Jhabriel Munoz, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jhabriel Munoz (“Munoz”) was convicted after a jury trial of murder,¹ a felony, and torturing or mutilating a vertebrate animal ² as a Level 6 felony and was sentenced to an aggregate term of sixty-three years in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”). On appeal, Munoz raises the following restated issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Munoz's objection to the State's use of a peremptory challenge to strike Juror 1 from the jury venire;

II. Whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its opening statement;

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted several exhibits that consisted of video and photographic evidence over Munoz's objections under Indiana Evidence Rule 403;

IV. Whether Munoz's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender.

[2] Finding no errors, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In July 2021, Tiffany Gough (“Gough”) lived in a ground-floor apartment at the Lake Castleton apartment complex in Indianapolis with her two small dogs, Moses and Moira. Her apartment had a front door that opened into a common hallway and a sliding glass door in the living room that opened onto a fenced patio. During the afternoon or early evening of July 10, 2021, Ceniya Jones (“Jones”), who lived in a second-floor apartment in another Lake Castleton building behind Gough's apartment, saw a man sitting on a bench next to the walking path and pond behind her apartment. The man was wearing a black hoodie and black pants and carrying a black backpack. Jason Biles (“Biles”), who lived in the apartment next to Jones, also saw a man walking around the apartment building and then sitting on the bench that evening. Neither Jones nor Biles found the presence of the man unusual as people often walked on the path or sat on the bench.

[4] Later that evening, both Jones and Biles heard a woman screaming for help. From their second-floor balconies, they could see into the living room of Gough's apartment through her sliding glass door. They initially saw what appeared to be an argument between Gough and an African-American man. Jones and Biles then saw the man stabbing Gough and hitting her in the head with a meat cleaver. Jones and Biles could see blood splattered on the walls of Gough's apartment. Jones called 911, and Biles went across the street from Gough's apartment building to try to get help from the fire station and to stop the attacker if he tried to leave. Biles did not see anyone come out of either the front or back of Gough's apartment building during this time. Another neighbor, Augusto Acosta (“Acosta”), also heard screaming and went out the back door of his apartment. Looking into Gough's apartment, he saw Gough and an African-American man and observed the man striking Gough with something shiny. Acosta called 911 and was able to give the dispatcher the address for Gough's apartment building. Acosta only saw two people in the apartment and did not see anyone going in or out of the apartment building during this time.

[5] When the police arrived, Biles directed them to Gough's apartment. Police officers from the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department entered Gough's apartment through both the front door and the sliding glass door in the living room. Inside the apartment, they found Munoz standing in the living room and holding a knife. Officers ordered him to drop the knife, and as they began handcuffing Munoz, the officers found a second knife—a meat cleaver—in his back pocket. Munoz's hands and clothing were covered in blood. As he was being handcuffed, Munoz told the officers, “she attacked me” and that Gough owed him money. Tr. Vol. 5 p. 153.

[6] Officer Xavier Smith (“Officer Smith”) conducted a sweep of the apartment to check for other occupants. Officer Smith entered Gough's bedroom and discovered her lifeless body face down on the floor in the narrow space between the bed and closet. Other officers entered the bedroom and attempted to render aid to Gough. However, Gough had no pulse or signs of life. In their search of the apartment, officers found Gough's dog, Moses, alive but bleeding from stab wounds. An animal control officer transported the dog to an animal hospital, where he was treated for stab wounds and a skull fracture. Gough's other dog, Moira, was not injured.

[7] As part of the investigation, the two knives that had been in Munoz's possession were collected and swabbed for possible DNA. Those swabs were later tested, and swabs from the handle and blade of one knife were found to contain a mixture of two contributors matching Gough's and Munoz's DNA profiles. A swab from the edge of that same knife contained a mixture of three contributors: Gough, Munoz, and a third contributor who could not be identified due to insufficient sample data. Swabs from the handle and the edge of the second knife contained a mixture of Gough's and Munoz's DNA. There was also blood collected from a hair on the blade of the second knife that contained a mixture of Gough's and Munoz's DNA. A blood swab from a clump of dark, curly hair found on the living room floor was tested and found to contain a mixture of Gough's and Munoz's DNA. Samples of blood from a blanket on the couch, the dining room floor, the refrigerator, the coffee table, the front door handle, and the blinds were tested and found to match Gough's DNA.

[8] An autopsy was performed on Gough on July 13, 2021. Thirty-seven sharp force injuries were identified and were located on Gough's scalp, face, jaw, neck, hands, and arms. Ten to fifteen blunt force injuries to her head, chest, and arms were also identified. Gough's skull was visible through some of the cuts to her head, and there were two sharp force injuries to Gough's neck that were believed to be fatal. The cause of death was determined to be “multiple modality traumatic injuries,” including sharp force injuries, blunt force injuries, and “probable strangulation,” with the manner of death being homicide. Tr. Vol. 4 pp. 193–94.

[9] After Munoz was arrested, he was interviewed by detectives at the police station after being read the Miranda warnings and signing a waiver of rights form. Munoz told police he had met Gough about four weeks earlier when he asked her for cigarettes, and “she seemed nice.” State's Ex. 377 at 04:40–04:50. He also said he did not know Gough, except that he had previously given her a $400 gift to help her pay her rent and told her that she would have to repay only $200, but then never asked her for the money. Munoz told police that on the evening of July 10, 2021, he was sitting on a bench near Gough's apartment smoking a cigar when he heard her screaming. Munoz said he went inside the apartment to help her and encountered a man with a gun. He described the man as African-American with an afro with blond tips and dreads at the back of his head, overweight, and wearing all black clothes.

[10] According to Munoz, the man forced Gough to lay on the floor and told Munoz to get on top of her. The man then got on top of Munoz and held a knife to Gough's neck. Munoz claimed he grabbed for the knife and cut his finger, then the man stabbed Gough in the neck and left. Munoz said he removed the knife from Gough's neck and tried to help her and then went to the living room to find her keys to take her to the hospital when police arrived and arrested him.

[11] On July 13, 2021, the State charged Munoz with murder and Level 6 felony torturing or mutilating a vertebrate animal. A jury trial was held on October 11–13, 2023. During voir dire, Munoz raised a Batson challenge to the State's use of peremptory strikes for two prospective jurors, Juror 1 and Juror 4, who were both black. In response to Munoz's objections, the State gave non-race-based reasons for the peremptory strikes, explaining that it wanted to strike Juror 1 because her questionnaire disclosed that her brother had been found guilty of murder, and wanted to strike Juror 4 because his questionnaire stated that his friend had been convicted of robbery, and he had said he “didn't trust the system.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 66. Munoz noted that Juror 4 had also said he could be fair and that the State did not challenge Juror 10, whose brother had been convicted of armed robbery. The State responded:

Judge, we can—I can also address that. With respect to Juror number 1, we also (inaudible) so much of trial work to know how you connect with the jury, what the rapport is. I just—we just didn't like Juror 1's demeanor during voir dire, how she answered the questions, the tone that she used, her facial expressions to both the State's questions and Defense Counsel's questions. When taking into account the content of her questionnaire along with how she acted and what she said during voir dire, we just didn't think she was the right juror for this case.

With respect to Juror number 4, in addition to the things that [the State] has already stated, it's a lot of the same. We felt looking at his answers, how he behaved, we felt that he didn't connect with us the way we wanted in a prospective juror. We felt he had a stronger connection with the Defense, and that's fine. But also, he's—we didn't feel like he was the right juror for this case based again on the content of his answers and his demeanor during voir dire.

Id. at 67. The State also added that Juror 10's father had been murdered, and that the State thought this “balanced it out” for that prospective juror, whereas Juror 4's additional expression of distrust of the system was a deciding factor when the State was deciding on peremptory strikes. Id. at 67–68.

[12] The trial court stated that it had noted Juror 1's demeanor during voir dire and agreed with the State's reasoning for challenging Juror 1 but stated that it did not notice the same demeanor issues with Juror 4. The trial court sustained Munoz's objection to the strike of Juror 4 but overruled his objection to the strike of Juror 1. As a result, Juror 4 served on the jury, but Juror 1 did not.

[13] During opening statements, the State discussed the evidence that a man had broken into Gough's apartment and stabbed her to death and injured her dog and that the police had discovered the man in Gough's apartment covered in blood and with two knives in his possession. The State then said, “So who was that man? Who killed Tiffany Gough? Ladies and gentlemen, you've probably already figured out the man who murdered Tiffany Gough is the Defendant, who sits before you today, Jhabriel Munoz.” Id. at 143. Munoz objected, stating, “I do have a problem with the prosecutor telling the jury that they've probably figured it out.” Id. The trial court overruled Munoz's objection.

[14] Throughout the trial, Munoz objected to the admission of various exhibits, which consisted of photos and videos depicting Gough's body, arguing they were unfairly prejudicial under Indiana Evidence Rule 403. Munoz objected to the last approximately thirty seconds of State's Exhibit 10, which was a body-camera video taken by Officer Austin Gray (“Officer Gray”), one of the responding officers, arguing that he thought that segment of the video was unduly prejudicial. The entire video depicted Officer Gray's response to the 911 call, his entry through the patio door of Gough's apartment simultaneously with other officers entering through the front door, and the arrest of Munoz. The last approximately thirty seconds of the video showed Officer Gray's vantage point as he approached Gough's body and then attempted to determine how seriously she had been injured. During these efforts, one officer indicated that he could not find Gough's pulse or her injury, and another officer examined Gough's head and said that Gough had been “scalped.” State's Ex. 10 at 9:40–10:21. The video then ends with officers concluding that they cannot medically assist Gough due to the extent of her injuries.

[15] The State responded to Munoz's objection and stated that the video of Gough's body was relevant because it showed how Officer Gray found her and checked for any signs of life. The State argued that the statement about Gough being scalped was a present sense impression of how the officer found the victim and was not overly prejudicial because the statement would be supported by other evidence of Gough's wounds, which included autopsy findings that Gough had suffered multiple slicing wounds separating the skin of her head from her skull. The trial court overruled Munoz's objection to the last part of State's Exhibit 10.

[16] Munoz also objected to approximately five seconds of State's Exhibit 20, the body-camera video taken by Officer Smith, for the same reasons, and the trial court overruled this objection as well. Munoz objected to the admission of the last seventy-two seconds of State's Exhibit 29, which was the body-camera video from a third responding officer, depicting the officer's discovery of Gough's body, the attempts to locate a pulse, and the officer's assistance in moving Gough's body to try to render aid. Munoz asserted that the evidence was “more prejudicial than probative at this point” and that it was “cumulative” of State's Exhibits 10 and 20. Tr. Vol. 4 p. 68. The trial court overruled this objection. Munoz also objected to State's Exhibit 34, a still image taken from State's Exhibit 29 under Evidence Rule 403 because it was cumulative. The trial court overruled this objection. Munoz also objected to State's Exhibit 47, a video recording of the crime scene taken by an evidence technician, which walked through the entire crime scene and included video of Gough's body. Munoz objected to “any of the scenes from the ․ video [that] show[ed] [Gough] in position that she was [sic]” because “any probative [value] ․ [wa]s substantially outweighed by [the] prejudicial effect” of showing “her body in the position at the scene.” Id. at 106. The trial court overruled this objection. Lastly, Munoz objected to State's Exhibits 112, 120–32, and 144, which were still photos derived from the video recorded by the evidence technician, based on the probative value being outweighed by the prejudicial effect of “those specific photos [that] deal with the deceased body in this case.” Id. at 110–12. The trial court overruled the objection.

[17] At trial, Munoz testified that on the evening of July 10, 2021, he went to a gas station across the street from Lake Castleton apartments to buy food, then sat on a bench in the apartment complex to eat. He claimed Gough, who he had never met before that day, was on her back patio smoking a cigarette and called him over. Munoz testified that Gough asked to use his phone, which he gave her, and she then went back into her apartment while he returned to the bench. After a few minutes, he stated that he heard Gough screaming for help and went inside her apartment, where he saw “blood all over the walls” and items “thrown everywhere.” Tr. Vol. 5 p. 128. Munoz testified that he went into Gough's bedroom and saw an African-American man wearing a black hoodie and black pants holding Gough “by her hair.” Id. at 129. Munoz said the man pointed a rifle at him, ordered him to the ground, and hit him on the head with the rifle, causing what Munoz believed was a concussion. Munoz testified that the man tried to drag him by the hair, and Munoz struggled with him. Munoz claimed the man then tried to swing at Munoz with a knife, and Munoz grabbed the knife with his hand. Munoz testified that, after the man left the room, he saw a meat cleaver, grabbed it, and went into the bathroom. Munoz said that when he believed the man had left the apartment, he went back to the bedroom and found Gough with a smaller kitchen knife in her neck, and he testified that he pulled the knife out and tried to perform first aid before walking into the living room, where police arrested him.

[18] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Munoz guilty of both counts. The sentencing hearing was held on November 6, 2023. Evidence was presented that Munoz was twenty-five years old at the time he murdered Gough and injured her dog and that he had no previous criminal history. While incarcerated prior to trial, Munoz was found to have engaged in “Disruption of Jail Operations.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 199. Munoz had been in a romantic relationship with a woman before committing the instant criminal offenses, and they had a child together who was approximately two years old at the time of sentencing. Munoz obtained his GED in 2016 or 2017, and he was in the “moderate” risk category to reoffend. Id. at 203. Munoz submitted evidence that, prior to the offenses, his “mental health was beginning to fracture” and that he had unspecified “mental health needs.” Id. at 220. After he was arrested, Munoz was diagnosed with sleep-related hallucinations, unspecified mood disorder, and unspecified anxiety disorder. At the sentencing hearing, Munoz stated that his “heart goes out to the family [of Gough] for their loss because [he] was also victimized” and was wrongfully convicted. Tr. Vol. 6 p. 76. Munoz also noted that he was willing to participate in rehabilitative programs while incarcerated.

[19] In pronouncing its sentence, the trial court considered Munoz's lack of prior criminal convictions to be a mitigating factor and noted that incarceration “may be a hardship” for his daughter. Id. at 81. The trial court acknowledged Munoz's mental-health needs but found that there was nothing suggesting that his claimed mental illnesses were a contributing factor to the crimes or a mitigating factor. The trial court also did not agree that Munoz was unlikely to reoffend, noting that he “found an innocent person ․ trying to enjoy the peace of their own home with her pets and butchered her mercilessly for no reason.” Id. at 82. The trial court found that the manner and circumstances of the crime were “far in excess of that captured or contained within the charges in this matter,” noting that Munoz's “attack on ․ Gough was vicious and torturous” and “caused her to suffer for an extended period of time, beaten, stabbed, thrown all over her home as evidence [sic] by the pictures[.]” Id. at 82–83. The trial court also found that the manner of Munoz's crimes had deeply affected Gough's family and impacted Gough's neighbors who had witnessed the crimes while being “helpless” to stop them. Id.

[20] The trial court sentenced Munoz to sixty-one years in the DOC for his murder conviction and two years in the DOC for his Level 6 felony conviction for torturing or mutilating a vertebrate animal with the sentences to be served consecutively for an aggregate executed sentence of sixty-three years. Munoz now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Jury Selection

[21] Munoz asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in concluding that the State, in seeking to strike Juror 1, was not purposefully discriminating against Juror 1 based on her race. “Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986). The use of a peremptory challenge to strike “even a sole prospective juror” on the basis of race violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Addison v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (Ind. 2012); see also Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1262–63 (Ind. 2008), cert. denied.

[22] In order to determine whether a peremptory challenge has been used improperly to disqualify a potential juror on the basis of race, a three-step test is utilized. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination on the basis of race. Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1208. Evidence that the State struck all or almost all of the potential jurors of one race is enough to meet the defendant's burden at step one. Id. at 1208–09. Second, after the defendant makes a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the State to present a race-neutral explanation for using the challenge. Id. at 1209. “ ‘Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the [States's] explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’ ” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991)). Although the race-neutral reason must be more than a mere denial of improper motive, the reason need not be particularly “persuasive, or even plausible.” Id. In the third step, if a race-neutral explanation is proffered, the trial court must then determine whether the defendant has carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1209. In doing so, the trial court must assess the plausibility of the State's reason in light of all evidence bearing on it. Id. at 1210.

[23] On appellate review, the trial court's decision as to whether a peremptory challenge was discriminatory is given great deference and will be set aside only if found to be clearly erroneous. Cartwright v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (Ind. 2012). “Clear error” is error that which “leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” DeGrado v. DeGrado, 243 N.E.3d 381, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Masters v. Masters, 43 N.E.3d 570, 575 (Ind. 2015)). “The trial court's conclusion that the prosecutor's reasons were not pretextual is essentially a finding of fact that turns substantially on credibility. It is therefore accorded great deference.” Highler v. State, 854 N.E.2d 823, 828 (Ind. 2006).

[24] “[S]electing impartial juries depends upon the parties’ discernment and the trial court's discretion to select a panel of objective and unbiased jurors ‘who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.’ ” Oswalt v. State, 19 N.E.3d 241, 245 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985)). Removing prospective jurors who cannot perform these tasks is the mechanism used to achieve an impartial jury. Id. at 245–46 (citing Emmons v. State, 492 N.E.2d 303, 305 (Ind. 1986)). “Unlike challenges for cause, the peremptory is often exercised on ‘hunches’ and impressions having to do, perhaps, with a prospective juror's habits, associations, or ‘bare looks.’ ” Merritt v. State, 488 N.E.2d 340, 341 (Ind. 1986). These “hunches” are difficult if not impossible to explain to a trial court or opposing counsel—which is why parties are “generally not required to explain [their] reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge, and the exercise is not subject to the trial court's control.” Price v. State, 725 N.E.2d 82, 86 (Ind. 2000).

[25] Munoz argues that the State's use of a peremptory challenge to strike Juror 1 was improper, and the State's proffered race-neutral reason was pretext for impermissible racial discrimination. In this case, the State used its peremptory challenges to strike Juror 1 and Juror 4, the only two African-Americans on the venire panel. As to Juror 1, Munoz objected, noting that Juror 1 was one of only two African-American potential jurors and stating, “we see no reason why Juror ․ 1 should be struck.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 66. This was sufficient to make the prima facie showing of discrimination on the basis of race under step one of the analysis. See Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1208.

[26] The State's initial explanation for striking Juror 1 was that her questionnaire indicated that her brother had been convicted of murder. Munoz pointed out that another non-African-American juror, Juror 10, had stated on his questionnaire that his brother had been convicted of armed robbery but had not been stricken. The State then responded that “so much of trial work [is] how you connect with the jury, what the rapport is.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 67. The State continued by explaining that “we just didn't like Juror 1's demeanor during voir dire, how she answered the questions, the tone that she used, her facial expressions to both the State's questions and Defense Counsel's questions.” Id. Taking into account Juror 1's questionnaire “along with how she acted and what she said during voir dire,” the State stated that it “didn't think she was the right juror for this case.” Id. Looking to the State's explanation, there was no discriminatory intent inherent in the explanation, the State's reasoning was more than just a mere denial of discrimination, and it sufficiently set out why the State believed that Juror 1 would not be a good fit for the jury in this case. Therefore, the State's explanation was race neutral. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768.

[27] After the State proffered its race-neutral explanation for striking Juror 1, the trial court agreed with the State's assessment of Juror 1's demeanor, stating, it observed the same demeanor issues with respect to Juror 1. Then, after discussion about the State's reasoning for striking other jurors, the trial court determined Munoz had not met his burden to prove purposeful discrimination as to Juror 1.

[28] In arguing that the trial court erred in its determination, Munoz contends that the State's reasoning for striking Juror 1, that her brother had been convicted of murder, was undercut by the fact that the State did not strike Juror 10, who was white and whose brother had been convicted of armed robbery. However, the State explained that it was not exclusively relying on Juror 1's questionnaire answer that her family member had been convicted of murder. That is, the State emphasized how important it is for there to be a connection with the jury and to have a good rapport in a jury trial. The State then stated that Juror 1's demeanor during voir dire and how she answered questions, along with her facial expressions, caused the State to think she would not be a good fit to be on the jury for the case. This was not a concern expressed with respect to Juror 10. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court's acceptance of the State's race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strike of Juror 1 was not clearly erroneous.

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct

[29] Munoz argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its opening statement. As our Supreme Court has held:

When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct properly raised in the trial court, we determine “(1) whether misconduct occurred, and if so, (2) ‘whether the misconduct, under all the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected’ otherwise.” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 2006)). “Whether a prosecutor's argument constitutes misconduct is measured by reference to case law and the Rules of Professional Conduct. The gravity of peril is measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury's decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Cooper, 854 N.E.2d at 835).

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1077 (Ind. 2025).

[30] In the present case, Munoz objected after the challenged statement in the State's opening and stated, “I do have a problem with the prosecutor telling the jury that they've probably figured it out.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 143. The trial court then overruled Munoz's objection. Although Munoz did not request an admonishment or move for mistrial, our Supreme Court recently held in Konkle that where a defendant objects to alleged misconduct by the prosecutor and the court overrules the objection, “nothing further is required to preserve the issue for appeal.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1082. Only where “the trial court sustains the objection,” is the defendant required to “request an admonishment of the jury, and if further relief is required, move for a mistrial.” Id. (emphasis in original). Therefore, because, here, Munoz objected to the alleged misconduct, and the trial court overruled the objection, Munoz has preserved the issue for appeal.

[31] Munoz argues that the State's comment during opening statements was prosecutorial misconduct because the comment was a violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. This is because it “grievously undercut[ ] the presumption of innocence” as it told the jury that it could assume Munoz was guilty before any evidence had been presented. Appellant's Br. p. 35. Although Munoz acknowledges that the jury was properly instructed on the principle of the presumption of innocence in Preliminary Instruction 7, he claims that because the instruction was read prior to opening statements, it did not cure the error because the jury could have interpreted the trial court's decision to allow the State's comment as meaning the comment was consistent with the jury instructions.

[32] The State began its opening statement by setting out how the crimes at issue occurred and the evidence that the police encountered when they arrived at Gough's apartment, including that Gough's dog, Moses, had been injured and that Gough had been stabbed to death. The State then informed the jury that it would hear proof that Gough was attacked and killed in her apartment and that the man who had killed Gough was still inside the apartment with the murder weapons in his possession when he was apprehended by the police. The State then said, “So who was that man? Who killed Tiffany Gough? Ladies and gentlemen, you've probably already figured out the man who murdered Tiffany Gough is the Defendant, who sits before you today, Jhabriel Munoz.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 143.

[33] “In arguments to the jury, a prosecutor can state and discuss the evidence and reasonable inferences that can be derived therefrom so long as there is no implication of personal knowledge that is independent of the evidence.” Emerson v. State, 952 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Additionally, “statements of opinion are not prohibited.” Id. Here, the State did not imply any personal knowledge independent of the evidence and did not inform the jury that it could disregard the trial court's instructions on the State's burden of proof or the presumption of innocence. Nor did the State suggest that the jury could convict Munoz based on information or knowledge that was independent of the evidence. Instead, the State's comment suggested to the jury that the State believed Munoz was the man who murdered Gough because he had been discovered in Gough's apartment, arrested by the police, and charged with the crimes at issue. Additionally, the jury was instructed on the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof in Preliminary Instruction 7 and was further instructed that “[s]tatements made by the attorneys are not evidence” in Final Instruction 6. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 148, 177. Therefore, we conclude that the State's comment did not constitute misconduct, and even if it did, it did not place Munoz in a position of grave peril to which he would not have been subjected otherwise. Accordingly, the State's comment was not prosecutorial misconduct.

III. Admission of Evidence

[34] Munoz argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted several pieces of evidence during the trial. The trial court is afforded wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841, 842 (Ind. 2017) (citing Nicholson v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1096, 1099 (Ind. 2012)). On appeal, evidentiary decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion and are reversed only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. at 842–43. “Errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence are considered harmless unless they affect the substantial rights of a party.” Housand v. State, 162 N.E.3d 508, 513 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “To determine whether an error in the admission of evidence affected a party's substantial rights, we assess the probable impact of the evidence on the jury.” Id. We will affirm a ruling on the admissibility of evidence on any reasonable basis apparent in the record regardless of whether it was relied on by the parties or the trial court. Turner v. State, 183 N.E.3d 346, 353 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.

[35] Munoz argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted State's Exhibits 10, 20, 29, 34, 47, and 112, 120 through 132, and 144. These exhibits consisted of body camera footage of three officers, a still photograph taken from one of the videos, a crime scene video by a crime scene technician, and several still photographs derived from the crime scene video. Munoz asserts that the probative value of these exhibits was low and such probative value was outweighed by the unduly prejudicial nature of the exhibits. He contends that the photographs and video evidence repeatedly depicted gruesome scenes in Gough's apartment and of Gough's body, showed her body after it had been moved by the responding officers, and contained a statement that Gough had been “scalped.” Appellant's Br. p. 40.

[36] Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence[,]” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Ind. Evidence Rule 401. “This ‘liberal standard for relevancy’ sets a low bar, and the trial court enjoys ‘wide discretion’ in deciding whether that bar is cleared.” Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 177 (Ind. 2017) (internal citations omitted). Under Indiana Rule of Evidence 403, relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of ․ unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Evid. R. 403. The trial court is afforded wide latitude in weighing probative value against prejudice under Rule 403. Willingham v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1110, 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “Although a photograph may arouse the passions of the jurors, it is admissible unless ‘its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.’ ” Lee v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1169, 1172 (Ind. 2000) (quoting Evid. R. 403). Photographic and video evidence depicting a crime scene or the aftermath of a crime is admissible over a Rule 403 objection if it is relevant and competently aids the jury in understanding the case. Id.

[37] State's Exhibits 10, 20, and 29 were body camera videos from three different officers who were among the first to respond to Gough's apartment. These videos each depicted the individual officer's response and entry into the apartment very close in time to the crime. State's Exhibit 34 was a still photograph taken from Exhibit 20, which showed Gough's body after it had been turned over in an effort to determine the extent of her injuries. The body-camera videos show the officers’ entries through the front door and rear patio door of Gough's apartment, which were the only two points of entry and exit in the apartment and also showed the officers apprehending Munoz, progressing through Gough's apartment to ascertain if anyone other than Munoz was inside, and locating Gough's body. “Generally, photographs that depict a victim's injuries or demonstrate the testimony of a witness are admissible.” Ward v. State, 903 N.E.2d 946, 958 (Ind. 2009), cert. denied. Body camera footage, even if gruesome in nature, has “strong probative value” if it is an interpretative aid for the jury. See Swingley v. State, 739 N.E.2d 132, 133 (Ind. 2000) (citations omitted) (“Photographs, even those gruesome in nature, are admissible if they act as interpretative aids for the jury and have strong probative value.”). Here, the challenged body camera exhibits were admitted to show how each officer discovered Gough's body, and the efforts used to ascertain if there were signs of life and if life-saving endeavors would be fruitful. The body-camera videos also aided the jury in making a determination as to whether Munoz and Gough were the only persons in Gough's apartment when Gough was killed. See Lee, 735 N.E.2d at 1172 (photographs are admissible over a Rule 403 objection if “they are relevant and competent aids to the jury”).

[38] Munoz contends that the body-camera videos and Exhibit 34 were not probative because they showed Gough's body after it had been turned over by police in an effort to determine the extent of her injuries and attempt to render first aid. However, this fact does not make the videos inadmissible under Rule 403. See Byers v. State, 709 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (Ind. 1999) (affirming, over a Rule 403 objection, the admission of a photograph “taken after the medics and the officer turned over” the victim). Additionally, evidence showing the condition of the front of Gough's body was helpful for the jury as they assisted in showing the viciousness of Munoz's attack and were helpful in allowing the jury to see the location of Gough's injuries as they appeared when the police arrived at the scene.

[39] State's Exhibit 47 was a video recording of the crime scene taken by an evidence technician that walked through the entire crime scene and included video of Gough's body. State's Exhibits 112, 120–32 and 144 were still photos taken from the evidence technician's video. The video and the still photographs taken from the video were helpful to the jury in that they documented the crime scene in a deliberate way that the body camera videos did not and documented all evidence from the entrance of the apartment to Gough's body and her injuries. Such depiction of the crime scene and victim's body, which was accompanied by testimony by the crime scene technician explaining the images, was useful to the jury. Further, the exhibits allowed the jury to compare Munoz's version of the events with the physical evidence present at the scene.

[40] Munoz asserts that all of the challenged evidence was unfairly prejudicial because the gruesome nature of the images had the tendency to arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jurors. “Unfair prejudice ․ looks to the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means, or the tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis.” Ingram v. State, 715 N.E.2d 405, 407 (Ind. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, although the exhibits depicted Gough's body and her injuries, they realistically showed the position of Gough's body and her condition when the officers encountered her in the apartment. The exhibits were an accurate reflection of how Gough was found, the extent of her injuries, and the viciousness of the attack. The nature of the crime was brutal and violent, and it should therefore not be surprising that the evidence reflects such. The evidence did not invite the jury to make a decision on an improper basis but instead depicted the severity of Munoz's attack on Gough and its fatal effect on her. The probative value of the exhibits was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the exhibits.

[41] As to Munoz's assertions that the exhibits were inadmissible because they were needlessly cumulative, each of the exhibits reflected different perspectives on the crime scene, including three different officers’ entrances into the apartment and discovery of Gough's body, and depictions of the crime scene from the perspective of a crime scene technician, which focused more deliberately on the evidence after the urgency of the responding officers. The exhibits corroborated the officers’ testimony and combined to present a comprehensive view of the crime scene that assisted the jury in understanding Munoz's role in Gough's death and the extent of her injuries. Each of the exhibits admitted by the trial court served a useful and relevant purpose in proving Munoz's guilt without the risk of causing unfair prejudice or needless repetition of evidence.

[42] Munoz also argues that State's Exhibits 10 and 20 were unduly prejudicial because of a statement made by Officer Gray, where he stated, “he scalped her.” State's Exhibit 10 at 10:00–10:01.³ In State's Exhibit 10, Officer Gray can be heard urgently talking with the other officers about locating Gough's pulse and the extent of her injuries. He then says that he could not find a pulse and then makes the statement, “I don't see ․ any”; and lastly says, “oh shit, it's the top of her head, he scalped her.” Id. at 9:56–10:02. The officers then conclude that rendering aid to Gough is beyond their abilities, and Officer Gray states, “we can't stop that.” Id. at 10:09. Munoz claims the remark about Gough being scalped was unfairly prejudicial because it could only serve to inflame the jury, suggesting a particularly barbaric and cruel injury. However, in making the statement, the officer was describing Gough's severe head injuries, which consisted of several large wounds that cut parts of her scalp away from her skull, to the other officers on the scene. The officer's statement assisted the jury in understanding that Gough's injuries were severe and fatal and why the officers deduced that further aid would not have been beneficial to Gough. Therefore, the portion of the exhibits that included the statement regarding Gough being scalped was not inadmissible under Rule 403.

[43] Further, even if the trial court had erred in admitting any or all of this evidence, any error would be harmless. Errors in the admission of evidence are ordinarily disregarded as harmless unless they affect the substantial rights of a party. Remy v. State, 17 N.E.3d 396, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. 2012)), trans. denied. In determining whether a party's substantial rights have been affected, we consider the evidence's probable impact on the factfinder. Id. “Improper admission of evidence is harmless error ‘if the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction.’ ” Id. (quoting Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1238).

[44] Here, there was testimony from six eyewitness—three neighbors and three responding officers—that established that Munoz was the only other occupant of the apartment with Gough and that Munoz killed her by stabbing her repeatedly. There was also significant DNA evidence that established that Munoz was the one who killed Gough. Munoz's explanation about how the real killer committed the crime, managed to place Munoz's DNA on Gough's body and items at the crime scene, and then somehow escaped from the apartment without anyone seeing him was contradicted by the testimony of the three neighbors regarding their observations and was self-contradictory in that his story of what occurred changed from his interview at the police station to his testimony at trial. Munoz's conviction was supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt, and we conclude that there was no substantial likelihood that the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction. Therefore, any error in admitting the challenged exhibits was harmless.

IV. Inappropriate Sentence

[45] Munoz argues that his sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). The Indiana Constitution authorizes appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing decision. See Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020). “That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019).

[46] Our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) focuses on “the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We generally defer to the trial court's sentencing decision, and our goal is to determine whether the defendant's sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[47] Here, Munoz was convicted of murder and Level 6 felony torturing or mutilating a vertebrate animal. A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five and sixty-five years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). A person who commits a Level 6 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six months and two and one-half years, with the advisory sentence being one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). The trial court sentenced Munoz to sixty-one years for his murder conviction and two years for his Level 6 felony conviction for torturing or mutilating a vertebrate animal and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total executed sentence of sixty-three years in the DOC.

[48] Munoz argues that his sentence should be revised based on his character primarily because the instant crimes were his first criminal convictions and because, at the time of the crimes, he had begun to experience mental health symptoms. Munoz acknowledges the “shocking and tragic” nature of his crimes but contends that his sentence should be reduced due to his good character. Appellant's Br. p. 52.

[49] We begin with the nature of Munoz's offenses, which he acknowledges is “shocking and tragic.” Appellant's Br. p. 52. The evidence in the record revealed that Munoz was observed sitting outside Gough's apartment on a bench in the apartment complex for some time prior to entering the apartment. Once he was inside the apartment, he brutally attacked Gough with a knife and a meat cleaver with the attack moving throughout the rooms of the apartment, which resulted in blood being splattered on the floors, furniture, walls, doors and other surfaces of the apartment. Munoz repeatedly struck Gough, inflicting thirty-seven sharp force injuries on Gough's body, located on Gough's scalp, face, jaw, neck, hands, and arms. Gough's skull was visible through some of the cuts to her head, and there were two sharp force injuries to Gough's neck that were believed to be fatal. She also suffered ten to fifteen blunt force injuries to her head, chest, and arms. Munoz also attacked Moses, Gough's dog, causing stab wounds and a skull fracture. The trial court accurately summarized the nature of the offense when it stated that Munoz “found an innocent person ․ trying to enjoy the peace of their own home with her pets and butchered her mercilessly for no reason.” Tr. Vol. 6 p. 82. This was a brutal attack on Gough, which resulted in her death, and as the trial court noted, “caused [Gough] to suffer for an extended period of time, [by being] beaten, stabbed, [and] thrown all over her home.” Id. at 83. Further, this crime affected more than the victim as the neighbors, who witnessed the crime and heard Gough screaming for help but could not do anything to help other than call 911, were deeply affected by the crime. Munoz's brutal murder was not accompanied by restraint or regard for Gough and weighs heavily against revising his sentence. Neither does the nature of Munoz's callous crime against Gough's dog. The lack of compelling evidence portraying the nature of his offenses in a positive light means Munoz must make an even stronger showing regarding his character to prevail. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127.

[50] When we look to a defendant's character, we engage in “a broad analysis of the defendant's ‘qualities, life, and conduct.’ ” Cramer, 240 N.E.3d 693, 699 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Crabtree v. State, 152 N.E.3d 687, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied). As to Munoz's character, he points to his life prior to the commission of the instant offenses in that he and his two siblings were raised by his mother, and he had no contact with his father until adulthood. There was evidence that Munoz has strong family support, and prior to his arrest, he lived with his girlfriend and their infant daughter. He had obtained his GED and had employment prior to being arrested. He had no history of substance abuse, and the present offenses led to his first arrest. Munoz also points to his experience of mental health symptoms shortly before the commission of the instant offense and the fact that he was diagnosed with several mental health disorders while incarcerated. While we acknowledge that Munoz lacks a criminal history and has very recently been diagnosed with several mental health disorders, the trial court considered these facts when imposing the sixty-one-year sentence for murder and the consecutive two-year sentence for the Level 6 felony, with those sentences above the advisory but below the maximum sentence. Overall, Munoz has not presented compelling evidence of good character needed to justify overriding the trial court's considerable sentencing discretion, particularly in light of the brutal nature of his offenses.

[51] Based on the facts in the record, Munoz has not shown that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

Conclusion

[52] We conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied Munoz's objection to the striking of Juror 1 and that the State did not commit prosecutorial misconduct. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence, and even if error existed, it was harmless. Lastly, we conclude that Munoz's sentence is not inappropriate.

[53] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-46-3-12(c).

3.   Munoz asserts that the statement by Officer Gray can be heard in State's Exhibit 20. However, in listening to the recording, such statement was not readily heard. As Munoz makes the same argument regarding the statement, the same reasoning applies equally to both exhibits.

Foley, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Felix concur. Mathias, J. and Felix, J., concur.