BLAINE v. STATE EX REL CASTETTER (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Darrin W. Blaine (“Blaine”) appeals the trial court's order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of the State of Indiana ex rel. Marie Castetter, the Indiana Securities Commissioner (“the State”) and against Blaine, Allen R. Geiger, Marguerite Kimball-King, Akamai Physics Inc. (“Akamai”), and Porrima Photonix, Inc. (“Porrima”) (collectively “the defendants”). Blaine argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the State's preliminary injunction. The State, however, argues that Blaine's appeal should be dismissed because he did not file a timely notice of appeal pursuant to Appellate Rule 9. Concluding that Blaine forfeited his appeal by failing to file a timely notice of appeal and that there is no extraordinarily compelling reason to restore the forfeited appeal, we dismiss this appeal of the trial court's grant of the preliminary injunction.

[2] We dismiss.

Issue

Whether Blaine's appeal should be dismissed because he failed to timely file his notice of appeal.

Facts

[3] Akamai, a company located in New Mexico, was developing a “laser that could detect chemicals” in such a way that it could detect “what molecules belonged to” drugs, people, and firearms. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 7). Blaine is the Chief Legal Officer of both Akamai and Porrima, which is a subsidiary of Akamai. Akamai filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in December 2020. Blaine, who the State alleged was not registered to sell securities in Indiana, began collecting investments from individuals to help fund the continued development of the laser technology.

[4] In April 2023, the New Mexico Regulation and Licensing Division, after seeing large amounts of money being sent to Akamai or Porrima from Indiana, contacted the State regarding Akamai and Porrima. In the fall of 2023, the State interviewed multiple investors who had, after speaking with Blaine, invested money into the technology. In total, the State alleged that Blaine had collected approximately $680,000 from investors in Indiana.

[5] In October 2023, the State filed a verified complaint for preliminary and permanent injunction against the defendants. The State, in its complaint, alleged that Blaine had sold securities in violation of Indiana Code § 23-19-3-1. Also in its motion, the State moved for an order freezing all accounts associated with the investments and for the appointment of a receiver. After a hearing that same month, the trial court granted the State a temporary restraining order and set a hearing for the preliminary injunction for November 2023.

[6] The trial court held a hearing on the State's motion for preliminary injunction on November 28, 2023. The next day, on November 29, 2023, the trial court issued an order granting the State's motion for a preliminary injunction.

[7] On December 27, 2023, Blaine filed a notice of appeal with the trial court clerk. On January 11, 2024, Blaine submitted, and our Court received, a notice of appeal and a motion for leave to file a belated notice of appeal. In his motion, Blaine noted that he had mistakenly filed his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk. Blaine also noted that “due to the end of the year and the holidays,” he had not noticed his mistake until January 9, 2024. (Motion for Leave to File Belated Appeal 2). In response, the State filed an objection to Blaine's motion for belated appeal. In February 2024, our Court's motions panel granted Blaine's motion for leave to file a belated notice of appeal.

Decision

[8] We will address the State's dispositive argument that we should reconsider our motions panel's decision and dismiss this appeal because Blaine failed to file a timely notice of appeal. We recognize that the motions panel granted Blaine's motion for leave to file a belated notice of appeal. But, “[i]t is well established that we may reconsider a ruling by the motions panel.” Core v. State, 122 N.E.3d 974, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). While we are generally “reluctant” to exercise our “inherent authority” to reconsider a motions panel decision, see id., we choose to do so given the guidance set forth by our Indiana Supreme Court's opinion Cooper's Hawk Indianapolis, LLC v. Ray, 162 N.E.3d 1097, 1098 (Ind. 2021).

[9] Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A)(5) provides that an appeal of a grant of a preliminary injunction is an interlocutory appeal of right. That same rule further provides that “[a]ppeals from the following interlocutory orders are taken as a matter of right by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk within thirty (30) days after the notation of the interlocutory order in the Chronological Case Summary[.]” Ind. Appellate Rule 14(A). A party who does not file a notice of appeal with the appellate clerk within thirty days after a trial court entered an order granting a preliminary injunction forfeits the right to appeal. Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(5) (providing that “[u]nless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited except as provided by P.C.R. 2”). “To reinstate a forfeited appeal, an appellant must show that there are extraordinarily compelling reasons why this forfeited right should be restored.” Cooper's Hawk, 162 N.E.3d at 1098 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

[10] Indiana courts have recognized several instances where a party has demonstrated the required extraordinarily compelling reasons required to reinstate a forfeited appeal. For example, in In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 972 (Ind. 2014), our supreme court held that the “constitutional dimensions of the parent-child relationship” constituted one such extraordinarily compelling reason. Additionally, we have reinstated a forfeited appeal in the context of bail. See Satterfield v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1271, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (restoring a forfeited appeal and recognizing that the right to bail is “a traditional and cherished right”). Further, our court has reinstated a forfeited appeal upon finding that a trial court's order that was in violation of the Indiana Child Support Guidelines was “manifestly unjust” and constituted an extraordinarily compelling reason. See Cannon v. Caldwell, 74 N.E.3d 255, 259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). On the other hand, our supreme court, in Cooper's Hawk, dismissed a belated interlocutory appeal of a trial court's order denying summary judgment when the party provided no extraordinarily compelling reasons to restore the forfeited appeal. See Cooper's Hawk, 162 N.E.3d at 1098. In that case, the appellant acknowledged that its notice of appeal was untimely, but it argued that its appeal should not be dismissed because “the legal issue on appeal involve[d] a substantial question of law, the early determination of which would promote a more orderly disposition of the case.” Id. The Indiana Supreme Court held that “much more” was needed to overcome the forfeiture of the appellant's appeal and dismissed the appeal because it found no extraordinarily compelling reasons to restore the forfeited appeal. Id.

[11] Here, our review of the record reveals that the trial court issued an order granting a preliminary injunction against the defendants on November 29, 2023. Thus, Blaine's notice of appeal was required to be filed by December 29, 2023 to comply with our appellate rules. Blaine mistakenly filed his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk on December 27, 2023. He did not realize his error until January 9, 2024. Blaine then filed with our Court a belated notice of appeal and motion for leave to file a belated notice of appeal on January 11, 2024. Blaine, in his motion for leave to file a belated notice of appeal, stated that he had not noticed his error due to the end of the year and the holidays.

[12] As our Supreme Court held in Cooper's Hawk, we too hold that this case does not present the extraordinarily compelling reasons required to reinstate a forfeited appeal. Firstly, there are no issues affecting constitutional rights or liberty interests exemplified by cases involving the parent-child relationship or bail. Additionally, we did not find on review, nor did Blaine allege, any errors in the trial court's order that made it manifestly unjust. Further, Blaine's interlocutory appeal here is from the trial court's order granting a preliminary injunction, and he will still have the right to appeal the final judgment at the conclusion of his case. As a result, Blaine has forfeited his interlocutory appeal and there are no extraordinarily compelling reasons to reinstate it. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal. See Cooper's Hawk, 162 N.E.3d at 1098 (dismissing a belated interlocutory appeal of a trial court's order denying summary judgment when the party provided no extraordinarily compelling reasons to restore the forfeited appeal). See also Syndicate Claim Serv., Inc. v. Trimmel, 178 N.E.3d 1273, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (dismissing a belated interlocutory appeal of a trial court's summary judgment order because there was no extraordinarily compelling reason to restore the forfeited appeal), reh'g denied.

Dismissed.

[1] We concur. We write separately to add that although we were members of the February 2024 motions panel that initially granted Blaine's motion for leave to file a belated notice of appeal, that decision was made without the benefit of full briefing. Now that this issue has been more thoroughly vetted, we agree with Judge Pyle's thorough analysis.

[2] Our Supreme Court set a high bar for reinstating forfeited appeals in Cooper's Hawk Indianapolis, LLC v. Ray, 162 N.E.3d 1097 (Ind. 2021). Upon further consideration and with the complete record before us, we agree that Blaine has not demonstrated the “extraordinarily compelling reasons” necessary to restore his forfeited right to an interlocutory appeal. Id. at 1098

[3] For these reasons, we concur with the majority's decision to dismiss this appeal.

Pyle, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Felix, J., concur with separate opinion.