florida. Berhalter had already heard about Reed being shot. Berhalter arrived at Porter's mother's house, and when he asked Porter what had happened, Porter responded, “that was me.” Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 15-16. Porter also said he had watched Reed's “blood pour out onto the pavement[.]” Id. at 16.

[10] Berhalter said he could not take Porter to Florida just then because his car needed repair. Porter's mother's husband said Porter had to go somewhere because he was “gonna make my house hot.” Id. at 16. Berhalter agreed to take Porter to another person's house for the night. Berhalter left Porter at the other house, with the understanding that he would take Porter to Florida the next day.

[11] The next day, Porter called Berhalter to say he would not be ready to leave at the time they had discussed. After that call, Berhalter had second thoughts and contacted the police. He made arrangements for officers to take Porter into custody later that day, at a time when Berhalter would be driving with Porter in a specific area.

[12] The State charged Porter with murder and attempted murder. The State also filed a firearm sentencing enhancement. At trial, Porter requested and received jury instructions on lesser included offenses and on self-defense. The trial court rejected Porter's request to give an instruction on mistake of fact.

[13] Porter testified in his own defense. He claimed that he shot at Reed and Armenta because: (1) Reed said he had a gun and Porter thought he was reaching for it; and (2) he saw Armenta holding a handgun. A jury determined Porter was guilty of murder and attempted murder, and he pleaded guilty to the firearm sentencing enhancement. The trial court imposed a sentence, and this appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Porter argues the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of mistake of fact. “The manner of instructing the jury lies largely within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we reverse the trial court's decision only for abuse of that discretion.” Huls v. State, 971 N.E.2d 739, 744-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “When evaluating jury instructions on appeal, we look to whether the tendered instructions correctly state the law, whether there is evidence in the record to support giving the instruction, and whether the substance of the proffered instruction is covered by other instructions.” Mathews v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1172, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. “A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defense which has some foundation in the evidence.” Huls, 971 N.E.2d at 746.

[15] The General Assembly has stated, “It is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact, if the mistake negates the culpability required for commission of the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-7 (1977). To establish a mistake-of-fact defense, the defendant must prove the mistake: (1) was honest and reasonable; (2) concerned a matter of fact; and (3) negated the culpability required to commit the crime. Chavers v. State, 991 N.E.2d 148, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), trans. denied.

[16] In Hoskins v. State, 563 N.E.2d 571, 573-74 (Ind. 1990), the defendant was convicted of attempted murder after a fracas in which he shot his ex-girlfriend, her sister, and her mother. At trial, he raised a claim of self-defense, arguing that the three women had attacked him first and that his ex-girlfriend's mother had repeatedly said she had a gun. Hoskins also tendered a jury instruction on mistake of fact, but the trial court rejected it.

[17] On appeal, Hoskins argued the trial court should have instructed the jury on mistake of fact, but the Indiana Supreme Court disagreed. The Court noted that the offense of attempted murder, as charged, required the State to show that Hoskins knowingly shot at the victim. Even if, as Hoskins alleged, he was mistaken about the victim having a gun, that mistake would not negate his required mental culpability because he knowingly shot at the victim in any case. That is, Hoskins’ testimony that he believed one of the women was armed was relevant to his claim of self-defense but did not show that he was unaware of his actions or their consequences when he opened fire. As a result, the trial court did not err in rejecting the jury instruction.

[18] In Porter's case, the State charged him with “knowingly or intentionally” killing Reed and “knowingly or intentionally” attempting to kill Armenta. Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 22. Porter argues he was mistaken about two things: “that Armenta had a gun, and/or that Reed was reaching for a gun.” Appellant's Br. p. 10. But, following the reasoning in Hoskins, we conclude that either mistake, even if honest and reasonable, would not have negated his culpability for the offenses of murder and attempted murder. Porter did not submit any evidence that would have negated his culpability for the charged offenses. Regardless of whether Reed or Armenta were armed, he knowingly or intentionally shot at them and was aware of the possible consequences of his actions. Porter's alleged mistakes are more pertinent to his defense of self-defense, which the jury heard and rejected. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Porter's proposed jury instruction on mistake of fact, because the evidence did not support giving the instruction.

Conclusion

[19] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[20] Affirmed.

Najam, Senior Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.