BROWN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In February of 2020, Asha Bennett lived in Muncie with the two children she shared with Peter Brown (“the Children”). On the morning of February 27, Bennett, who was staying with the Children at Brown's home because all three were ill, was speaking on the telephone with a friend. When Brown made a disparaging comment about the friend, Bennett rudely told him to be quiet, which prompted him to take Bennett's telephone and throw it, punch her multiple times in the face, and strangle her to unconsciousness. Bennett suffered a broken nose and a concussion.

[2] After the State filed a number of criminal charges against Brown, he sought to present, inter alia, two witnesses who were expected to testify that they had witnessed violent behavior from Bennett toward Brown. Ultimately, the trial court did not allow Brown to present this testimony, and a jury found him guilty of multiple offenses. Brown contends that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the two witnesses. Because any error the trial court might have made in excluding the witnesses can only be considered harmless, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On February 25, 2020, Bennett was living in Muncie with the Children, who were born in March of 2017 and June of 2018. Both Children were sick with influenza, and Bennett dropped them off at Brown's home so that she could pick up their medicine. Bennett returned to Brown's home and gave the Children their medicine, but left because she felt ill and was later diagnosed with influenza as well. Bennett returned the next morning to find the Children “really sick” and decided to stay the night with them at Brown's. Tr. Vol. II p. 79.

[4] The next morning, Bennett was speaking on the telephone with a friend and Brown “started saying stuff like, ‘You know [Bennett] said you had sex for a Range Rover,’ and just all kinds of stuff[,]” which was a comment directed toward the friend. Tr. Vol. II p. 81. Bennett turned to Brown and said, “[b****], shut the f[***] up[,]” at which point Brown “grabbed” and threw her telephone, “slammed” her to the floor, pinned her down, and began punching her in the face with closed fists. Tr. Vol. II p. 81. Brown “grabbed” Bennett's neck with his right hand, punched her in the face at least twenty times, and eventually “just cho[ ]ked [her] completely out.” Tr. Vol. II p. 81. When Bennett regained consciousness, her nose “was just bleeding everywhere” and she noticed that she had urinated on herself. Tr. Vol. II p. 84. This occurred in the presence of the Children.

[5] A responding police officer observed that Bennett was “out of it” and “shocked” with noticeable swelling and redness on the right side of her face and a developing black eye. Tr. Vol. II p. 103. A responding EMT later described Bennett's appearance as alert and oriented with swelling and discoloration on the right side of her face and her nose and bruising under both eyes. Brown appeared to have a small scratch or abrasion on his forehead. When Bennett was examined at a hospital, it was determined that she had suffered a broken nose and a concussion. An examining nurse also noticed signs of strangulation, specifically bruising on Bennett's neck and petechiae at various places on her face and neck.

[6] On January 16, 2024, the State charged Brown with Level 3 felony aggravated battery, Level 5 felony domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury, Level 6 felony strangulation, Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent, Level 6 felony domestic battery, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. Brown filed pretrial notices indicating his intent to present evidence about Bennett's criminal record and of other bad acts pursuant to Evidence Rule 404(b). Brown ultimately indicated that he wished to present evidence of a previous prosecution of Bennett and testimony regarding an incident between Brown and Bennett that had occurred on February 14, 2018.

[7] On October 9, 2024, the court conducted a hearing on various matters, including the Rule 404(b) notice. Brown indicated that he still intended to present witnesses that he alleged were relevant to his self-defense claim. The trial court indicated that it would allow evidence about Bennett's prior prosecution, which was a domestic battery case for which Bennett had been on pre-trial diversion at the time of this offense, as relevant to Bennett's motive. As to the other witnesses, Brown indicated that he would call them outside the presence of the jury so that the trial court could determine admissibility at that time. During trial, the State noted that the pretrial diversion was for a charge of domestic battery alleged to have been committed against Brown, which had stemmed from the February of 2018 incident.

[8] On October 21 and 22, 2024, Brown's jury trial was held. After the State had closed its case-in-chief, Brown notified the trial court that he intended to call Erin Young and Rhonda Kirkpatrick to testify about Bennett's violent nature to show that she had been the initial aggressor and to show his fear of her. The State's position was that there had to be evidence of aggressive behavior by the victim before such evidence could be admitted. The State also argued that the incident Brown wanted to talk about had occurred two years prior to the incident at issue in this case and was thus not relevant. The trial court ruled that the evidence would not be admitted unless Brown first presented appreciable evidence of Bennett's aggression and stated that, because the 2018 incident was remote in time, Brown would have to demonstrate a higher degree of relevance of that incident.

[9] Brown testified that, on the morning of February 27, 2020, Bennett had argued with a friend on the telephone and he had asked her to go outside or calm down so that she would not upset the Children. After Bennett had refused to do so, Brown had tried to “grab” Bennett's telephone from her, at which point Bennett had jumped on him, wrapped her legs around his waist, grabbed his sweatshirt, and struck him on the back of the head with her telephone. Tr. Vol. II p. 188. When Brown had put his arm between them to separate them, he had lost his balance and fallen, causing both of them to strike their heads on a stove. According to Brown, as Bennett had continued to “kick and flail” at him, he had restrained her until she had stopped. Tr. Vol. II p. 188. Brown denied having initiated the attack, having strangled Bennett, and that she had lost consciousness. Brown testified to his belief that Bennett's injuries had been caused by her falling on the stove.

[10] After Brown's testimony, he made an offer of proof, in which he stated that Young would testify regarding four occasions prior to February 27, 2020, on which she had seen Bennett “attack or commit violence” on Brown. Tr. Vol. II p. 200. As to Kirkpatrick, Brown's offer indicated that she would testify that in October, November, and December of 2019, she had seen Bennett “commit violence” on Brown. Tr. Vol. II p. 200. The trial court excluded the evidence.

[11] The jury found Brown guilty of Level 5 felony domestic battery, Level 6 felony strangulation, Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent, Level 6 felony domestic battery, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. On November 20, 2024, the trial court sentenced Brown to an aggregate sentence of seven-and-one-half years of incarceration.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Decisions concerning admission of evidence at trial are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Higgason v. State, 210 N.E.3d 868, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citations omitted), trans. denied. Those decisions are only reversed when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. “Conflicting evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.” O'Keefe v. State, 139 N.E.3d 263, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We may affirm a trial court's judgment on any theory supported by the evidence. State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180, 1186 (Ind. 2014).

[13] Pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 401, “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Evidence Rule 403, however, provides that relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Brown contends that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Young's and Kirkpatrick's testimony regarding prior incidents of domestic violence between him and Bennett, arguing that it was relevant to show Bennett's violent nature and his fear of her. The State counters that (1) the evidence was inadmissible because it concerned events too remote in time to be relevant; (2) even if relevant, the evidence was inadmissible pursuant to Rule 403; (3) Brown failed to make an adequate offer of proof regarding this testimony; and (4) any error the trial court might have made in its exclusion can only be considered harmless. Because we agree that any error in excluding Brown's proffered evidence was, at most, harmless, we need not address his admissibility arguments on their merits.

[14] An error is disregarded as harmless unless it affects the substantial rights of a party. Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 491 (Ind. 2023); Indiana Appellate Rule 66(A). An error in the admission of evidence is harmless where a conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt that there is no substantial likelihood that the erroneous evidentiary ruling contributed to the conviction. Montgomery v. State, 250 N.E.3d 478, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. This is determined by a comparative look at the evidence as presented and what, perhaps, should have been presented, analyzing “the likely impact of the improperly admitted or excluded evidence on a reasonable, average jury” and whether that “impact undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding below.” Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492.

[15] Suffice it to say that the evidence indicating that Brown had not acted in self-defense is overwhelming. Bennett testified that Brown had repeatedly punched her in the face and strangled her to the point of unconsciousness, testimony that was extensively corroborated by other evidence. Specifically, the responding officer, an EMT, and a forensic nurse testified to Bennett's multiple facial injuries, including black eyes, bruising around her nose, and a very swollen jaw, and it is undisputed that Bennett had suffered a broken nose and a concussion. The forensic nurse also testified to a specific pattern of bruising on Bennett's neck and petechiae on her face and head, both of which were consistent with having been strangled by hand. Bennett's report of other symptoms such as having urinated on herself, having been unable to speak, and having suffered impaired hearing and short-term memory loss were corroborated by other witnesses as being consistent with having been strangled to the point of unconsciousness. This abundant corroborating evidence simultaneously largely undercuts Brown's testimony that he had not strangled Bennett and that she had never lost consciousness.

[16] Moreover, Brown admitted to having been the initial aggressor when he attempted to grab the phone that was in Bennett's hand. The jury was entitled to interpret this as provoking, instigating, or participating willingly in the violence,¹ which would have fatally undercut Brown's assertion of self-defense. See, e.g., Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021) (in context of sufficiency claim, the Indiana Supreme Court noting that jury could have found the defendant to have been the initial aggressor by escalating the situation with “inflammatory remarks” or by grabbing a handgun from a safe); K.D. v. State, 754 N.E.2d 36, 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that touching an item that was intimately connected with a person can constitute battery). In light of Bennett's testimony, the abundance of corroborating evidence, and Brown's admission to having been the first aggressor, the trial court's exclusion of evidence that Bennett had engaged in some unspecified act of battery against Brown in the past (even if in error) does not undermine our confidence in the jury's verdict. See Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492.

[17] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The jury was instructed that, in order to find that Brown had acted in self-defense, it must find, among other things, that he “did not provoke, instigate or participate willingly in the violence[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 216.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.